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Gustavo A. García-López 
Scaling up from the top down and the bottom up: The impacts and governance of inter-
community forestry associations in Durango, Mexico 
 Mexico’s community forestry experiment has become famous as a global model for 
sustainable forest use and socioeconomic development. However, many Mexican forest 
communities are facing significant challenges such as weak organization and limited access 
to markets. Scholars and practitioners have argued that connections across different levels 
of governance between local communities, inter-community networks, and other 
governmental and non-governmental stakeholders may help deal with these situations. Yet 
there are still gaps in our understanding of why these cross-scale arrangements form, their 
internal governance, their benefits, and the factors that make them successful.  
This dissertation addresses these gaps by analyzing the economic, political and 
forest impacts that inter-community forest associations (FAs) –a type of cross-scale 
governance arrangement– have on forest communities; and the factors that influence FAs’ 
effectiveness. Drawing on collective action and political economy theories applied to 
common-pool resources, I engaged in a year-long comparative case study of four FAs in 
the Mexican state of Durango –two organized by communities themselves (bottom-up) and 
two created by non-community actors (top-down).  
The results show that FAs often form from in response to community needs, but 
also as adaptation strategies and responses to national policies and the political-economic 
context. Throughout their histories, FAs have played a crucial role in helping communities 
solve regional problems such as improving road infrastructure, preventing and combating 
forest fires, and improving market access and political representation. The results also 
underscore FAs’ capture by peasant leaders and foresters using the organizations for profit 
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and for escalating into higher political positions. Finally, I show that leadership, financial 
autonomy, social capital and enforcement of institutions are crucial for the success of these 
associations. 
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CHAPTER 1 
UNDERSTANDING CROSS-SCALE GOVERNANCE AND IMPACTS IN 
COMMUNITY FORESTRY: AN INRODUCTION 
 
1.1. Forest governance: From global to local in Mexico 
Global forest resources are essential for ecological reasons (biodiversity, climate 
regulation, water purification, etc.) as well as social ones (rural livelihoods), yet deforestation 
continues at high rates around the world (Chomitz et al., 2007). Original approaches to deal with 
the problem sought to protect the forests from humans through the so-called fortress 
conservation approach. Since the 1980s, this approach began to be challenged and supplanted by 
a more human-oriented approach that sought to integrate forest inhabitants into conservation, and 
increasingly, to give them the right to use the forest resources for their own benefit. Thus, 
community-based resource management (CBNRM) has come to be recognized as a potential 
strategy for development and environmental conservation, and devolving land to communities 
has become a policy trend (Gibson et al., 2000; Padgee et al., 2006; Sunderlin et al., 2008). At 
the same time, the limitations of CBNRM in an interconnected world have led many to call for 
more attention to factors external to the communities.  
Mexico is one of the five most bio-diverse countries in the world (Barsimantov, 2010). 
Almost 33% of its territory is covered by temperate and tropical forests, of which approximately 
70% is estimated to be under community ownership, the second highest percentage in the world 
(Antinori and Bray, 2005; Antinori and Rausser, 2010; Bray, 2010).1 This is in stark contrast to 
                                                           
1
 There are two types of community ownership, ejidos and comunidades. Ejidos are agrarian communities in which 
lands which were granted by the government to landless peasants, while comunidades had lands recognized because 
of historical settlement. Ejidos are the predominant type, representing 92% of all such property in Mexico (Merino 
and Martínez, 2011). I follow Antinori and Bray (2005) in referring to both ownership categories as communities.  
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countries like the United States (where the majority of forests are private property) or India 
(where all forests are public lands). About 2,400 Mexican forest communities currently extract 
timber under government-approved forest management plans (Antinori and Rausser, 2010; Bray, 
2010).2 Of these, about 700 have formed community forestry enterprises (CFEs) (ibid).3 In 
addition, there are hundreds of communities with conservation areas created and managed by 
themselves.4 This property rights regime was an outcome of the Mexican Revolution of 1910 and 
the subsequent land redistribution programs embodied in Article 27 of the 1917 Constitution, 
which over a period of 60 years distributed land in common property to groups of landless 
peasants or indigenous communities. Today, an estimated 12 to 13 million people live in these 
forest communities; most of them are poor and depend on forests for their livelihoods (Merino 
and Martínez, 2011). Given that vast natural resources and populations that are at stake, the 
continued viability of these communities is all-important.  
A substantial body of literature has highlighted the successes of the Mexican community 
forestry experiment (e.g. Bray et al., 2005; Bray et al., 2008; Bray, 2010; Antinori and Rausser, 
2010; Merino and Martínez, 2011; Tucker, 2004). Research has shown that forests under active 
community management (i.e. timber extraction and/or conservation) have very low levels of 
deforestation, especially when compared to government-run protected areas; protect biodiversity; 
and contribute to poverty reduction, social capital, and conflict management (Barsimantov and 
Navia, 2012; Bray et al., 2008; Durán et al., 2011).  
                                                           
2
 CONAFOR estimates that there are between 6,000 and 6,500 total forest communities, and that 1,200 (half of the 
Antinori and Rausser and Bray estimate) currently have forest management (timber extraction). 
3
 This number is somewhat disputed in the literature. While Bray  (2010) counts as CFEs all forst communities with 
timber extraction, Merino (2011) proposes a narrower definition which excludes communities under rentismo (type 
II), i.e. which rent out their land to companies which organize the extraction and sale. 
4
 A recent sample in the main five forest states found 44% of communities had established such areas (Merino and 
Martinez, 2011). 
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In spite of the many successes of this experiment, there are many practical challenges and 
empirical puzzles. According to recent surveys, only about 25% to 30% of all forest communities 
currently have logging permits (Antinori and Rausser, 2010; Merino and Martínez, 2011). Many 
of those which have permits –about 61% in the Merino and Martinez (2011) study– still operate 
under the system of rentismo,5 under which communities rent out their land to private companies 
which then organize the extraction and sale, often without any participation from the 
communities (Merino, 2004: 49). In addition, those with community forestry enterprises face 
substantial challenges related to weak organization, insufficient management skills, limited 
access to markets and credit, and policy obstacles (Merino and Martínez, 2011).  
At the same time, deforestation and forest degradation have been a continuing concern. 
Deforestation was estimated at an average of 1.7% between 1993 and 2000, one of the highest 
rates in the world, resulting in a loss of about 770,000 ha (Barsimantov, 2010), although in the 
following decade it decreased by approximately 50% (El Siglo de Duango, 10-04-2010). Illegal 
logging is also substantial. In 2007, the chief of the Mexican forestry enforcement agency or 
‘environmental police’ (PROFEPA) estimated that 40% of national timber production –about 3.5 
million m3 of timber per year– was from illegal sources (Reforma, 06-24-2007). The expansion 
of agriculture and grazing activities, forest fires, and illegal logging are identified as the three 
main proximate causes of deforestation –although some the main underlying causes have been 
institutions such as laws, policies and programs (Bray et al., 2004; Merino, 2004; 2012; Roy 
Chowdhury, 2006). These problems are combined with decreasing productivity and 
competitiveness of the sector and the increasing importation of cheaper wood from countries like 
Chile (Merino et al., 2008; Merino, 2011).  
                                                           
5
 Also called type II communities in oficial jargon. These represented 20% of the entire sample, which includes the 
communities which have potential to harvest timber but do not (so-called type I communities). 
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In practical terms, addressing these challenges is critical because they threaten vast forest 
areas and the livelihoods of millions of rural households. Conceptually, they present a paradox: a 
well-developed and presumably sustainable community forestry experiment coupled with high 
national levels of deforestation (CCMSS and RR, 2010; Barsimantov, 2010). As some authors 
have recently noted, this implies that there are supra-community factors that may have strong 
effects on community forestry (Antinori and García-López, 2008; Barsimantov, 2010; 
Barsimantov and Navia, 2012; Wilshusen, 2010). Within this emerging scholarship, we can 
identify three crucial elements. One is external actors, particularly foresters and NGOs. These 
have been shown to play a key supporting role in the economic and ecological success of 
Mexican forest communities (Antinori and Rausser, 2008; Barsimantov, 2010), and others in 
countries like Brazil and Guatemala (Cronkleton et al., 2008). However, this effect is not always 
positive, and is mediated by the regionally-contingent historical relationships with communities 
(Barsimantov, 2010; Klooster, 2002; Mathews, 2006; for the case of Nepal, see Thoms, 2008). 
The second is the political-economic context, including national policies such as logging bans 
(e.g. Klooster, 2000), governance reforms (e.g. Wilshusen, 2005; Taylor and Zabin, 2000), or 
agricultural support programs (e.g. Roy Chowdhury, 2006), sometimes combined with economic 
pressures such as the avocado expansion in Michoacán (Barsimantov and Navia Antezana, 
2012).  
The third factor is the role of cross-scale/multi-level governance arrangements such as 
inter-community forest associations (FAs), a form of regional collective action where multiple 
communities form an organization to address multiple aspects of community forestry (Antinori 
and García-López, 2008; Bray et al., 2012; Durán et al., 2011; Merino et al., 2008). While 
working in 2007 as field researcher for the National Survey of Community Forests in Mexico 
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project (see Antinori and Rausser, 2010), I found that a large number of FAs operated in the 
study sites of Durango and Michoacán, and that these organizations seemed to indeed play a key 
role in community forestry.  Yet considerable uncertainties remain about FAs’ inner workings, 
their potential impacts, and the internal and external factors influencing their effectiveness. Some 
authors have concluded that inter-community governance is extremely difficult and that is has 
usually failed in Mexico (Bofill-Poch, 2005; Bray and Merino, 2004). Most studies to date have 
been of a single case or comparisons of a few cases (with the few exceptions of Antinori and 
García-López, 2008; Antinori and Rausser, 2010; Merino et al., 2008). In the case of Antinori 
and Rausser (2010), the study’s focus was not FAs, and the questions asked about FAs were 
directed at identifying the different services that these associations provide and to lesser extent 
the internal operating rules. Thus, it does not give us much insight into how issues of internal 
governance and effectiveness interact. As for the Merino et al. (2008) study, it included only one 
FA in Durango, and consequently it was not able to capture many of the complexities and 
conflicts in the state, even while it hinted at some of them. Finally, given the problems 
encountered in other associations across the country, their conclusion about the positive 
performance of associations in Durango demands further analysis.  
In this dissertation, I attempt to address some of the major unexplored issues concerning 
cross-scale linkages in Mexico and elsewhere by looking at the processes of constitution and 
evolution, internal governance, and impacts of FAs in Durango, Mexico (see Figure 1.2 below). 
Specifically, I seek to answer four key inter-related questions:  
1. What factors lead to the formation of FAs? 
2. How do these regional collective action initiatives contribute to community forestry?  
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3. How do top-down FAs differ from bottom-up/grassroots ones in terms of their 
services and benefits to member communities?  
4. How do these differences affect FAs’ effectiveness in positively influencing 
community forestry? 
  
1.2. Analytical framework: Beyond panaceas, polycentric governance and the political 
economy of cross-scale linkages  
To answer these questions, my research is situated within the framework of political 
theories of collective action and institutional analysis as applied to the study of community-based 
natural resource management (CBNRM). This is often referred to the “theory of the commons”, 
which stands for common-pool resources (CPRs).6  At the same time, this work draws on related 
traditions of scholarship, most notably the political economy tradition (for a distinction between 
the two, see Armitage, 2008; Johnson, 2001; Sikor, 2006).  
Collective action studies emphasize how resource users at the local level can jointly create 
institutions –rules regarding resource use– which can strongly influence outcomes of resource 
management (Baland and Platteau, 1996; Ostrom, 1990). In recent years, there have been 
significant advances in this tradition that are of relevance for this study. One is the development 
of a diagnostic (‘beyond panaceas’) framework that can help researchers in dealing with the large 
number of variables that can potentially affect common pool resources (CPR) management 
outcomes. The other is the recognition of the importance of cross-scale, multi-level or 
polycentric governance. I combine these insights with other work from related traditions, 
                                                           
6
 CPRs are a type of good that are usually defined as having low “excludability” (the right and capacity of owners to 
exclude others from the resource) and high “subtractability” (the use by one user reduces the capacity of others to 
use it) (see Poteete et al., 2010). CPR theory is sometimes mistakenly called common-property theory, but the two 
are distinct – CPRs refer to the types of goods, and common-property refers to a type of property system, which can 
apply to different types of good (ibid).  
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referred to as the ‘political economy’ tradition and the related field of “political ecology”, which 
emphasize the importance of macro-level political-economic structures, relations of power, 
conflict, clientelism and patronage. From these traditions I derive three basic theoretical insights, 
discussed in more detail in the sections below (1.2.1 – 1.2.3). Firstly, I posit that there is a need 
to abandon the idea of universal, generalizable laws between each independent variable and a 
given outcome. Rather, we need research that builds on a “diagnostic theory”, which 
incorporates “both general theory related to causal processes and learning how to identify key 
variables present or absent in particular settings so as to understand successes and failures.” 
(Basurto and Ostrom, 2009: 39). In other words, the focus should be on how different 
combinations of variables generate similar or dissimilar outcomes in different cases.  
Secondly, I argue that cross-scale linkages, and particularly FAs, may have a positive 
effect on resource management outcomes, but that they cannot be considered as a necessarily 
positive element. Rather, the outcomes will depend on a set of specific characteristics of the 
linkages. Different bodies of work have focused on different characteristics, but in this work I 
attempt to bring them together. The underlying idea is that FAs’ effectiveness is affected by both 
internal organizational characteristics and the political-economic context in which they operate. 
For instance, contrary to those who equate networks with ‘social capital’ (e.g. Bodin and Crona, 
2009; Lin, 1999), I analyze the characteristics of social capital within each association, showing 
that in fact different associations have different levels of such capital despite all having similar 
formalized connections between communities. Finally, I posit that institutions and organizations 
including cross-scale arrangements, are embedded in historical and current political-economic 
contexts and power relations which influence their operation.  
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1.2.1. A Diagnostic Approach to go Beyond Panaceas 
The literature on CPR management has shown that there are a considerable number of 
variables potentially affecting local CPR management outcomes. In his survey, Agrawal (2001; 
2002) identified thirty-one such variables (see also Padgee et al., 2006; Poteete et al., 2010). 
Ostrom (2007) has identified a similarly large number of biophysical, socio-economic, 
institutional, and political variables operating at the local and supra-local levels. The usual 
strategy by both researchers and policy-makers has been to take one or a few variables identified 
as important in actors’ management of CPR problems in some cases, and then transplant them to 
every other case as ‘blueprint’ solutions. This work has relied heavily on large-N statistical 
research. Ostrom calls this the “panacea trap”. As an alternative, she proposes a ‘diagnostic’ 
approach, in which the analyst, as a doctor would with a patient, must first have an ontological 
framework that specifies the universe of potentially relevant factors within different categories, 
and then must carefully specify a particular problem and context and identify the variables which 
are most likely to be relevant for that situation (Ostrom, 2007; 2009; also Poteete et al., 2010).7 
As stated by Basurto and Ostrom (2009: 40):  
“The intention is to enable scholars, officials, and citizens to understand the potential set of 
variables and their sub-variables that could be causing a problem or creating a benefit. 
When we have a medical problem, a doctor will ask us a number of initial questions and do 
some regular measurements. In light of that information, the doctor proceeds down a 
medical ontology to ask further and more specific questions (or prescribes tests) until a 
reasonable hypothesis regarding the source of the problem can be found and supported. 
When we begin to think about a particular problem, we need to begin to think about which 
                                                           
7
 This framework is discussed in more detail in Chapter 5. For empirical applications, see Basurto and Ostrom 
(2009) and Madrigal et al. (2011). 
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of the attributes of a particular system are likely to have a major impact on particular 
patterns of interactions and outcomes.” 
 
Others like Charles Ragin have proposed a similar “configurational” view of social 
research, where cases are understood in terms of causal combinations of set memberships that 
lead to a given outcome, rather than as relations between individual variables (Basurto, 2007; 
Ragin, 2000; Ragin et al., 2003; Rihoux and Ragin, 2008; Rudel et al., 2009).  
In this dissertation, I use the diagnostic framework, as well as previous scholarship on 
CPRs and cross-scale governance, as a guide to identify and organize the combination of 
potentially relevant variables explaining the effectiveness of FAs (question 4). The main focus is 
on the internal characteristics of these associations (i.e. origins and previous experience, 
leadership, autonomy, internal institutions, social capital). I also consider the social, political and 
economic context as an overarching set of variables that influence the independent variables as 
well as the outcomes of interest (i.e. emergence and sustainment of collective action, benefits to 
communities, elite capture). Figure 1.1 provides a model of the expected relationships.  
 
1.2.2. Multi-level/Cross-scale Governance, Polycentricity and Networks  
The second insight concerns the role of connections across multiple levels and scales of 
governance. Recent work has pointed out that more attention needs to be paid to how “cross-
scale” or “multi-level” governance can affect local resource management outcomes (Agrawal, 
2007; Berkes, 2008; Brondizio et al., 2009). Linkages, also called ‘institutional interplays’ 
(Young, 2002), can be defined as “direct interactions through networks to provide information or 
tangible resources related to the management system.” (Adger et al., 2006: 9) In other words, 
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they are the multiple horizontal and vertical connections between communities and other levels 
or scales of organization such as government agencies and civil society groups.  
 
Figure 1.1. Conceptual model of factors influencing FAs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The conception of institutions embedded in higher-level institutions is not new. This factor 
was very present in the work on polycentric governance (McGinnis, 1999; 2011; Ostrom, 2010), 
particularly the work on metropolitan policing by Ostrom and colleagues. This work 
incorporated multiple units of analysis and showed that government service provision often 
requires inter-connected organization across levels and scales; some services like patrolling 
where more effectively provided by small, local administrative units, while others, like forensic 
research, required larger, regional units. The multi-level/cross-scale concept was also present in 
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two of Ostrom’s (1990) design principles for sustainable resource governance: “minimum 
recognition of rights”, and “nested enterprises”. The former stated that “external government 
agencies do not challenge the right of local users to create their own institutions.” (Cox et al., 
2010:  48). In other words, the principle is a requirement for local decision-making autonomy. 
The “nested enterprises” principle, in turn, considered whether “governance activities are 
organized in multiple layers of nested enterprises” (Ostrom 1990: 90; see also Brondizio et al., 
2009; Cox et al., 2010). A recent review of Ostrom’s work (Cox et al., 2010) found moderate 
support for both principles. In the development scholarship, Brown (1991: 1) similarly 
emphasized the importance of “horizontal linkages across sectors, and vertical linkages that 
enable grassroots influence on national policy-making”. He and others (e.g. Bebbington, 1996) 
further argued that “bridging organizations” and inter-community associations could play key 
roles in creating these linkages. Network scholars have similarly emphasized the importance of 
horizontal and vertical connections. Many of these scholars, however, have focused on networks 
of individuals (see e.g. Bodin and Crona, 2009; Carlsson and Sandstrom, 2008; Janssen et al., 
2006 for applications in CPR studies); those focusing on networks between organizations (e.g. 
Agranoff, 2006; Benjamin et al., 2011; Knoke, 1998; Wilshusen and Murguía, 2003) are more 
relevant for this study.  
The work on cross-scale linkages remains underdeveloped. There is a need to measure the 
effects of these linkages and understand why they have different effects across space and time –
that is, what are the factors that make cross-scale linkages more or less effective. Agrawal (2007; 
see also Berkes, 2008) posits that we need to ask how do processes at multiple social and 
institutional levels interact with each other to generate outcomes relevant to forest governance. 
This is precisely one of the main focuses of this dissertation project: how connections between 
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communities (organized in FAs) as well as connections between FAs and other actors 
(government agencies, NGOs, technical service providers, etc.) make a difference for local-level 
resource governance outcomes –not only ecological but also social and economic (research 
question 2).  
These issues are not only relevant for CPR scholars. They tie into longstanding concerns in 
political science and public administration on how to best organize government for effective 
attainment of different goals (e.g. provision of a service, alleviation of poverty and generation of 
grassroots economic opportunities, sustained protection of natural resources). Considering 
connections across scale also leads us to take into account the role of the government agencies 
(sometimes referred to as the ‘State’ –see Agrawal, 2001, Anthony and Campbell, 2011) that 
relate to communities in a given context –in this case, forest management and rural development. 
The appropriate role for government –and consequently of civil society– has been one of the 
most contentious issues in social sciences (Ostrom, 2005), and is one which CPR scholars have 
constantly had to address. The role of civil society organizations and networks –such as FAs– 
has also been a central concern of development and public administration scholars. For instance, 
Stone (1989; 1993), thinking about how cities were governed, argued that governance capacity 
was not easily controlled through the electoral system but that it was ‘created and maintained by 
creating coalitions with governmental and nongovernmental partners with appropriate resources.  
 
1.2.3. Political economy of linkages 
Approximately ten years ago, several reviews of the CPR scholarship identified the role of 
supra-community (external) factors –including the role of FAs, social movements, NGOs, the 
state, and market forces– as one of the key understudied topics in CPR studies (Agrawal, 2001; 
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Stern et al., 2002).  One of the main criticisms of this scholarship was then, as it is today, its 
inattention to these issues (Agrawal, 2001; Armitage, 2008; Bermeo, 2010; Clement, 2010; Cox 
et al., 2010; Poteete et al., 2010; Rudel, 2011). In a recent paper, Rudel (2011), drawing on 
scholarship from sociology, argues that a country’s economic and political development –
including factors like the strength of the state, the level of national social capital, globalization 
and business cycles– can have significant effects on local collective action by influencing the 
‘design principles’ proposed by Ostrom (1990). The issue of power, intricately related to 
political-economic conditions, has also been understudied (García-López, 2009; Clement, 2010; 
Kashwan, 2011). A focus on these issues will help me answer the question of how FAs emerge 
and evolve as well as how and why internal governance becomes captured by certain groups 
(questions 1, 3, 4). 
Political ecology emerged as a field in the 1980s precisely to study these problems (e.g. 
Blaikie, 1985; Blaikie and Brookfield, 1987; Hecht, 1985; for reviews see Bryant, 1998; Peet and 
Watts, 1996; Robbins, 2012). These scholars sought to redefine ecological problems –usually 
blamed on local resource users– as the outcomes of macro-level or ‘structural’ political-
economic factors associated with the global expansion of market economies. As with CPR 
scholars, they drew on anthropological research showing communities’ ability to organize and 
devise local institutions to manage resources collectively. Yet they had a much more bleak 
perspective on the generalizability of these experiences, pointing to the constraining effects of 
macro-level economic and political conditions (e.g. governments seeking to extract rents or 
votes, large corporate interests, macro-economic crises) and to unequal power relations within 
communities and between communities and external actors. The focus tended to be not so much 
on local successes and their characteristics, but on how governments and corporations oppressed 
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communities and prevented local autonomy in resource management (e.g. Peluso, 1992). At the 
same time, political ecology scholars have emphasized on the struggles through which 
communities and their allies can defend their autonomy and the resources on which they depend 
for their subsistence, or promote changes in undesirable national institutions (e.g. Bebbington et 
al., 2008; Berkes, 2006, Goldman, 1998; Martínez-Alier, 2002; Peet and Watts, 1996; Peluso, 
1992). This research tradition addressed an important question left unanswered by the “minimal 
recognition” principle: how users gain decision-making autonomy in the first place. The focus on 
how autonomy is achieved is consistent with my proposed model of the emergence and evolution 
of cross-scale arrangements as partly resulting from political contests between grassroots and 
top-down collective action processes.  
The focus on regional processes such as land degradation, as well as regional forms of 
organization, have accompanied political ecology from its beginnings (Birkenholtz, 2011; Dove 
and Hudayana, 2008; Walker, 2003). This requires paying particular attention to the “importance 
of local-scale social dynamics while situating these dynamics within broader scales of regional 
processes” (Walker, 2003: 7). These regional processes are in turn nested into higher-scale 
processes, representing “scalar hierarchies” (see Blaikie and Brookfield, 1987). This regional 
approach has recently been combined with network theory to provide useful insights on how the 
horizontal and vertical connections between actors influence regional socio-ecological change 
(see Birkenholtz, 2011). This regional approach is very compatible with the focus on cross-scale 
governance embedded in macro-level political-economic processes employed here.  
The issue of power has been another central concern in the political ecology tradition. 
From this perspective, unequal power relations exist between communities and external actors, 
and also within communities and across communities. The focus is on the politics of resource 
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management –“the practices and processes through which power, in its multiple forms, is 
wielded and negotiated” (Paulson et al., 2003: 209)– and its effects on access to and control over 
natural resources. There is now a substantial body of research looking at the effects of power 
inequalities on institutions and natural resource governance (e.g. Agrawal and Gupta, 2005; 
Crona and Bodin, 2010; Engel and Palmer, 2006; Kashwan, 2011; Lund and Lund, 2005; Nayak 
and Berkes, 2008; Peluso, 1992; Perez-Cirera and Lovett, 2006; Sikor and Lund, 2009; Brechin 
et al., 2003). 
 The perspective of power predominant in most political ecology research has been that of 
power over, i.e. the coercive forms of power. The collective action tradition, on the contrary, has 
mostly emphasized power to –the ability to use power to do things, e.g. to develop institutions 
and enforce them) (for a review of this distinction, see Raik et al., 2008).  Both perspectives are 
needed to fully understand collective action in CPR settings. Agency and social structure have a 
“dialectical relationship”– social structures shape individuals’ practices but are also shaped by 
the individuals (Wilshusen, 2003). This is consistent with the “the three dimensions of power” 
model (Lukes, 1974; Gaventa, 1980) that considers the power of A to make B do something, the 
power of A to control the agenda (Bachrach and Baratz, 1962; Stone, 1988), and the power of A 
to influence ideas and discourses. The second dimension can be extended to include how 
institutions create benefit for some groups at the expense of others (Bachrach and Baratz, 1970; 
Moe, 2005; Steinmo et al., 1992; Thelen, 1999). Concerns about power relations are deeply 
engrained into this dissertation as a whole, although they are clearest in Chapter 4.  
Elite capture of local institutions has been a related concern in political economy work, and 
has evident parallels to the work on power. This literature has mostly looked at how powerful 
local-level actors can disproportionately capture resources. Yet if elite capture happens at the 
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local level, then we may also expect it to happen at the regional level of cross-scale governance. 
Most initial work of decentralization –a policy closely related to cross-scale governance– touted 
it as a strategy to disperse power, crucial to the projects of ‘democratization’ and ‘new 
governance’ in developing countries. However, in summarizing the empirical studies of 
decentralization, Bartley et al. (2008: 163) conclude: “In a variety of locations, decentralization 
reforms in the forestry sector have been plagued by contradiction, ambiguity, and perverse 
incentives.” (see also Poteete and Ribot, 2011; Ribot et al., 2006) This suggests that we need to 
pay more attention to power to better understand governance arrangements and their outcomes. 
Adger et al. (2005: 15), explore these issues through a “political economy of cross-scale 
linkages” framework that analyzes “how decisions are negotiated, how tradeoffs are made…and 
how other actors are enrolled on a cause.”  
Finally, the ‘weight of history’, a concern that political ecologists share with historical and 
sociological institutionalists, also informs this work. Institutions reflect previous collective action 
experiences –cooperative and conflictive– that remain embedded and are hard to change 
(Frechette and Lewis, 2011; Kashwan, 2011; Pierson, 2000; 2003). The work on post-socialist 
countries has highlighted how clientelist networks persist even after a change in formal regime 
(e.g. Ledeneva, 2006). In this case, I focus on the persistence of historical social relations and 
practices of peasant organization vis-à-vis the state and political parties, specifically clientelism, 
corporatism and caciquismo. These practices are a crucial part of the context that needs to be 
considered, as it influences all of the independent and dependent variables of interest. 
Clientelism is here defined as “offering, promising, giving and managing in exchange of political 
fidelity” (Flores and Rello, 2002). Caciquismo is the practice of promoting authoritarian political 
bosses to lead peasant organizations and rural communities (Knight, 1998); while corporatism 
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refers to a ‘system of representation of professional interests’ where individuals from a given 
sector (e.g. agriculture) are coalesced into one organization based on the position of the 
individuals in the production process (e.g. peasants in agriculture) (Schmitter, 1974). The case of 
Durango is an illuminating example of all these practices because, contrary to other states like 
Oaxaca where communities had a long history of autonomous governance since before the 
Spanish conquest, and have more or less maintained that autonomy (often through very visible 
struggles) from the State, in Durango forest communities emerged from the womb of the post-
revolutionary state-party apparatus.  
Yet historical path dependence and lock-in may not be all –the role of social conflicts, 
power relations, and the interactions between actors in the political arena, including the State– 
may be useful to better understand persistent patterns of inefficiency. Within policy punctuations 
there can be many incremental changes characterized by constant conflicts and adaptations 
(Peters et al., 2005). This is consistent with the approach described above that looks at social 
structures as mutually constituted by human agency (collective action) rather than as pre-
determined, and as evolving rather than permanent.  
 
1.3. Research questions and hypotheses 
To analyze the questions posed above,8 I proposed the following hypotheses, numerically 
labeled to coincide with the questions:  
• H1: FAs emerge as a combined response to macro-level and micro-level factors, specifically: 
communities’ needs to solve collective problems and openings in macro-level political-
                                                           
8
 To recap, the questions are: (1) What factors lead to the formation of FAs?; (2) how do these networks contribute 
to community forestry?; (3) how do top-down FAs differ from bottom-up/grassroots ones in terms of their services 
and benefits to member communities?; and (4) how do these differences affect FAs’ effectiveness in positively 
influencing community forestry? 
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economic conditions. Functionalist interpretations have focused on the emergence of 
institutions as solutions to collective dilemmas by autonomous actors (e.g. cross-boundary 
environmental problems like water conflicts, market access, information sharing, political 
representation). Alternative explanations include changes in political opportunity structures, 
a concept developed by social movement scholars to explain movement emergence; and 
political strategies of re-scaling, discussed by geographers in relation to State strategies of 
maintaining political control over populations and resources. 
• H2: FAs provide three types of benefits to members– political empowerment, socioeconomic 
development, and improvements in forest conditions. FAs will contribute to empowering 
communities by providing political representation. They will improve socio-economic 
conditions by channeling resources from government and non-government sources and 
organizing their own regional enterprises. And they will improve forest conditions by 
coordinating management activities (e.g. fire combat, reforestation, monitoring) and 
providing technical capacity-building and forestry services at the regional level. Two 
corollaries derive from this hypothesis. 
o H2a: Communities in FAs will have better political, socio-economic and forest conditions 
than before they joined the associations. 
o H2b: Communities in FAs will have more benefits than those outside these associations.  
•  H3: Bottom-up and top-down FAs will have significant differences in their services and 
benefits. There is substantial research showing the differences between bottom-up and top-
down governance efforts. Bottom-up efforts have been found to lead to better forest 
conditions and activities more closely in line with communities’ own needs and aspirations. 
Two corollaries derive from this hypothesis. 
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o H3.a: Compared to top-down FAs, bottom-up FAs will have a stronger focus and higher 
benefits on issues related to strengthening local organization and institutions; 
increasing market power of communities and providing economies of scale in the timber 
market; and providing political voice and representation.  
o H3.b: Top-down FAs will have a stronger focus on activities related to forest 
management, political/clientelist activities, and elite capture. They will have higher 
levels of benefits in forest management and higher levels of elite capture.  
• H4: The most effective FAs will be those with a combination of the following factors: 
grassroots origins and previous collective action experience, strong leadership, significant 
financial and political autonomy, strong institutions, and high social capital. These factors 
draw on E. Ostrom’s (1990) design principles as well as her more recent diagnostic 
framework. All of them have been recurrently identified as important for different measures 
of the success of collective action, including the sustainability of collective action itself and 
of development and resource management outcomes. Five corollaries derive from this 
hypothesis. 
o H4.a: FAs with grassroots origins and previous collective action experience will be more 
effective than those with top-down origins 
o H4.b: FAs with strong leadership will be more effective than those with weak leadership 
o H4.c: FAs with significant financial and political autonomy will be more effective than 
those with weak financial and political autonomy 
o H4.d: FAs with strong institutions will be more effective than those with weak institutions 
o H4.e: FAs with high levels of social capital will be more effective than those with low 
levels 
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1.4. Research Design  
As stated above, the central goal of this research is to better understand cross-scale 
governance through the example of inter-community networks (FAs) in the community forestry 
sector in Durango, Mexico (see Figure 1.2). Specifically, I look at how and why they emerge 
and evolve over time (Chapter 2); what impacts different types of FAs have at the local 
(community) level (Chapter 3); their internal governance (institutions and power) and how these 
affect “elite capture” (Chapter 4); and the different factors that influence FAs’ effectiveness 
(Chapter 5). 
In this section, I explain the overall methodological approach followed, the sampling 
procedure and the data gathering employed, and how they fit into my research goals and 
questions. Two considerations serve as general guidance for the research design. First, a multi-
level/cross-scale/network approach requires understanding not only network impacts but their 
internal governance (Benjamin et al., 2011). As stated by Berkes (2006: 56): “…when multiple 
levels are involved, the emphasis of the inquiry should shift from the question of scaling-up to 
understanding linkages, their nature, and dynamics.” This implies that we need to look inside the 
linkages –in this case inside the FAs– to understand how and why the linkages form and change 
over time, how they are governed (e.g. who makes rules, who enforces them, how are benefits 
distributed), what do the linkages do (what are their activities), how people perceive the linkages, 
and how people relate to each other. Second, the focus on political economy implies that we need 
to look not only at the ‘rules of the game’ (i.e. the institutions) but also the ‘players of the game’ 
and how they are socially intertwined within relations determined not only by institutions but by 
other historical and current political-economic factors, and within unequal relationships (Sick, 
2008). 
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Figure 1.2 Durango and its Forest Management Regions (UMAFORs)  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: SRNyMA (2006) and UPUCODEFO4 (2008)  
Note: The UMAFOR numbers used below (Sect. 1.5.4) do not correspond to the real UMAFOR numbers seen here. 
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1.4.1. Overarching methodological framework 
 The research design and methodology employed in this dissertation is based on the 
comparative case study approach, often referred to as both a research design and a method (see 
Gerring, 2007). This approach based on “structured, focused comparison” –structured in the 
sense that the researcher writes general questions that reflect research objective, that are asked 
across cases to guide and standardize the data collection; and focused in that it deals only with 
certain aspects of the cases analyzed (George and Bennett, 2005; also Gerring, 2007). In other 
words, case study analyses entail the systematic collection of the same information across 
carefully selected units, combined with theoretically-guided questions, in order to obtain 
“systematic description” which can serve for causal inference (George and Bennett, 2005; see 
also McAdam and Tarrow, 2011).9 The case study method has four main advantages relative to 
statistical analysis (George and Bennett, 2005): (1) achieving high “conceptual validity”, i.e. to 
identify and measure the indicators that best represent the underlying theoretical concepts 
through contextualization of the concepts;10 (2) identifying new hypotheses and variables; (3) 
close examination of causal mechanisms in individual cases; and (4) capacity for addressing 
causal complexity, where different combinations of variables or paths can produce the same 
outcome (“equifinality”), or the same path can produce different outcomes (“multifinality”) 
(George and Bennett, 2005; Ragin, 2000). 
 Causal mechanisms are a key element of this comparative method (Stinchcombe, 2005; 
George and Bennett, 2005). These are defined as independent stable factors that under certain 
                                                           
9
 Note that the ‘case study method’ is also an umbrella of different qualitative methods, including participant 
observation, surveys, interviews and archival research. Here I employ all of those to different extents. 
10
 This reduces the problem of “conceptual stretching” common in statistical methods, where the operationalization 
employed in one context –say the definition of organizational autonomy– is transposed to another context.  
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conditions link causes to effects.11 This contrasts with statistical methods, which focus on 
“causal effects”, i.e. the numerical impact of an independent variable (cause) on a dependent 
variable (effect/outcome). Causal mechanisms are crucial to causal inference, i.e. for making 
statements about how ‘what causes what, when and how’ (George and Bennett, 2005; Brady, 
2004). The focus on causal mechanisms allows for the exploration of a large number of 
intervening variables and their relationships, and to observe unexpected outcomes. It also helps 
deal with the problem of causal complexity. This distinction is crucial for understanding causal 
complexity. Some have argued that causal effects logically precede causal mechanisms (King et 
al., 1994), but it is not clear that this is so (Brady, 2004). In statistical (correlation) analysis, 
complex causality is very hard to account for – actually it is usually assumed away. Linearity is 
the norm. When complex “interaction effects” are taken into account, they require massive 
samples to offset the problem of collinearity (Ragin, 2004). Thus, statistical analysis often 
discards the outliers as part of the error term or as part of unaccounted-for variables, instead 
providing ‘mean’ (average) values of the impact of a given variable on an outcome. Of course, 
the researcher may include more variables to improve the explanation, but this may not be 
advisable on statistical terms (e.g. Achen, 2002, 2005; Kennedy, 2003), and in any case, it omits 
the fact that there may be many causal processes/mechanisms leading to the same outcome. 
 Causal mechanisms are usually studied through the technique of “process tracing” (George 
and Bennett, 2005; McAdam and Tarrow, 2011). The technique involves tracing “ “the links 
between possible causes and observed outcomes” by examining “histories, archival documents, 
interview transcripts, and other sources to see whether the causal process that a theory 
hypothesizes or implies in a case is in fact evident in the sequence or values of the intervening 
                                                           
11
 The definition of causal mechanisms, as a relatively new concept, is subject to debate. Mahoney (2001, cited in 
McAdam and Tarrow, 2011) documented 24 different definitions. 
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variables in that case” (George and Bennett, 2005: 6). By carefully analyzing this sequence of 
events, or “what follows what”, participants and their connections, scholars can provide 
explanations for an outcome or relationship (George and Bennett 2005: 207; also McAdam and 
Tarrow, 2011). It allows researchers to connect the phases of a policy/decision process and to 
identify the reasons for the emergence of a particular decision through the dynamic if events 
(Tarrow, 2004). The analysis of the sequence of events needs to be combines with a careful 
evaluation of the causal mechanisms at play, i.e. “delimited changes that alter relations among 
specified sets of elements in identical or closely similar ways over a variety of situations.” 
(McAdam and Tarrow, 2011: 3) In this dissertation, process tracing will allow me to identify 
when, how, why and by whom each FA was formed, when, and how, why and by whom they are 
captured. It will also allow me to identify the specific causal processes that link combinations of 
potential causal factors (e.g. FA leadership, autonomy, social capital) and observed outcomes 
(e.g. FA level of success). 
 While most of the information gathered is from the case study approach I also take 
advantage of statistical techniques as a complementary source of insights, particularly in Chapter 
2. Specifically, I draw on a random stratified sample of forty-one (41) communities from 
Durango and Michoacán (see Antinori and Rausser, 2010) to provide descriptive statistics of the 
different FAs identified in the sample and calculate basic correlations between factors such as the 
date of formation, the type of FA (bottom-up vs. top-down), and the type of services provided.  
  
1.4.2. Unit of analysis and sampling 
 The central unit of analysis for my study is inter-community forest associations (FAs). 
These are the networks that I compare and contrast in terms of their impacts, effectiveness and 
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internal governance. While initially the idea was to compare a few FA communities (members of 
an FA) and non-FA communities from four different regions in Durango, the plan evolved 
during the fieldwork due to two factors: the realization that in some regions all forest 
communities were formally integrated into an FA, that there was substantial variation of 
conditions across FA members (thus making comparisons with non-FA members very difficult), 
and that these comparisons (and the time spent doing them) would not contribute much 
knowledge to FAs’ internal governance.  As already explained, I still have maintained the 
concept of a comparison between members and non-members but in a much less central way. 
However, as this is a multi-level study trying to determine the connections between FAs, 
communities and other actors, I necessarily shift across levels to observe different aspects. Thus, 
I have gathered data for individual communities within each association and it is from those 
communities from which I primarily derive information about the main issues addressed.12 
 The four FAs in the study were chosen from a group of 14 Durango FAs represented in a 
random stratified sample of 41 communities from Durango (28 communities) and Michoacán 
(13). This sample was designed for a survey of community forestry in which I participated in 
2007 (see Antinori and Rausser, 2010). The survey included questions about FAs including their 
origins, membership, and activities. It identified 14 associations in Durango. Based on the 
information available, I selected two grassroots/bottom-up (created and controlled by 
communities), and two top-down (created and controlled by external actors) for further analysis 
of the questions central to this dissertation. Information from the database was used to attempt to 
control for group size as well as location. Within each FA, I then sampled different member 
communities. In this sense, the sample was nested –a sample within a sample– (see Poteete et al., 
                                                           
12
 I also have information from external observers (foresters, government officials), internal FA foresters, and FA 
leaders, but these are secondary and serve mostly to triangulate the information obtained from the communities. See 
below. 
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2010) but also purposeful –selected based on a given variable and comparative intent (see 
Gerring, 2007). 
 In FA-2, FA-3 and FA-4, I sampled all the member communities –12, 10 and 13 
respectively. This could be described as a complete sample. In the case of FA-1, sampling of all 
member communities (40) would have been impossible given time and financial constraints. 
Therefore, I did a “convenience” of a similar number of communities than those sampled in the 
other three associations (14). Figure 1.3 shows this sampling strategy. 
 
Figure 1.3 Sampling strategy 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
14 FAs in Durango 
Bottom-up
 
Top-down
 
  
  FA-1 FA-2 FA-3 FA-4 
14 comms. 
(35% of 
members) 
12 comms. 
(100% of 
members) 
10 comms. 
(100% of 
members) 
13 comms. 
(100% of 
members) 
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1.4.3. Data gathering methods 
 Data gathering employed a combination of survey techniques (from the 2007 project with 
C. Antinori), in-depth interviews, focus group discussions, and participant observation. I spent 
one year in the field between January 2010 and January 2011, with a return visit September-
October 2011. Approximately three and a half months were devoted to each FA, though this 
necessarily varied. The full list of data-gathering activities carried out is detailed in Table 1.1.  
 
Table 1.1. Activities carried out in the field 
Level Interviews Participant obs. Focus groups Qty.* 
National National CONAFOR 
officials 
  2 
 CONAFOR meetings  1 
Civil society**    4 
State 
 
State and federal 
officials 
  16 13 
Civil society    4 14 
Forest industry   3 
State-level FA leaders   1 
 State-level FA 
assemblies 
 10 
 Forest agency meetings  6 15 
 Other forest sector 
activities 
 6 
Regional 
(sub-state) 
FA leaders and ex-
leaders  
  45 16 
Foresters   33 17 
 FA assemblies  8 18 
 Other FA activities  2 
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 9 CONAFOR, 5 SRNyMA, 1 SAGDR, 1 CADER03-Durango 
14
 2 with foresters, 2 NGOs 
15
 4 in FA-1, 1 in FA-3, 1 in FA-4 region  
16
 15 in FA-1, 10 in FA-2, 8 in FA-3, 12 in FA-4 
17
 9 in FA-1, 3 in FA-2, 10 in FA-3, 8 in FA-4, 1 in FA-X(U4), 2 in FA-X(LF) 
18
 2 in FA-2, 1 in FA-3, 2 in FA-4 
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Level Interviews Participant obs. Focus groups Qty.* 
Local Community leaders   59 19 
Other community 
members 
  39 20 
Local government 
officials 
  5 21 
  Governmental 
agency meetings 
1 
 Community assemblies and focus groups 25 22 
* Some people were interviewed more than once 
** Civil society includes NGOs, academics and foresters 
 
   
 My overall data-gathering approach was inspired by ethnographic methods, and more 
specifically by what has been labeled political ethnography. Broadly defined, ethnography is a 
fieldwork-based approach characterized by “prolonged exposure” and “immersion” in the social 
life of a given group, which is the object of study (Kubik, 2009; Schatz, 2009). The main method 
employed by ethnography is participant observation, i.e. immersion, though ethnographers also 
rely on other related methods, particularly in-depth interviews and focus groups (ibid). The 
question of whether a given research project is ethnographic is open to debate leading Kubik 
(2009) to distinguish between ethnographic research and research with an ethnographic 
sensibility. In this dissertation, participant observation is used as a more secondary tool, but one 
that yields valuable insights, and thus it is more accurate to chareacterize it as having an 
“ethnographic sensibility”. 
 Ethnography can be a very useful tool to build in-depth understanding of causal processes. 
As Tilly (2006: 410) argues, if one believes that “how things happen is why they happen [i.e. 
causal processes/mechanisms], then ethnography has great advantages over most other 
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 17 in FA-1, 17 in FA-2, 13 in FA-3, 12 in FA-4 
20
 7 in FA-1, 14 in FA-2, 11 in FA-3, 7 in FA-4 
21
 2 in FA-1, 2 in FA-2, 1 in FA-4 
22
 4 in FA-1, 6 in FA-2, 6 in FA-3, 8 in FA-4, 1 in FA-X(LF), 
29 
 
conventional social scientific methods as a way of getting at cause-effect relations.” While most 
methods depend on correlations and comparative statics (measuring the conditions under which 
processes occurs or the outcomes that correlate with them), ethnography requires that the analyst 
look carefully at the social processes as they unfold –in other words, ethnography focuses on 
how a given cause generates certain outcomes, and does so from a comparative perspective that 
recognizes causal complexity.  
While ethnography has contributed substantially to the study of politics, it has tended to be 
marginalized in social sciences other than anthropology (Schatz, 2009). Recent years have 
witnessed a renewed attention to the topic of ethnography in politics (Auyero, 2006; Baiochi and 
Connor, 2008), with two recent books (Joseph et al., 2007; Schatz, 2009). “Political 
ethnography”, argues Tilly (2006: 410), provides privileged access to politics –the “dynamic, 
contingent interaction among persons, households, and small groups…in which at least one 
government participates as actor, object, and/or influential third party”, because it “brings field 
workers into direct contact with political processes instead of filtering that knowledge through 
other people’s testimony, written records, and artifacts of political interaction.” (see also Schatz, 
2009) Similarly, Kubik (2009) posits that ethnography can help unearth the multiple layers of 
formal and informal power structures, which is what I attempt to do in one of the chapters 
(Chapter 4).  
While the ethnographic approach served as inspiration, I triangulated participant 
observation with other sources including in-depth interviews with multiple stakeholoders, focus 
group discussions, and archival research (see Table 1.1 above). Quasi-open ended interviews 
were carried out with FA leaders (members of the elected governing board), FA foresters, and 
other FA members (community representatives, advisors); community leaders; federal, state and 
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local government officials; external foresters, and other civil society actors (e.g. NGO 
representatives). Group discussions were held with community members, often as part of general 
assembly meetings. Except for a few interviews with external actors which were tape-recorded, 
all interviews and discussions were carried out with a notebook/notepad and pen. This was done 
consciously because of the tendency of distrust towards external actors and unease with tape-
recording initially found in the field.  
Interviews and focus groups at the community level helped illuminate the major challenges 
communities face; their reasons for forming or eventually joining an FA, or for not participating 
in one; the nature and extent of their involvement in these organizations (including the forms of 
participation and accountability); the actual services they receive from them; and the perceptions 
of community members about key issues related to FAs, including the quality of these services, 
the types and level of benefits, the associations’ strengths and weaknesses, and their overall 
relevance and effectiveness (for a similar application, see Britt, 2002). The interviews also 
included questions about other local factors related to community forestry outcomes, including 
community institutions and decision-making, forest use, local leadership, and perceived forest 
quality. Appendix 1 provides the questionnaires used as guides for the different stakeholders. 
How closely the interview followed the script of the questionnaire depended on the interviewee’s 
knowledge about particular issues of interest. 
Oral histories about each FA gathered through the interviews were used to understand how 
communities’ political empowerment, socioeconomic development, and forest conditions have 
changed over time, and whether FAs had a role to play in these changes. It is important to note 
that I do not have ‘hard’ data over time in terms of the characteristics of communities before and 
after joining an FA. Thus, in trying to understand how FAs have historically influenced forest 
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communities, I relied primarily on these oral histories and, when available, archival 
documentation from associations themselves. This “recall” technique has its limitations (e.g. 
Bernard et al., 1984; Ricci et al., 1995), but short of doing extensive archival research, it was the 
only realistic technique at my disposal.  
Interviews at the FA level focused on each association’s origins and history, current 
internal characteristics (rules, size, resources and infrastructure, staff, leadership); main goals 
and activities related to community forestry; main projects and other achievements to date; 
perceived strengths and weaknesses; and relationship to the federal, state and local governments, 
political parties, foresters, other FAs and civil society organizations, and the private timber 
sector. To determine the political connections of different actors in the FAs –and particularly 
clientelist and caciques (political bosses) ties– and their influence on internal governance, I used 
questions inspired by network analysis and power studies. These questions helped me determine 
how different actors are positioned or embedded in a network, the type of interactions between 
them, and the distributions of power, as has been done through questionnaires (e.g. Knoke et al., 
1996; Kriesi et al., 2006), analyses of decision-making in governance networks using the actor-
process-event scheme (APES) (Vogeli et al., 2006), or “membership network analysis” (Breiger, 
1974, cited in Domhoff, 2007). To better understand power relations, I combined those questions 
with others inspired by “content analysis” (see Domhoff, 2007) that seek to measure the power 
and benefits of certain actors by asking who participates in decision-making arenas, who wins or 
receives the most benefits, and who is perceived by peers as having power.  
Interviews were complemented with focus group discussions and participant observation of 
community and FA assemblies and other activities. Participant observation allowed me to gain a 
better grasp of the process of information-sharing, debate, participation, decision-making, and 
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leadership within each FA, and the relations between FA actors and other stakeholders. For 
instance, by assisting to meetings of the state-level association, I was able to observe the 
predominant role of foresters in the FAs, and the close relationship between the state government 
and these associations. And by participating in political events like meetings of the ‘forest sector’ 
with the PRI candidate for governor, I was able to ascertain the close ties between most FA 
leaders and this party, which had previously been suggested in multiple interviews.  
I also carried out thematic interviews with informants representing the interests of other 
key stakeholders –including representatives from other FAs, external foresters, and government 
officials from the federal and state forestry and environmental agencies– which offered an 
outsider’s perspective on these organizations and a better understanding of how relations 
between different actors affect FAs’ operations. Finally, I conducted archival research of FA 
documents –including previous studies conducted in each of the four regions– government 
reports, and newspaper articles, among others. 
The data was coded into pre-defined categories as it was transcribed from my hand notes 
into my computer. These categories (established in the interview guides in Appendix 1) included 
things like “FA history”, “impacts/benefits”, “Leadership”, and “other associations/networks”. 
As the fieldwork evolved, new categories were added. This data was then organized into a series 
of descriptive documents for each of the associations for the important themes of the dissertation: 
history, services and benefits, internal organization, leadership, autonomy, and strengths and 
weaknesses. Keyword searches were used to gather the information on each topic. These 
descriptive documents later served as a source of information on each topic, though going back 
again to the original interviews was sometimes required.  
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1.4.4. Data analysis 
The analysis in this dissertation draws on the multiple sources and methods described 
above. Chapter 2 uses historical analysis based on interviews and archival sources to document 
the reasons behind the formation of different cross-scale linkages. Process tracing helps to 
understand how macro-level processes –changes in national institutions and socio-political and 
economic conditions– were related to the observed outcome. This is complemented with 
quantitative analysis derived the abovementioned survey of 41 communities in Durango and 
Michoacán (Antinori and Rausser, 2010). Principal component analysis was used to determine 
the main types of services provided by different associations in the sample, and binary 
correlation analysis was used to determine the relationship between the form of origin (top-down 
versus bottom-up) of the FA and the types of services it provides, the date of formation 
(historical period), and the existence of previous experiences of collective action.  
The analysis of FA services and benefits in Chapter 3 draws on the interviews with FA 
leaders, community leaders and other community members in each association, as well as 
external observers, to derive categories of types of services. These are then quantified according 
to the percentage of member communities that stated benefits in each category, per association. 
Other indicators of impact –more directly tied to measurable community-level outcomes– are 
also derived from communities’ perceived changes in timber stock and in the number of forest 
fires,23 the level of vertical integration and of diversification of forest, and the extent of 
certification of sustainable forestry among member communities. Perceptions about timber stock 
and forest fires were used as measures of ecological outcomes as a cost-effective way of 
obtaining indications of forest ecosystem conditions from those who are closest and interact the 
most with them. Perceptions have been recognized as a cost-effective method to measure 
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 This is still based on community perceptions, but it is more tied to a community outcome.  
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ecological conditions (Anadón et al., 2009; Danielsen et al., 2005). To the extent possible, I 
triangulated this information with insights from foresters and others. Hard data on deforestation 
and forest firest for the specific areas covered by each FA was not readily available, and would 
have required susbtantial amount of time and effort to develop. What was available was data for 
the four UMAFORs where the FAs operate (FAs do not cover their entire UMAFORs), which I 
present below in Section 1.5. 
In Chapter 4, I draw on institutional analysis to identify key rules related to the process of 
elite capture. Power, in turn, is analyzed based on the questions identified in the previous section 
(1.4.3). Drawing on interview with different stakeholders, participant observation and archival 
research, I identify the level of elite capture in each of the four associations based on the oral 
histories of each association and responses to questions related to autonomy, leadership, relations 
to other stakeholders, and organizational strengths and weaknesses.  I then use process tracing to 
identify the key causal mechanisms through which power and institutions combine to influence 
elite capture.  
Finally, to analyze how different factors influence FA effectiveness (Chapter 5), I follow 
Ostrom’s (2007, 2009) diagnostic framework and draw inspiration (though do not apply it 
directly) on the methodology of Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) (Ragin, 2000; Ragin et 
al., 2003). QCA focuses on the presence or absence of particular variables of interest and the 
ways these variables combine in different ways to produce a given outcome of interest (in this 
case, ‘FA effectiveness’) across cases. In other words, what is compared and contrasted are not 
relations between individual variables, but the different configurations of causal conditions that 
lead to the outcome. 
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1.5. An introduction to the context: Mexico, Durango and the four regions 
 Common-pool resource governance is embedded in micro- and macro-level contexts 
which affect actors’ participation in collective action (Poteete et al., 2010). Here, I provide an 
overview of the national legal, economic and policy context in which Mexico’s community 
forestry sector operates. In the following section (1.5.2), I explain the formal community and 
inter-community institutions that shape collective action at the local level. I then move to 
describe the state of Durango (1.5.3) and the four regions (1.5.4) covered in this study. 
 
1.5.1. National institutions 
 The Mexican federal government oversees forest activities through three main agencies: 
the Environment and Natural Resources Secretariat (SEMARNAT), and two decentralized 
organizations which are within SEMARNAT –the National Forest Commission (CONAFOR), 
and the Federal Environmental Protection Attorney’s Office (PROFEPA) (see Merino, 2011).24 
SEMARNAT’s role is regulating the sector: it awards and oversees permit applications for 
forestry activities. CONAFOR is in charge of the promotion and development of forestry 
activities, and to that end handles all programs related to sector. CONAFOR has a national office 
which establishes the programs and their rules of operation, and also has state-level offices 
which make decisions on most of these programs (a few are handled at the national level). 
Mexican scholars and practicioners have often criticized the poor coordination between both 
agencies; for instance, about 30% of all forest management plans financed by CONAFOR are 
rejected by SEMARNAT (Merino, pers. com., 07-04-2012). Finally, PROFEPA is in charge of 
monitoring and enforcement. It carries out inspections, investigations and helps organie 
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 Other Secretariats have roles to play in forest communities, particularly those related to natural protected areas 
(CONANP), biodiversity (CONABIO), water (CONAGUA), agrarian issues (SAGARPA, SRA), indigenous issues 
(CDI, previously INE), and social development issues (SEDESOL).  
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community and regional forest protection committees. Each state also has its own environmental 
agencies. 
 Within this organizational framework, Mexican forest policy has varied widely throughout 
modern times, with eight different forestry laws since the 1917 Constitution –in 1926, 1942, 
1947, 1960, 1986, 1992, 1997, and 2003. Alternating between supporting peasants in forest 
communities and supporting private logging companies (Collier, 1987, in Haenn, 2005; Klooster, 
2003), this history, particularly over the last 20 year, has been characterized as erratic (Klooster, 
2003), unstable (Bray et al., 2006), inconsistent  (CCMSS, 2007a), and cyclical (Collier, ibid). In 
Chapter 2, I provide a historical overview of how this context has evolved over time and how it 
has affected the emergence and evolution of FAs. 
 Any landowner wishing to do any timber or non-timber harvest (aprovechamiento) must 
contract a certified professional forester to design a management plan, which then must be 
submitted to the SEMARNAT for approval. Plans for commercial wood cutting in temperate dry 
forests of northern Mexico are usually for 10-12 years. According to the 2003 forest law 
(LGDFS, 2003, Art. 37), each Management Plan must present a body of basic information 
including the cutting cycle, the method for conducting the forest inventory, the amount of wood 
cut in each minimum management unit, and activities related to stand improvement, treatment, 
reforestation, as well as to the prevention, control, and combat of forest fires, plagues and 
diseases.  They must also produce periodic reports on the implementation of the plan and request 
permission from SEMARNAT for any modifications. They must also carry out bookkeeping 
during the extraction process. In this way, while communities own the land and have the right to 
extract and benefit from the resource, the central government retains substantial regulatory 
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authority, in a system that could be characterized as between community-based and co-
management.  
The federal government (and to a much less extent the state governments) provides 
financial and technical support to forest communities and FAs. Currently, most of the supports 
are grouped into the PROARBOL (‘Pro-Tree’) program. PROARBOL includes two broad 
categories: “forestry development” (previously PRODEFOR) and “conservation and restoration” 
(see Merino, 2011). The first includes the sub-categories of forest management studies, 
silviculture (e.g. roads, technological improvements, wildlife management), certification 
processes (e.g. FSC), and commercial timber plantations. The second includes reforestation, soil 
conservation and restoration, and environmental services (hydrological and biodiversity). 
Finally, and of most relevance for this dissertation, is the PROFAS (now PROFOS) program, 
established to provide support for existing and new FAs (see Chapter 2). 
Since its creation in 2001, the budget of CONAFOR has increased by more than 3000%, 
yet legal national timber production has decreased by about 20% and the contribution of the 
forestry sector to the national economy has shrank (to 0.3% currently) (Milenio, 04-04-2011). 
Moreover, the trade deficit of the timber sector has increased dramatically, by more than 133% 
between 1997 and 2006, representing more than half of the entire trade deficit in the Mexican 
economy (CCMSS, 2007a; Merino, 2011). The CCMSS (2007a) pointed to three potential causes 
for the increasing deficit: (1) an accelerated increment of demand unmatched by national supply, 
(2) the drop in national production, and (3) a loss of competitiveness. In terms of 
competitiveness, in 2010 CONAFOR estimated that the f.o.b parity price of kiln-dried 
sawnwood in the sawmill yard was US$8.30 per board foot in Mexico, but only US$7.00 per 
board foot in Chile, Mexico’s main competitor (World Bank, 2010). The community forestry 
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sector has a particularly hard time competing: prices from commercial plantations in South 
America and Southeast Asia are approximately 30% lower than similar products from Mexico’s 
most efficient community forest enterprises (World Bank, 2010). This lack of competitiveness, in 
turn, is to blame on with excessive government regulation of the forest sector, low technological 
development of forest extraction and processing activities, and possible dumping practices 
(highly subsidized imported wood) (CCMSS, 2007a). 
Another recurrent problem has been the funding priorities established by CONAFOR. 
Most of the current CONAFOR budget –about seventy-five percent (75%)– goes to reforestation 
and timber plantations (Chapela, pers. com., 2012; Merino ,2011). Reforestation, in fact, was a 
centerpiece of F. Calderón’s presidency (2006-2012). This distribution shows a lack of attention 
towards the two main problems in the forest sector: the lack of institutional and productive 
capacities of many forest communities, and the degradation of forest resources through illegal 
logging, fires, etc. (Merino, 2011). Enforcement is another important problem, and although it is 
to some extent related to the lack of funds, it is also due to lack of will and corruption. For 
instance, despite a pledge of zero-tolerance for illegal logging from the federal government, only 
0.13% of the illegal wood on average was confiscated from 2000 to 2006 (CCMSS, 2007b).  
  
1.5.2. Local institutions 
National laws, policies, and regulations regarding forest use are usually filtered by local 
institutions which can both halt deforestation and lead to sustainable forest management. As 
Gibson et al. (2000: 3, emphasis added) noted some time ago: “National governments rarely 
possess enough personnel or money to enforce their laws adequately…It is becoming 
increasingly clear that local communities both filter and ignore the central government’s rules. 
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They also add their own rules, generating local institutions –rules-in-use- and patterns of activity 
that can diverge widely from legislators’ and bureaucrats’ expectations.”  
The common-property regime in Mexico evolved from a ‘democratization of natural 
resources’ based on over sixty years of land reform which gave communities (Antinori and Bray, 
2005; Bray et al., 2006). As mentioned above, overall this has proved to be a very successful 
experiment in CPR governance. The basic organizational structure of agrarian (forest and non-
forest) communities, as established in the Agrarian law, is composed of three basic units: the 
General Assembly, the Governing Board (Comisariado); and the Oversight Council (Consejo de 
Vigilancia). The General Assembly, composed of all official community members (all 
individuals with membership rights or derechos), is the supreme decision-making body in the 
community. It elects the Comisariado and the Oversight Council and serves as their oversight 
body, having to approve all of their decisions. The Comisariado is composed of a president, 
secretary, treasurer and their substitutes. It is the official community representative and as such is 
legally responsible for the community’s forest activities, and by law must rotate every three 
years in what is known as the cargo system. Reelection is prohibited per the Agrarian law. The 
Oversight Council is similarly composed of secretary, treasurer and their substitutes. Its job is to 
make sure the community rules (bylaws) are being followed and monitor the work of the 
Comisariado (see Figure 1.4). 
 Many forest communities have additional positions depending on their level of ‘market 
integration’ –i.e. if they sell stumpage or roundwood or sawn wood (see Antinori and Bray, 
2005; Antinori and Rausser, 2010; Bray et al., 2006). Some of these communities have further 
specialized their community forest enterprises (CFEs) with a structure that is separate, but 
connected to, the basic governance bodies. Some have a separate ‘manager’ or ‘administrator’ 
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position that runs the company and is not subject to the 3-year term limits. Some may also have 
administrative or elder councils composed of previous recognized community leaders and which 
serve as an advisory group. In other communities there are intra-community sub-groups, called 
‘work groups’ (grupos de trabajo). The variety of organizational strategies suggests that they are 
adapted to local conditions and that there is no one ‘correct form’. 
 
Figure 1.4 Basic organization of Mexican forest community with timber extraction 
 
   Source: Bray et al. (2006) 
 
 Finally, and most importantly for this dissertation, communities may be linked to inter-
community associations (FAs) that can be organized at regional (sub-state), state, multi-state, 
and national levels, as well as to other external organizations such as NGOs. See Figure 1.5. 
Gordillo (2007) argues that the main reasons why the community sector has not 
disappeared are the advantages it offers for different interest groups. For the state sector, it has 
been a vehicle for political control following a pattern of clientelism since its inception after the 
revolution (see also Fox, 1996). For the private sector, it has been a source of cheap labor as 
community members leave to seek employment outside the community; and a source of cheap 
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raw materials as private companies were given access to resources through leases/concessions.  
For individuals within the communities themselves, it is a peasant economy that provides mutual 
insurance, livelihood (even if at subsistence levels) and political representation, despite the 
contradictions of the system.  In a way, the community is a political apparatus that permits 
mutual individual insurance and a body of peasant representation where common property is 
possibly a competitive advantage. Lastly, communities assure access to common-pool resources 
that would not be available to community members individually.   
 
Figure 1.5 Community organization in cross-scale linkages in Mexican community forestry 
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1.5.3. Durango 
Durango is located in the northern extreme of Mexico’s interior or central region. The state 
is bordered by the state of Chihuahua to the north, Zacatecas and Nayarit to the south, Coahuila 
and Zacatecas to the east, and Sinaloa to the west (SNRMA, 2006). See Figure 1.2 above. It has 
a total size of 123,451.2 km2 (12.3 million ha), which makes Durango the 4th largest state in 
Mexico, after Chihuahua, Sonora and Coahuila (in descending order) (Government of Durango, 
2011). Its location gives Durango a strategic position for communications with the north, the 
center, the east and the west (Pacific Ocean) (Government of Durango, 2011). The capital is 
Victoria de Durango or simply Durango, located in the municipality with the same name. 
Despite its size, Durango is a sparsely populated state. According to the 2010 Census by 
INEGI, the state had a population of 1,632,934, only 1.45% of the nation’s total, and a density of 
13.2 inhabitants per km2, 24th in the country (Government of Durango, 2011). The three main 
cities in the state concentrate almost 65% of the population (Durango – 35%, Gomez Palacio -
20.1% and Lerdo 8.6%) (Government of Durango, 2011). The remaining 35% is highly 
dispersed in 37 small urban settlements, and 5,757 rural settlements (localidades) of less than 
2500 inhabitants; 91% of those settlements have less than 250 inhabitants (Government of 
Durango, 2011). 
Durango is divided into 39 municipalities. This study’s four (4) regions cover six 
municipalities, though two of these are not forestry regions and little analysis was done there. 
The state is crossed on its west side by the Sierra Madre Occidental mountain range, which 
crosses all of Mexico. This mountain range houses the state’s main peaks, which surpass three 
thousand meters, and most of its forest resources (SNRyMA, 2006). The mean elevation above 
sea level 1,750 meters in the valley region and 2,450 meters in the sierra region. Durango’s 
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climate is widely varied, ranging from very dry semi-hot in the northeast to temperate in the 
northwest and southeast, and tropical in small area in the west of the state (SNRMA, 2006). 
Historically, Durango was one of the main and most important sites of large-scale 
industrialized during the Porfirio Díaz dictatorship (1884-1911). Díaz’s 1884 law on ‘waste’ 
lands (terrenos baldíos) and the practice of denunciation and possession, allowed any individual 
could denounce a piece of land as being unused and acquire possession of it. From 1876 onward, 
Díaz began handing out an unprecedented number of permits for business operations and land 
ownerships to foreigners in Durango (Hart, 1999). In exchange, the president hoped to bring 
investment in communications and transport infrastructure, industry, mining, timber, agriculture 
and ranching (Hart, 1999). Many came to Durango purchasing lands from land measurement 
agents who declared lands as wastelands, many of which were inhabited and even owned by 
indigenous groups and peasants or by local hacendados. These entrepreneurs captured land at 
extremely low prices (for instance one sale in 1895 of 501,800 acres for $125,000 Mexican 
pesos). By 1910, North Americans owned the entire southwest Sierra Madre region of the state 
(65% of the land in Durango), rich in timber and mining resources, where they started large 
timber and mining operations (Hart, 1999). Among those was the Durango Lumber Company, 
which was a crucial actor in the emergence of FA-1 (see Chapter 2). 
 The Mexican Revolution (1909-1912) had a direct and drastic impact on the context of 
land distribution and social organization in Durango. It led to the massive exile of foreigners in 
Durango in 1911, and to a process of redistribution of land which lasted several decades. Land 
reforms in the 1920s and 1930s redistributed large tracts of the land that had been bought by the 
foreign and local investors (e.g. Hart, 1999). These land reforms cemented a strong relationship 
between the PRI (often through the National Peasant Confederation (CNC), which became an 
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intermediary in requesting land grants) and the peasants. However, many latifundios remained 
untouched, and land reform efforts after Cárdenas (1934-40) dropped substantially given the 
increasingly conservative Presidents which focused on economic growth rather than social 
reforms (Hamilton, 2011). Moreover, the properties redistributed where in marginal lands with 
little quality timber (e.g. Luján Castañeda, n.d). In the forest sector, the more conservative, pro-
business national governments quickly turned to a combination of logging bans and concessions 
of large areas to large private timber companies. In 1948, the federal government established a 
total ban on extraction in two million hectares of forests in Durango (Zarzosa, 1958, in Bray and 
Merino, 2004), which lasted until 1967 (Arreola Valenzuela, 1995). At the same time, Durango 
had the most expansive logging concessions in the entire country; in a recent study, 71% of the 
communities sampled had had their land under a concession, compared to about 30% in Oaxaca 
and Jalisco (Merino and Martínez, 2011). Most of the land reforms in the forest regions in 
Durango took place in the 1960s and 70s. The first community forestry experiments also began 
in this period.25 Of the 135 community forestry enterprises created by the government between 
1970 and 76 in the country, 68% were in Durango and Chihuahua (Enriquez Quintana, 1976, in 
Bray and Merino, 2004). 
Today, Durango’s forest sector has immense importance politically and economically. The 
state occupies the second place nationally in terms of temperate forest land area (where most of 
the timber is produced), with 4.9 million ha (41% of the 12.3 million ha total landmass in the 
state) as temperate forests (bosques) (Government of Durango, 2011, SRNyMA, 2006). It is also 
the country’s main timber producer and has the largest timber stock (estimated at 410,833,340 
m3), giving it the title of “Number One Forest Reserve” in Mexico. The state’s share of national 
timber production has oscillated between 20 and 30% in the last decade (SRNyMA, 2006). In 
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 For a more detailed analysis, see Chapter 2. 
45 
 
2008, the authorized extraction volume in the state was 2,470,114 m3; almost 90% was 
distributed between pine (73.3%) and oak (16.5%) (ibid).26 Though 18 municipalities have 
extraction permits in the state, the majority of the authorized extraction volume (79.5%) is 
concentrated in six municipalities (SNRyMA, 2006); four of those six are represented in this 
study.  
Most of the state’s forests (about 80%) belong to the 395 forest communities that have 
collective lands the state. These forest communities exhibit a high level of organization 
compared to other regions. Durango has the highest percentage of communities with their own 
timber processing equipment (so-called ‘Type IV’ communities), and the lowest percentage of 
forest communities that have potential to sell timber but do not sell it (Type I communities).27  
Durango has also been a leader in sustainable forest management. The state has the 
highest number of communities (22, representing 58% of the total in Mexico) and the largest 
forest area (377,183 ha, 53% of total) certified by the Forest Stewardship Council’s (FSC) 
program (Trujano et al., 2010). The state also had the highest rate of growth of certification –for 
the 2010-2011 cycle of the PROARBOL program the amount of money assigned for certification 
in the state was larger than that assigned to all other 31 states combined (Trujano et al., 2010). In 
2007, the state was identified by the then-chief of PROFEPA as having one of the “most 
ordered” forestry sectors in the country, showing low levels of ilegal logging (El Siglo de 
Torreón, 08-10-2007). In addition, in contrast to other regions of the country, Durango shows 
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 Durango has 24 species of the Pine genus (Pinus), 39 of the Oak genus (Quercus), two of the Fir genus (Abies), 
two of the Douglas-Fir (Pseudotsuga), as well the genuses Cypress (Cupressus), Juniper (Juniperus) and Spruce 
(Picea). Pine is the most commercially harvested genus because of its abundance, distribution, and wood 
characteristics. The pine species most used are: Pinus cooperi, P. engelmannii, P. durangensis, P. arizonica, P. 
teocote and P. herrerae (García and González, 2003).  
27
 Type IV communities are indicative of high levels of organization and local collective action, since they represent 
more vertical integration into the timber market and a much more complex operation. However internal organization 
is not the only factor driving vertical integration; ecological factors (particularly forest size) have also been shown to 
be determinant (Antinori and Rausser, 2008). 
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low levels of deforestation, with a rate of only 1% between 1993 and 2002, 5% lower than the 
national average (Perez-Verdin et al., 2009).  
Despite these notable qualities, Durango also shows some of the same problems as the 
national forest sector. The decline in the state’s timber production and industrial processing 
activities, and to lesser extent of community forestry enterprises, and the loss of competitiveness, 
have been the two main concerns in policy circles in Durango (Government of Durango, 2011). 
The government posits that the main problems are the lack of integration of the timber 
production chain and the high cost of timber. Interviewees also pointed to the importation of 
cheaper and lower quality timber from Chile, the United States, Canada and even China (in the 
form of cheap furniture) as one of the main culprits. Increasing timber production has been the 
main response by the State government, through promotion of increased timber extraction in 
managed areas through small (20 ha) clear-cutting projects, tree production, industrial capacity, 
and improved combat of forest fires.  
 
1.5.4. The four regions  
 In what follows, I provide basic relevant information on each of the regions where each FA 
operates to give background context of the cases. “Region” here is defined based on the Forest 
Management Units (UMAFORs) established by the government (CONAFOR and SEMARNAT) 
on the different watersheds within each Mexican state beginning in 2002.28 Durango has a total 
of twelve UMAFORs, with at least one FA operating in each region; the four FAs in this study 
operates in separate UMAFORs, which I will refer to (in numerical correspondence to the FAs) 
as UMAFOR 1, UMAFOR 2, UMAFOR 3 and UMAFOR 4.29 The information is mostly based 
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 For more on UMAFORs, see Merino et al. (2008) and Chapter 2. 
29
 These numbers do not correspond to the real UMAFOR numbers. 
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on the Regional Forest Studies (ERFs) commissioned by CONAFOR for each UMAFOR across 
Mexico. These studies, funded through the PROFAS program and community contributions, 
used government data, expert interviews and focus groups to provide detailed assessments of the 
social, economic and ecological characteristics of each region, as well as the main problems and 
potential solutions. Table 1.2 summarizes the basic characteristics of the four regions. Table 2.3 
in Chapter 2 shows the basic characteristics of each of the four corresponding FAs. 
 
1.5.4.1. Location and area 
 UMAFORs 1, 2 and 3 are located in the southwest region of the state and border each 
other. In contrast, UMAFOR 4 is located in the uppermost northwestern portion of the state, 
bordering to the north and west with the state of Chihuahua. UMAFOR 1 and 3 have similar 
areas, each covering between 550 and 600 thousand ha, about 4.7% of the state area (see Table 
1.2). UMAFOR 2 is the smallest of the four, with an area of 215,434 ha, of which 95% is in the 
Cataño municipality. UMAFOR 4 is the largest, with 1,133,614 ha;30 almost half (48%) is 
covered by the Moriviví municipality and the rest distributed between Ciudad (32%) and San 
Jacinto (20%). Combined, the four regions cover 2,493,653 ha, which represent 20% of the 
state’s area. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
30
 In this case, it is important to underscore that the forest region of this UMAFOR is almost exclusively 
concentrated in one of the region’s three municipalities, and the area of this municipality is comparable to that in 
UMAFOR 1 and 3.  
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Table 1.2 Some basic characteristics of the four regions 
Region Size(ha) Pop. Forest 
(ha) 
For* 
(%) 
Per 
cap** 
Mgmt
*** 
Vol.(m3) Indstry 
**** 
UMAFO1 558,270 45,829 474,543 85% 10.4 43% 504,900 33.5% 
UMAFO2 215,433 5,238 180,965  84% 34.5 30% 122,004 0% 
UMAFO3 586,335 23,835 450,692 77% 18.9 43% 445,689 17% 
UMAFO4 1,133,614 23,168 763,153 67% 32.9 30% 384,397 NA 
TOTAL/ 
AVG. 
2,493,653 98,070 1,869,353 78% 19.1 36.5% 1,456,990 17% 
* Percent of total land that is forest 
**Forest area per capita (ha/person) 
*** Percent of forest area under management 
****Percent of communities selling timber with primary and/or secondary processing 
 
1.5.4.2. Population and economy 
 In terms of population, the regions present a similar picture as the rest of the state. The four 
municipalities, being predominantly rural, have even lower population densities. In all four, 
population was less than 50,000 (see Table 1.2). Moreover, the population remains stable (i.e. 
without growth). Significant migration is a common factor in all four regions. UMAFOR 1 is the 
most populated of the four regions and is also the most densely populated, with 9.5 inhabitants 
per km2, which is still below the state average (12/km2). About half (53%) of the region’s 
population lives in two main towns, and the rest is in rural areas. UMAFOR 2 has the least 
population, with less than 6,000 inhabitants, representing less than 1% (0.35%) of the state 
population. Population density is very low (2.4/km2) and there are no settlement with more than 
2,500 people. Many community members live in the capital and or work there, and one of the 
region’s communities even holds its monthly assembly meetings there.  UMAFOR 3 and 4 are 
in the middle of the group. In UMAFOR 3, population density is also in the middle, with 
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approximately 4 inhabitants per km2. In UMAFOR 4, which is significantly larger than the other 
three regions, population density is significantly lower, ranging between 1.6 to 2.6.   
 The four regions have very similar economies based on four main activities – agriculture, 
livestock grazing, forestry, and mining. Corn, foraging oat, and beans are the main products. 
Potatoes and squash are produced for self-consumption. Production and productivity tend to be 
low because of droughts, freezes, dispersion of agricultural land, inaccessibility, and poor 
technical assistance. Fish farming is also carried out in some communities, but mostly for self-
consumption. Environmental services, ecotourism, and wildlife hunting (particularly of deer and 
peacocks) are considered as having much potential. High levels of unemployment, low payment 
and the seasonal nature of forest-related jobs, were identified in the ERFs and my fieldwork as a 
major issue in all four regions, mainly in forest communities. 
 There are some cross-regional differences. In UMAFOR 3 and UMAFOR 4, mining is an 
important component of the economy, but it is confined to the municipal capitals. Fish farming is 
also much more developed than in the other regions. There are fourteen trout farms of which ten 
are currently operating, producing 14.75 tons/year, approximately 50% of their full capacity. FA-
3 has had a lot to do with this; one of its members has the largest trout farm in the state. 
 In UMAFOR 2 and UMAFOR 4 there is a clear division, geographically and economically, 
between two sub-regions – a forest sub-region where forestry (i.e. timber extraction) is the main 
source of income and employment, and a semi-arid sub-region where agriculture and ranching 
are the main activities. The semi-arid sub-region in UMAFOR 4 has the largest and most 
important cattle grazing area in the entire state.  
1.5.4.3. Social conditions 
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 All four regions have similar conditions regarding basic services like housing, potable 
water, drainage, electricity, health, education, and transportation. These services, and particularly 
water, sanitary connection and electricity, often do not reach forest communities, and are mostly 
concentrated in the municipal capitals due to dispersion of settlements, rugged topography and 
the scarcity and poor condition of communication routes. Houses without sanitary connection 
usually use latrines, while a portion of those without electricity have solar panels.    
 Levels of formal education are low in all four regions. One of UMAFOR 1’s strengths is 
that it a university focused on forestry issues. In forest communities, formal education is 
complemented with environmental education and technical capacity-building courses offered by 
CONAFOR and by the communities’ foresters. Levels of health coverage in the four regions are 
also low, ranging between less than 30% in UMAFOR 2 and UMAFOR 3, to 38% in UMAFOR 
1 and 43% in UMAFOR 4.  
 Poverty in all four regions is high. In UMAFORs 1, 3 and 4, the percent of families under 
“patrimonial poverty” (i.e. not having enough income to cover their basic needs of food, 
education, health, clothing, housing, and transport) is between 70% are 80%.31 These three 
regions also have high levels of social marginalization (rezago social). In UMAFOR 2, the level 
of patrimonial poverty (55%) and the level of social marginalization (low-very low) are lower 
than in the other three regions, but this is partly a bias due to the proximity to the capital.  
 
1.5.4.4. Road infrastructure 
 Road infrastructure is an important factor influencing production costs in the forest sector, 
and has been identified as one of the main problems in Mexico (Merino, 2011). Contrary to the 
US and Canada, the Mexican government has largely abandoned construction and maintenance 
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 The data is in the ERFs and is taken from the National Population Commission’s 2006 study (CONAPO, 2006).  
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(ibid). Communities often have to invest heavily in these activities. In all four regions, the poor 
quality of the road infrastructure (unpaved roads, insufficient maintenance) was identified as one 
of the main problems. UMAFOR 1 and fared the best in this category, with 95% and 70% of 
their roads paved. The amount of roads in UMAFOR 1 is considered sufficient for the timber 
extraction activities. The region is crossed by two major highways that connect it to the coast and 
to the state capital, giving it easy access to other timber markets. In UMAFOR 2, road conditions 
were substantially enhanced in 2011 with the completion of the paving of the region’s main road 
that connects directly to the capital. Previously, according to interviews, it took approximately 8 
hours to get from the region’s main town to the capital; now it takes about 1.5 hours, and even 
less to some of the communities that are closer.  
 UMAFOR 3 and 4 have the worst road conditions of the four regions. Only 5% and 11% of 
road infrastructure respectively are paved. In UMAFOR 3, an additional 79 km of paved roads 
are needed, and more than 300 km need rehabilitation. In UMAFOR 4, 71% of the roads are in 
poor conditions and the rest are in ‘regular’ conditions. The region is connected to a city in the 
south of Chihuahua through a 125 km route of paved road. The same road has 120 km of 
unpaved road which links the center of the forest sub-region to the municipal capital. There is an 
ongoing project to pave a portion of this dirt road. 
 
1.5.4.5. Forest management  
 All four UMAFORs are predominantly forested and, as stated above, are four of the five 
most important forest regions in the state. In terms of forest area, UMAFOR 4 has the largest of 
the four and of the state, UMAFOR 2 is the smallest, and UMAFORs 1 and 3 have similar ‘in-
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between’ sizes (see Table 1.2).32 Percentage-wise, however, the relationship is somewhat 
inverted: UMAFORs 1 and 2 are the most forested, followed by UMAFOR 3, while UMAFOR 4 
is the least forested. In terms of per capita forest area, UMAFOR 2 and 4 have the highest (34.5 
and 32.9 respectively), followed by UMAFOR 3 (18.9) and UMAFOR 1 (10.4). In total, the four 
regions have 1,869,353 hectares of forest, which is 37.5% of the state’s total. 
 The types of forests predominant in each region include pine, pine-oak, oak-pine, and oak 
formations. Proportions of forest area corresponding to pine forests vary and are highest in 
UMAFOR 1 (48%). Other ecological zones are induced grassland, natural grassland, and shrub 
lands. Forest areas in UMAFORs 1, 2, and 3 have relatively high timber productivity, with over 
70% of these areas having high or moderate productivity.33 UMAFOR 4, in contrast, has 
approximately 30%. 
 The area under forest management ranges between 30% in UMAFORs 2 and 4 to 43% in 
UMAFORs 1 and 3 (see Table 1.2). In terms of timber volume extracted, UMAFORs 1, 3 and 4 
all have similar volumes that ranges between 400 and 500 thousand m3; UMAFOR 2 has a 
significantly lower volume (see Table 1.2).34 Still, all four regions are estimated to be under-
producing (at about 70%) compared to their full potential. In relation to this, declining levels of 
timber production was identified as one of the main forestry-related problems. For instance, 
production in UMAFOR 1 has fallen since 2000 by an estimated 40% (El Siglo de Durango, 04-
15-2010).  
                                                           
32
 Forested areas in Mexico include “forests” (temperate forests of pine-oak formations) and “jungles” (selva, forests 
in lower elevations with sub-humid or semi-dry temperatures with deciduous species). Forests are the only 
commercially viable forestlands in Durango. Above, I have included only (temperate) forest areas. The area of selva 
per region is: 47,273 ha in UMAFOR 1; zero (0) ha in UMAFOR 2; 106,680 ha in UMAFOR 3; and 49,647 ha in 
UMAFOR 4.  
33
 Moderate productivity is defined as more than 15 m3/ha/year and less than 40 m3/ha/year of tree volume growth. 
High productivity is defined as more than 40 m3/ha/year. 
34
 This volume includes pine, oak, deadwood and other minor species; about 70-75% in each region is for pine, 
except in UMAFOR 4 were a very high proportion of this volume (about 50% some years) comes from deadwood. 
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 Forest management in all four regions is generally characterized as good by knowledgeable 
observers, with the expected variation between different communities. Each has important 
historical trajectories of forest management, and of community forestry, but UMAFOR 1 has 
always been considered a national leader in this regard. In the 1930s, it was the site of one of the 
largest private timber companies in the country. It was also where one of the first community 
forestry experiments and one of the first FAs were formed. Currently, the region stands out as 
having the most communities and forest area in the state covered by the FSC sustainable forestry 
certification. 
 UMAFORs 1, 3 and 4 have relatively high levels of industrialization of the forestry 
sector, each with dozens of sawmills, box, pallet and molding workshops, and lumber yards, and 
several charcoal kilns. A substantial difference, however, exists in terms of the local processing 
of wood. In UMAFOR 1, about 80% of the current production is industrialized locally (within 
the region), while the remaining 20% is industrialized in other parts of the state (mostly in the 
capital city of Durango). In contrast, in UMAFORs 3 and 4 only a third of the extracted wood is 
processed in the region.  
UMAFOR 2 is substantially less industrialized than the other three regions. Currently, 
there are no sawmills, only two small coal factories and 4 small-dimension factories for pallets 
and box part. The vast majority of the timber extracted from the region is sold unprocessed –
either in ‘standing board’ (extracted by the buyers) or extracted by the landowners.35 However, 
even in UMAFORs 1, 3 and 4, the value added to the wood is relatively low compared to the 
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 The region’s main timber company had a sawmill in the region but closed it after a few years and moved to the 
city of Durango; according to the manager, finding a sufficient and consistent workforce was difficult and the costs 
of operation were higher. Several of region’s communities also operated sawmills in the 1990s. In 2010, the largest 
forest community installed a new sawmill but to date it has not been able to begin operations because it lacks 
electricity. The ERF estimated that there was potential for only two or three communities to install small timber 
processing operations. 
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potential. Most of the timber in the three regions is sold as logs (en rollo), with a smaller 
percentage sold as sawn wood.  
 
1.5.4.6. Conservation  
 Formal conservation areas are mostly based on the legally-mandated protection of buffer 
zones (areas next to streams, rivers and lakes) and areas with more than 100% slope. However, 
each region also has additional areas destined for conservation. Overall, conservation lands 
represent between 4% and 5% of the forests in each region. Table 1.3 presents this and other 
regional indicators of ecological sustainability. Some communities are also involved in 
CONAFOR’s environmental services (PSA) program, which pays communities to conserve a 
portion of their forests to maintain provision of these services (see Table 1.3).  Because of their 
location in the highest parts of the watershed, the regions serve an important role in protecting 
water. Unfortunately, these programs are only approved for 5-year periods and communities do 
not always renew them. Moreover, definitions of the eligible areas for the PSA are somewhat 
arbitrary (Merino, 2011), and many areas with potential for environmental services in Durango 
have been excluded (e.g. UPUCODEFO4, 2008).  Finally, reforestation and soil conservation 
activities are carried out yearly as required by management plans. These activities are supported 
with funding from CONAFOR and help regenerate areas where extraction is carried out or which 
have been impacted by forest fires, overgrazing or illegal logging (see Table 1.3). 
 
1.5.4.7. Land use change 
 Deforestation was found to be moderate in the four regions. The total area lost (length of 
period varied) represented between 2.4% (in UMAFOR 1) to 7.3% (in UMAFOR 2) of each 
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region’s forest land, which equals less than 1% per year (between 0.2% to 0.7%) in each case 
(see Table 1.3).36 
Table 1.3. Ecological indicators of sustainability in the four regions 
 UMAFOR 1 UMAFOR 2 UMAFOR 3 UMAFOR 4 
Indicat. Level and 
Description 
Level and 
Description 
Level and 
Description 
Level and 
Description 
Deforest Level: Moderate 
(0.2% per year) 
 
Period: 1991-2003 
Area: 11,220 ha 
Per year: 1,020 ha 
Level: Moderate 
(0.7% per year) 
 
Period: 1993-2004 
Area: 13,207 ha  
Per year: 1,321 ha 
Level: Moderate 
(0.3% per year) 
 
Period: 1991-2000 
Area: 12,495 ha 
Per year: 1,249 ha 
Level: Moderate 
(0.3% per year) 
 
Period: 1990-2006 
Area: 31,000 ha 
Per year: 1,938 ha 
Forest 
Degradt 
Level: Moderate 
(0.7% per year)  
 
Period: 1991-2003 
Area: 75,007 ha 
Per year: 7,501 ha 
Level: Moderate 
(0.8% per year) 
 
Period: 1993-2004 
Area: 14,576 ha 
Per year: 1,458 ha 
Level: Moderate 
(0.4% per year) 
 
Period: 1991-2000 
Area: 15,642 ha 
Per year: 1,738 ha 
Level: Moderate 
(0.2% per year)  
 
Period: 1990-2006 
Area: 21,970 ha 
Per year: 1,373 ha 
Forest 
Fires 
Level: Moderate 
(0.4% per year) 
 
Period: 1995-2006 
Area: NA  
Per year: 2,000 ha 
Level: Moderate 
(0.6% per year) 
 
Period: 1998-2006 
Area: 11,113 ha  
Per year: 1,389 ha 
Level: Low  
(0.2% per year) 
 
Period: 1998-2006 
Area: 8,795 ha  
Per year: 977 ha 
Level: Moderate 
(0.2% per year) 
 
Period: 1995-2006 
Area: 20,481 ha 
Per year: 1,707 ha 
Reforest
.  
Level: Low  
 
Period: 2002-2006  
Area: 1,727 ha 
% of needed*: 4 
Per year: 345 ha 
Level: Low 
 
Period: 2002-2006  
Area: 1,614 ha 
% of needed: 7.5 
Per year: 323 ha 
Level: Moderate 
 
Period: 2002-2006 
Area: 2,998 ha 
% of needed: 25% 
Per year: 600 ha 
Level: Low 
 
Period: 2002-2006 
Area: 1,202 ha 
% of needed: 11.5 
Per year: 240 ha 
Conserv
Areas 
Level: Low 
 
Area: 23,103 ha 
% of forest: 4.9 
Level: Low 
 
Area: 8,680 ha 
% of forest: 4.8 
Level: Low 
 
Area: 20,396 ha 
% of forest: 4.5 
Level: Low 
 
Area: 29,282 ha 
% of forest:  3.8 
PSA 
areas  
Level: Low 
 
Area: 13,099 ha 
% of forest: 2.8 
Level: Low 
 
Area: 6,202 ha 
% of forest: 3.4 
Level: Very low 
 
Area: 0 ha 
% of forest: 0 
Level: Very low 
 
Area: 8,700 ha 
% of forest: 1.1 
 
* Percentage of area considered degraded and therefore subject to restoration 
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 The data used in in the ERFs was the INEGI land use and vegetation sheets, which are at 1:250,000 scale. 
Deforestation is defined as the net change in area covered by tree vegetation (forests and jungles). 
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 Most of the deforestation and degradation occured in closed (high density) pine and pine-
oak formations.37 Open pine-oak formations and grasslands (used for livestock), in contrast, 
where the land-use categories with the largest increases. The former represent the process of land 
degradation from more dense to less dense forests, while the latter show the process of 
deforestation. UMAFOR 3 was the only region where closed pine forests increased (by 2,311 
ha).  
 The main causes of deforestation and degradation were common across the four cases: 
forest fires, forest plagues and diseases, expansion of cattle grazing land and other land uses, and 
illegal logging. The increase in grasslands points to this as one of the main drivers of 
deforestation. Infrastructure expansion –particularly electricity lines and highways– was an 
important cause in some areas. Forestry-related impacts also present a risk (particularly of 
overharvesting), but reforestation and restoration activities that take place every year have 
facilitated the gradual recovery of these areas. Foresters also identified the low level of ‘forestry 
culture’ among landowners as a cause. 
 
1.5.4.7. Social organization of timber production 
 In UMAFOR 1 about 90% of the region’s annual extraction volume is produced by 
communities. Most communities (48%) administer their extraction process and sell their wood 
unprocessed, either with or without transportation to the lumber yards (patios de concentración). 
These communities, however, represent only 4% of the annual extracted volume in the region. 
The second-largest group of communities are those with primary processing capacity (box 
workshops and/or sawmills); they represent 28.5% of all communities but extract the vast 
                                                           
37
 Closed forests are defined as those with a tree density of more than 40 m3/ha, a tree coverage of over 40%, and a 
predominance of pine species (more than 80% of trees). Open forests are those below those boundaries. 
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majority of the region’s volume (74.5%). Eight communities (19%) sell stumpage wood (en pie), 
the lowest level of organization in which the landowners rent out their land to a private 
contractor which controls extraction and processing; they represent only 2% of the total annual 
harvested volume. Finally, only two communities (5%) have achieved the highest level of 
development, i.e. secondary processing capacity or ‘added value’, and they represent 13% of the 
volume. 
 In contrast, in UMAFOR 2, 71% of the timber is produced by communities and 29% by 
private properties. Moreover, there are no communities with value-added production. Most of the 
communities (61%) sell “standing” (buyer handles the entire harvesting, extraction and transport 
process), 28% sell in logs (community handles the process), and the remaining 11% do not 
harvest timber.  
 In UMAFOR 3, there are 48 communities (representing 35% of all properties with forest 
management) which produce about 66% of the timber. Of these, the vast majority (81%) sell 
“standing” timber and cover the largest share of the region’s total volume (about 40%). Only 1 
community sells logs, generating 9% of the volume, and 17% of communities sell sawn wood, 
pallets or packaging boxes, accounting for 17% of the timber. The remaining 34% of the timber 
is produced by 90 private properties; most of them produce standing. 
 In UMAFOR 4, 78 of the 125 properties with forest had timber extraction. There is no 
information available on the types of products and volume each property managed.  
  
1.5.4.8. Forest associations and other regional organizations 
 Each of the four regions has at least one forest association (FA). In UMAFOR 1, all of the 
communities with current timber extraction in the region are officially incorporated into FA-1. A 
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few small non-forestry communities are not integrated into the association. There is also a 
parallel association that provides forestry services and covers most of the region’s communities. 
In UMAFOR 2, there are two associations: FA-2 and a newer association created through the 
PROFAS program, which groups almost all of the region’s communities and private properties. 
This other association works mostly on carrying out research, supporting the regional eco-
tourism projects and promoting environmental services. Seven of the region’s 19 communities 
(38%) are not integrated into any association. UMAFOR 3 has three forest associations in the 
region, though one of them is currently non-operational. FA-3 is the largest and oldest of them; 
the other two were formed with the PROFAS program. There are 24 communities and 42 private 
properties that are not integrated into any FA. There are also two road committees (one of them 
is closely linked to FA-3) that contribute financially to maintenance of the region’s roads. In 
UMAFOR 4 there are three FAs, including FA-4. However, in both regions, very large 
proportions of the communities (50% in UMAFOR 3, 70% in UMAFOR 4) are not organized in 
any FA. 
 In each region there are also producer associations or “chains” (cadenas productivas) that 
seek to integrate the process of production from extraction to processing and sale. In UMAFOR 
1, there is one functional producer association (cadena productiva) which groups all of the 
region’s ecotourism enterprises. In UMAFOR 2, there are two producer associations organized in 
the region, one for vegetable coal led by a coal company with the participation of some 
communities, and another for pallets organized by four communities. UMAFORs 3 and 4 do not 
have any registered producer associations, through there is certainly potential for them, 
particularly in the deadwood market in UMAFOR 4. 
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 The presence of non-governmental organizations in the four regions is scarce. The only 
one that stands out is Rainforest Alliance, which works with forest certification, has worked with 
some communities in each region (except UMAFOR 4) and has a strong presence in UMAFOR 
1. In UMAFOR 3 the NGO Caritas helps basic needs like food baskets. The National Peasant 
Confederation (CNC) also has presence in all four regions and works mostly on agricultural and 
livestock issues, without any direct involvement in natural resource management.  
 Despite the relative strength of community forestry in the four regions, there are substantial 
organizational challenges that are highlighted in the ERFs. An illustrative example is UMAFOR 
1. Analyses carried out by the FA itself as well as my own interviews highlight that while this 
region was considered one of the strongest in the country in the 1970s and 1980s, the level of 
organization has begun to weaken and fall behind other regions. The FA-1 Strategic Plan (FA-1, 
2010) points out that from 2002 to date, there has been an increase in the sale of standing wood 
and concludes that social organization in their region is “unstable” and “underdeveloped”.38 Low 
levels of education and capacity-building in forestry, and poor extension services were identified 
as related problems. At the community level, this is reflected in the process of vertical 
disintegration, evident in all four regions (see also Antinori and Rausser, 2010 for data on a 
sample of 28 communities in Durango). 
 
1.6. Overview of Chapters and Summary of Findings 
This dissertation is organized in a paper format, where each of the chapters serves as a 
separate piece of research focusing on a specific issue related to cross-scale/multi-level 
governance, and aims to provide a theoretical and empirical contribution to the relevant 
                                                           
38
 This characterization coincides with my own findings; the reasons are explored in depth in Chapters 4 and 5. 
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literature. Given that most of the information in the dissertation comes from a comparative case 
study of four FAs, there is inevitable repetition in the papers, particularly regarding the 
theoretical framework, methods and case descriptions. I have tried to minimize to the extent 
possible these duplications. 
Following this Introduction, Chapter 2 traces the emergence and historical evolution of 
inter-community forest associations (FAs) in Mexican community forestry. The analysis seeks to 
explain how and why these organizations emerge and evolve over time by looking at different 
factors that drive these historical transformations. The study is based on an extensive literature 
review of existing studies combined with fieldwork spanning a period of approximately three 
years (2007-2011). The findings show how forest associations form and transform in response to 
changes in community needs, public policies, and political-economic conditions.  
Chapter 3 analyzes the local-level impacts of cross-scale linkages by evaluating the 
operation of the four FAs (two top-down and two bottom-up). Specifically, the chapter focuses 
on two inter-related issues: (1) the services that each association provides to their member 
communities and how these services impact forest management, political representation and 
community forestry enterprises; and (2) the differences in services, benefits and internal 
governance between top-down and bottom-up FAs. The findings show that FAs are a central 
component of multi-level/cross-scale governance in Mexico which can be crucial for the 
provision of services, goods and infrastructure related to the protection and enhancement of 
community forests, the economic development of community enterprises, and the political 
representation of these communities. At the same time, the study finds important differences 
between top-down and bottom-up FAs, while pointing to some of the advantages and 
disadvantages of each of these linkages.  
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Chapter 4 delves more in-depth into the dysfunctionalities of cross-scale governance, and 
particularly on the problems of elite capture and persistence and their ensuing conflicts, in the 
four FAs. It attempts to explain why elite capture occurs and how it can be mitigated. The results 
show the multiple external and internal actors involved in the capture of FAs for both political 
and economic purposes. In particular, I show certain organizational problems or  “pathologies” –
using a medical metaphor–  such as leaders and associated foresters utilizing the organizations as 
‘ladders’ to escalate into higher political positions (which brought about internal divisions) or 
using them to profit. Furthermore, they underscore that the different forms of capture can be 
explained as a combined effect of institutions, power inequalities and political-economic and 
historical factors. 
While Chapter 3 shows that there is a wide range of observable benefits provided by FAs 
to member communities, and Chapter 4 explains one of the main problems with these regional 
collective action endeavors, they do not delve on the different levels of impacts, or the 
comparative success of each type of FA. Chapter 5 directly addresses this issue by analyzing 
how a combination of internal and external factors influences the effectiveness of the four FAs in 
the study. Applying Ostrom’s diagnostic framework, I focus on how five factors –origins and 
previous experience, leadership, autonomy, social capital and internal institutions and 
governance– affects the associations’ level of benefits and their perceived success. The results 
show that leadership, financial autonomy, social capital and enforcement of rules are recurrent 
variables but that they operate in different combinations to influence success. Origins did not 
show the expected relationship to elite capture or success –the most successful FA (FA-3) and 
one of the two with the least elite capture (FA-4) were both top-down. Finally, previous 
experience and political autonomy were not as relevant as expected for success. 
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Chapter 6 provides a summary of the main results and some concluding remarks about the 
empirical and theoretical contributions of this dissertation, its policy implications, and the gaps 
that should be addressed in future research.  
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CHAPTER 2 
HISTORICAL TRANSFORMATIONS IN THE FOREST COMMONS: THE 
EMERGENCE AND EVOLUTION OF INTER-COMMUNITY FOREST 
ASSOCIATIONS IN MEXICO  
(with Camille Antinori, UC-Berkeley) 
  
ABSTRACT: Cross-scale linkages play an important role in common-pool resource 
governance. However, these linkages and their origins and transformations only recently began 
to receive scholarly attention. To address this gap, in this paper we trace the emergence and 
historical evolution of inter-community forest associations, as a form of cross-scale linkage, in 
the Mexican community forestry sector. We analyse different factors that drive the formation and 
change of these associations over time. The research is based on a review of existing studies, 
community survey data and case studies over a three-year period (2007-2011). The findings 
show how forest associations form and transform in response to changes in public policies, 
political-economic conditions, and community needs. Overall, the paper raises important issues 
about the need to analyse the role of cross-scale governance in common-pool resources, to 
understand changes in these arrangements as a form of institutional change from a historical, 
process-centred perspective, and to analyse the role of the State in these processes. 
 
 
2.1. Introduction  
Recent scholarly work has begun to devote attention to the role that cross-scale linkages 
play in common-pool resource (CPR) management (e.g. Basurto, 2007; Berkes, 2002; Heikkila 
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et al., 2011; Mwangi and Wardell, 2012; Young, 2002).39 In this tradition, some have pointed to 
inter-community forest associations (FAs)40, which provide services such as political 
representation, technical forestry services, and marketing and production (Antinori and García-
López, 2008; Bray et al., 2012; Paudel et al., 2010; Taylor, 2010). With growing recognition of 
the global relevance of forest and the importance of community-based institutions for their 
management, it is important to understand how these inter-community associations shape 
collective action and resource governance. This, in turn, requires evaluating their diverse origins 
and purposes. 
Mexico’s highly successful community-based forest management experience has led some 
to call it a “global model for sustainable landscapes” (Bray et al., 2003; see also Barsimantov, 
2010; Bray et al., 2005; Merino and Martínez, 2011). A significant number of community 
forestry enterprises (CFEs) have consolidated their entrepreneurial strategies and diversified their 
forest industries (Antinori and Bray, 2005; Antinori and Rausser, 2009; Merino and Martínez, 
2011). Deforestation in Mexico, particularly in temperate forests, declined considerably in the 
last decade (about 50% according to CONAFOR –see El Siglo de Durango, 10-03-2010), and 
community forestry is likely one of the contributing factors, along with emigration and 
agricultural abandonment (Bray et al., 2008; Merino, 2011). However, many forest communities 
involved in forestry activities still face substantial challenges related to weak organization, 
insufficient management skills, and limited access to markets (Barsimantov, 2010; Merino and 
Martínez, 2011).  
                                                           
39
 Cross-scale linkages can be defined as points of interaction or cooperation between different actors or across 
different levels of governance (Heikkila et al., 2011). 
40
 This definition subsumes other monikers, such as inter-community organizations (ICOs) (Antinori and García-
López, 2008), secondary-level associations (Taylor, 2010), inter-community collective action (Bray et al., 2012), 
community networks (Britt, 2002; Paudel et al., 2010), or regional organizations (Fox, 1992). 
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Recent scholarship suggests that connections (linkages) to external actors like NGOs, 
foresters and FAs at multiple governance levels or scales can be crucial for the socio-economic 
and ecological success of community forestry activities (Antinori and García-López, 2008; 
Barsimantov, 2010; Chapter 4; Orozco-Quintero and Berkes, 2010). Surveys of forest 
communities in Mexico show that the majority have at some point held membership in a forest 
association (Antinori, 2000; Antinori and Rausser, 2010; Bray and Merino, 2004).41 In recent 
years, the government has channeled substantial sums of money to existing and new 
associations. Yet important gaps remain in our understanding of how and why linkages between 
communities and other actors across scales emerge and evolve over time, the role of the State 
and the political-economic context in which the linkages operate (see Anthony and Campbell, 
2011; Armitage, 2008; Fréchette and Lewis, 2011; Stern et al., 2002; Thiel and Egerton, 2011). 
In fact, evaluating “how these linkages have evolved, at what points in time, and in relation to 
what forces”, has been identified as one of the research directions in this field (Heikkila et al., 
2011). After all, understanding how and collective action begins at different levels of governance 
is central to explaining the sustainability of resource management (Poteete et al., 2010).  
The amount of potential explanatory variables is large, requiring careful contextual 
analyses using combinations of methods (Poteete et al., 2010). Some see cross-scale 
arrangements as a result of bottom-up cooperation across levels, others as a strategic move by the 
State and/or local actors to maintain control over decision-making, and still others as a product of 
historical path dependencies and macro-structural changes. When considering these perspectives, 
a key question is how grassroots collective action and institutions may emerge in highly 
                                                           
41
 In 1992, about 20% of the country’s forest communities participated in at least one FA, with 83 FAs across the 
country, 54 of them regional; by 2004, 43 such associations existed, with 20 confirmed to be functional (Bray and 
Merino-Pérez, 2004).  
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centralized states or authoritarian systems (as has been the case in Mexico) where resource users 
have little autonomy and few incentives to cooperate (Fréchette and Lewis, 2011).  
This chapter seeks to address these gaps by analyzing the historical trajectories of inter-
community forest associations (FAs) in Mexico, focusing on the main macro- and micro-level 
factors influencing their origins and evolution. By combining explanatory factors, we seek to 
close the gap between different theories of collective action and between two traditions in 
commons scholarship which have focused on either macro or micro-level factors (Johnson, 2004; 
Armitage, 2008; Clement, 2010; Sikor, 2006). We also engage with recent studies of 
decentralization that critically analyze the reasons for the formation of, or the lack of change in, 
natural resource governance regimes (e.g. García-López and Kashwan, 2008; Nayak and Berkes, 
2008; Poteete and Ribot, 2011; Ribot, 2009; Ribot et al., 2006), but which have had very little to 
say about FAs. In particular, we highlight the conceptualization of decentralization of authority 
to local (community) and regional (inter-community) organizations as a way of creating multi-
level/cross-scale governance, i.e. re-scaling (see Mwangi and Wardell, 2012); (b) the role of FAs 
in driving and implementing decentralization reforms; (c) how the creation of new FAs or 
modification of existing ones can be a component of these reforms; and (d) the effects that 
decentralization policies and programs can have on existing FAs.  
The analysis is based on three sources developed using both qualitative and quantitative 
methods: (1) a review of existing literature on Mexican forest associations , (2) empirical data 
from a survey of 41 communities (see Antinori and Rausser, 2010), and (3) case studies of four 
associations from Durango, Mexico, represented in the survey (labeled FA-1, FA-2, FA-3 and 
FA-4). We draw inspiration on the “process-tracing” approach, which traces causal processes of 
interest through careful, structured comparisons (George and Bennett, 2005; Stinchcombe, 
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2005); in this case, we compare different FAs formed over several historical periods to determine 
the ‘when, how, why and by whom’ (for a similar application, see Britt, 2002). The large-N 
survey data allows us to combine this qualitative process analysis with a variable-based approach 
focused on correlations. This mixed approach contributes to the study of inter-community 
collective action and institutional change by combining specific, quantitative and qualitative 
information within a contextual narrative to characterize the drivers of the emergence of these 
collective action processes in an important forestry sector. The results show the complex 
combination of macro and micro-level factors, including actors’ interests and strategies as well 
as political-economic conditions. They also underscore the hybrid and dialectical nature of cross-
scale/multi-level governance, with interactions between local bottom-up pressures for change 
and top-down government strategies, and between cooperation and conflict. The historical, 
evolutionary approach allows us to evidence these interactions. Finally, we also demonstrate the 
crucial role of FAs in the emergence and success of community forestry in Mexico. 
The chapter is organized as follows.  Section 2 provides a review of the macro and micro-
level factors expected to influence cross-scale linkages’ emergence and change.  Section 3 traces 
the historical emergence and evolution of Mexican FAs in five distinct periods related to shifts in 
national forest policies and political-economic conditions. Section 4 presents the results from the 
Durango-Michoacán database, followed by the case studies which represent FAs from four of 
these periods. Section 5 presents a discussion of the main findings in the study and their 
theoretical and practical implications, followed by a conclusion.  
 
 
 
87 
 
2.2. Explaining the emergence of cross-scale linkages: Insights from the literature 
When studying collective action and institutional change, we need to consider that action at 
one level occurs within a given institutional and socio-political context which creates  constraints 
and opportunities for participants (Ostrom, 2005; Poteete et al., 2010). Thus, the ability of actors 
to shift levels of action so as to change the higher-level rules bounding them is crucial (Ostrom, 
2005: 33, 59-62). Social movements and organizations such as FAs that can facilitate this shift 
may be created for this purpose. At the same time, collective action and institutional change 
cannot be explained only as motivated by efficiency and cooperation; power, conflict, path 
dependency and political-economic opportunities and constraints are also important (Clement, 
2010; Kashwan, 2011; Fréchette and Lewis, 2011; Thiel and Egerton, 2011).  
In different historical periods, Mexican FAs have emerged in multiple forms and for 
multiple reasons. In many cases, their formation has been driven by government policies or 
strategic government actors; in others, by grassroots cooperation or local elites seeking power or 
rents. Moreover, they have emerged under a socio-political context characterized by a state with 
a very strong political involvement on rural life, but very weak action on issues like road 
construction and provision of basic services. These processes cannot be understood along single 
disciplinary lines. Inspired by recent scholarship pointing to the need for more nuanced analyses 
that incorporate multiple perspectives to explain institutional change (Armitage, 2008; Clement, 
2010; Fréchette and Lewis, 2011; Ostrom, 2009; Poteete et al., 2010), we consider multi-
disciplinary explanations from scholarship in CPRs, social movements, and cooperatives.  
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2.2.1. Macro-level context: Political opportunities and constraints 
Local forest governance operates within varied historical, political, and socio-economic 
contexts. Understanding the influence of these contexts on collective action has been the focus of 
a particular strand of the ‘political economy of natural resources’ or ‘entitlements’ tradition (see 
Armitage, 2008; Johnson, 2004; Sick, 2008; Sikor, 2006; Clement, 2010). Similarly, the social 
movement literature focuses on how political opportunities –incentives or disincentives for 
collective action– influence movement emergence and success. These opportunities depend on 
the openness of formal institutions to potential challenges; stability of coalitions among political 
elites; alliances between social movements, government and non-governmental actors; and the 
level of coercion or repression of collective action (McAdam et al., 1996; McAdam and Tarrow, 
2011; Tarrow, 1998).  
An important component is the institutional context (e.g. laws, policies) in place, which 
affects the incentives that actors face when making collective action decisions (Ostrom, 2007; 
Poteete et al., 2010). Resources provided by the state can generate incentives for the formation of 
organizations like FAs (Anthony and Campbell, 2011; Mettler and Soss, 2004; Tarrow, 1998). 
Policies can also structure, stimulate, and/or stall participation directly by mandating specific 
organizational forms or creating new organizations directly. Decentralization can create openings 
for collective action to emerge, and is usually tied to the creation of multi-level governance 
regimes (Mwangi and Wardell, 2012); yet decentralization can also create ‘closings’ by 
excluding certain groups, facilitating elite capture, or recentralizing authority in government 
agencies (e.g. Johnson et al., 2005; Larson, 2005; Poteete and Ribot, 2011; Ribot et al., 2006; 
Sikor and Ngoc Thanh, 2007; Wollenberg et al., 2006).  
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In the US, laws limiting free forestry extension services created a ‘management void’ for 
landowners, indirectly promoting the emergence of landowner cooperatives to provide those 
services (Tiles et al., 2004). In Turkey, the large number of laws regulating coops, the 
government’s insufficient support and its political intervention have limited their formation and 
development (Atmiş et al., 2009), while in India, post-independence politics envisioned these 
organizations as part of local rural development, and consequently granted them special status 
(Lalvani, 2008). Market and government failures such as imperfect competition, excessive 
concentration of power, and unmet demand for goods and services may also spur the creation of 
coops (Bebbington, 1996; Fulton, 1999).  Alliances with key external actors can also facilitate 
the emergence and sustainment of movements or organizations (e.g. Britt, 2002; Johnson et al., 
2005; Paudel et al., 2010). However, external actors may hinder local collective action (e.g. 
Barsimantov, 2010; Larson, 2005; Mitlin et al., 2007; Poteete and Ribot, 2011).  
 Previous studies have shown the importance of combinations of these factors in 
understanding the emergence of FAs. Britt (2002), for instance, showed how changes in forest 
laws and the level of democracy, networking between forest communities and external actors, 
and changes in the way forest issues were framed, explained the formation of the Federation of 
Forest Users (FECOFUN) in Nepal. And Cronkleton et al. (2008) found that the emergence of 
forest-based social movements in Latin America was due to the historical weakness or absence 
of government institutions, the imposition of policies that promoted massive development or 
conservation schemes excluding forest communities, a history of indigenous capacity for 
collective action, and external technical and monetary assistance (see also Paudel et al., 2010). 
 Applying the political opportunities concept to Mexico, Fox (1996) argued that successful 
grassroots organization was strongest in regions with low levels of state repression, alliances 
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with external actors such as bureaucratic state reformers and NGOs, and a history of inter-
community collective struggles (see also Chapela, 1998). He identifies three distinct causal 
pathways to creating local-level social capital: (1) coproduction (convergence) between state 
(bureaucratic reformers) and societal actors, (2) coproduction between local and external societal 
actors (NGOs, donors, etc.), and (3) independent grassroots scaling-up. These processes can 
interact, with for instance grassroots organizations taking advantage of support from social 
capital co-produced previously with bureaucratic reformers or NGOs. 
 
2.2.2. Micro-level context: Local political and economic struggles 
From a transaction-cost perspective, networks form when the capabilities of individual 
organizations (in this case, communities) are considered insufficient, or the costs too high, to 
solve a given problem on their own (Benjamin et al., 2011; Fréchette and Lewis, 2011). Such 
may be the case with “wicked” environmental problems that are large, complex and cross 
multiple scales/jurisdictions (Benjamin et al., 2011). For instance, inter-state water compacts in 
the US formed to deal with problems of water scarcity and ensuing conflicts (Heikkila et al., 
2011). Similar motivations have led to the emergence of transboundary conservation schemes in 
national parks (e.g. Schoon, 2008), and proposals for managing marine fisheries (Berkes, 2010). 
Networks and cooperatives of private forest landowners, meanwhile, have emerged to address 
new local needs for forestry services (Tiles et al., 2004; Wolf, 2011). FAs may also form to 
protect the resources on which they depend for their livelihoods from exploitation by external 
agents such as mining and timber companies or governments, and/or to influence public policies 
(Bebbington et al., 2008; Britt, 2002; Cronkleton et al., 2008; Martínez-Alier, 2002; Paudel et al., 
2010; Seixas and Davy, 2008). Finally, cross-scale linkages may emerge in order to improve 
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economic conditions by pooling resources, sharing information about markets, and/or gaining 
bargaining power. In Brazil, for instance, a nut growers’ cooperative was created to improve 
marketing and members’ livelihoods (Paudel et al., 2010).   
Yet some propose that the emergence and maintenance of cross-scale arrangements –what 
geographers call “re-scaling”– is better understood as the product of power, conflict, and 
individualistic interests (Adger et al., 2005; Norman et al., 2012; Perreault and Bridge, 2009; 
Reed, 2010; Thiel and Egerton, 2011). The government may strategically promote local and 
cross-scale collective action as a way to increase their legitimacy or gain leverage with certain 
groups. This is specially the case in clientelist and corporatist systems. Organizations’ leaders 
and regional caciques may follow a similar logic. Top-down cross-scale linkages such as co-
management arrangements in Indian forests (Nayak and Berkes, 2008), legally-mandated 
associations in irrigation systems in Bulgaria (Theesfeld, 2009), top-down ‘regional’ governance 
bodies in Senegal (Ribot et al., 2006), and community-based organizations in wildlife 
management in Botswana (Poteete and Ribot, 2011) exemplify these processes. The ensuing 
power struggles between actors promoting decentralization and re-centralization or different 
forms of cross-scale arrangements create conflictive ‘back and forth’ dynamics (Bartley et al., 
2008; Poteete and Ribot, 2011; Wollenberg et al., 2006).  
 
2.3. A history of cross-scale linkages in Mexico 
Mexico’s history shows a wide diversity of FAs which have formed for different purposes 
from providing political representation and forestry extension, marketing and processing 
services, to mobilizing electoral constituencies or protecting natural resources. The formation 
and evolution of these FAs has been embedded in a highly authoritarian and clientelist state 
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which made effective grassroots social organization difficult and fostered the formation of 
lasting top-down clientelist political linkages (Chapela, 1998; Wilshusen and Murguia, 2003). 
This state has begun to weaken and liberalize in the last two decades, substantially modifying the 
political and economic terrain in which FAs operate.  
 At the same time, FAs often responded to forest and agrarian policies which have been 
characterized as “erratic” (Klooster, 2003) or “cyclical” (Collier, 1987, in Haenn, 2005), 
alternating between decentralization initiatives to support communities and recentralization 
attempts to promote large-scale corporate appropriation (for cogent reviews of this policy 
history, see Antinori and Bray, 2005; Merino, 2011). In this context, peasants show a 
longstanding “culture of accommodation” to institutional changes (Wilshusen, 2010). In what 
follows, we provide a historical view of FAs over five different periods, paying attention to the 
effects of changes in macro-level political-economic conditions on these associations.  
 
2.3.1 First phase (1930s – 60s): Centralized concessions and logging bans 
The 1917 Mexican constitution granted land rights to landless peasants and indigenous 
communities and began a process of agrarian reform, including land redistribution. These 
reforms initiated by President Lázaro Cárdenas (1934-40) were accompanied by the first 
government initiatives for creating community-based forest cooperatives (Bray and Merino, 
2004).  In 1931, as governor of Michoacán, Cárdenas ended the practice of private firms 
contracting with communities to harvest timber and established that Michoacán’s forests could 
only be managed by cooperatives organized by community members. As president, he promoted 
the creation of hundreds of these cooperatives nationwide, but their impacts on community 
development were few, and most dissolved (Bray and Merino, 2004: 56).   
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The more conservative president Ávila Camacho (1940-1946) ended land redistribution 
and support for community organization. Miguel Alemán (1946-1952) embraced a 
‘modernization’ and pro-market program, a definitive break with the leftist tradition within the 
Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) to that point (Durand Ponte, 2009). As part of his 
industrialization policies, a forest law and a series of presidential decrees imposed monopsony 
power in timber production by leasing community forests first to private companies (1940s – 
1960s) and then to state-controlled companies (1960s – 1980s) (Klooster, 2003; Merino, 2004: 
213-214). These concessions were combined with bans on community timber harvesting in large 
swaths of forests. From 1959 to 1980, about 50% of Mexican forests were under concessions, 
with the other 50% subject to bans or short-term contracts with private companies (Bray and 
Merino, 2004). In total, 37 concessions were given to parastatals and 10 to private companies 
(Mota Villanueva, 2002).  See Table 2.1. Under this system, communities theoretically had the 
right to refuse the contract offered to them, but generally accepted, with little room for 
negotiating (Klooster, 2003; Merino, 2004). The concessionaires were responsible for forest 
management plans and for paying the communities a “stumpage fee”, which had no 
correspondence to market value. Payments were deposited into community trust fund account for 
local development projects. Few communities were ever able to access these funds (Bray and 
Merino, 2004).  
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Table 2.1. Timber concessions given in Phase 1 and Phase 2  
State Parastatal* Private Beginning End FA response 
Chiapas Compañía 
Forestal de la 
Lacandona 
 1950s NA NA 
Triplay de 
Palenque 
1950s NA NA 
Chihuahua PROFORTARA  1972 1989 ARIC-GFA 
Durango PROFORMEX  1976/78 NA UNECOFAEZ, 
1976 
 Durango Lumber 
Company 
1900s 1969 UNECOF-ES, 
1968/1976 
Triplay y 
Maderas del 
Norte 
1958 1977 UEGP, 1960s 
Guerrero Forestal Vicente 
Guerrero 
 1972 NA UEHG, 1980  
Chapas de 
Triplay 
1950s NA NA 
Jalisco Fábricas Papel 
de Atenquique 
 1950s NA NA 
Mexico & 
Morelos  
 UIEF-San Rafael 1947 1991 UEFEZ, 1974 
Nayarit APROFON  1971 NA NA 
Michoacan MIMICH  1961 NA UECIFOMET-
LEA, 1976 
PROFORMICH 1970s NA NA 
Oaxaca FAPATUX  1956 
(1964 
govt. 
ownership) 
1982 UPAMP, 1967; 
ODRENASIJ, 
1980 
 Oaxaca Forest 
Company 
NA NA NA 
Quintana 
Roo 
MIQRO  1950s 
(1959 
govt. 
ownership) 
1982 SPEFQR and 
OPEFZM, 1986 
Veracruz FAPATUX  1956  NA NA 
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The political system had specific characteristics that facilitated political control of the 
peasantry, constricting the possibilities of autonomous collective action (Bartra and Otero, 2005; 
Chapela, 1998; Durand Ponte, 2009; Gordillo et al., 1998): (1) ‘presidencialismo’ –the 
concentration of power in the executive branch; (2) a de facto ‘one-party system’ (the PRI had 
governed uninterrupted since 1929) which limited the scope of dissent and competing policies; 
(3) caciquismo – the control of local and regional organizations by political bosses supported by 
the state (see Knight, 1998); and (4) corporatism and authoritarianism. Peasant groups “were 
often formed at the initiative and encouragement of the state” (Bartra and Otero, 2005: 164). 
Autonomous associations were often expressly prohibited or discouraged; they were allowed “as 
long as their loyalty to the state was not in doubt” (ibid), which usually meant having to join the 
corporatist National Peasant Confederation (CNC). Community assemblies were overseen and 
approved by representatives from the Agriculture Ministry (SARH). At the same time, 
government supports were used to build clientelist ties (Gordillo et al., 1998; McDonald, 2001). 
The community sector was “a repressed peasant economy in the grips of the state” (Gordillo et 
al., 1998: 24).   
 
2.3.2 Second phase (1960s – 86): Community re-appropriation of forest governance  
The growing inequalities of the modernization model imposed in the 40s and 50s 
(Hamilton, 2011) spurred the emergence of various social movements during the 1960s and 
1970s. In the forest sector, communities organized to end concessions and obtain property rights 
over their forestlands, which they saw as their source of livelihood (Klooster, 2003; Antinori and 
Bray, 2005) (see Table 2.1). Community members refer to this effort as “the struggle”, reflecting 
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the bottom-up and conflictive nature of the process. By 1980, there were approximately 5000 
communities owning about 65% of all forest lands, and more than 1,000 communities and 3,000 
small property owners became integrated into approximately 25 unions throughout the country 
(Klooster, 2003). Overall, these community and inter-community organizations generated local 
and regional social capital that underscored the future development of community forestry and 
FAs (Bray and Merino, 2004; Klooster, 2003). 
 Two consecutive pro-peasant presidents, Echeverría (1970–76) and López Portillo (1976–
1982), brought a new wave of land reform and state-supported “activism” in the rural sector 
(Bofill Poch, 2005; Hernández Navarro, 1992; Klooster, 2003). The 1971 Agrarian Reform Law 
allowed the creation of inter-community associations between communities to guarantee access 
to credit and organize commercialization of their products (Hernández Navarro, 1992). Some of 
the land struggle organizations later became producer organizations. Old clientelist leaders began 
to be displaced as the new economic focus required new leaders with some basic skills in 
economic and financial management, administration, and relations to banks and governmental 
development agencies (Hernández Navarro, 1992).  
The government’s financial and logistical support to those communities and associations 
also stimulated the creation of many FAs, albeit through top-down schemes. President 
Echeverría used the FONAFE community trust fund to organize hundreds of Community 
Forestry Enterprises (CFEs).42  In addition, between 1971 and 1976 seven of the logging bans 
were removed (Bray and Merino, 2004). López Portillo created an office of peasant affairs 
within the Agriculture Ministry’s Forestry Directorate (DGDF) to promote community forestry 
(Silva, 1997). During his tenure, the DGDF and its cadre of progressive bureaucrats implemented 
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 In the early 1960s, FONAFE created community forestry enterprises in 135 communities, 128 (95%) in Durango 
and Chihuahua, the two states with the largest forest reserves in the country.  
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a program for forestry development called “social production” (‘socio-producción’), to continue 
promoting CFE development and inter-community FAs (Silva, 1997). This was still top-down 
but more empowering (Bray, personal communication). Yet they were also strategically aimed at 
quelling social unrest and shoring up political support. 
 Other important political openings included the political crisis initiated by protesting 
students in the 1960s and the 1968 Tlatelolco massacre; the first electoral defeat for the PRI in 
two municipal elections; and the economic crisis in the late 1970s and early 1980s, which 
substantially reduced the government’s ability to financially support communities, FAs and other 
peasant organizations and consequently weakened clientelist and corporatist ties, generating 
opportunities for autonomous organization (Bizberg, 2003; Gordillo et al., 1998; Durand Ponte, 
2009). Together, they marked the beginning of the PRI’s ‘legitimacy crisis’ (Durand Ponte, 
2009; Gordillo et al., 1998). The political crisis of the late 1960s also led to a resurgence of a 
leftist discourse in the PRI, an electoral reform in 1977 that allowed the participation of 
previously prohibited political parties, and a confluence of government support for peasants. 
Finally, the crisis, combined with internal mismanagement and an emerging technocratic 
ideology, eventually led to the economic demise of the timber concession system in the mid-
1980s (Bofill Poch, 2005; interviews, 2010).43  
Among the first FAs formed were FA-1 (see sect. 2.4.2 below), and UNECOFAEZ. 
UNECOFAEZ was created in 1976 in the Santiago Papasquiaro region of Durango less than two 
years after the concessionaire PROFORMEX began operations. Perceived injustices (e.g. under-
payments, forest mismanagement, lack of employment) of this concession ignited this movement 
(interviews, 2007 and 2011).  Its success was also partly due to its ability to forge alliances at the 
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 The actual end dates for each varied across states as their leases came up for renewal; Echeverría, while espousing 
a pro-peasant discourse and promoting land reform, actually renewed and expanded several concessions as part of 
his state-directed industrialization efforts (see Table 2.1).   
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federal level with the sub-secretary of Agriculture, bureaucrats in the Forest Department, and 
PROFORMEX foresters. These connections helped the organization bypass resistance from the 
state government, which supported PROFORMEX (Taylor, 2001; interviews, 2007, 2011). 
Similarly, ODRENASIJ was formed in 1980 in Oaxaca initially to demand better labor 
conditions in the FAPATUX concession system, and later to fight against the renewal of this 
concession. Progressive academics and NGOs strongly supported the formation and success of 
this association (Abardía-Moros and Solano-Solano, 1995). Contrary to UNECOFAEZ, 
however, ODRENASIJ dissolved once it achieved its objective. 
These associations had a decidedly autonomous, bottom-up character that persists today 
(Merino, 2004), but they also had strong support from government and/or non-governmental 
actors (e.g. foresters, NGOs). In some cases FAs were promoted or directly created by 
government agencies. For instance, the SARH and DGDF facilitated the creation of several ejido 
unions, such as Unión de Ejidos y Comunidades Indígenas Forestales de la Meseta Purépecha 
(UECIFOMET-LEA) in Michoacán in 1979 and similar ones in Oaxaca, Puebla and Campeche 
(see Bray and Merino, 2004). In the case of UECIFOMET-LEA, the government’s efforts were 
combined with grassroots action by some community leaders and the CNC, and with the 
financial support of the government’s National Rural Credit Bank (BANRURAL) (Bofill Poch, 
2005).  
However, the political-economic conditions of the period were still relatively limiting. 
Clientelism, corporatism and caciquismo remained the norm (Durand Ponte, 2009). The use of 
the FONAFE funds by Echeverría did not seek to empower but to facilitate timber operations of 
the concessionaires, and to co-opt autonomous movements (Guerrero, 1998). In addition, most 
CFEs and FAs in this period were still forced to integrate to the CNC, and became politically 
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controlled by its representatives (Guerrero, 1998). In other cases the government created parallel, 
loyal unions to counteract autonomous ones (Gordillo et al., 1998). For instance, in Oaxaca the 
Agriculture Ministry promoted the José López Portillo Production Unit in 1981-82 as a strategy 
to stop the anti-concession movements led by ODRENASIJ (Bray and Merino, 2004; Abardía-
Moros and Solano-Solano, 1995).  Thus, the creation of multi-level/cross-scale governance 
emerged from combinations of grassroots movements, hybrid initiatives of communities 
motivated by the State, and top-down clientelist and corporatist strategies. 
 
2.3.3 Third phase (1986 – 92): Community forestry and liberalization of forestry services 
The 1986 Forest Law officially ended timber concessions and confirmed community rights 
to produce and commercialize their forest resources (Bray and Merino, 2004; Merino, 2004). 
Furthermore, it transferred all forestry services from government-run Administration Units 
(UAFs) to Forest Conservation and Development Units (UCODEFOs) operated through 
concessions by individual communities, FAs or foresters (Bray and Merino, 2004). These units, 
as the UAFs, sought to promote forest management at the eco-regional level while also serving 
as economic ‘development poles’.  
The end of concessions generated a new need for communities to organize timber 
production and sale, which entailed channeling and pooling resources to obtain extraction and 
processing equipment (trucks, sawmills, etc.), sharing information about prices, negotiating with 
powerful corporations, maintaining the road infrastructure (previously maintained by the 
concessionaires), and sustaining a political presence in policy-making. This involved adapting 
existing governance institutions designed to administer a community and a territory in order to 
administer a CFE (Antinori and Bray, 2005).  FAs had to adapt to remain relevant to these new 
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needs. This led to the emergence of new grassroots FAs and the evolution of some existing ones 
from grassroots movements with a predominantly political/advocacy role into ‘multi-purpose’ 
organizations focused on political, economic and ecological issues.44  
Community-driven adaptations to changing needs were not the only factor driving FA 
emergence and evolution. The role of the government (financial and political) was again 
essential. At the same time, and in contrast to the previous period, non-governmental actors, 
especially NGOs, professionals such as foresters, academics and foundations emerged as crucial 
actors in some instances. Consequently, most of the FAs formed in this period could be 
categorized as top-down, though community initiative was often also present.   
Among the FAs formed during this period, one type was focused on obtaining concessions 
to provide technical forestry services to member communities, principally the elaboration of the 
required forest management plans and the related activities (e.g. reforestation and fire combat), 
but also broader community development and market services. The first five concessions were 
approved in 1988; by 1992 there were a total of 83, of which about half were given to 
communities and FAs and the other half to foresters (Bray and Merino, 2004). The Sociedad de 
Productores Forestales Ejidales de Quintana Roo (SPFEQR), formed in 1986 in Quintana Roo 
following 25 years of a timber concession, sought to provide forestry services, help communities 
develop their forestry enterprises, create a common marketing front to compete with the 
parastatal (which continued to exist in other communities), improve communities’ production 
efficiency, access new markets, and channel resources from government programs and 
                                                           
44
 This transition was also situated in a context of new rural/peasant movements and organizations which shifted 
their main objectives from gaining access to land to generating economic benefits through strategies of ‘self-
management and democratic production’ of agricultural and forestry resources, and more autonomous and 
decentralized networks isolated from clientelism and corporativism, labeled a transition ‘from land expropriation to 
peasant appropriation’ (Bartra and Otero, 2005; Fox and Gordillo, 1989; Gordillo, 1988; Otero, 2000). This 
transition was seen by some as the means to achieve economic self-sufficiency, which in turn would lead to political 
autonomy (Bartra and Otero, 2005). 
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international donors (Taylor and Zabin, 2000; Wilshusen, 2010). The association was created 
through an alliance between the state government, the DGDF and the German Agency of 
Cooperation for Development (the equivalent of USAID) (Bofill Poch, 2005; Bray and Merino, 
2004). However, its origins also responded to the communities’ previous regional collective 
action, including their fight against the concessionaire MIQRO (which in turn had pushed the 
state government to take action), and previous inter-community organizational attempts by 
FONAFE in the 1970s (Bofill Poch, 2005).  
In Oaxaca, the Unión de Ejidos y Comunidades Forestales de Oaxaca (UCEFO), formed in 
1984 at the insistence of the DGDF, sought to integrate its member communities into the forest 
management activities and to develop vertically-integrated community forestry (Lopez Arzola 
2005, interviews, 2007). The organization also provided accounting services, product and input 
price lists, and political representation as a member of the state forest policy committee 
(interviews, 2007). In contrast, UZACHI, formed in 1991 as a forestry service union, and 
currently considered one of the most successful FAs in Mexico, may be a unique example from 
this period of an FA created with the support of a regional NGO, Rural Research and Advisory 
Services (ERA) and progressive academics (Bray and Merino, 2004). 
Other communities within UCODEFO concessions formed new FAs called permisionario 
unions more narrowly focused on obtaining the forestry service concessions. Contrary to some of 
the forestry-service ejido unions, which combined government and community initiatives, most 
permisionario unions retained the top-down management style of the UAFs because of the 
strong role of government and foresters in promoting them (Merino et al., 2008), and were  
susceptible to elite capture by  these foresters, as Chapela (1998) found in eastern Michoacán.  
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A second type of new FA focused on the economic aspects of community forestry through 
increasing market power, investing in physical capital, sharing information, and improving 
regional infrastructure. A few of these organizations went further to become producer 
cooperatives, among the first being FA-1 (sect. 4 below) and UNECOFAEZ in Durango. 
UNECOFAEZ developed a price list and monitored timber contracts between communities and 
firms (interviews, 2007; Taylor, 2001). The Union also developed a timber processing branch 
using the infrastructure they obtained from the concessionaire PROFORMEX, as part of an 
agreement with President Salinas de Gortari in 1990. However, in contrast to FA-1, 
UNECOFAEZ created a separate organization (SEZARIC) to manage the timber processing 
operation (Taylor, 2001). Currently UNECOFAEZ also owns an industrial machinery center for 
repair and manufacture, a tree nursery, an agricultural collection center, and a water purification 
and bottling company. The role as political representative continued but mostly focused on 
channeling resources for community forestry, infrastructure or basic needs (Taylor, 2001).  Other 
organizations like a credit association and UECIFMOET-LEA in Michoacán (Bofill Boch, 
2005), a rural collective interest association grouping seven ejido unions (ARIC-GFA) in 
Chihuahua (Bray and Merino, 2004), and the Chingahuapan ejido union (UECH) in Puebla 
followed the producer cooperative model and established inter-community sawmills. 
Unfortunately, most of these did not last due to mismanagement, either from corruption or lack 
of appropriate knowledge and capacity, or the economic transition of the 1990s.  
“Road committees” grouping communities and private landowners also emerged in this 
period, often promoted by the CNC and by ejido unions, to pool resources and channel 
government funds to provide maintenance repairs to the road infrastructure as a strategy to 
reduce transportation costs (interview, 11-30-2010). 
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Finally, in the mid-1980s, third-level organizations (i.e. associations of associations) 
started to form at the national level through parallel grassroots and government-directed efforts 
(Chapela, 1998). From the top-down, the corporatist CNC created the Unión Nacional de 
Organizaciones Forestales in 1986. From the bottom-up, a crucial actor was the National Union 
of Regional Autonomous Peasant Organizations (UNORCA), formed in 1985 in an attempt to 
break the monopoly over peasant organization held by the (Gordillo, 1988). An offspring of 
UNORCA was the MOCAF Network (formed in 1991), a non-partisan, pluralist coalition of 
forestry NGOs, forest production-oriented organizations, communities, and small landowners 
offering technical assistance, training, design and evaluation of productive projects, 
environmental studies, participation in related policy-making, and resource-channelling. These 
FAs provided regional associations with an increased presence in the national policy and 
political arena.  
 
2.3.4 Fourth phase (1992 – 2000): Neoliberalization and capacity-building  
The community forestry boom would not last long. Towards the end of the 1980s and 
beginnings of the 1990s, community forestry fell in contradiction to the modernization and 
economic neoliberalization efforts started during de la Madrid’s presidency (1982-88) and which 
intensified dramatically under Salinas de Gortari (1988-94). These policies were part of a broad 
structural adjustment program imposed on Mexico by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) 
given Mexico’s default on its debt servicing (Durand Ponte, 2009).45  
The Salinas de Gortari administration implemented three key reforms which 
accommodated forest communities t its neoliberal vision and affected FAs directly and 
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 This program echoed others that swept across Latin America and other developing regions in the 1980s and which 
threatened cooperative organizations’ “competitiveness and, in many cases, their survival.” (World Bank, 2008: 
138). 
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indirectly:  the 1991-92 constitutional reform, the 1992 Forest Law and the signing of the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in 1994.  
 The reform of Article 27 of the Constitution and of the Agrarian Law ended land 
redistribution (i.e. the formation of new ejidos), opened the way for privatization of community 
land and liberalized the land market. Communal property was seen as an obstacle for the 
industrial development and capitalization of the forest sector, as community enterprises were 
seen as inefficient (Bofill Poch, 2005). While communal resource stock such as forests still 
cannot be divided, Article 75 of the Agrarian Law allows community members to form ‘work 
groups’ separate from the community’s traditional decision-making structure (the general 
assembly and the comisariado) to manage timber extraction, transport, and commercialization 
(Taylor, 2001:129; Wilshusen, 2005: 129). This model has been widely adopted in Durango 
(Antinori and Rausser, 2010; interviews, 2010). The reform also removed many of the State’s 
political controls over peasant communities, especially the intervention of the Agrarian Reform 
Secretariat, and sought to loosen the grip of local caciques by allowing ejidatarios more freedom 
of movement outside the ejido while maintaining ejido rights. 
The 1992 Forest Law privatized forestry services, eliminating the UCODEFOs and the 
associated government subsidies. Communities could now select any certified forester, and 
foresters could work in any given region. This increased competition from new private foresters 
often offering lower prices. As a result, many forestry service FAs lost members and some 
disintegrated. In Durango, for instance, only three out of the 14 original permisionario unions 
remain, and only two could be said to be functioning (interviews, 2010).  Membership loss was 
often related to issues of heterogeneity, with the largest members being the first to leave to 
establish their own exclusive forestry services (Bray and Merino, 2004). This was the case of 
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UCEFO in Oaxaca (interviews, 2007) and UECIFOMET-LEA in Michoacan (Bofill Poch, 
2005). The 1992 Law also substantially reduced financial support for community forestry, 
shifting subsidies to promote private timber plantations (Bray and Merino, 2004; Klooster, 2003; 
Silva, 1997); and eliminated regulations related to the monitoring of forestry activities, leading to 
substantial increase in illegal logging, intra-community conflicts, and economic losses for 
community enterprises (Bray et al., 2006; interviews, 2010).  
NAFTA removed tariffs on timber imports which had been gradually reduced since the 
1980s (Jaffee, 1997). The forest and agricultural sectors were not ready to compete with the 
much more industrialized and heavily subsidized Canadian, US, and Chilean corporations.  In 
Michoacán’s forest communities from 1990-1994, timber profits dropped, harvesting increased, 
and jobs were lost (Jaffee, 1997). These impacts continue to date (see next section). The 1994 
peso devaluation and the consequential increase in interest rates had further impact on FAs. Most 
associations did not have financial insurance against price declines or inflationary processes, and 
as a result they lost their patrimonial capital and eventually dissolved (Bartra and Otero, 2005; 
Gordillo, pers. comm., 2009). For instance, the Chignahuapan ejido union (UECH) in Puebla had 
to use all of the revenues from its timber sales for six straight years to pay back the suddenly-
increased debt on the sawmill it had acquired one year before (Bray and Merino, 2004).   
The impacts on FAs of these political-economic changes have been mixed, reflecting the 
contradictions between political and economic liberalism embedded in the reforms (Gordillo et 
al., 1998). On one hand, a more autonomous community governance system (Gordillo et al., 
1998) and an “unprecedented combination of communally-organized forestry and smaller local 
associations” (Wilshusen and Murguía, 2003) emerged. This was supported by the so-called 
“social contract” created by Salinas de Gortari, which promoted the coexistence of oppositional 
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groups at the local level in exchange for support to the national neoliberal agenda (Bartra and 
Otero, 2005; Rubin, 2003). The then-SEDESOL director (C. Rojas) was the face of much of this 
support and was described by an FA leader as “the father of [peasant] organizations.” (interview, 
11-10-2010)46 At the national level, Salinas de Gortari promoted the National Union of 
Communal Forestry Organizations (UNOFOC) in 1993, with the participation of some of the 
most powerful grassroots organizations at the time, including UNECOFAEZ (which had 
previously been affiliated to UNORCA and Red Mocaf) and the San Juan Nuevo community in 
Michoacán. Such affiliations had financial payoffs –UNOFOC later captured 80% of the 
resources from the 1995 National Reforestation Program (PRONARE) and gained privileged 
access to entities like the World Bank, becoming the ‘official’ interlocutor of the community 
forestry sector (Bofill Poch, 2005).  
On the other hand, the reforms directly and indirectly undermined the nascent community 
forestry sector and related organizations (Taylor, 2001; Wilshusen and Murguía, 2003). As 
Merino (2004:195, translation our own) concludes: “the agrarian communities obtained more 
autonomy, but they also became more abandoned”. At the same time, new forms of political 
patronage were created to maintain control over rural communities, one of the most visible being 
Salinas de Gortari’s National Solidarity Program (PRONASOL) (Dresser, 1994; Magaloni et al., 
2002).  Moreover, associations faced continued pressure to maintain their autonomy and self-
management capacity vis a vis the national peasant organizations and political parties (Wilshusen 
and Murguía, 2003), and many resources were captured by organizations which maintained 
clientelist linkages or created new ones (e.g. McDonald, 2001). UNOFOC, for instance, was a 
clearly clientelist model which sought to marginalize oppositional groups such as the MOCAF 
Network. 
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 All interview references follow the month-day-year format. 
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Many existing FAs tried to adapt to this new context in multiple and often contradictory 
ways, generating new organizational forms. Wilshusen (2010) finds that SPEFQR in Quintana 
Roo has engaged in a set of highly creative ‘accommodations’ which include  hybrid discourses 
that integrate efficiency and entrepreneurialism with traditional peasant ideals of ‘collectivism’; 
the subdivision of some community lands while retaining others under communal ownership; 
and  the formation of intra-community work groups. Similar adaptations are observed in the case 
of UNECOFAEZ (Taylor, 2001; Taylor and Zabin, 2000). These adaptations have spurred new 
challenges for FAs. For example, in UNECOFAEZ and SPEFQR work groups have led to a rise 
in the costs of forestry services (ibid). In UNECOFAEZ, there were also tensions regarding some 
work groups’ demands to have their own representation, separate from their communities’, on 
the association. In our fieldwork, interviewees indicated that work groups have made collecting 
membership and forestry service dues more difficult. The entrepreneurial focus has led 
UNECOFAEZ to depend on its ability to generate profits in order to maintain legitimacy. When 
interviewed, the current leaders of the union recognized this crisis and tied it to the union’s lack 
of control over its processing and commercialization venture (SEZARIC), as well as lack of 
funding (interview, 10-05-2011).  
The transition from political to multi-purpose associations in turn created new challenges. 
For the political associations of the 1960s and 1970s, the heterogeneity of communities was not a 
major issue. Having more members gave the organizations more political clout, and the services 
provided were the same regardless of each member’s characteristics. However, in the new 
organizations, services required by each member community and the prices for these varied. The 
larger communities, who paid more, wanted more services and more decision making power, 
while the smaller communities wanted to maintain low prices and felt excluded from decision-
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making. Many associations lost their largest members (Bray and Merino, 2004); some 
disintegrated as a result, as was the case with UECIFOMET-LEA in Michoacan (Bofill Poch, 
2005). 
Meanwhile, as a direct response to the problems of illegal logging fostered by the 1992 
forestry law, and the increasing globalization of environmental/conservationist NGOs and 
discourses, communities formed new grassroots movements and associations concerned with 
deforestation and environmental conservation. In some regions, communities and private 
landowners created anti-illegal logging committees, such as the ones in the Chingahuapan region 
in Puebla (Bray and Merino, 2004), and in the sierra of Durango (see FA-2 in sect. 2.4.2.3 
below). In Guerrero’s Costa Grande Region, two FAs, the so-called ‘ecologist peasants’, were 
created to struggle against the operations of US timber corporation Boise, heavily promoted by 
the then-governor. The anti-concession movement faced heavy persecution by the state and 
private mafias, with leaders jailed and dozens of members massacred (Ross, 2000). In addition, a 
local cacique formed an ejido union in collusion with Boise Cascade to support the concession 
(Ross, 2000). However, a strong leadership and alliances with national and international human 
rights and environmental NGOs facilitated the movement’s success, leading to the Governor’s 
resignation and Boise Cascade’s exit in 1998.  
A similar case is the CNDCHIM in Chiapas formed in the early 1990s to protest a 
proposed road in the Chimalapas region, a sensitive ecological area; and for the resolution of 
land conflicts, the revocation of extraction permits to two large timber corporations, and the 
establishment of a community-managed protected forest area (Umlas, 1998). The emergence of 
CNDCHIM was facilitated by the support of the then-director of SEDESOL and the 
government’s vulnerability as it faced international (especially US) scrutiny on its environmental 
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policies before entering NAFTA. This was combined with the organization’s ability to recognize 
this opening and act upon it effectively using connections with government agents and with 
national and international NGOs while drawing on previous community and NGO mobilizations 
against illegal logging in the region (Umlas, 1998).  
Towards the mid-1990s, the problems associated with the Salinas reforms led to strong 
pressures from an alliance of forestry-sector stakeholders to revert some of the institutional 
changes and increase support for the forest sector. The government of Zedillo (1994-2000) thus 
began a renewed support for community forestry and FAs. The first measures were the creation 
of the Environment Ministry (SEMARNAP) in 1995 and the appointment of an environmental 
activist and researcher to head the agency (Silva, 1997). Later, a new Forest Law in 1997 
increased regulations of extraction activities and proposed more supports for community forestry 
(Bofill Poch, 2005) through the creation of two extremely programs to support community 
forestry– PRODEFOR and PROCYMAF. PROCYMAF was created with a $15 million loan 
from the World Bank exclusively to support community forestry, with a particular focus on local 
social capital. It initially ran from 1997 to 2003 (later extended from 2004 to 2007 with an 
additional $20 million loan) and covered the states of Oaxaca, Guerrero and Michoacán, Jalisco, 
Durango and Chihuahua. PRODEFOR’s objective was to expand the forest area under 
management (timber harvesting) and help develop community forestry enterprises and regional 
timber production chains. Despite that few of the resources of these programs went directly to 
FAs, the social capital build-up and the new spaces of collaboration and exchange between 
communities also strengthened regional governance. 
In some cases, international agencies and donors such as United Nations Development 
Program (UNDP) and the Global Environmental Fund (GEF), as well as NGOs, filled the 
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financing gap FAs. For instance, in 1997 twelve NGOs in Yucatan formed the Sustainable 
Development Network (ROSDESAC) with the help of a UNDP-GEF Small Grants program 
(Wilshusen and Murguía, 2003). The interventions of these non-state actors were furthered by 
the increasing democratic openings in the country.  
 
2.3.5 Fifth phase (2000 – present): Recentralization of control over forest resources?  
The 21st century began with substantial problems related to continued deforestation, with 
about 500,000 hectares lost per year between 1993 and 2000, a rate of 1.0% for pine-oak forests 
and 2.1% for tropical forests (Velázquez et al., 2002). Overall, the country had lost half of its 
original forest cover (ibid). There were also problems of declining timber production, an 
increasing trade deficit in wood (+133% between 1997 and 2006) and a perceived ‘lack of 
organization’ of forest communities (CCMSS, 2007; CONAFOR, 2001). In the political sphere, 
the PRI suffered in 2000 its first electoral defeat in presidential elections in 70 years, with the 
victory of V. Fox (2000-2006) from the conservative National Action Party (PAN). To some, 
this represented “the end of an era of authoritarianism and corporate politics” (Castañeda, 2003: 
1), though the changes were slow, uneven and contradictory (Tulchin and Selee, 2003).47 Rural 
conditions spurred the formation of grassroots social movements, epitomized by The 
Countryside Can Bear No More movement, an alliance of peasant and forestry associations 
which demanded increased support for peasants (Bartra and Otero, 2005). This led to a series of 
agreements signed by President Fox.  
Fox sought to provide new impulse to the forest sector by creating the National Forest 
Commission (CONAFOR) in 2001 as the central agency in charge of the sector. Following the 
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agreements signed, he increased the budget substantially for CONAFOR’s signature forestry 
programs (PROCYMAF and PRODEFOR). He also created two innovative programs: the 
Payment for Environmental Services (PSA) program, and the Community Biodiversity 
Conservation (COINBIO) project. By the end of the Fox administration in 2006, CONAFOR’s 
budget was 2,326 million Mexican pesos, an increase of 878% from 2001 (Merino, 2011). This 
yearly increase continued in the administration of F. Calderón (2006-2012). In 2010, the 
CONAFOR budget was 6,570 million Mexican pesos, representing an increase of 3,200% over 
the decade (Milenio, 04-04- 2011). 
In addition, in 2003 the federal Congress passed a new Forest Law (LGDFS, 2003), which 
mandated CONAFOR to create Regional Forest Management Units (UMAFORs) within each 
state and sought to promote regional-level collective action (Merino et al., 2008). These 
UMAFORs were supposed to be delimitated based on ‘micro-watersheds’ in each state. National 
CONAFOR officials made recommendations and then each state’s CONAFOR offices 
‘validated’ them with other stakeholders before implementation (interviews, 2010). Within each 
UMAFOR, CONAFOR was mandated to ‘generate ‘self-managing structures of forest users at a 
local level’, and to ‘strengthen the organization and participation of forest users in decision-
making.’  
CONAFOR started the Program for the Strengthening of Self-Management of Forestry 
(PROFAS) in 2004 to provide support for FAs at the regional, state and national levels. This 
policy shift was quite significant. The model intentionally harked back to the UCODEFOs of the 
1980s and the permisionario unions that operated within them; the objective was to return to 
some form of regional-level collective action processes for forest management. This was also the 
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first time since the 1970s and 1980s that the government developed a program directed at 
supporting FAs. 
Unfortunately, in practice CONAFOR used PROFAS to mostly fund new associations, 
which it called regional silviculturalist associations (ARS) (Martínez Tenorio et al., 2005; 
Merino et al., 2008). CONAFOR wanted each ARS to operate within a specific UMAFOR, and 
to be integrated in a pyramidal structure into state-level organizations (AES), in turn grouped 
into national organizations (see Martínez Tenorio et al., 2005; Merino et al., 2008). These 
associations had to include both communities and private landowners, and were expected to 
perform an extensive list of activities.48 Ejido unions were not recognized as valid associations in 
PROFAS, as they only included communities.  
In many instances, ARS were created to capture CONAFOR funds and dissolved after a 
few years, or were unknown to most communities (Merino et al., 2008). By 2007 CONAFOR 
shifted its policy of supporting all possible FAs within each UMAFOR and decided it would 
fund only one association per UMAFOR labeled as the “official” regional association. The other 
FAs within an UMAFOR –including pre-existing ones– were labeled “local” associations and 
were excluded from funds, from decision-making bodies like the state forest councils, and from 
other collective action groups like the state-level associations (AES) (Merino et al., 2008; 
interviews, 2010). The policy was widely perceived as an attempt to shore up support in rural 
areas for the governing PAN and marginalize and destroy pre-existing FAs traditionally 
associated to the PRI (Red Mocaf et al., 2005; interviews, 2010).  
Nevertheless, the impact of this policy has varied depending on the regional and state level 
conditions. In Durango and Oaxaca, Merino et al. (2008) found that the new ARS are more 
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active and consolidated because they built on a long history of grassroots collective action, and 
because the states’ CONAFOR offices were led by people closer to communities and with more 
autonomy in the implementation of PROFAS. In Oaxaca, the delimitation of the UMAFORs 
respected the social boundaries of the existing FAs, in great part thanks to the mobilization by 
these FAs and the support of S. Anta, the state director of one of the CONAFOR programs.  
Durango was one of the most active states in adopting the policy, dividing the state into 
twelve UMAFORs. The boundaries of these regions proposed by CONAFOR were negotiated at 
the state level with foresters so that the pre-existing boundaries of forestry services would not be 
disrupted (interview with CONAFOR official, 07-06-2010). At least one ARS per UMAFOR 
formed. Some are completely new and others are existing organizations which changed names 
and structure. The ‘official’ ARS are incorporated into a state-level association. Foresters were 
central in this process, as they heavily promoted, and oftentimes directly created, the associations 
based on the communities they service (interviews, 2010). In the field, it was common to hear 
people refer to these FAs as ‘X forester’s association’ (see Chapter 4). Their top-down nature 
was evident in interviews with CONAFOR officials who stressed that they had created the 
associations. Their bylaws were developed based on a standardized model provided by the 
agency; communities felt they had little autonomy to change them. As an FA leader emphasized 
during a meeting with an NGO when the need to modify their bylaws came up: “But it was 
CONAFOR who did our bylaws, so if we change them, what would happen with CONAFOR? 
Because in any case it [CONAFOR] is our father.” (focus group, 11-04-2010) 
Some of these top-down FAs had a very short duration, as expected. In those cases, 
foresters or political bosses appropriated most of the funds (interviews, 2010). In other regions 
the program led to permanent divisions of existing associations or to the creation of parallel 
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organizations. For instance, UNECOFAEZ’s membership was split into five UMAFOR. 
Consequently CONAFOR and the region’s foresters pressured UNECOFAEZ to create five 
parallel associations. According to interviews, this, combined with poor leadership, has 
substantially weakened the organization. The forced transition into ARS has brought internal 
conflicts in some associations and resentment towards the federal government. Nevertheless, as 
the PRI has maintained Durango as its political bastion, the associations’ leaderships have 
retained strong links to that party, rather than forging alliances with the PAN as was intended.49 
Meanwhile, national FAs resisted CONAFOR’s policy of supporting only silviculturalist 
associations and as a result the 2011 version of the program explicitly supports all types of FAs. 
In the economic realm, free trade policies continued in this period with the signing of the 
Mexico-Chile Free Trade Agreement, which further facilitated the dumping of cheap wood on 
the Mexican market. The recent global economic crisis has also influenced FAs. A sense of crisis 
pervaded many of our field interviews concerning the forestry sector and rural life in general. 
Forest communities are much more cash-strapped than before, and consequently have a hard 
time paying their FA membership dues. Prices for Mexican communities’ timber have either 
remained constant or decreased, even as production costs have risen substantially. Recent studies 
show that between 1997 and 2010 there has been a significant decrease in the number of 
communities which sell sawn wood products and a consequent increase in those selling logs or 
not selling wood at all (see Antinori and Rausser, 2010; Merino and Martínez, 2011). Price lists, 
one of FAs’ main activities in the 1970s and 1980s, have disappeared in most regions, reflecting 
disorganization among members and a shift in the balance of powers from communities to 
buyers, which currently set prices. Interviewees also perceived that the new economic and 
political context has reduced FAs’ political power and organization. In addition, drug-related 
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violence has affected timber and non-timber forestry projects (e.g ecotourism) as well as 
collective action in some regions. In Durango, some FAs have had to re-locate their meetings 
away from the forest region into major cities while some communities have suspended them 
altogether.  
Despite these top-down processes, several factors have created opportunities for new 
bottom-up FAs to emerge: (1) international and national policies such as the emerging markets 
for certified products (e.g. sustainable timber, organic and fair trade farming) and the national 
PSA (environmental services) program; (2) evolving member needs, particularly regarding 
diversification; and (3) increasing interventions of national and international NGOs –partly 
facilitated by increasing democracy– which have equilibrated the balance of powers, providing 
funds and promoting the increased participation of rural actors.  
Oaxaca provides three interesting yet contrasting examples; in all of them, grassroots 
community action is combined with a diverse set of non-governmental and governmental allies. 
The first is the Communal Forest Integrator of Oaxaca (ICOFOSA), recently constituted by 
three forest communities as a production and marketing cooperative organization with its own 
furniture brand50. All three member communities are FSC certified, have their own sawmills, and 
have specialized managers running their companies. New members are accepted only if they 
follow this model. The organization receives economic and logistical support from two global 
environmental NGOs. This could be characterized as part of a new wave of FAs expanding into 
the finished and certified products markets.  
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The second and third are examples of emerging environmental services and conservation-
oriented FAs.51 One is Community System for Biodiversity (SICOBI), formed in 2001 from the 
initiative of a local environmental NGO and several national NGOs in collaboration with five 
forest communities. SICOBI seeks to develop its members’ technical capacities and their timber 
and non-timber enterprises, establish networks across regions, provide legal advice, and establish 
regional environmental services programs.52 They promote forestry, conservation, agroforestry 
and sustainable shade coffee production. The other is the Natural Resources Committee of 
Chinantla Alta (CORENCHI), created in 2005 by six communities after several years of 
interventions by six national and international NGOs throughout the 1990s and funding from 
CONAFOR’s environmental services program, the US government, and the Global 
Environmental Fund (Bray et al., 2012). The FA focuses on developing community statutes for 
resource management, community protected areas, and a common environmental service 
payment scheme in the region’s watershed.  
  
2.4. Cross-scale linkages in perspective: Results from survey data and four case studies 
2.4.1 Survey Data 
 In 2007, we completed fieldwork in Durango and Michoacán for a community forestry 
database (see Antinori and Rausser, 2010). A total of 41 forest communities based on a random 
stratified sample were surveyed, 28 in Durango and 13 in Michoacán. Interviews with 
community level authorities indicated that most (32 or 78%) communities were currently 
members of an FA, and about half of those were in more than one, for a total of 46 memberships 
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in 21 separate FAs (see Table 2.2).53 Durango communities are significantly more likely to hold 
FA membership than those in Michoacán.  
 
Table 2.2. Forestry Associations in two Survey Samples in Durango, Michoacán & Oaxaca 
Name Year formed TD/BU # members 
# comms. 
in survey* Main service 
Meetings/ 
year 
 
DURANGO (from 2007 dataset) 
UPUCODEFO4-LVM 1966 BU 181** 1 Forestry services 1 
UNECOF-ES 1968 BU 24 3 Politics/policies, Resource 
channeling 12 
UPUPSE-ES 1970 TD 28** 4 Forestry Services 3 
UNECOFAEZ 1977 BU 72 8 
Market search, Legal 
advice, 
Nursery/Greenhouse 
6 
UECSG 1989 BU 12 3 Resource channeling 1 
SEZARIC 1990 BU 40 7 Timber harvesting and processing 3 
Road committee-
SP*** 1992 NA NC 1 
Road building, 
maintenance and 
improvement 
6 
UEGS 1993 BU 8 1 Resource channeling 6 
UNECOSID 1994 BU 12 1 Forestry services 4 
ARS-H 1995 BU 7** 1 Road repairs/maintenance 6 
UMAFOR-ND 2003 TD 18** 5 Conservation, restoration, 
reforestation 2 
ARS-T 2005 TD 4** NA Forestry services 0 
APROFONOR 2005 TD 59** 2 Resource channeling 4 
ARS-SMC 2006 TD 29** 2 Resource channeling 3 
 
 
MICHOACÁN (from 2007 dataset) 
UEJMMP 1965 BU 9 1 Broomstick 
commercialization 6 
UPFU 1978 TD 12 1 Forestry Services 3 
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Name Year formed TD/BU # members 
# comms. 
in survey* Main service 
Meetings/ 
year 
UPFLMP 1986 BU 13 1 Forestry Services 12 
UMADFOR-CH 1990 TD 30 1 Forestry Services 6 
UMADFOR-SN 2003 TD 9 1 Forestry Services  
CRFC 2005 TD 13 1 Conservation, restoration, 
reforestation NA 
ARS-MT 1994 TD 95 1 NA 4 
 
 
OAXACA (from 2000 dataset) 
IXETO 1989 NA 4 2 Forestry Services, Timber processing (Sawmill) 12 
MIXTZA 1989 NA 4 4 NA 0 
UCEFO 1984 NA 5 1 Forestry Services 10 
UZACHI 1992 BU 4 3 Forestry Services 12 
YUCUTACO 1989 NA 5 3  NA 0 
*Some communities in >1 FA. 
** Silviculturalist Associations and Permisionario Unions have private landowners and communities as members 
*** There are several other road committees which we know about but were not captured in this survey 
   
 Based on interview responses concerning motivating forces in the FAs’ formation, we 
coded FAs as either “bottom-up” (BU) or “top-down” (TD). Ten of the twenty-one FAs (48%) 
originated though a bottom-up process. This is a surprising finding given the history of strong 
state intervention in Mexican community forestry. Statistical analysis revealed that bottom-up 
organizations are older (statistically significant at 5%), while almost all of the organizations 
since 2000 are top-down. This reflects the effect of the UMAFOR/ARS policy and the PROFAS 
program discussed above. We also found that 13 communities (32%) participated in anti-
concession movements, that all of them are currently in FAs, and that they are significantly more 
likely to be in a bottom-up organization than communities which did not participate in these 
movements (data not shown). These results highlight the conflictive origins of many FAs and the 
importance of previous histories of collective action as a basis of social capital for future action, 
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as Antinori and Rausser (2008) also found in Oaxaca. In this case, we see that previous history of 
collective action is an important condition for cross-scale/multi-level governance. 
To analyze what services FA provided, in order to understand the causal factors in inter-
community collection action, we also created categories of types of services through a principal 
component analysis (PCA).54 Of the 14 services mentioned by interviewees, the analysis retained 
five distinct components: (1) political representation, legal assistance, and channeling 
resources/funds; (2) capacity-building, environmental protection, and tree nurseries; (3) radio 
communication and road maintenance; (4) accounting services, commercialization, and 
extraction; and (5) professional forestry services. These services vary according the FAs’ date of 
formation. Component 1 (political representation) has a negative and significant pairwise 
correlation with year of FA formation (rho= -0.62) consistent with the early impetus for FAs. In 
other words, FAs from earlier periods (1960s-1986s) tend to be more centered on politics. 
Component 2 (environmental protection and capacity-building) correlates positively and 
significantly with year, consistent with the observed focus on environmental issues in the current 
phase (2000s-present).  
Finally, the services offered by FAs reflect their origins (bottom-up or top-down). 
Components 2 (environmental protection and capacity-building) and 5 (forestry services) 
correlate positively and significantly with top-down FAs, consistent with the observations that 
forestry-service FAs were mostly created by the initiative of the government and foresters. 
Components 1 (political representation) and 4 (accounting, commercialization) correlate 
positively and significantly with bottom-up FAs, consistent with the grassroots-led impetus in 
the 1970s and 1980s to appropriate the timber production process. In other words, top-down FAs 
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focus more on ecological aspects, while grassroots FAs have a stronger emphasis on political and 
socio-economic issues. 
 
2.4.2 Case Studies of four FAs in Durango55  
Drawing on the original dataset, the study selected two top-down and two bottom-up 
associations for closer inspection. Information was gathered during one year of fieldwork 
through interviews with FA leaders and other stakeholders (community leaders, government 
agents, etc.), focus group discussions with community members, and participant observation of 
FA and government meetings and other related activities. The four associations are labeled FA-1 
thru FA-4. FA-1 and FA-2 represent the bottom-up associations, and FA-3 and FA-4 the top-
down ones. They span four of the policy phases identified above: 1960s-1986, 1986-1992, 1992-
2000, and 2000-present. Table 2.3 summarizes these basic characteristics.  
 
Table 2.3. Basic characteristics of 4 FAs in sample 
Name Year Phase Origins Previous experience Members 
FA-1 1968 2 BU Anti-concession and land 
grants movement 
40 coms*, 33 pp** 
(77 tot) 
FA-3 1986 3 TD Ejido Union (75’);  
UAF/UCODEFO (78’/86’) 
10 coms, 178 pp 
(188 tot) 
FA-2 1994 4 BU Ejido Union (83’); 
Permisionario Union (86’) 
12 coms  
(12 tot) 
FA-4 2003 5 TD Ejido Union (98’);  
Permisionario Union (86’) 
13 coms, 8 pp 
(21 tot) 
* coms = communities 
   ** pp = private (smallholder) properties 
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2.4.2.1 Anti-concession and production-oriented FAs (phase two): FA-1  
FA-1 formed in 1968 after several years as a social movement to resist low timber prices 
paid by the concessionaire (here referred to as the ‘Company’), and to promote the development 
of community-owned forestry enterprises, in what several interviewees described as the 
‘liberation struggle’. The Company had bought hundreds of thousands of hectares as part of 
president Porfirio Díaz’s industrialization plans in the early 1900s. The Company also operated 
within community lands, were it paid meager amounts.56 
In the 1960s, things started to change. The support for land distribution and community 
forestry by the federal government in this period was taken by local peasant leaders from the 
CNC as an opportunity to weaken the Company. Almost half of the region’s communities were 
created between 1960 and 1970 (Hernández, 2005). By the mid-1960s, the Company had lost 
more than half of its forest land (Luján Castañeda, n.d.; interviews, 2010). Three of the region’s 
largest communities formed the first community forestry enterprises in the country in this period 
(Bray and Merino, 2004). The Company responded by entering into individual contracts with 
communities, and taking advantage of the little knowledge communities had of the permitting 
process, it kept most of the 
The Company’s low payments led several communities to try to sell timber to other buyers. 
The Company, Governor Dupré Ceniceros (1962-66) and the Mexican Workers Federation 
(CTM), which represented the Company’s workers, opposed the move, arguing that it risked the 
Company’s workforce. Communities sought the intervention of the CNC, which provided access 
to federal echelons of power within the government-party structure, bypassing opposition by the 
state’s governor, lawmakers, and the federal Secretary of Agrarian Reform.  Eventually FA-1 
gained the support of the new governor, Rodríguez Solórzano (1966-68), the Secretary of 
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Agriculture, and the President. This gave FA-1 substantial political power. These two processes 
eventually created a scarcity of raw materials (timber) for the Company (ibid; interview, 03-29-
2010). A second factor was the beginning of the Mexican Social Security program in 1958, 
which substantially increased the Company’s operating costs (ibid). As the Company struggled 
economically, the payments to communities and workers became delayed, and discontent 
increased.  
At the same time, oral histories highlighted the importance of a shared sense of region and 
solidarity that pervaded the movement. Equally important for the FA’s success was the framing 
of the concession system as an ‘injustice’ and of the movement as an attempt to ‘liberate’ the 
communities from the oppression of that system. The logic was simple and convincing: if the 
communities were the owners of the forests, then the fair thing was for them to reap the benefits. 
The lack of transparency of the concession system –the Company managed the communities’ 
permits– was an added component of this perceived injustice. This discourse eventually was 
adopted by the higher levels of the government, giving state support to these ideas and 
consequently ‘legitimizing’ them. In a 1976 speech in the region, President Echeverría declared 
that “The forests of the country should be reaped for the benefit of the communities” and one of 
his top aides argued that the private and state-run timber concessions “continue to marginalize 
the peasants owners of the forests from decision-making and sometimes from the economic 
benefits of the exploitation of forest resources.” (Echeverría and Gascón Mercado, 1976: 3) 
While the main initiative for the formation of FA-1 came from a grassroots movement, the 
political-economic context in which the association emerged implied that this support was given 
in exchange of incorporation into the state structure. In fact, after a few years of having formed, 
the government argued that the organization was illegal because its initial structure was not 
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recognized in any law, and forced it to reconstitute into a legally-recognized ejido union and to 
integrate into the CNC. FA-1 thus became formally integrated into the political machinery of the 
PRI. 
One of FA-1’s first actions was to create a price list of different classes of wood products 
and wages. The prices represented the minimum any community within the union could accept 
for their products and labor; all communities committed to selling at this price. Another of FA-
1’s initial actions was establishing a sawmill and timber marketing service in the 1970s to 
purchase raw material from their member communities, process and market it, then distribute 
profit-shares to members. In the 1980s the association also established a tree nursery for 
communities’ reforestation activities. Unfortunately, after a few years these projects went 
bankrupt due to corrupt and inefficient administrators.  
In 1970, the government took over authority over forestry services with the creation of a 
Forest Administration Unit (UAF). This unit eventually became a permisionario union after the 
1986 forest law, which has operated in parallel to FA-1 and took over the administration of FA-
1’s tree nursery. The permisionario union initially covered all of the region’s communities, but 
since the privatization of forestry services in 1992 it has lost the region’s largest communities, 
which now have their own individual foresters. 
By the 2000s, FA-1 was facing strong internal divisions between the small-and-poor and 
large-and-wealthy communities. In this context, with the beginning of the PROFAS program, 
and under CONAFOR threats to exclude FA-1 and its member communities from all forestry 
programs, the organization split into two new associations (ARS). In 2007, again under pressure 
from CONAFOR, which had decided it wanted one ARS per region, and the guidance of a strong 
regional leader, the two FAs merged into one. This transition has generated strong resentment 
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among some members.57 In addition, the forced integration of new members (private landowners 
and some communities) has been problematic, because many of these new members rarely attend 
meetings. Consequently, the association faces difficulties in constituting quorum for assemblies, 
showing a decline in capacity for collective action. 
 
2.4.2.2 Top-down forestry services (phase three): FA-3 
 FA-3 originated in 1989 as a permisionario union to provide forestry services within a 
given region (UCODEFO). Between 1958 and 1978, part of the region had been under a 
concession to a private timber company. In 1978 the concession ended as a combined result of an 
anti-concession movement, internal company mismanagement, and increasing management-
labor conflicts. The government then created government-run forestry services (UAF). The 
creation of these forestry services fostered local social capital and technical know-how through 
capacity building courses and networking within and between communities within the region.  
 The 1986 Forest Law brought strong promotion by government agents to create the 
permisionario union. The perception among communities was that the creation of an FA was 
legally mandatory. The organization was also motivated by discontent with the forester that 
directed the region’s UAF, and the leadership of communities and smallholders and a forester 
who was second in command in the UAF. The forester had a strong hand in the creation of the 
organization, partly motivated by the possibility of becoming forestry services director himself, a 
position he reached in 1990 and held uninterruptedly until 2010. The previous collective action 
experience with the anti-concession association was also important, as it not only established 
regional links but also provided a venue for emerging leaders –FA-3’s first president had been 
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one of the founding leaders of that previous association– as well as for initial investments in 
infrastructure. 
In 1990, the Union’s members created a regional road committee. Later, the Union 
successfully lobbied for the paving of the region’s main road and the electrification of some 
areas. Meanwhile, FA-3’s forestry services, which have been described as the best in Durango 
and among the best in the country, have evolved today into a large cooperative economic 
enterprise which has three tree nurseries producing over one million pine plants a year for 
members’ reforestation activities and for sale to others. The organization also has five fire 
watchtowers, the most of any region in the state, organizes and equips fire brigades in every 
community, and has a radio communication system that helps in emergencies and to share 
information quickly and inexpensively. According to the leaders, these services not only improve 
forest management (see Chapter 3) but also help resolve members’ needs in a less expensive and 
more functional manner. Closely related to the forestry services is the role of FA-3 as 
intermediary to lobby for and channel resources from forestry, agriculture and other programs. 
Despite these positive attributes, some feel that the organization is excessively controlled by the 
forester and the president, who have been in their positions for more than twenty years (see 
Chapter 4). 
 
2.4.2.3 Bottom-up forestry services (phase four): FA-2 
FA-2 emerged in 1994 from the disintegration of a permisionario union resulting from 
communities’ discontent with the forester for his apparent mismanagement of the forest and of 
the union’s resources, combined with the 1992 privatization of forestry services. Invoking the 
1992 Law, the forester successfully claimed that the permisionario union needed to be dissolved 
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and he appropriated the union’s infrastructure to run his own forestry services. The majority of 
the union’s members left to form FA-2 with the objective of providing forestry services to 
members, which they saw as an opportunity to have more autonomy –to ‘free themselves’ from 
the forester and, as the current president of the Union expressed, so they could “do the work [the 
forest management, channeling of government resources, etc.] themselves, so they could be the 
ones ordering the forester, and not the other way around” (interview, 07-14-2010).  They also 
sought to increase the probability of being taken into account by the government, since “an ejido 
alone is not paid much attention to anymore”. The decline of the CNC as the traditional venue 
for resource channeling and representation and its corrupt practices were also mentioned as 
motivations for creating the association. Previous collective action was evidently a facilitating 
factor. In the previous permisionario union, the communities had created a regional road 
committee to invest in maintenance and improvement of the region’s (unpaved) roads –an issue 
that has been central to FA-2. Some of the region’s communities had also participated in two 
different ejido unions in the mid-1980s; in fact, the previous president of FA-2 had been 
secretary of FA-1’s governing board. 
Following these previous experiences, one of FA-2’s first actions was investing in a motor 
grader and in a tree nursery. Support from the state and municipal governments, a loan from the 
government’s rural bank (BANRURAL), and a new federal program for reforestation activities 
(PRONARE) were essential for these initiatives. The association also sought to provide resource 
channeling and political representation, and  began to lobby for the paving of the region’s main 
road and the electrification of its main town, both of which it has achieved with the support of 
the state government.  
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In the mid-1990s, FA-2 faced two important challenges. One was the peso devaluation 
crisis, which led to an inability to pay the bank what it owed for the motor grader because the 
debt quadrupled. The second was the illegal logging that emerged in the region after the 
deregulation of 1992. To combat it, the Union created a regional committee which established a 
checkpoint in the region’s main road.  
In 2002, a change in leadership brought important internal changes. The Union at that time 
was described as disorganized and controlled by the forester; the new governing board assigned 
the Union’s legal representation to themselves (i.e. the elected leaders) and changed the forester. 
In 2006, with the PROFAS program, a parallel ARS was created by the main timber entrepreneur 
in the region along with other private landowners. FA-2 was cut off from the PROFAS funds and 
from participation in state-level decision-making bodies, including a state-level FA they had 
helped create. Thus, in 2008, FA-2 decided to join the ARS, although in contrast to FA-1, they 
chose to maintain FA-2 as a functioning parallel organization. As explained by FA-2’s president, 
this was a strategic adaptation to be able to access PROFAS and other CONAFOR funds and 
create a division of labors. In his words: “we dance to the tune we are played” (interview, 02-26-
2010). The new ARS mostly focuses on tapping into the new forestry programs and creating a 
regional network for eco-tourism. Meanwhile, FA-2 has continued providing forestry services, 
channeling resources in forestry, agriculture and basic services, and engaging in “political 
issues” in which the ARS cannot become involved.58 FA-2 has benefitted from this situation, 
using some of the equipment acquired by the ARS –particularly office equipment and a plotter. 
In addition, it has gained access to regular meetings with CONAFOR and the state’s Natural 
Resources Secretariat which are exclusive to the ARS. However, considering that the funding 
                                                           
58
 All ARS are registered as non-profits and Mexican law prohibits any partisan activities for these types of 
organizations. 
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that goes to the ARS could as well go directly to FA-2, the creation of the ARS does not seem so 
positive. 
 
2.4.2.4 Top-down silviculturalist associations: FA-4 
FA-4 was created in 2003 as an ARS by the region’s main forester. Similar to FA-2, FA-4 
had as its precursor a permisionario union which had created regional-level collective action for 
forest management and built inter-community social capital, but which was controlled by the 
same forester.59 Yet in contrast to FA-2, where communities rebelled against the forester, in the 
case of FA-4 the forester led the initiative to form the new association in collaboration with some 
community leaders. The forester’s motivation was the 2003 Forest Law and its perceived 
mandate to create associations of communities and private landowners (ARS) within each of the 
new government-defined regions called UMAFORs. Similar to the cases of FA-3 and the new 
ARSs in FA-1 and FA-2, communities stated that the reason for organizing FA-4 and joining it 
was a legal requirement tied to the funding they could receive. As a leader explained, “there had 
to be an organization to access government programs and projects.” The forester was again a 
central figure, drafting the bylaws and mobilizing communities and government support. 
However, the region’s communities also drew on previous experiences of regional collective 
action.  
FA-4’s first activities were investing in fire watchtowers and road improvement 
equipment, deemed two of the region’s main problems. These projects were financed by a 
combination of member contributions and government support. In 2006, in a classic example of 
the rent-seeking effect of the new ARS policy, the right hand man of the forester took advantage 
                                                           
59
 Some of the member communities had also participated in the early 1990s in a short-lived ejido union which 
sought to regulate prices and develop a regional timber enterprise (see Table 2.3 above). 
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of the PROFAS funds to create a new association with almost half of the FA-4’s communities 
and build his own forestry services. This had a substantial impact on FA-4, as it greatly reduced 
its contribution base.  
 The organization has weathered this impact and continues to focus on resource 
channeling from CONAFOR programs. It obtained a regional permit for fuelwood extraction and 
recently obtained funds for an administration course, a seminar with another FA in Oaxaca, and 
an environmental impact study for a large road-improvement project. Finally, as occurred in FA-
2, a new leadership is attempting to shift the organization’s control from the forester to the 
elected leadership. 
 
2.5. Discussion 
The analysis from this study offers important insights into the factors influencing 
institutional emergence and change, particularly that of inter-community forms of collective 
action and linkages across scales. Overall, it shows that these processes have resulted from a 
combination of political-economic conditions, grassroots social mobilizations and the 
government’s responses to them, and strategic adaptations by the associations. Table 2.4 
summarizes these results.  
The case provides strong support to our hypothesis that macro-level political-economic 
conditions play a central role in shaping FAs’ emergence and change. The specific characteristics 
of the Mexican state, however, make this factor stronger and more complex. As an authoritarian 
system that lasted seventy years, the Mexican government substantially influenced the 
emergence of grassroots FAs while promoting the formation of top-down ones. Public policies 
and programs were central in this endeavor. Here, it is important to underscore that while 
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agrarian policies seem to have had more of an impact on community-level changes over time 
(see Bray et al., 2006), our historical analysis shows that forest policies have been the most 
important in the case of FAs. 
At least two political-economic changes were essential for the formation of inter-
community linkages: the waning power of the central government and the PRI, and FAs’ 
external linkages. But even as it lost centralized power, the state retained a central role in 
promoting the formation of many, if not all, FAs. Certain reformist sectors within the 
government, foresters, international aid organizations (e.g. Ford Foundation), NGOs, and 
progressive academics were all decisive in the formation of different FAs. State- and national-
level FAs have also been essential for providing a voice for community forestry at these levels. 
Yet external alliances can also hinder collective action, as the examples of the CNC and foresters 
(see Chapter 4) and previous studies demonstrate.  
Each phase had a combination of constraining and enabling characteristics. In addition, 
over time there are constant ‘back and forth’ struggles between decentralization and re-
centralization, generating top-down or bottom-up FAs. FAs are an important part of cross-
scale/multi-level governance in Mexico, but the constant struggle between autonomy and state 
intervention has Frequently, the Mexican government responded to grassroots efforts by creating 
their own organizations or co-opting existing ones in attempts to maintain political control or 
promote clientelism, as with Echeverría’s land reform and community forestry programs, Salinas 
de Gortari’s ‘pact’ with peasant organizations, and the PROFAS program. Local actors, such as 
foresters or regional caciques, also created new FAs as ways of capturing resources and gaining 
political power. This shows the importance of opportunistic, strategic behavior in re-scaling. It 
also confirms the conception of decentralization as a contested and messy process, or as 
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“incoherent and unstable regimes” (Wollenberg et al., 2006; also Bartley et al., 2008; Poteete and 
Ribot, 2011) and coincides with the previous descriptions of Mexican forest and agrarian policies 
as erratic and cyclical.  
 
Table 2.4. Factors affecting FA emergence and change across policy phases 
Phase Type of organization Main factors  
I (30
s-
60
s) 
• No FAs 
• Community-level chicle 
production cooperatives  
• Support for cooperatives from President 
Cardenas  
• Logging concessions and bans 
• Strong paternalism 
• Financial and political controls 
II
 (60
s-
86
) 
• Grassroots social movements 
against concessions 
• Top-down FAs as 
response/political front  
• Beginning of PRI’s legitimacy crisis  
• Unjust conditions and inefficiencies of 
concession system 
• Pro-peasant Presidents (Echeverría, López 
Portillo)  
• Programs supporting community forestry and 
FAs  
• Progressive government agents allied to the 
movements (foresters and others) 
• Previous local-level collective action 
experience 
• Strong paternalism and clientelism  
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Phase Type of organization Main factors  
III
 
(86
-
92
) 
• Economic FAs focused on 
developing productive capacity and 
improving market conditions  
• Forestry services FAs  
• Some FAs combining both 
 
• End of concessions 
• 1980s economic crisis 
• 1986 Forest Law 
• External supports from foresters, NGOs, etc. 
• Strategic alliances with some government 
actors  
• Previous collective action experience  
• New community needs in forestry market 
integration 
IV
 
 
(92
-
00
) 
• New forestry service FAs (adapted 
from previous ones) 
• Disintegration of many productive 
and forestry service FAs  
• New grassroots forest-
protection/environmental FAs (e.g. 
anti-logging committees) 
• 1992 Forest Law and Agrarian Reform 
• 1994 economic crisis  
• Large development projects and illegal 
logging 
• Pro-community forestry programs  
• Political openings: PRI 1997 election loss  
• National FAs lobbying for more government 
support 
• New community needs in forestry services 
V
 
 
(00
-
pr
es
.
) 
• New top-down regional 
“silviculturalist” associations: forest 
management and infrastructure 
improvements 
• New grassroots FAs:  
conservation/environmental services, 
diversification, commercialization 
• Political openings: PRI loses Presidency; 
• Clientelist networks reconstitute and electoral 
fraud returns (2006) 
• CONAFOR and government supports for 
community forestry 
• National FAs lobbying for more government 
support 
• 2003 Forest Law and PROFAS program 
• External support from international and local 
NGOs 
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These conditions are also untidy and contested to the extent that their implementation and 
effects vary depending on interactions at the local and state levels. States with previous local and 
regional histories of collective action seem more adept at taking advantage of policies promoting 
the creation of new (top-down) associations. But the implementation also depended on local 
political affiliations and personal interests, such as resource capture. While there have been 
openings at the national level, many FAs at the local level in states like Durango remain loyal to 
the PRI. This reflects the combined effect of historical and current political-economic conditions, 
and FAs’ reactions to them. Loyalty to the PRI has generated norms of reciprocity and a belief 
that the PRI is the party best representing peasants’ interests. But there is also a strategic 
calculation by peasants who recognize the PRI’s continuing strength and the lack of alternatives. 
This helps explain how old clientelist structures readapt to new contexts, as has occurred in 
Mexico (e.g. Lutz-Bachere, 2006; McDonald, 2001) and other countries (e.g. Ledeneva, 2006; 
Robinson, 2008). It also reflects the path-dependence of many institutions which affect the 
incentives of actors that are linked horizontally and vertically, generating a “complex web” of 
inter-dependent patterns (Fréchette and Lewis, 2011: 583-584). 
The complexity of collective action processes also blurs a clear differentiation between 
bottom-up and top-down FAs, which can be categorized as generally hybrid in terms of their 
constitution. Many bottom-up organizations had strong support from external actors, while top-
down organizations often have had grassroots initiatives to support them. Moreover, in the four 
case studies there were previous bottom-up and top-down organizational experiences which 
served to build social capital and influence current collective action. Similarly, many 
government-created ARS in Durango had a membership which directly correlated to previous 
permisionario unions. In addition, associations may transition from top-down into more bottom-
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up organizations, as with FA-4, or vice-versa, as with FA-1. And while the literature on Mexican 
FAs has continually pointed to the top-down origins as the reason for the dissolution of these 
organizations, some top-down FAs have been able to succeed. These results underscore the 
multiple ways in which grassroots social capital can be generated from the top or the bottom, as 
argued by Fox (1992).  
The analysis also shows the dialectic relation between changes in political opportunities 
and mobilization by FAs. Consistent with previous research on the relationship between states 
and social movements (e.g. Goldstone, 2003), we saw that while openings in these structures 
have promoted the creation of new associations and changes in existing ones, associations have 
at the same time acted to increase these openings and promoted new ones. For instance, 
Echeverría’s support for land reform and community forestry were partly a response to the pro-
democracy and anti-concession movements, as was the 1986 forest law. Similarly, the 1997 and 
2003 forest laws and the PROFAS program were influenced by active participation from FAs. In 
this way, associations achieve what Tang and Tang (2001) call “negotiated autonomy”, which 
stresses the dual role of both conflict and cooperation in institutional emergence and change. 
 At the micro-level, the research underscores the importance of cooperative behavior 
seeking solutions to common-pool resource governance problems as a key motivation for 
forming or changing cross-scale linkages. Grassroots associations have often emerged as 
attempts to protect their forest resources and appropriate the benefits flowing from them, 
influence public policies, and provide services not offered by markets or government, such as 
forestry services and resource-pooling for basic infrastructure. Leadership and pre-existing social 
capital were also found to be important factors facilitating the formation and sustainability of 
FAs. In the four case studies as well as many other examples, the movements began with a few 
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community or regional leaders who organized meetings with communities to mobilize support, 
as well as activate connections to government and non-government allies at multiple levels. 
These movements, however, built on previous (and often top-down) organizational experiences 
that had begun building a regional, inter-community social capital. 
Finally, the results display that FAs and communities are mutually constitutive. The 
community forestry projects that began in the 1960s built up local social capital which later 
facilitated regional collective action; the anti-concession movements further solidified this 
process (Bray and Merino, 2004; Antinori, 2000; Antinori and Rausser, 2008). At the same time, 
some have argued that the success of FAs is to a certain extent dependent on its member 
communities’ level of development and success (e.g. Bofill Poch, 2005; Bray and Merino, 2004). 
Changes at the community level such as the formation of ‘work groups’ –themselves promoted 
by structural and micro-level factors– or new needs in forestry services, have created challenges 
and some changes in FAs, such as increasing the costs of forestry services. 
 
 
2.6. Conclusions 
Previous scholarship has emphasized the difficulties of inter-community collective action, 
given that they require not just one but two levels of action (Bray and Merino, 2004); and that 
they often face very constraining political and economic environments (Wilshusen and Murguía, 
2003). Our research confirms these difficulties while also highlighting that grassroots inter-
community cooperation can overcome them through constant adaptations, including mobilizing 
to change the macro-level structures in place. We also showed that the emergence and evolution 
of multi-level/cross-scale governance in Mexico has depended on grassroots collective agency 
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but also on top-down policy efforts, broader political-economic developments, and personal 
power-seeking strategies. 
These findings offer important contributions to the study of institutional change and cross-
scale linkages. Moreover, the mixed methods approach proved a valuable tool to understand both 
broad patterns and the specific nuances of individual cases. Still, the large diversity across 
regions within Mexico implies that more research needs to be done at the local, regional and 
state levels to analyze the trajectories of particular forest associations within a given state and 
across states. Why, for instance, is it that significantly more communities in Durango belong to a 
forest association than in Michoacán? Or why have FAs in Oaxaca apparently remained more 
autonomous than in other regions? By the same token, comparisons with forestry cooperatives or 
producer or service associations in other countries would have to take the particular current and 
historical contextual factors into account. We also need to better understand how internal 
organizational factors affect the adaptation of cross-scale systems to internal and external 
disturbances, as suggested by scholars of social-ecological systems (e.g. Fleischman et al., 2010). 
Finally, an issue which needs more attention is how the characteristics of the resources such as 
abundance, salience, and complexity, affect inter-community collective action and institutional 
performance (see Antinori and Rausser, 2008; Basurto and Ostrom, 2009). These research 
directions will help us better understand inter-community collective action, which in turn will 
allow policy makers to design better policies to support it.  
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CHAPTER 3 
SCALING UP FROM THE GRASSROOTS AND THE TOP DOWN: THE IMPACTS OF 
CROSS-SCALE GOVERNANCE ON COMMUNITY FORESTRY IN DURANGO, 
MEXICO 
 
ABSTRACT 
This chapter analyzes the local-level impacts of cross-scale linkages in Mexican community 
forestry by evaluating the operation of four inter-community forest associations (FAs). Based on 
one year of fieldwork in Durango, Mexico, the paper focuses on two inter-related issues: (1) the 
services that each association provides to their member communities and how they impact forest 
management and the development of communities’ forestry enterprises, and (2) the differences in 
services and impacts between top-down and bottom-up FAs. The findings show that FAs, as a 
form of cross-scale linkage, can be crucial for the provision of services, goods and infrastructure 
related to the protection and enhancement of community forests, the economic development of 
community enterprises, and the political representation of these communities. At the same time, 
the study finds important differences between top-down and bottom-up FAs, while pointing to 
some of the disadvantages of each type of linkage.  
 
3.1. Introduction: From community to cross-scale  
 The collective action tradition has demonstrated that local institutions can strongly 
influence resource management (Agrawal, 2007; Baland and Platteau, 1996; Gibson et al., 2000; 
Ostrom, 1990; Ostrom et al., 2002). Recent work, however, has pointed out that sustainable 
resource management requires reorganizing governance to move from centralized and 
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community-based projects into “cross-scale” or “multi-level” arrangements (Antinori and 
García-López, 2008; Berkes, 2008; Brondizio et al., 2009; Carlsson and Sandström, 2008; 
Heikkila et al., 2011; Taylor, 2010). As Berkes (2008: 1) states, “It is becoming increasingly 
clear that commons governance necessarily involves a network of interactions at various levels. 
An increasingly globalized world requires institutions that link the local level to the various 
higher levels of social and political organization.”  
 “Cross-scale” refers here to the horizontal and vertical connections between communities 
and other levels of organization such as government agencies and civil society groups. In this 
sense, it implies a form of networked governance (Carlsson and Sandström, 2008; see also 
Benjamin et al., 2011; Bödin and Crona, 2009). It is also reminiscent of the concept of 
polycentric governance, in which collective action occurs in multiple interconnected action 
situations at different levels and scales (McGinnis, 1999; 2011).60 
  Despite some incipient research (e.g. Antinori and García-López, 2008; Bray et al., 2012; 
Heikkila et al., 2011), little work has been done on how these linkages actually work and the 
impacts they generate at the local level. To address this gap, in this paper I seek to analyze the 
function and impacts of a particular form of cross-scale/networked governance –inter-community 
forest associations (FAs)– in community forestry through a comparative study of four FAs in the 
state of Durango, Mexico. The findings show that Mexican FAs have important roles in the 
provision of services, goods and infrastructure related to the protection and enhancement of 
community forests, the economic development of community enterprises, and the political 
representation of these communities. There are also important distinctions in services and 
                                                           
60
 These concepts are also related the work on ‘joint’ or collaborative/co-management (e.g. Armitage et al., 2007) 
which looks at partnerships between communities, government agencies and other organizations such as NGOs; the 
concept of “nested enterprises” or ‘institutions embedded within institutions’ (Ostrom, 1990; also Brondizio et al., 
2009); and that of “bridging organizations” in the development literature (Brown, 1991; Bebbington, 1996). 
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impacts between top-down and bottom-up FAs. In discussing these results, I contend that the 
differences are partly a result of the distinct internal governance of each type of FA, but that 
there are also multiple other factors at play, such as leadership and the historical and political-
economic contexts (see Chapter 5).   
 In the next section, I provide the conceptual grounding for studying cross-scale linkages 
(CSLs) in common-pool resources, focusing on their potential benefits, the distinction between 
top-down and bottom-up linkages, and the application of these issues to the Mexican forest 
commons. In the third section, I present the methods and material used in the analysis, and in the 
fourth section the main results. The fifth section explains these results, and the sixth section 
presents the conclusions. 
 
3.2. Conceptual framework 
3.2.1. The potential benefits of cross-scale linkages 
 There are four types of potential roles for cross-scale linkages (CSLs) in common-pool 
resource settings: ecological, economic, social and political. In the CPR and social-ecological 
systems literatures, the main focus has been on how CSLs can help improve the ecological 
aspect of CPR management. CSLs often form to tackle complex, cross-scale environmental 
problems (Benjamin et al., 2011; Heikkila et al., 2011; Chapter 2). By sharing of information and 
resources and generating coordination, CSLs can help social actors and institutions respond to 
social-ecological changes more effectively, increasing local resilience and robustness (Armitage, 
2008: 14-15; Berkes, 2008; Janssen et al., 2006; Olsson et al., 2006; Ros-Tonen et al., 2008). 
CSLs also foster negotiation and the integration of different management objectives and 
‘knowledge systems’ (Berkes, 2008; Brown et al., 2005; Reid et al., 2006). As Olsson et al. 
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(2006: 29) conclude, networks show “a willingness to experiment and generate alternative 
solutions to emerging problems”. Similarly, Heikilla et al. (2011) demonstrate how inter-state 
water agreements lead to the creation of new cross-scale institutions that promote better water 
governance. 
 CSLs can also have economic impacts, helping to scale up and diversify production 
activities by pooling resources, and to improve market power in community-based economic 
projects such as community-owned timber enterprises (Antinori and García-López, 2008). 
Cooperatives and other peasant organizations have usually been shown to help members deal 
with imperfect competition, reducing monopoly and monopsony, generating economies of scale 
and lowering transaction costs (e.g. designing and administering projects), promoting vertical 
integration, coordinating aspects of production (production chains, e.g. secondary processing and 
commercialization of timber), reducing risks (by pooling resources and stabilizing returns), and 
increasing groups’ market power and/or profits –for instance, getting better prices for timber 
(Anderson, 2003; Ashton, 2006; Bebbington, 1996; Flores and Rello, 2002; Fulton, 1999; 
Kazoora et al., 2006; Tiles et al., 2004). These organizations can also contribute in the provision 
of services and goods previously offered by government agencies (Flores and Rello, 2002). 
 Finally, cross-scale linkages can have social and political effects. Organizations or 
networks that bridge scales –such as FAs– can amplify members’ voice in the political arena and 
increase their bargaining power as part of struggles to gain or defend rights to forests, or to 
influence public policies (e.g. Britt, 2002; Cronkleton et al., 2008; Durán et al., 2011; Paudel et 
al., 2010). Network scholars refer to this as “interest aggregation” (Benjamin et al., 2011). 
Ostrom (2005: 59-63) points to the mechanism of shifting scales as one of the strategies for 
changing higher-level institutions. FAs may play an important role here in serving as a bridge 
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between the community and the policy-making levels of government agencies and/or the 
legislature. They may also serve to expand the “scope of conflict” that also influences 
institutional change. 
 Scaled-up or networked forms of organization can also strengthen local social capital 
through small-scale projects that build trust, participation, conflict-resolution and institutional 
and technical capacities (Bebbington, 1996; Bray et al., 2012; Brown, 1991; Durán et al., 2011; 
Paudel et al., 2010), and can increase communities’ ability to adapt to external political-
economic disturbances (Berkes, 2008; Fabricius et al., 2007; Hahn et al., 2006; Smith and 
Wandel, 2006).  
 
3.2.2. Different linkages, different benefits: Top-down and bottom-up 
 To this date, research on CSLs has paid little attention to how different types of linkages 
influence their operation and impact. However, previous work has shown that bottom-up and 
top-down institutions can differ in both internal governance and resource management outcomes. 
Some recent studies have shown that government-initiated (top-down) co-management projects 
have worse management outcomes than self-organized or NGO-led community governance in 
forests (Agrawal and Chhatre, 2007; Behera, 2009). Moreover, these top-down linkages can lead 
to a reduction of communities’ linkages with external actors, lower levels of local collective 
action, and politicization of local resource governance (Nayak and Berkes, 2008). Self-organized 
processes/institutions are not necessarily more successful, but more likely to be so. There are 
several reasons for this, which have been explained elsewhere (e.g. Agrawal and Chhatre, 2007; 
García-López and Arizpe, 2010; Ostrom, 1990; Scott, 1998). At the same time, recent research 
shows that top-down linkages can also have positive outcomes. For instance, Schoon (2008), in 
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an analysis of transboundary park conservation in Africa, finds that while bottom-up 
arrangements do increase cooperation and coordination at the operational level (the day to day 
management of the parks), top-down arrangements can also generate successful cooperation but 
at higher levels of governance (national level policies and ministerial frameworks).  
  
3.2.3. Cross-scale linkages in the Mexican forest commons 
 In Mexico a substantial body of literature developed over the last twenty years has 
highlighted the notable successes of its community forestry experiment, which have led some to 
call it a “global model for sustainable landscapes” (Bray et al., 2003; see also Antinori and Bray, 
2005; Barsimantov and Navia, 2012; Bray et al. 2005; Bray et al., 2008; Merino 2004; Tucker, 
2004). Approximately 80% of Mexico’s forests, covering over one fourth of the country’s 
territory, are estimated to be under community ownership, the second highest percentage in the 
world after Papua New Guinea (Antinori and Bray, 2005). This property rights regime was an 
outcome of the Mexican Revolution and the subsequent land redistribution, embodied in Article 
27 of the 1917 Constitution, which gave land in common property to groups of landless peasants 
or indigenous communities.  
 Notwithstanding this large-scale devolutionary process, Mexico continues to suffer from 
high levels of deforestation (Barsimantov, 2010). In addition, recent research shows that less 
than 25% of Mexico’s forest communities are harvesting timber, and the majority that are sell 
stumpage wood, with little participation in the extraction process (Antinori and Rausser, 2010; 
Merino, 2011).61 At the same time, communities face substantial challenges related to weak 
organization, insufficient management skills, and limited access to markets (CONAFOR, 2000; 
Merino, 2011). To these challenges one must add the decreasing productivity at the national level 
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 There is variation by state; Durango and Oaxaca have the highest percentages of vetically-integrated communities. 
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and the increasing importation of cheaper wood from countries like Chile (Merino, 2011). These 
problems threaten the survival of vast forest areas and the livelihoods of millions of rural 
households, while suggesting that community institutions are not enough for successful forest 
management, pointing to the need for connections across scales.  
 FAs are one example of inter-organizational networks that create cross-scale linkages 
connecting communities to each other and to higher levels of governance.62 As shown in Chapter 
2, FAs have a long history in Mexico, emerging in top-down and bottom-up forms since the 
1960s with a diversity of objectives and activities. An emerging scholarship has begun to analyze 
the role of these associations in Mexican community forestry (e.g. Antinori and García-López, 
2008; Bray and Merino, 2004, Chap. 11; Bray et al., 2010; Bray et al., 2012; Duran et al., 2011; 
Merino et al., 2008; Taylor, 2001; Taylor and Zabin, 2000; Wilshusen, 2010), as well as other 
cross-scale linkages (Barsimantov, 2010; Orozco-Quintero and Berkes, 2010). Most of them 
have been case studies of individual FAs, with only a handful of comparative analyses (e.g. 
Taylor and Zabin, 2000). These studies have pointed to the positive impacts that FAs can have 
on member communities, as well as the challenges they face. Using a survey database of 41 
communities from Michoacán and Durango, in Chapter 2 I analyzed the services provided by 
FAs as reported by members. A principal factor analysis identified seven types of services 
provided by the FAs: legal and political representation; environmental protection; price 
information and contract monitoring; radio communication and road infrastructure; timber 
extraction and marketing; forestry services; and capacity-building and resource channeling. 
Antinori and Rausser (2010), using the same database, further showed that while associations do 
not always have the expected positive impacts on member communities, association membership 
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 Each community has its own collective action organization; therefore, an inter-community association (FA) is an 
organziation of organizations, or an inter-organizational network. 
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is positively correlated to community investments in secondary processing, diversification of 
forestry activities, and investment in local public goods (e.g. roads, schools). FA membership 
was also associated with reduced incidence of illegal harvesting, and with self-reported 
improvements in both forest cover and wildlife abundance. There was also a significant 
correlation between the type of FA (bottom-up or top-down) and the type of service provided: 
top-down FAs focused more on capacity-building, environmental protection, tree nurseries, and 
professional forestry services, while bottom-up FAs focused more on timber extraction and 
commercialization. At the same time, historical analyses show the hybrid organizational origins 
of many FAs, reflecting that top-down and bottom-up categories are very fluid (see Chapter 2). 
 Merino et al. (2008) argued that FAs are necessary for taking advantage of scale 
economies, financing quality forestry services, developing professionalized commercialization of 
forest products, and political representation.  Using a national-level survey of FAs, they found 
that top-down FAs have had some positive impacts related to coordination with the government, 
particularly participation in activities related to the promotion of government programs and 
diffusion of information, as well as improvements in the expedition and execution of the 
projects. The top-down FAs operate as ‘specialized’ organizations to process applications to 
CONAFOR projects that support forestry activities (Merino et al., 2008). They have also 
provided benefits including obtaining training and resources for equipment for forest fire 
fighters, training in tree production, and exchange of experiences with forest communities from 
other regions (ibid).  
 Important gaps, however, remain in this research agenda. First, there is no clear 
understanding of the causal mechanisms, i.e. how and why these impacts occur, and how they 
vary across bottom-up and top-down linkages. Second, the success cases presented in the 
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literature must be taken with caution, given the multiple organizational, political-economic and 
historical factors that can hinder the effectiveness of FAs. This is particularly the case in contexts 
of authoritarianism in state agencies and rural communities, clientelism and corporatism, as has 
been the trend in Mexico (Wilshusen and Murguía, 2003).  
 
3.3. Research Design and Methods 
  This work is based on the comparative case study method, which allows for close 
examination of complex empirical processes by collecting information across carefully selected 
units, based on theoretically-guided questions (George and Bennett, 2005). I purposefully 
selected four FAs following the “diverse-case” approach, in which the selection of cases is done 
to achieve maximum variation in the variable of interest (Gerring, 2007). In this case, the 
variable was the origins of the linkage: whether the FA was created by communities (bottom-
up/BU) or by external actors (top-down/TD). I selected two grassroots FAs (FA-1 and FA-2) and 
two top-down ones (FA-3 and FA-4). I also selected the organizations based on their time of 
origin, in order to have a representative sample of the different phases of Mexican forest policy 
and the different types of associations that emerged in each phase (see Chapter 2). Finally, there 
was an attempt to control for group size and location. Basic coded information about the form of 
origins, year of formation, and membership size was obtained from a 2007 survey of forest 
communities in Durango (see Antinori and Rausser, 2010). Within each FA, I sampled 
communities –all of the communities in FA-2, FA-3, and FA-4, and a sample of communities 
from FA-1 that was similar in size to those of the other three associations and that was 
representative of community size and of the different sub-regions found in FA-1.  
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 Data gathering was done through one year of fieldwork in Durango based on archival 
research and semi-structured interviews of key actors within each organization,  participant 
observation of FA meeting activities, interviews with other key stakeholders (e.g. government 
agencies, foresters), community-level focus group discussions, and semi-structured interviews 
with members and elected leaders of the communities. A total of 48 communities from the 4 FAs 
participated in the study.  
 I identified the benefits of FAs in three ways: by asking leaders and other community 
members open-ended questions about services and benefits (perceived benefits), by looking at 
specific community characteristics, and by comparing member and non-member communities. 
The focus group discussions tended to confirm the community leadership’s perceptions, though 
in some cases they were diametrically opposite.63 The measured benefits include two 
community-level socio-economic characteristics that could be influenced by FAs: vertical 
integration, which is a proxy for the level of community collective action and development; and 
whether communities are internally united or divided into so-called work groups.64 I also include 
three measures of the impact on forest management: self-reported incidents of forest fires and of 
changes in timber stocks, investment in diversification of forest uses (eco-tourism, payment for 
environmental services, etc.), and the adoption of sustainable forestry (FSC) certification. These 
outcomes could be directly related to FA membership if the FA helps the community channel 
resources for industrial timber processing equipment or business-related training, or indirectly by 
channeling resources for activities like courses that strengthen community organization or by 
promoting vertical integration or FSC certification.  
                                                           
63
 The perceived benefits or impacts from the FA activities are also influenced by subjective perceptions about the 
organization which include, among other things, whether the individuals interviewed are in alliance with (or 
support) the FA leadership. These problems are somewhat mitigated by interviews with multiple community 
members, though it was not possible to visit all the communities in each FA. 
64
 On work groups, see Wilshusen (2005), Taylor (2003). 
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3.3.1. The setting: Durango 
 The state of Durango is located in the northern extreme of Mexico’s interior or central 
region (see Figure 1.2, Chapter 1), bordered by the state of Chihuahua to the north, Zacatecas 
and Nayarit to the south, Coahuila and Zacatecas to the east, and Sinaloa to the west (SRNyMA, 
2006). It is the fourth largest state in the country, but also one of the least populated 
(Government of Durango, 2011). While most of the population (65%) lives in 3 large cities, the 
remaining 35% is highly dispersed, living in 5,000+ locations representing 99% of all of the 
state’s settlements. Durango also has a strong primary sector economy (agriculture, livestock and 
forestry) constituting the highest share of Gross Internal Product (GIP) (12.7%) of any state in 
the country (Government of Durango, 2011). The state also has one of the lowest proportions of 
economically active population in the country (56% in 2008 – UPUCODEFO4, 2008: 207). 
 Durango’s forest sector has substantial importance both at the state level and nationally. 
The state is crossed on its west side by the Sierra Madre Occidental mountain range, which 
crosses all of Mexico. This mountain range houses the state’s main peaks, which surpass three 
thousand meters, and most of its forest resources (SRNyMA, 2006). Durango has the country’s 
second-largest temperate forest area (4.9 million hectares, 41% of the state’s total area) and the 
largest timber stock (410 million m3, approximately 20% of the country’s total) and ranks, 
together with Chihuahua, first or second (depending on the year) in terms of timber production 
with an average of 2 million m3 of timber per year (SNRyMA, 2006). Moreover, contrary to 
other areas of Mexico, the state shows low levels of deforestation, with a rate of only 1% 
between 1993 and 2002, 5 percentage points lower than the national average (Perez-Verdin et al., 
2009). Durango also has the most communities and the largest area certified as sustainably 
managed under the Forest Stewardship Council’s (FSC) certification system (Trujano et al., 
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2010). As a result, forest-sector stakeholders in Durango proudly claim their title as the “Number 
One Forest Reserve” in Mexico.  
 Durango has also historically been a pioneer in community forestry in the country. The 
state has a total of 395 forest communities (including temperate and jungle/selva forests), of 
which 78% are ejidos and 22% comunidades. In 2008 SEMARNAT had 618 timber extraction 
permits of which 45% belonged to forest communities and the rest to private properties (de la 
Mora, 2004, cited in UPUCODEFO4, 2008). Recent surveys (Antinori and Rausser, 2010; 
Merino and Martínez, 2011) found that Durango has the highest proportion of communities with 
timber extraction and the highest proportion of vertically-integrated communities.  
 Durango’s forestry sector began developing towards the end of the 19th and beginning of 
the 20th centuries, when the state was subject to large-scale investments in forestlands by US 
investors benefitting from dictator Porfirio Diaz’s ‘vacant lands’ policy to expropriate 
indigenous and peasant lands. After the Mexican revolution, lands slowly began to be devolved 
through land grants to indigenous communities and peasant ejidos. However, between the 1950s 
and 1970s, Durango served as laboratory for the implementation of the federal policy of logging 
bans and timber concessions. During the 1970s, Durango’s forest communities held a privileged 
position with the federal government, which allocated to them most of the funds for forestry 
enterprises.  
Thus, contrary to states like Oaxaca, where most forest communities are indigenous and 
have had a long history of autonomous organization, Durango’s forest communities and their 
organizations emerged directly in association with the Mexican semi-authoritarian state-party 
system. Moreover, again in stark contrast to Oaxaca, Durango has a practically non-existent 
NGO sector related to community forestry, with the notable exception of Rainforest Alliance, 
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which does the FSC certification and some other forest-related projects. In Durango, this NGO 
role is mainly filled by private foresters who contract individually with communities, and to less 
extent by FAs. Lastly, despite the importance of Durango as a forest state, few researchers have 
ventured there (the two previous exceptions are Antinori and Rausser, 2010 and Taylor, 2001, 
2003). Oaxaca has been the focus of the vast majority of research on Mexican community 
forestry. Research outside Oaxaca has tended to focus on a few ‘model’ communities, such as 
San Juan Nuevo in Michoacán and El Balcón in Guerrero. Whether the findings from such 
particular settings are generalizable across different contexts remains unclear, and this study 
hopes to contribute to elucidate this. 
 
3.3.2. The four FAs 
The four FAs in the study –FA-1, FA-2, FA-3 and FA-4– are located in four of the five 
main forestry municipalities in Durango, representing about 60% of the authorized extraction 
volume of timber in the state as of 2003 (SRNyMA, 2006). The regional forest studies conducted 
in each region give a broad picture of some of the regions’ main problems.65 Socio-economic 
issues include communities’ poor organization for commercialization of timber products and 
integration of production chains, poor quality of infrastructure (mainly roads), low private and 
public sector financing for community forestry enterprises and projects, low levels of community 
re-investment into their forestry enterprises, rural unemployment and migration, drug-related 
insecurity and lack of basic services like electricity, health, education and potable water. Lack of 
employment was the main or one of the main problems mentioned by all the communities 
interviewed. The main source of employment in forest communities is usually temporary work in 
forest-related activities (e.g. timber cutting and extraction, transport, reforestation) which lasts 
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 For a more detailed description of the regions, see Chapter 1. 
168 
 
about 3-4 months each year (see also Antinori and Rausser, 2010). This is often combined with 
subsistence-based agricultural activities. On the ecological front, recurrent problems are soil 
degradation, over-grazing, forest fires, and deforestation, the main drivers of which are illegal 
drug production and expansion of grazing lands (SRNyMA, 2006). Table 3.1. summarizes the 
characteristics of the four FAs. 
  
Table 3.1. Basic characteristics of 4 FAs in Sample 
Name Year Origins Members Total forest area (ha) Timber volume (m3) 
FA-1 
 
1968 BU 40 coms*, 
33 pp** 
(77 tot) 
474,543 Pine: 385,521 
Oak: 102,739 
TOT:  504,914  
FA-2 1994 BU 12 coms 
(12 tot) 
52,833 Pine: 39,477 
Oak: 16,900 
TOT: 56,377 
FA-3 1986 TD 10 coms, 
178 pp 
(188 tot) 
186,000 (aprox.) Pine: 167,825 
Oak: 39,901 
TOT: 216,933 
FA-4 2003 TD 13 coms, 
8 pp 
(21 tot) 
56,638  Pine: NA 
Oak: NA 
TOT: 73,831 
* coms = communities 
   ** pp = private (smallholder) properties 
 
FA-1 was officially constituted in 1968 as part of communities’ struggles against the 
government concession of the region’s forest lands to a foreign timber corporation. As with other 
similar associations (see e.g. Taylor, 2001 on UNECOFAEZ in Durango), FA-1 began with 
support for land titling and to promote the organization and unity of forest communities and the 
development of their nascent community forestry sector, and later for industrialization and 
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commercialization of community timber enterprises. One community leader expressed it as an 
attempt to “protect” each other and gather strength for processing and commercializing their 
timber (interview, 04-27-2010). The Union’s 1976 work program established two objectives: (1) 
creating a concentration area (patio de concentración) to collect member communities’ forest 
products and commercialize them, therefore “avoiding the interruption of production”, and (2) 
commercializing these products through the Union, in order to avoid the participation of 
intermediaries (FA-1 constituting meeting minutes, 1976). Pursuant to these objectives, one of 
the key services of the Union during its initial years was a price list with set prices for logs and 
sawn products. In the 1970s, the union acquired its own sawmill and served as intermediary 
between communities and timber buyers, but these projects failed after a decade. In the 1990s, 
the Union built a tree nursery, but it never became operational and was transferred to the region’s 
largest forestry services.  
From 2005 and 2007, the Union underwent a process of restructuring (see Chapter 2 and 
4) in response to pressures from CONAFOR, changing from ejido union to the new “regional 
silviculturalist association” (ARS) model. This also implied changing its membership as well as 
its bylaws and objectives to meet the requirements of article 112 of the 2003 Forest Law. 
According to its ex-president, the organization now “seeks to contribute to obtaining a 
sustainable forest planning, an ordered planning of the forestry activities and the efficient 
management of forest resources, by carrying out the activities contemplated in the law, and be 
able to receive the economic support to carry out those activities and enjoy the supports and 
stimulus established by the Federal Law for the Promotion of Activities Carried out by Civil 
Society Organizations.” (FA-1 meeting minutes, 2007). 
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FA-2 emerged from the ashes of a permisionario union that had formed in 1986, and 
which disintegrated as a result of the 1992 Forest Law. The law created an opening for the 
union’s forester, who –knowing his removal from his position was imminent– convinced a 
majority of members that the union needed to be dissolved, and appropriated the union’s 
infrastructure (see Chapter 4). FA-2 formed from the majority of communities that did not want 
to stay with the forester and instead wanted to have their own forestry services. FA-2’s motto 
became: “for the rational management of the forest and the development of its inhabitants.” 
According to the Union’s bylaws, the FA’s main objectives are in issues related to raw materials 
in agriculture and forestry, and provision of technical forestry services and other services such as 
resource channeling, commercialization, access to credits education, and legal and financial 
advice.  
 FA-3 came into being in 1986 as a result of the 1986 Forest Law’s provision to give 
forestry service concessions to FAs. Initially only a few individuals joined, though eventually a 
total of eleven communities and 204 private landowners constituted it. One of the main reasons 
for forming the organization was dissatisfaction with the director of the government-run forestry 
services (UAF), though many communities perceived that it was a legal obligation from the 1986 
law. A forester in the region, who had been the right hand man of the UAF director, had a strong 
role in its creation. FA-3 obtained the concession to provide the forestry services in the region in 
1989, with the same membership as the government UAF. Through these services, the 
association sought to “contribute to the social, economic and ecological development of the 
forest areas” by promoting “the sustainable use of forest resources” in the region (FA-3 bylaws, 
1989). More specifically, FA-3’s objectives were to design management plans and other 
171 
 
technical studies for members, provide capacity-building, channel resources, represent the 
interests of the members, and help mediate in and resolve conflicts (FA-3 bylaws, 1989). 
FA-4 was created in 2003 by the region’s main forester, who had been the director of the 
government-run forestry services and later of a permisionario union. The main motivation was 
the 2003 Forest Law’s perceived mandate to create new regional associations within each 
Regional Forest Management Region (UMAFOR) in the state. FA-4 was the first of its type in 
the country. However, community leaders also participated, especially some who had previously 
formed an ejido union in the 1990s. The overall objective of FA-4 is to “achieve a sustainable 
management of forests ecosystems that guarantees its productive capacity in the short, medium 
and long terms, through the promotion and diversification of integral forest production, seeking 
out the social improvement of producers.”  Specific objectives include generating regional 
analyses to plan forest actions; identify forest products markets to improve investment; develop 
commercialization and timber production; integrate region-wide information to improve the 
quality and efficiency of forestry services; organize regional ‘production chains’; and develop 
regional strategic planning (FA-4 bylaws, 2003).  
 
3.4. Results 
3.4.1. What do linkages do?  
The research identified five types of services provided by the four FAs: resource 
channeling, resource pooling, political representation and information exchange, regional 
analysis and strategic planning (except FA-2), and forestry services (FA-2 and FA-3 only). 
Table 3.2 summarizes the services provided by each FA. Resource channeling –or what 
interviewees commonly refer to as “gestoría” (roughly translated as agency or lobbying)– refers 
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to FAs’ actions to secure funds from different government programs in forestry, housing, 
agricultural subsidies, and basic infrastructure like roads and electricity, for a specific 
community or for the whole region. Sometimes this means applying to funds directly, while 
others it entails lobbying government agencies for certain projects. Interviewees in all four cases, 
as well as external stakeholders, constantly referred to this as the associations’ main role. An ex-
leader of a community from FA-1 expressed that the objective was “to make sure that 
communities are obtaining their resources” (interview, 08-26-2010). A forester from the same 
region further described the associations as a “bridge” between communities and government 
agencies where “[community] needs flow from here to there [to the government] and support 
programs flow from there to here.” (interview, 03-04-2010) In one of the member communities, 
the leaders said that the FA was the one lobbying for all of their projects (interview, 06-11-
2010). In all four FAs, some interviewees remarked that if there was no one lobbying agencies 
on their behalf, they would never obtain those resources. For instance, FA-2 and (to a lesser 
extent) FA-3 were instrumental in creating inter-community initiatives (road committees) to 
improve the regions’ main roads and eventually to get the government to pave them, and in 2011 
FA-1, FA-3 and FA-4 received funding for road improvements in their regions. FA-2 and FA-3 
have also been instrumental in pressuring for the regions’ electrification. FA-1, FA-2 and FA-3 
also channel subsidized agricultural inputs (oat seeds, etc.) to members.  
It is important to note that some interviewees considered that their receipt of funds, 
especially those from CONAFOR, was conditional on their membership in the associations, 
rather than on lobbying and representation (referred to as “gestoría” in Mexico). As one 
community leader in FA-1 said, “being in the association is how we receive the PROARBOL 
funds” (interview, 04-30-2010). In relation to this, others believed that being in the Association 
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automatically gave the community some points in the applications for CONAFOR program 
funds. This view was more prevalent in the non-forestry service associations, receiving seven 
mentions in these associations (two in FA-1 and five in FA-4), compared to one mention in FA-3 
and none in FA-2. This perception results from the fact that between 2005 and 2007 CONAFOR 
awarded 3 extra points in the program applications to communities within the new (ARS) 
associations, as a way to ‘convince’ communities into joining these associations. Yet currently 
this perception is incorrect because after 2007 these points were discontinued. Moreover, with a 
few exceptions, most CONAFOR programs are awarded to individual communities and not to 
the FAs, and it is the forester hired by each community who applies to those programs. 
Resource pooling refers to gathering members’ contributions for certain projects, 
oftentimes combining them with government funds. Most federal government programs require a 
portion of the costs to be covered by the solicitor. By pooling the resources from their 
membership, FAs reduce the financial contributions that a given community would have to do on 
its own. FA-3 and FA-4 have used member fees to invest in their fire watchtowers (FA-4 has 
built three and FA-3 five) and to support fire combat brigades, either with salaries or food. FA-2, 
FA-3, and FA-4 all collect member contributions for roads improvements, while FA-2 and FA-4 
have also invested in road improvement machinery (motor graders and backhoes). Through these 
investments, associations engage in the provision of public goods (e.g. improved forest 
protection, better transport infrastructure). Some of the FAs also pool resources for economic 
enterprises. FA-2 and FA-3 have tree nurseries (FA-3 has two); the first produces about 100,000 
saplings per year, and the second about 2 million. They sell these trees to their member 
communities at subsidized prices, and to CONAFOR. FA-1 also used collective investments for 
its collective enterprises (sawmill, nursery), yet as seen above all of them have since failed.  
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Table 3.2. Services provided by 4 FAs in the study  
Services Association 
 FA-1 FA-2 FA-3 FA-4 
Resource channeling X X X X 
Resource pooling X X X X 
Political representation X X X X 
Regional analysis and strategic 
planning 
X  X X 
Forestry services  X X  
 
 Political representation and information exchange is tightly linked to FAs’ lobbying 
activities, and more generally to FAs role as intermediaries facilitating “interest aggregation”. As 
a community leader expressed, the objective is to “represent all the communities in government 
agencies…to go united towards a common goal.” (interview, 05-22- 2010)  One aspect of this is 
intervening to help communities in conflict resolution. For instance, FA-1 was instrumental in a 
conflict between a member community and a timber company, and more recently in negotiating 
with the Mexican Social Security Institute (IMSS) when it does not provide the needed health 
services66, which is a common occurrence among rural residents; and to convince the federal 
Treasury to condone or reduce a tax debt that many of the region’s communities have with the 
agency.67 A second dimension is associations’ participation in governmental decision-making 
bodies at municipal, regional, and state levels. FA-2 and FA-3, for instance, have voting 
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 In Mexico, social security refers to medical coverage provided to employees of a company, not to money from 
employment.  
67
 Communities are subject to taxes on their profits from their timber sales, but many do not pay it, and some have 
even convinced the government not to charge it to them (e.g. San Juan Nuevo in Michoacán). 
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representation in the Municipal Council on Sustainable Rural Development (CMDRS), the 
Evaluation Committee of the State’s Natural Resources Secretariat (SRN), SEMARNAT’s 
Central Consultative Council for Sustainable Development, and the Committee on Forest 
Management within the State’s Forests and Lands (Suelos) Council. Three of the FAs also have 
indirect representation in CONAFOR’s state evaluation committee through their membership in 
a state-level association. Each of these committees is in charge of evaluating and approving 
proposals for funding submitted by communities or individuals, except for SEMARNAT’s 
Council, which is an advisory body. Leaders in one of the FAs described this as one of their most 
important and at the same time challenging activities, which gives them the ability to influence 
government policies and the resource channeling process. A third dimension of representation is 
the use of FAs as traditional clientelist networks through which FAs connect peasants to political 
parties (especially the PRI) in exchange of certain benefits (see Chapter 4).  
 In some cases, FAs also link to other external actors at different levels. In the case of FA-3, 
the President is the municipal representative of a national NGO dedicated to agricultural and 
forestry research and technology transfer. FA-2 and FA-1 are also members of UNOFOC, a 
national association of FAs and forest communities68; while FA-1, FA-3, and FA-4 are members 
of the state confederation of regional silviculturalist associations, which in turn is a member of 
the national association of state confederations. Through these higher-level associations, FAs try 
to influence state and national policies and programs and can better coordinate with agencies at 
those levels. Lastly, FAs are tied to peasant organizations and political parties. FA-1 and FA-2 
leaders, for instance, consider the association as tightly interlinked to the CNC. Both FA-2 and 
FA-3 stated that they are taken into account in the process to select candidates for office for the 
PRI party. 
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 On UNOFOC, see Chapela (1998). 
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 Regional analysis and strategic planning has been funded by CONAFOR as part of what 
the agency considers the new ARS associations’ ‘duties’. These ‘duties’ include the Regional 
Forest Study, 5-year Strategic Plans, Plans for Raising and Diversification Income, and Annual 
Work Plans. These are currently pre-requisites for receiving other funding. The only one that has 
not been involved in this type of activity is FA-2, because it is not an ARS. However, the ARS 
that formed parallel to FA-2 has been doing these studies. 
 Finally, FA-2 and FA-3 have their own forestry services,69 which involve designing 
landowners’ forest management plans, obtaining extraction permits, and supervising the process 
of tree mark-up. As is common in Durango, these services also entail channeling funds for forest 
management and soil conservation (reforestation, mini-dams, fire lines, etc.), capacity-building 
through courses, eco-tourism projects, payments for environmental services, and development of 
communities’ timber and non-timber enterprises, among others. Forestry services are also a form 
of resource pooling, where members’ service fees are used to invest in infrastructure that 
enhances these forestry services (and ultimately forest management), such as the tree nurseries 
and fire combat infrastructure, which individual communities and small private forestry services 
are often unable to acquire on their own.  
 
3.4.2. Perceived benefits 
 Table 3.3 presents the results regarding the perceived benefits from member communities 
(leaders and/or focus group discussions) in each FA across different categories.70 Figure 3.1 
presents these results in visual form. A high percentage of member communities in each of the 
associations perceived some benefits in at least one of the categories (see the last column, 
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 The communities in FA-1 and FA-4 contract private forestry services. 
70
 Appendix 2 presents the detailed responses by community. 
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TOTAL). This ranged from 83% of the communities in FA-4, to 100% in FA-3. Eight different 
categories were identified: (1) resources for forestry programs, (2) resources for agriculture, (3) 
resources for basic infrastructure, (4) information, (5) political representation, (6) unity, (7) 
forestry services, and (8) investments in public goods.71 These are ordered from left to right in 
order of importance, i.e. the average percentage of communities in the full sample of 
communities (n = 48) mentioning the category as a benefit. The most important categories where 
those directly related to resource channeling/gestoría: forestry (63%), basic infrastructure (42%), 
and agriculture (40%). Investments in public and collective goods (39%), forestry services 
(35%), and unity (34%) emerged as moderately important; and political representation (17%) 
and information (16%) as the least important. 
 Forestry-related resources were the most important benefits perceived on average across 
the whole sample. FA-2 and FA-3 had the highest percentages of member communities reporting 
this as a benefit (75% and 70% respectively), as expected given that they provide forestry 
services. However, the percentages were also high in FA-1 and FA-4 (57% and 50%). In FA-3 
and FA-1 this was the second most important benefit, and in FA-2 the most important. Some 
communities also mentioned equipment and food (dispensas) for fire brigades. Importantly, only 
in very few cases did communities mention ‘diversification’ programs such as payment for 
environmental services or wildlife management units (1 mention each in the whole sample), eco-
tourism (3 mentions – 2 in FA-2 and 1 in FA-3), and a region-wide permit for extraction of 
cellulosic material (1 mention – in FA-4). The most-mentioned supports were those directly 
related to forest management (e.g. reforestation). However, there was one significant difference 
between the associations that provide forestry services and the ones that don’t. In those that 
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 Note that these categories have some overlap. For instance some of the associations invested in public goods such 
as fire towers and road improvement machinery, but these investments were coupled with resources channeled rom 
government programs. 
178 
 
provide these services, these resources were perceived as a direct benefit of the forestry services, 
and communities made the link to specific programs. In contrast, in FA-1 and FA-4, 
communities mostly perceived them as indirect benefits related to membership and referred to 
resource channeling in general terms. In FA-1, only two communities mentioned specific 
programs, and in FA-4, three communities did.  
 
Table 3.3. Perceived benefits of 4 FAs in the study by category 
FA Benefits (% mentioned) 
 
RC-F RC-BI RC-A IC+PG FS UNITY PR INFO TOTAL 
FA-1  
(n = 14) 
57.1% 21.4% 78.6% 0% 0% 14.3% 35.7% 14.3% 93% 
FA-2 
(n = 12)  
75% 66.7% 25% 8.3%72 50%73 58.3% 25% 33.3% 100% 
FA-3 
(n = 10) 
70% 50% 50% 70% 90% 40% 0% 0% 100% 
FA-4 
(n = 13) 
46% 30.8% 7.7% 76.9% 0% 23.1% 7.7% 15.4% 84.6% 
AVG.  
(n = 49) 
62% 42.2% 40.3% 38.8% 35% 33.9% 17.1% 15.7% 94.4% 
 
RC-A: Resource channeling for agriculture  
RC-F: Resource channeling for forestry  
RC-BI: Resource channeling for basic infrastructure 
PR: Political representation 
FS: Forestry services 
IC+PG: Investment in common and public goods 
 
 The second most important type of perceived benefit was resources for basic 
infrastructure. The two most predominant benefits mentioned in this category were road 
improvements and electrification. Basic services like potable water and housing improvements 
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 This refers to FA-2’s past investment in road-maintenance machinery, which they sold once the road was paved. 
73
 N=8, the number of member communities that actually contract with the Union’s forestry services.  
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were also mentioned in some communities. FA-2 was the association with the highest percentage 
of mentions in this category (66.7%), and it represented the second most-important perceived 
benefit for this FA.74  
 The third type of benefit in order of importance was resources for agriculture. FA-1 
showed the highest percentage of communities perceiving this benefit (78.6%), followed by FA-
3 (50%). The main resources mentioned were subsidized oat seeds and fertilizer, channeled 
through the state’s agriculture ministry. FA-3, for example, obtained 160 tons of oat seeds with 
50% subsidy in 2011. Fruit trees and women’s tortilla enteprrises (in FA-1), wire for fencing (in 
FA-1 and FA-2), trout farms (in FA-2 and FA-3), and nutritional supplement for livestock (in 
FA-2) were also mentioned. In FA-4 only one community reported benefits in this category. This 
coincides with the observation that this association currently does not provide any services in this 
area, though its current president has plans to develop programs to this end.  
 The fourth-ranked type of benefit was investment in public goods, which had a very similar 
average to RC-A across the four FAs. This was perceived as a benefit by a very high percentage 
of communities in FA-3 and FA-4 (70% and 75% respectively) and was the most important 
benefit in FA-4 and the second most important (tied with RC-F) in FA-3. In FA-4, the main 
aspect mentioned was the investments in road improvements, through the purchase of road-
improvement machinery (motor grader and backhoe), and in fire combat infrastructure 
(watchtowers and brigades). In FA-3 communities mentioned these as well as tree nurseries and 
the radio communication system, which serves in cases of forest fires or emergencies like road 
accidents or illnesses. Referring to the importance of the radio communication and watchtowers 
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 Only one community mentioned housing supports, but the current leadership declared in its report to the 
members’ assembly in Sept. 2011 that they had helped channel floor constructions for 35 houses in different 
member communities by collecting and submitting the paperwork to the Municipal Housing Institute (IVED), and 
also ‘promoted’ housing improvement credits for 6 families. 
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for combating fires, a previous leader of FA-3 concluded: “Communication is development.” 
(interview, 10-05-2011, emphasis added) FA-3 also has a longstanding tradition of investing a 
fixed percentage of all government program funds even when there is no formal requisite to do 
so, as an ‘incentive’ for the government to approve their proposals (interview with FA-3 forestry 
service director, 06-26- 2010). In FA-1 and FA-2 these benefits were practically non-existing, 
though some interviewees noted they had existed in the past. FA-2 does have tree nursery and in 
the past invested substantially in maintaining the road. 
 Forestry services ranked fifth across the four FAs (35%), though only two of the FAs (2 
and 3) provide this benefit.75 It was the most prominent perceived benefit in FA-3 (90%). In this 
association, many emphasized the high quality of services (particularly the fact that the services 
were, as several interviewees put it ‘more than just markup of trees’), and the good forest 
management practices implemented, including a strong focus on reforestation and soil 
conservation activities, fire combat, and the proper markup and cutting of trees. Several 
communities expressly connected the good forestry services to the observed reduction in forest 
fires and the overall improvement of their forest, especially regarding timber volumes. In FA-2, 
while some mentioned good forest management and service quality, others emphasized the 
importance of having their own forestry services so “they could do the [forestry] work 
themselves, so they would be the ones commanding the forester, not the other way around” 
(interview, 08-03-2010, emphasis added).  
 Another benefit mentioned in a substantial percentage of communities in all four 
associations (32%) was unity. FA-2 had the highest percentage of communities (58.3%) in this 
category, followed by FA-3 (40%). FA-1 had the lowest percentage (14.3%), perhaps because of 
the organization’s strong internal divisions. The underlying idea was that being united provided 
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 This benefit is tightly linked to resource channeling for forestry programs 
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‘political strength’ –the well-known saying of ‘unity provides strength’ was often mentioned– 
which in turn made it easier to access government resources and solve problems. As one 
community leader from FA-1 put it: “one speaking for oneself is not the same as one speaking 
for twenty” (interview, 05-22-2010). This highlights the political role of FAs. In other cases, 
there was a perception that being united was a benefit because the government gave preference 
to communities organized within FAs. As mentioned by a community leader in FA-2: “united it 
is much easier to obtain attention, because they [the government] rarely pay attention to a 
community on its own anymore” (interview, 08-25-2010). This perception coincides with 
government statements which emphasized that they would give priority to the ‘well-organized’ 
communities. A few others emphasized how being united allowed them to ‘work together’ and 
pool resources to invest in projects or equipment. 
 The two least important benefits in the sample were political representation and 
information-sharing. Despite its low overall average, PR was important in two associations: FA-
1 (35.7%, the third most important category in this FA) and FA-2 (25%). This category 
overlapped with those of ‘unity’ and resource channeling. In the cases where this was mentioned 
directly, it was related to problem-solving. In FA-1, respondents mentioned the association’s 
help in dealing with “large problems” with government agencies like the IMSS (5 mentions), the 
Treasury (3 mentions), the Federal Electric Commission (CFE) (1 mention), and the Federal 
Environmental Police (PROFEPA) (2 mentions). Finally, there were benefits referring to 
communities’ perception that they could now get more information and advice about different 
the government programs available (INFO).76 FA-2 showed the highest percentage in this 
category (33%). In FA-3, no communities mentioned these two categories as a benefit. 
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 Information sharing is not necessarily a benefit, because it requires that communities have the knowledge of how 
to use it, and that they actually do use it. 
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Figure 3.1 Average of perceived benefits across four FAs 
 
RC-A: Resource channeling for agriculture   
RC-F: Resource channeling for forestry  
RC-BI: Resource channeling for basic infrastructure 
PR: Political representation 
FS: Forestry services 
IC+PG: Investment in common and public goods 
 
3.4.3. Community-level indicators 
From the findings above, we see that currently none of the associations provide any 
specific services directly focused on communities’ vertical integration or internal organization. 
Moreover, leaders of all four associations stated that they tended to not intervene in internal 
community affairs. However, resource channeling of forestry programs –for instance, through 
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capacity-building– could contribute to improving community organization if correctly focused.77 
In terms of forest management, the FAs providing forestry services would be expected to have a 
stronger impact because they are owned by communities –and therefore can incorporate local 
knowledge– and they apply forest management at the regional level. We also expect FA-3 and 
FA-4 to have a strong impact on forest fires because of their investment in fire detection and 
combat. Table 3.4 summarizes these results. For each category, a grey shade identifies the FA 
with the highest value. 
 
Table 3.4. Measurable community-level indicators 
Level of impact Association78 
 FA-1 FA-2 FA-3 FA-4 
Vertical Integration  
(% type IV) 
50%  
(n = 14) 
0% 
(n = 12) 
9% 
(n = 10) 
23% 
(n = 13) 
Community organization  
(% members w/out sub-groups) 
34% 
(n = 14) 
25% 
(n = 8) 
67% 
(n = 6) 
54% 
(n = 13) 
Timber stock (% members w/ 
stable or increased stocks) 
58% 
(n = 7) 
60% 
(n = 5) 
100% 
(n = 9) 
0% 
(n = 7) 
FSC Certification  
(% of members) 
40% 
(n = 14) 
0% 
(n = 12) 
10% 
(n = 10) 
0% 
(n = 13) 
Forest fires  
(% members w/ reduced fires) 
NA NA 100% 
(n = 6) 
31% 
(n = 4) 
 
The analysis shows a somewhat weak relationship between vertical integration and FA 
membership. There is wide variation in level of vertical integration within each FA, and an 
almost complete lack of integration in some FAs. For instance, in the region in which FA-3 
operates there are eight (8) communities with sawmills, but only one of those is from FA-3 (9% 
                                                           
77
 One of the challenges noted in interviews is that foresters often prefer applying for programs focused on 
ecological aspects such as reforestation, soil conservation, or environmental services because of economic incentives 
(these programs often carry a higher payment for forestry services) and because it is their area of expertise. 
78
 Sample sizes vary in each FA because of non-responses.  
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of membership). In contrast, three of the sawmill-owning communities in the region are not 
members of any association. In FA-2, there is only one community with a sawmill, but they have 
been unable to jump start its operation because of lack of financing, and community members 
expressed that the association had not helped them with this aspect. In FA-1 and FA-4, there are 
higher proportions of communities with sawmills (50% and 23% respectively). However, the 
causal linkage between their establishment and FA actions is not always clear; in the three 
sawmill-owning FA-4 communities and some of the FA-1 communities, the sawmills were 
established previous to the formation of the association. In addition, all four associations show a 
marked trend towards vertical disintegration. Six member communities in FA-1, five in FA-2, 
three in FA-4 and one in FA-3 have sold their sawmills and gone back to selling roundwood.79 
This does not mean that FAs do not help communities in their vertical integration. The sawmills 
in the two communities in FA-2 and FA-3 were established with the support of their associations. 
And historically, FA-1 was crucial in helping communities obtain loans and other supports for 
their emerging timber enterprises, and to obtain better prices for their timber, which translated 
into higher profits for those enterprises. 
 Regarding community organization, there is a notable trend of formation of intra-
community ‘work groups’ in three of the associations, generally interpreted by interviewees as a 
sign of internal divisions. In FA-1, nine member communities of those sampled (64%) have 
internal divisions, and the president of the association estimated that about 50% of all the 
members have work groups. In FA-2, six members (75% of sample) have done the same; and in 
FA-4, six (46%). FA-3 has been the most successful FA in this aspect, with only two member 
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 The lower number in FA-3 is due to the fact that historically there have only been 2-3 communities with sawmills 
in the organization. 
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communities (33% of sample) forming work groups; interviewees attributed this to efforts by the 
association’s forester. 
 In terms of forest management, communities in all FAs except FA-3 reported declining 
timber volumes. This was most obvious in FA-4, where all seven communities that answered the 
question (100%) reported decreasing volumes. In FA-1, and FA-2, the trend was more 
ambiguous but still negative overall. In FA-1, three out of seven communities (43%) reported 
declining volumes, two (29%) reported no change, and two (29%) reported increases. In FA-2, 
two out of five communities (40%) reported decreases, one reported increases (20%), and two 
reported no change (40%). The Association’s president claimed that overall the forest volumes in 
the region had remained stable but that the composition had changed towards smaller-diameter 
trees. In contrast, in FA-3 seven of nine communities (78%) reported increased timber volume 
(the two exceptions reported no change), coinciding with the perceived benefits in resource 
channeling for forestry programs and forestry services.  
 Meanwhile, communities reported a reduction in forest fires in FA-3 and the FA-4. This 
possibly points to the potential effect of investments in fire prevention and combat that both 
associations have made. In the case of FA-3, according to its forestry services director, forest 
fires have been reduced from 12,000 ha per year 15 years ago to 50-100 ha per year currently 
(interview, 06-26-2010).80 Five member communities (50%) mentioned this trend. The ex-
Treasurer of the FA also mentioned the end of illegal logging in the region in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s as another of the Union’s achievements related to forest protection (interview, 10-
05-2011). This is confirmed by the regional forest study (ERF), which states that none of the 
communities in FA-3 have this problem. The leader of FA-2 also mentioned a reduction in illegal 
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 This and the increased timber volumes led the FA-3 Secretary to claim that their forests had been ‘totally 
transformed’ (interview, 07-29-2010). 
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logging as a result of the formation, in the 1990s, of a regional committee which established a 
regional checkpoint. In the case of FA-4, the forester and four communities (31%) also 
mentioned a substantial decrease in the frequency and magnitude of forest fires. In both cases, 
these statements were further confirmed by the analyses in the ERFs. In FA-4, the ERF data 
showed that between 1995 and 2002 there were an average of 14 fires per year affecting an 
average of 2,260 ha. From 2003 to 2006, the per-year average number of fires dropped to 6, and 
the average area affected to 348 ha. The study concluded that the investments in constructing fire 
towers and increasing the number of combat brigades, as well as increased coordination with 
CONAFOR, were the main reasons for the decline. Still, these results need to be taken with 
caution, for two reasons. First, because the causes of forest fires are manifold, e.g. climate 
variability, and agricultural expansion; and second, because the perceptions of forest fires may 
be incorrect. In fact, in the cases of FA-3 and FA-4, the associations’ own data for its member 
communities (data not available for the other two FAs) shows that the paterns of perceived fire 
reduction are less clear, with some recent years showing spikes in the amount of fires. 
 The impact of FAs on member communities’ investments in forest diversification projects 
is also weak. FA-3 and FA-4 have not developed eco-tourism at all, except in one FA-3 
community. FA-2 has promoted eco-tourism and environmental services programs, but it is still 
an incipient project and some communities complain about the unequal distribution of the 
benefits, mostly captured by the private properties associated to the region’s main timber 
entrepreneur (see Chapter 4). In the establishment of sustainable forest management (FSC) 
certification, FA-1 has the highest number of certified communities of all the state’s regions (8, 
20%). FA-2 was very active in this regard in the 2000s and at one point had almost half of its 
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membership certified (five, 42%), but to date all have abandoned certification.81 In contrast, in 
FA-3 there is only one member community certified (another member is in process), and in FA-4 
there are none. These results need to be taken with caution. The wide diversity of members’ 
socio-economic and ecological characteristics –which also influence the observed outcomes– 
makes it very hard to draw conclusive links. In addition, the analyses of deforestation and forest 
fires in the ERFs include communities and other properties outside the membership of each of 
the FAs. Moreover, in the case of FA-4, the association did not exist for much of the period of 
analysis.  
 
3.4.4. Analysis of communities outside the linkages 
Another way to evaluate the impacts of membership in FAs is by looking at the situation 
of communities outside the linkages. In this case, interviews with non-FA communities illustrate 
that some communities outside the linkages are doing as well or better than those inside, while 
others are doing worse. Moreover, the analysis highlights how other linkages can substitute or 
supplement the FAs activities. In the FA-2 region, I interviewed the leaders of a non-member 
community, Excelencia (fictitious name). According to informants, Excelencia is one of the most 
developed communities and among the first in reception of benefits from government programs 
in the region. The community has received many supports for housing improvements, recently 
built a large hotel, and the government installed water drainage. Moreover, it has rejected 
pressures by some members to become internally divided into work groups. According to 
informants, in both of these processes, the region’s main timber entrepreneur –who owns a 
majority of shares in the community– played a key role. The president of Excelencia’s 
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 The reasons for doing so expressed by members were mostly related to the costs and the perceived lack of 
benefits.  
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Comisariado explained that when FA-2 formed they considered joining but decided it was not 
necessary. He argued that the community was doing well on its own, and that they had more 
government resources than communities within the Union. For him the key was their forester. 
Residents from a FA-2 member community bordering Excelencia noted that the reason 
Excelencia had received the state supports for housing improvements while they had not was  
because Excelencia’s leaders were “more active” than their own.  
 In the FA-3 region, I visited Detractora (fictitious name). Detractora left the association a 
few years ago because of the high costs of the forestry services. The community members 
interviewed unanimously agreed that with their new forester they have the same benefits they 
had with FA-3, except the forestry services cost them almost 50% less. In addition, while FA-3 
did not help them with agricultural issues, the new forester does. Also, now they have a portable 
radio, which they did not under FA-3 because of the costs, and they receive more forestry 
supports from the government. They are now in a new association which has a tree nursery and 
sells them the plant cheaper than FA-3 did. Finally, they explained that social supports are 
channeled through individual community leaders as well as the forester. Similar comments about 
resources being channeled through local leaders were common in other communities in all four 
FAs. This region offers other examples of communities which are not in any FA, like Conducto, 
which has its own sawmill (i.e. is vertically integrated) and has FSC certification (i.e. has 
sustainable forest management), even though it is divided internally into work groups. 
 In the FA-4 and FA-1 regions I found contrasting examples. In the FA-1 region, almost all 
of the communities, with very few exceptions82 were formally integrated into the association 
since 2007 (through the PROFAS program). The association’s forester and CONAFOR officials 
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 The exact number of non-member communities could not be determined but was estimated to be between 2 and 3 
communities, and it was impossible to reach the comisariados of the two identified. 
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explained that those not integrated into FA-1 did not have any forestry activities at the time and 
did not receive any forestry-related supports, and this was precisely the reason for not joining an 
FA. 
 In the FA-4 region, the community of Desprovista is a formal member of the association 
but they were unaware of it and have never participated. According to interviewees, the 
community used to be one of the strongest in Durango, they had a concentration yard in one of 
the largest cities and bought timber form other communities. They also led the formation of a 
now-extinct FA. Now the community is in a “very bad” state; it does not receive any government 
supports in forestry, agriculture or cattle and there is a strong lack of trust between community 
members. Timber volume has dropped between 50% and 70% according to their calculations. 
They are internally divided in two groups, and the division was so strong that for years each 
group had its own separate assemblies. They hire a forester who lives in a faraway city from 
another state. This year, the forester didn’t even visit the community to ask them if they wanted 
to apply for any programs. The division and the poor quality of technical services, as well as 
weak leadership and ‘disconnection’ from regional initiatives, were cited as the main reasons for 
the community’s current state.  
 
3.4.5. Differences between top-down and bottom-up linkages  
 There are some observable differences between top-down FAs (FA-3 and FA-4) and the 
bottom-up ones (FA-1 and FA-2) in the activities they carry out. Figure 3.2 summarizes these 
distinctions. The top-down associations strongly emphasize issues directly related to forestry, 
and their members perceive them as being dedicated to this. Combating forest fires has been one 
of their main goals, and they have invested substantially in this as well as in road improvements. 
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At the same time, there is an evident lack of attention to other issues such as industrialization, 
commercialization, and price regulation, despite the fact that these constantly come up as some 
of the main problems in member communities in all four FAs. There are stark contrasts in 
two categories of perceived benefits: political representation and investments in public goods. 
Only one of the communities in the top-down FAs mentioned political representation as a benefit 
(4%), while an average of 30% of the two bottom-up FAs did. In investments in public goods, 
the relationship is inverted: an average of 75% in the top-down associations mentioned this as a 
benefit, but in the bottom-up FAs only 4% (1 community) did.83 In terms of measurable impacts, 
both top-down FAs have also been more successful at investing in regional projects and as a 
result show more success in reducing forest fires and, in the case of FA-3, in increasing timber 
stock.  
 However, these distinctions, as with the historical origins of each association, are blurry. In 
FA-3, 50% of communities perceived benefits in agriculture, higher than one of the bottom-up 
organizations (FA-2). And FA-3 also had a housing program for member communities, though 
the majority did not identify this as a benefit.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
83
 There are also important differences in terms of internal governance, particularly in terms of sense of ownership 
and participation, which will be discussed in Chapter 5.   
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Figure 3.2 Differences in perceived benefits between the TD and BU FAs in the sample 
 
RC-A: Resource channeling for agriculture   
RC-F: Resource channeling for forestry  
RC-BI: Resource channeling for basic infrastructure 
PR: Political representation 
IC+PG: Investment in common and public goods 
 
3.5. Discussion 
3.5.1. Benefits of cross-scale linkages: Beyond CPR management  
 FAs, as a type of cross-scale linkage, are carrying out activities closely related to CPR 
management, particularly in providing connections to government agencies to channel resources 
for forestry-related programs, sharing information about these programs, investing in public 
goods to improve forest management, collectively providing technical forestry services, and, to 
lesser extent, diversification of forest activities (e.g. ecotourism). They help deal with some some 
ecological problems that cross geographic scales, particularly forest fires. Moreover, these 
activities have important perceived and (for some aspects) measurable benefits at the local level. 
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In the process, new institutions such as norms about collaboration in cases of forest fires or about 
collective bargaining for better timber prices have been developed to deal with cross-scale 
problems. The findings lend support to other scholarship which has emphasized the importance 
of cross-scale/multi-level forms of collective action for common-pool resource management.   
 However, contrary to what one would expect from reading this scholarship to date, 
political representation appears as a central component of almost everything the associations do 
–participating in decision-making bodies at different levels, providing political muscle, 
interceding on behalf of communities to solve problems with agencies, lobbying agencies to 
address needs in basic infrastructure and services, or channeling resources from existing 
government programs. Theoretically, these findings suggest connections between concepts in 
common-pool resource (CPR) management and those in social movements literature (see García-
López and Villamayor Tomás, 2012; Britt, 2002). Empirically, they highlight the influence of 
both historical and current contextual factors. On one hand, as the historical analysis of Mexican 
FAs in Chapter 2 showed, these associations were often created with the objective of being the 
‘representatives’ of peasants in a given region, be it for a struggle such as the anti-concession 
movements, to deal with the inefficiencies and lack of service-provision by the government, or 
for the purposes of integrating communities into the corporatist CNC-PRI structure (more on this 
last point in Chapter 4). From this vantage point, these associations can be seen as a way of 
reducing transaction costs for the government and for peasant communities. For a community 
located far away from a main town where information about the programs is provided and where 
applications are submitted, the FA can help by serving as information-provider and by collecting 
and submitting the applications, and even by helping fill out the applications. For the government 
agencies, it means they don’t need to visit each community individually or receive each of them 
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in their offices. With the increasing competition over ever-scarcer resources of government 
programs, this role becomes even more important, as several of the community leaders 
interviewed stressed.  
 Another relevant finding is that one of the most important functions of the forestry 
programs that FAs help to channel is, at least from the communities’ perspective, not really 
ecological but economic –the provision of local employment. As Antinori and Rausser (2010) 
found in their survey in Durango and Michoacan, forestry-related activities are the main source 
of employment in the majority of forest communities (but see Merino, 2011). Wage labor 
benefits have also been highlighted in some other cases of local resource governance (e.g. 
Daftary, 2010). The activities related to agriculture may also be surprising if one thinks of these 
organizations as forestry organizations, but it makes perfect sense when one considers that forest 
communities in Mexico, as in many other developing countries (e.g. India – see  Kashwan, 
2011), are also peasant/agricultural communities.  
  
3.5.2. Top-down and bottom-up linkages 
 The distinctions between top-down and bottom-up associations coincide with Antinori and 
Rausser’s (2010) findings. The fact that foresters were key actors in the formation of the two top-
down linkages in the study explains their strong focus on forestry issues. In addition the two BU 
associations’ emphasis on the political dimension –unity and representation– has to do with their 
origins as grassroots political movements. The differences between top-down and bottom-up 
recall the work on polycentric governance and the theory of co-production, where different types 
of production processes are understood to require different forms of polycentric arrangements 
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(McGinnis, 1999). In other words, different types of FAs and different types of linkages between 
communities, FAs, and other actors are needed for different activities. 
 Furthermore, other actors and organizations at the local, regional and state levels play 
important roles in the provision of goods and services that FAs often do not provide, such as 
forestry services, legal advice, grant-writing for different projects. The results are inconclusive, 
yet they also present a conundrum previously noted by some in the CPR scholarship –that 
different evaluative criteria may be in conflict with each other (see e.g. Kashwan, 2011; Padgee 
et al., 2006). In this case, top-down linkages may be better at improving forest conditions, but 
this can come at the expense of economic development, internal democracy and equity. 
However, these are often hybrid processes (see Chapter 2) and it is impossible to draw hard 
conclusions from four cases. While the foresters in the top-down FAs seemed to have more 
control of the organizations, in different periods foresters also have had much internal influence 
in the bottom-up organizations. Moreover, associations may shift from more bottom-up to more 
top-down models of governance, as highlighted by all four cases (see Chapter 2).  
 
3.5.3. Qualifying the linkages 
 While cross-scale linkages can provide some important benefits, they can also be very 
turbulent (Bray et al., 2012) and can have many failures or dysfunctionalities (Benjamin et al., 
2011). In the cases analyzed, I point to several important caveats. First, the perceived benefits as 
well as their magnitude varied, sometimes substantially, amongst different communities and 
different members of a community. For instance, in FA-1, four community leaders expressed 
there were no benefits, but focus groups within the communities said there were some. In focus 
group discussions in this and other FAs, it was not uncommon for some members to say that they 
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did not see any benefits. The percentage of communities where at least some members 
considered there were no benefits was substantial: an average of 50% of member communities in 
three of the FAs (1, 2 and 4). Most often, interviewees blamed politicking and/or bad leadership.  
 In FA-1 and FA-2, some also perceived an unequal distribution of benefits amongst 
members, with a preference towards the larger, wealthier communities. Others considered that 
there had been benefits in the past but that currently there were fewer benefits or none at all, 
while others considered the opposite. Most FA-1 communities perceived that the organization 
had become weaker and currently provided substantially less benefits than in the past. Many 
lamented that the association did not regulate timber prices or help in timber commercialization 
or industrialization anymore, despite this having being one of the primary reasons to form the 
organization. In FA-2 the opposite perception was prevalent with the majority but some 
communities still felt that the organization had been stronger during the first half of the last 
decade. In FA-4, both discourses seemed to have equal prevalence. In FA-3, it seemed 
unanimous that the organization had continued to improve over time.  
 In other cases, interviewees argued that the FAs were not addressing crucial issues. None 
of the FAs currently has its own timber business; nor do they contribute to regulating timber 
prices or commercializing members’ timber products, or in generating sustained (rather than 
temporary) employment opportunities. There were also criticisms that the associations were not 
doing enough to support agricultural issues and diversification of forest uses (e.g. ecotourism, 
environmental services). And, on the majority of occasions, they do not help in ensuring the 
adequate provision of basic services like health and education. None of the four FAs has had 
much impact on strengthening community organization, partly because they have not been 
actively involved in this aspect. And only one community in the whole sample (of 49) mentioned 
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the regional forest study as a benefit in itself. One community leader in FA-1 complained that 
“there have been studies but no palpable benefits” (interview, 10-12-2011). In ecological terms, 
aside from continuing problems with fires, pests and soil degradation (as result of overgrazing), 
the main limitation is the lack of integration of management strategies at the eco-regional level. 
While the four FAs cover broad areas, none has been able to incorporate all of the communities 
in their watersheds as defined by CONAFOR’s forest management units (UMAFORs). The 
closest to achieving this is FA-1, but they do not provide forestry services directly. The examples 
create a contrast with other FAs such as ICOFOSA and SICOBI in Oaxaca (see Chapter 2).  
 There was also a noticeable failure of all four FAs in influencing federal and state forestry 
policies. Communities, in fact, rarely mentioned FAs’ participation in decision-making bodies as 
a benefit, though FA leaders emphasized this aspect. A clear example is the failure to influence 
the delineation “priority areas”, a concept CONAFOR developed to determine which areas in a 
given state have priority for different programs. In the first meeting I attended during the 
beginning of my fieldwork in 2010, foresters and FA representatives complained about the 
exclusion of many areas from the priority areas of reforestation and soil conservation programs. 
CONAFOR officials responded that the areas could not be modified but promised they would 
take the concerns into account in 2011. However, the same problem was repeated in 2011. The 
failure is also reflected in the inability of FAs to alter market conditions even as member 
communities suffer from increased dumping of cheaper timber from the US, Canada and Chile. 
This relates to the high level of centralization of Mexican forest policy; many key issues such as 
the definition of priorities and the budget are decided at federal levels, with little or no local or 
state consultation. It also suggests that, as proposed by Chapela (1998), that part of the problem 
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is that Mexican FAs have been unable to develop a national coalition to influence national 
policy-making (see Chapela, 1998).  
 We also need to recognize the conflicts inherent in these linkages and their capture by 
certain internal and external actors (see Chapter 4). In sum, besides benefits, it is also important 
to underscore what FAs –BU or TD– are failing to do and what they are doing wrong, what 
Benjamin et al. (2011) refer to as the functionalities and dysfunctionalities of networks. Table 
3.5 summarizes these issues for the four FAs. 
  
3.5.4 Beyond FAs and towards multiple linkages 
 Many communities have additional linkages –foresters, other associations, local and 
regional leaders– that supplement or substitute the services FAs provide and create a more 
complex network than what is here analyzed. A community leader in FA-2 made this clear when, 
asked about the benefits of the association’s membership to his community, replied that the FA’s 
role was intermixed with those of community leaders and the region’s main timber entrepreneur, 
who had been key in achieving the paving of the region’s main road and the development of eco-
tourism (09-10-2010). Similarly, a community leader from FA-1 expressed: “[The resources] all 
come from the Forestal [forestry services], the Union, and the government…between all of them 
together.” (interview, 06-02-2010)  
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Table 3.5. Functionalities and dysfunctionalities of FAs  
Category Benefits Limitations 
Economic • Channeling resources  
• Bargaining power for better 
prices (historical) 
• Collectively investing in public 
and common goods (e.g. roads, 
fire prevention and combat) 
• Insufficient resources 
• Economic capture (corruption and 
mismanagement) 
• Unequal benefit distribution 
• Unwillingness and inability to invest 
by many communities 
• Focus on short-term activities 
• Lack of attention to projects that 
strengthen community organization or 
generate employment and income 
• Lack of vertical integration of 
communities and trend towards de-
integration 
• Weak community organization, trend 
towards internal divisions 
Social and 
Political 
• Regional unity (social capital) 
• Political representation (interest 
aggregation)  
• Political capture (use of FAs for career 
advancement)  
• Lack of influence at the national level 
• Control of internal decision-making by 
foresters employed by the 
organizations 
Ecological • Technical forestry services: 
management at the regional 
scale 
• Reduction of forest fires 
• Reforestation and soil 
conservation activities 
• Increase in timber stock (only in 
one FA) 
• Declining timber stocks (in 3 of the 4 
regions) 
• Continued problems of soil 
degradation 
• Lack of management at the eco-region 
level 
 
 In Durango, there is a practical inexistence of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), –a 
a common linkage in other Mexican forest communities (e.g. Orozco-Quintero and Berkes, 
2010; Chapter 2). This scarcity was reflected in the member communities of the four FAs. As a 
consequence, foresters have taken over many NGO functions, especially channeling resources 
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from federal forestry programs and sometimes also from social and agricultural ones. 
Communities without a good forestry service, even when they are within an FA, can become 
isolated from government funds, as with Desprovista above. As discussed above, there are also 
contrasting examples from communities where good foresters, combined with local leaders and 
timber entrepreneurs, can obtain the same or more benefits than FAs.  
 The linkages in Durango also show a relative isolation in the sense of not having many 
connections to organizations at the national level. For instance, when a new national FA was 
created to group FSC-certified communities, only one community from Durango participated, 
despite the state having the most communities of this type in the country. To a certain extent, this 
can explain the failure of these linkages in promoting substantial policy changes in forestry. 
 Finally, it is important to recognize that there are multiple other factors that affect both 
FAs and member communities and complicate the analysis of the ‘benefits’ that these linkages 
provide. Relevant factors identified in this study include leadership at the community and FA 
levels, socio-economic and ecological characteristics of communities, and the macro-level 
political-economic context. For instance, in the case of Desprovista its participation in FA-4 was 
hindered partly by their high levels of internal conflict and division as well as the poor quality of 
their forestry services. As was constantly emphasized by interviewees and observations in all 
four cases, the ability of FAs to provide benefits is also partly dependent on whether local 
leaders actively seek help from the FAs and from other linkages. As an assembly member in FA-
2 expressed, “He who doesn’t speak, God doesn’t hear.” (10-31-2010)  Member heterogeneity 
has also been an issue commonly affecting the internal governance of FAs and their ability to 
provide benefits; moreover, communities’ need of associations and their decision to join or exit 
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one is partly associated to this heterogeneity (e.g. Bray and Merino, 2004). These issues will be 
further explored in Chapter 5.  
 
3.6. Conclusions 
 This study has analyzed the operation and local-level impacts of cross-scale linkages in a 
sample of 49 communities within four inter-community associations (FAs). It also has provided 
insights into the differences in two types of linkages –top-down and bottom-up– and the unequal 
distribution of benefits in the linkages. The results show that inter-community associations can 
be an important organization in these linkages, but that their role is not only ecological, but also 
political and economic. Second, I find evidence that there are important distinctions between TD 
and BU organizations, though there are also many similarities. Finally, conflict and capture 
emerge as an inherent part of these linkages’ operation and even their raison d’etre. In other 
words, the maintenance of the linkages is done to some extent to provide collective goods, but 
also to facilitate the continued appropriation of their benefits by certain powerful actors. 
 These contributions can help further refine our understanding of CSLs as a crucial 
component of CPR governance. Still, much more research is needed to better understand CSLs. 
For instance, we need to study the factors influencing the success or failure of different linkages, 
since the design principles of scaled-up forms of collective action may be different from those of 
local-level governance. We also need to better understand the distinctions between communities 
inside the linkage and similar communities outside. Finally, which types of linkages –e.g. 
forester, NGOs, FAs– matter most where and under which circumstances is a key question that 
has not been addressed substantially in the literature.  
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CHAPTER 4 
THE POLITICAL-ECONOMY OF CROSS-SCALE GOVERNANCE: 
EXPLAINING ELITE CAPTURE IN INTER-COMMUNITY FOREST ASSOCIATIONS 
IN DURANGO, MEXICO  
 
ABSTRACT: Cross-scale governance has been posited as a requisite for sustainable resource 
management. However, recent work has emphasized that aside from the 'functionalities' of these 
arrangements, there are also 'dysfunctionalities' or failures. These failures often relate to the 
capture of governance arrangements and their benefits by some groups at the expense of others, 
and to the ensuing conflicts. This paper analyzes elite capture and conflict in two bottom-up 
(community-created) and two top-down (externally-created) cross-scale systems in community 
forestry in Durango, Mexico. The study focuses on how local institutions, power inequalities and 
political-economic factors produce different forms of capture and resistance to it. The results 
show the prevalence of elite capture in the four networks studied. At the same time, they also 
underscore that multiple factors combine to produce different levels and frequencies of capture.  
 
4.1. Introduction 
Recent scholarship argues that institutions and organizations connecting different levels 
and scales of governance –variously referred to as multi-level, networked, nested, cross-scale or 
polycentric– are essential for sustainable resource management (Berkes, 2008; Brondizio et al., 
2009; Heikkila et al., 2011). Until now, this approach has mostly been interested in 
understanding how these governance arrangements –for instance, the connections a community 
has with external actors, the information and knowledge shared between them or new rules 
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created– affect outcomes of resource management. When politics has been inserted into the 
analysis, it has usually been to highlight the ‘empowering’ potential of networked/cross-scale 
connections. Moreover, networks and cross-scale have been implicitly assumed to be self-
organized (Benjamin et al., 2011; Knox et al., 2006).  
A parallel line of scholarship has promoted a heightened attention to relations of power, 
hierarchy, control and conflict within these inter-connected systems.84 As Benjamin et al. (2011: 
212) argue, understanding the functionalities and dysfunctionalities of organizational networks 
“must start with a focus of the tensions between what networks are formed to do… and the 
power dynamics and internal relationships of networks themselves.” This critical approach has 
recognized that while cross-scale or networked interactions may help to empower resource users 
at different levels, they can also increase the power and resources of the most powerful actors, 
perpetuating patterns of marginalization and domination (Adger et al., 2005; Crona and Bodin, 
2010; Fabricius et al., 2007; Nayak and Berkes, 2008; Njaya et al., 2012). In this context, actors 
create and maintain linkages to further their own interests, often in dissonant and uncoordinated 
ways (Adger et al., 2005). This scholarship ties to a longstanding tradition in development 
studies that seeks to explain why decentralization projects are often ‘captured’ by local and 
regional elites and government actors (Agrawal and Gupta, 2005; Platteau, 2004; Clement, 2010; 
Poteete and Ribot, 2011; Ribot et al., 2006). From this perspective, decentralized and cross-
scale/networked governance is not only a process of ‘connecting’ levels of decision-making to 
improve resource management, but also a ‘power struggle’ to capture resources, control 
decision-making and maintain or restructure power relations across and within these levels. What 
causes this elite capture, and how to mitigate or prevent it, have been recurrent concerns in 
                                                           
84
 A similar critique has been leveled on some of the scholarship in common-pool resource studies (e.g. Armitage, 
2008; Clement, 2010; García-López, 2009; Johnson, 2004; Kashwan, 2011; Sikor, 2006; Sick, 2008).  
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decentralization scholarship (see Wong, 2010), but not in the emerging cross-scale governance 
literature. 
In Mexico, a large and successful community forestry experiment (Bray et al., 2003; Bray 
et al., 2005; Merino and Martínez, 2011; Antinori and Rausser, 2010) coexisted for about 
seventy years with a highly authoritarian national political system (Bartra and Otero, 2005; Fox, 
1996; Gordillo, 2007). Although there is a considerable amount of research on this experience, 
most studies have focused on individual cases from a few states like Oaxaca, raising doubts 
about the generalizability of results. Moreover, most analyses have emphasized successes, with 
only a few have looking at inequalities and power relations or the effects of the political-
economic context (Bofill Poch, 2005; Mathews, 2006; Nuijten, 2003, 2004; Pérez-Cirera and 
Lovett, 2006; Wilshusen, 2009).  
This paper draws on the political economy approach to explain elite capture in four cross-
scale arrangements –inter-community forest associations (FAs)– in community forestry in 
Durango, Mexico. Durango was selected because of its importance in the forestry sector and its 
political history (see Chapters 1, 3). The study addresses three interrelated questions: First, how 
prevalent is elite capture in the context of cross-scale forest governance in Mexico? Second, 
what actors are involved in these processes? Third, what factors influence the occurrence of elite 
capture?  
The next section deals with the theoretical work trying to explain why elite capture may or 
may not occur, and why it may persist over time. It centers on two main factors that have been 
posited as relevant: power relations and local institutions. Section 3 presents the context and 
research design. Section 4, which presents the results, show that elite capture is an issue in the 
four networks studied, but that it takes different forms, levels and frequencies in each. Section 5 
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discusses how these results may be explained using the theoretical insights gained from the 
literature. I argue that institutions and power are important but insufficient to account for the 
observed patterns, and that we need to take into account the political-economic context. Section 
6 concludes.   
 
4.2. Explaining elite capture and persistence 
Elites are individuals or groups with disproportionate influence over collective action 
processes because of their higher level of power (Wong, 2010; Schmidt and Theesfeld, 2010). 
Elite capture occurs when elites control or manipulate governance arrangements to serve their 
personal interests (Wong, 2010). This commonly includes treacherous behavior such as 
purposeful deception, corruption, biased selection and exclusion of certain groups from benefits 
or participation, and avoiding compliance or modifying certain rules to their benefit (Iversen et 
al., 2006; Labonte, 2011; Schmidt and Theesfeld, 2010; Theesfeld, 2009; Wong, 2010).85 Elites 
in common-pool resource governance and community-based development may be local or 
regional community leaders (e.g. Balooni et al., 2010; Peluso, 1992; Poteete and Ribot, 2011; 
Ribot et al., 2006; Sikor et al., 2009), but also government agents (Nelson and Agrawal, 2008). 
While studies of elite capture provide a useful lens to understand cross-scale governance, 
they have five main limitations which pave the way for my central arguments. First, elite capture 
is usually explained as a problem of either institutional design or of socio-economic (i.e. power) 
inequalities. I argue that each is insufficient on its own; their combined effect needs to be 
considered. Second, whereas most studies have focused on local elites, I posit that attention 
should also be paid to political parties, government agencies and external advisors, which are 
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 These processes have also been labeled as “local tyrannies” (Andersson and Ostrom, 2008), and “power abuse” 
(Theesfeld, 2009).  
215 
 
central in the ‘politics of scale’ approach.  Moreover, there is a need to understand the strategies 
employed by these actors to achieve their goal of recentralization or capture (e.g. Poteete and 
Ribot, 2011). Third, most of the analyses have focused on the community or local government 
level. However, in cross-scale governance, there are both downward and upward pressures for 
accountability (e.g. national policies and regulations and local community rules) and for 
provision of ‘benefits’ (e.g. delivering votes to parties and channeling resources to communities), 
which create both constraints and openings for elite capture and resistance to it. Fourth, while the 
persistence of institutional arrangements (i.e. path dependence) and elites have been widely-
documented, this seems to be at odds with the emphasis on the capacity to self-organize 
proposed by collective action scholars in common-pool resource governance. On the opposite 
side, there has been a tendency to assume that elite capture and persistence are inevitable 
outcomes (Saito-Jensen et al., 2010).  This leaves little room for agency of the actors affected, 
which often mobilize to resist or overturn it.  
 
4.2.1. Local institutions 
From the perspective of institutional analysis and collective action studies, elite capture –
and the failures of decentralization more generally– has been explained as a problem of 
institutional design. Institutions structure the opportunities available to different actors and 
therefore can facilitate or constrain elite capture (Bartley et al., 2008; Iversen et al., 2006; 
Theesfeld, 2009; Wong, 2010). Four types of institutions are relevant in this study: (1) 
monitoring, enforcement (including sanctions) and accountability, (Iversen et al., 2006; Labonte, 
2011; Schmidt and Theesfeld, 2010); (2) decision-making institutions such as competitive 
elections, transparency, and secrecy of ballots (Fritzen, 2007); (3) reelection rules, which can 
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create incentives for good governance (Krishna, 2002; Daftary, 2010); and (d) membership rules, 
which determine who can formally participate. Norms of appropriateness may also be relevant, 
as they can help legitimize elite capture when it is considered fair compensation for the time and 
resources invested by elites in their leadership positions (Labonte, 2011), especially when they 
do not receive a salary. Finally, the origins of the institutions can also be a determining factor. 
Projects and institutions designed from the top are more likely to be captured, especially because 
these projects often fail to truly integrate and empower the different strata of local resource users 
(Adger et al., 2005; Platteau, 2004; Schmidt and Theesfeld, 2010; Theesfeld, 2009; Wong, 
2010). In this context, top-down linkages can serve to politicize resource management, 
concentrate authority in government agencies, and impose government or NGO objectives for 
resource management (Nayak and Berkes, 2008; Ribot et al., 2006; Zia et al., 2011; Duffy, 
2011).  
 
4.2.2. Power relations 
In recent years, some scholars have pointed to the limitations of institutional analyses to 
explain local-level outcomes of decentralization policies, and to the need to consider the role of 
power relations (e.g. Clement, 2010; Dasgupta and Beard, 2007; García-López, 2009; Kashwan, 
2011; Poteete and Ribot, 2011; Ribot and Peluso, 2003; Theesfeld, 2009; Wong, 2010). In 
development studies and the scholars dealing with the problem of “access” to natural resources 
(e.g. Ribot and Peluso, 2003; Sikor and Lund, 2009), elite capture is explained as a result of 
inequalities in resource endowments or different forms of capital –social, economic and 
political– which in turn provides differential access to natural resources and development 
projects. Platteau (2004) points to inequalities in social positions, access to economic resources, 
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knowledge of political protocols, and education (see also Bardhan and Mookerjee, 2011; 
Theesfeld, 2011). In the words of Lebel et al (2006: 19): “Power is reflected in, and reproduced 
by, the capacity to control and capture resources from different levels.” Multiple forms of capital 
are inter-related and inter-changeable and are influenced by previous endowments of capital 
(Bourdieu 1977, in Wilshusen, 2009). This so-called “first dimension” of power is measured by 
looking at who participates, who prevails in decision-making, and who gains and who loses 
(Gaventa, 1980; Lukes, 1974; Wilshusen, 2003). 
Elites’ bundles of resources allow them to bargain from a stronger position because they 
have lower exit costs (costs of not reaching an agreement), less risk aversion, lower discount 
rates (more ‘patience’), and can make more credible commitments (Knight, 1992; Theesfled, 
2011 for a case study). The key positions that they hold –positional power– and their higher 
levels of education give them privileged access to information, knowledge, and 
connections/networks to external actors (Adger et al., 2005; Bardhan and Mookherjee, 2000; 
Theesfeld, 2009; Wong, 2010). Information and connections in turn also allows them to capture 
additional resources, thus generating a self-reinforcing process (Platteau and Gaspart, 2003). 
Since often leaders are the main or only contact with donors, this creates major information 
asymmetries and lack of accountability that facilitate corruption (Schmidt and Theesfeld, 2010). 
Elites’ connections, combined with their leadership position, also give them a ‘status’ as the only 
actors capable of channeling resources (Daftary, 2010; Platteau, 2004; Schmidt and Theesfeld, 
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2010; Wong, 2010).86 From this perspective, social capital becomes a tool to reinforce resource 
and power inequities (Wilshusen, 2009).87 
Positional power also affords control over decision-making, allowing elites to design or 
change rules to their benefit, sometimes through undemocratic means, or to skirt them, even 
while they enforce them on others (Andersson and Ostrom, 2008; Kashwan, 2011; Pérez-Cirera 
and Lovett, 2006; Schmidt and Theesfeld, 2010). The power to make rules and control the 
agenda affects not only “who gets what, when and how, but… who gets left out and how.” 
(Gaventa, 1980: 9) Finally, the fear of punishment or loss of benefits may make less powerful 
actors reluctant to enforce rules on elites (D’Exelle and Ridle, 2008; Kashwan, 2011; Wong, 
2010).  
 
4.3. Research Design and Context 
4.3.1. Questions, Sample, Methods and Cases 
This project began as an attempt to understand the histories, impacts and internal 
governance of a cross-scale form of organization –inter-community forest associations (FAs)– on 
community forestry. FAs are organizations composed of multiple forest communities in a given 
region, and as such could be conceived of as networks connecting scales and levels (see Chapter 
3). Understanding the dysfunctional characteristics of networks requires attention not only to the 
                                                           
86
 As Platteau (2004: 227) puts it: “In a context where the ability to deal with external sources of funding is 
concentrated in a small elite group, the bargaining strength of common people is inevitably limited…If the 
intervention of the elite results in an improvement in the predicament of the poor, however small that improvement, 
the latter tend to be thankful to their leader(s)…” 
87
 For instance, in the case of a water irrigation association formed in Bulgaria (Theesfeld, 2009), the manager 
created the association thanks to the privileged access to information, training, connections and resources he gained 
in his position in the youth organization of the Communist party. The creation of the association then increased his 
reputation and his income (from collection and mismanagement of fees from members), which in turn furthered his 
career in politics.  In the case of forest communities in India, local leaders’ intermediary role between community 
members and forest officials in the process of land titling allowed them to extract benefits from both sides and to 
influence community members’ land titling decisions to their advantage (Kashwan, 2011). 
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their impacts (governance by networks) but also on their internal operation (governance of 
networks) (Benjamin et al., 2011). Here, I try to determine how prevalent elite capture is in FAs 
and what could explain the observed outcomes. I also aim to move the discussion forward by 
proposing to look at elite capture in terms of degrees rather than simply its presence or absence. 
Initial information about the origins, year of formation, and membership size of a sample of 
fourteen FAs in Durango was obtained from a 2007 survey of forest communities in Durango in 
which I participated (see Antinori and Rausser, 2010; Chapter 2). The survey found 14 FAs 
operating in Durango. From these, I selected four –two created by communities (bottom-up) and 
two created by external agents (top-down)– based on the hypothesis that top-down linkages 
would be less accountable downward (to communities) and consequently more susceptible to 
elite capture. Selection of cases was thus purposeful, seeking to achieve maximum variation in 
the variable of interest –organizational origins (Gerring, 2007). At the same time, I attempted to 
control for other independent variables expected to influence institutional performance, mainly 
group size and forest area. Within each FA, I tried to obtain information from as many of the 
member communities as possible. A total of 49 communities from the four FAs –the full 
membership in FA-2, 3 and 4 and 14 of the 40 communities in FA-1– participated in the study 
(see Chapter 1 and Table 4.1 below). 
 There was no knowledge of elite capture outcomes at the outset; based on the existing 
literature, there was some (limited) knowledge about the successes of some of these associations. 
Based on the review of the literature, I hypothesized that bottom-up origins and strong internal 
institutions (transparency and accountability, enforcement, voting and participation, alternation 
of leaders, norms about corruption) would be associated with low levels of elite capture. I also 
expected that the unbalanced power of some elites would facilitate elite capture and persistence 
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through, among other things, subversion of existing institutions, control and manipulation of 
information, threats and lies, and clientelist exchanges.   
The data for this analysis was gathered as part of a one year dissertation fieldwork in 2010 
in Durango, Mexico. The unit of analysis is each forest association as a space of elite capture at 
different points in time, and the outcome observed is the multiple occurrences of elite capture and 
its intensity and frequency. The comparative case study method provided a structured approach 
for analysis, allowing for close examination of the subject of interest (George and Bennett, 
2005). The methods included archival research and semi-structured interviews of key actors 
within each forest association –current and past elected leaders, community representatives– a as 
well as external stakeholders (government officials, foresters, etc.), participant observation of FA 
meeting activities, and focus group discussions and semi-structured interviews with community 
members. A total of more than 300 interviews were conducted in the 49 communities selected 
(see Chapter 1). Interviewees were asked about key internal governance factors of FAs such as 
decision-making and election rules, leadership, and relations to other actors. Information was 
coded according to these factors (themes) as it was manually transcribed and then searches for 
keywords (e.g. capture, corruption, leadership, etc.) were used to track down the information. 
These multiple sources provided triangulation that served as a safeguard for the reliability and 
validity of information. The historical analysis, meanwhile, allowed me to observe how changes 
in institutions and/or power relations influenced, and were influenced by, elite capture in an 
interactive process. 
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4.3.2. Mexico and Durango  
The Mexican Revolution of 1910-1917 led to a substantial redistribution of land to 
communities over several decades. However, it also resulted in an authoritarian political system 
that lasted seventy years and was characterized by a one-party dominant system --the 
Revolutionary Institutional Party (PRI) governed the country uninterruptedly for seventy years--, 
corporativism (social organizations controlled by the state), clientelism and patronage (benefits 
in exchange for political support), and caciquismo (peasant organizations controlled by local 
caciques or political bosses). 
In the 1980s, Mexico began a process of democratization which intensified in the 1990s 
and culminated in 2000 with the election of the first opposition President in the 20th century 
(from the National Action Party, PAN). This democratization was expected to reduce clientelism 
and the power of caciques. Yet changes have been slow, uneven and contradictory, and vary 
across states; in some cases, traditional patterns of governance have readapted and reconfigured 
(Hamilton, 2011; Rodríguez Araujo, 2009; Olivera Rivera, 2010; Chapter 2). In some cases, 
reforms marginalized some previously dominant caciques and clientelist structures tied to the 
National Peasant Confederation (CNC, the corporatist peasant branch of the PRI) but these were 
replaced by new, “techno-caciques” –entrepreneurs with political connections (e.g. McDonald, 
2001; 2003). 
 These historical patterns have combined with local institutions to generate different 
outcomes. For example, in his analysis of the governance of a timber marketing fund,  Wilshusen 
(2009) finds that informal lending practices were facilitated by the lack of rules about the use of 
the fund’s money and the lack of monitoring and enforcement. Moreover, relationships with the 
fund’s managers, especially family (compadrazgo) ties, were crucial in determining who 
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captured the money. These informal loans were sometimes used by local elites to lend money to 
third parties, further reinforcing their status. In some cases, these were longstanding elites, but in 
others, new elites emerged. Wilshusen also finds that informal lending and elite capture repeated 
itself continuously in the histories of both the FA and member communities. In other words, they 
were part of “broader processes of elite persistence based in long-standing practices.” 
(Wilshusen, 2009: 402).  
Mexico’s experience provides contradictory theoretical expectations. The documented 
successes of the community forestry sector imply strong local institutions that should help 
prevent elite capture, while the historical tradition of centralized governance should lead to 
strong capture. In Durango, these issues acquire particular relevance because of several factors. 
Durango is one of Mexico’s most important forestry states, with a rich history of forest politics. 
In addition, Durango offers a test of the relevance of political context for community forestry and 
FAs because, despite the political openings occurring at the national level, it has remained a 
bastion of the PRI. The PRI has never lost the governorship and most municipalities, particularly 
the rural ones where forest communities are located, and in federal elections the state has never 
voted for the opposition. Forest communities and their associations have been a crucial part of 
this tendency. 
 
4.4. Results: Elite capture in cross-scale linkages in Durango, Mexico 
In this section, I trace out the processes of elite capture in each of the four FAs in the study, 
focusing on the historical events where elite capture was a central issue. Table 4.1 presents a 
summary of the results. Given the variation in institutional origins and other institutional 
characteristics of each FA, we would expect elite capture to occur in some cases and not in 
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others. Yet elite capture was found in all four associations. At the same time, the type (economic 
or political), degree and frequency (recurrence) of capture did vary across different 
organizations. There were also a very similar set of elite actors involved in the process: foresters, 
FA leaders, politicians and timber entrepreneurs, which can be labeled elite persistence (see 
Wilshusen, 2009). These results will be explained in Section 4.5. 
 
Table 4.1. Observed elite capture in four FAs 
Name Origins Political 
use* 
Corruption* Unequal 
benefits* 
Frequency Elite groups 
involved 
FA-1 
(N=14) 
 
BU 36% 21% 27% High Elected leaders  
Large communities  
Forester 
PRI 
FA-2 
(N=12) 
BU 25% 0% 25% Low Elected leaders 
Timber entrepreneur 
City councilmember 
Forester  
PRI 
FA-3 
(N=10) 
TD 18% 36% 0% High Elected leaders 
Forester 
Large community 
Timber entrepreneur 
PRI 
FA-4 
(N=13) 
TD 15% 0% 8% Low Elected leaders 
Forester 
PRI 
 
* Percent of sampled member communities stating this as current problem 
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4.4.1. FA-1: Social movement turned political organization  
 From the table above, elite capture appears to be the highest in FA-1. FA-1 originated in 
the mid-1960s out of a peasant struggle against the concession of vast areas of forests to a private 
corporation in the most important forest region of Durango (see Chapter 2). Community leaders, 
including CNC operatives, organized the struggle to distribute the company’s lands to landless 
peasants in the region and allow communities to control the extraction process. The political-
economic context in which FA-1 emerged, however, implied that this support was given in 
exchange of incorporation into the state structure through the CNC. 
One of the FA’s main problems has been elite capture by leaders, for both political and 
economic gain. Thirty-six percent (36%) of members identified political use as a current 
problem, while 21% identified corruption. According to interviews, this problem started in the 
early 1980s, when a cacique from the region took hold of the association. During the twelve 
years he held power directly or behind the scenes, his mismanagement of the organization’s 
sawmill and timber marketing service led to its demise and to his personal enrichment. The FA 
also became a “political trampoline” or “ladder” from which leaders could achieve higher 
positions of power. Two union presidents went on to become municipal presidents. Others were 
appointed into positions within the local government such as councilmembers, or elected as 
presidents of the local CNC committee or other organizations such as the local cattle ranchers’ 
association, also integrated into the CNC. Financial mismanagement and corruption became a 
common strategy to raise the needed campaign funds. These processes, in turn, generated 
internal power struggles between competing factions looking to lead the organization.  
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The same story has recurred since, showing path dependence.88 The 1998 Activity Report 
from the association’s governing board complained about the mismanagement of a $10 million 
MXN pesos project for a tree nursery handled by the previous board. An equal sum was spent by 
the complaining board for a timber commercialization project that lasted less than 3 years. The 
president, described as a cacique, went on to develop a restaurant and personal ecotourism 
venture. The following leader, B.R., described by many as an “astute politician” who was well 
known, or “made himself known” (interview 08-04-2010), collected contributions from member 
communities for subsidized fertilizer and oat seeds that never reached their intended 
beneficiaries. This leader was instrumental in promoting a change in the organization’s structure 
imposed by the National Forest Commission (CONAFOR, see Chapter 2). His support for this 
policy further cemented his position within FA-1 and significantly advanced his political career. 
By creating a new parallel association, he was able avoid the two-term limit in the original FA-1 
bylaws and extend his presidential term for 3 more years. This in turn allowed him to expand his 
resource capture by accessing a whole new set of resources given by CONAFOR to the ARS 
associations, and to delay internal investigations about his financial management. It also 
solidified his position in the presidency of a state-level forest association he had helped create, 
which in turn led to his recent appointment as secretary of a national forest association. While 
these positions do not entail salaries, they do provide access to other funds for capture – for 
instance, B.R. obtained a large grant to develop a website for the state-level association, which 
he never completed.  
These processes have been embedded in a recurring conflict between large communities, 
who represent the largest share of wealth in the association but are a minority in numbers, and 
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 The recurrence is nicely captured by this citation from a community leader: “the Union has always been like the 
ejidos – with the same problems of bad management (corruption).” (interview, 04-06-2010) 
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small ones, who are many but poor, over control of the organization. Twenty-seven percent of 
sampled communities perceived inequalities in benefit distribution, particularly in relation to 
B.R., who according to many interviewees (mostly of small and poor communities) was corrupt, 
politically-motivated, and biased towards the larger communities. One community leader 
complained: “It’s always them [the larger communities], we are only taken into account when a 
[voting] majority is needed.” He explained that B.R. would often hold meetings about 
government programs but would only invite the larger communities.  
These inter-community conflicts were also related to the political aspirations of competing 
groups and interventions by external actors, particularly a forester, J.J., who until 2010 directed 
the region’s main forestry services (the privatized remnant of the government-run services). The 
forester enriched himself through these services. He was described by a government official as 
“one of those who become inflated in a position of authority” (interview 02-24-2010), and others 
referred to his forestry services as “captive”. In 2007, when FA-1 became a top-down regional 
silviculturalist association (ARS), J.J. became the association’s secretary, despite a longstanding 
rule in the union against the incorporation of people external to communities.89 A year later, he 
became the representative of the municipal CNC council. Then, in the 2010 state elections, he 
vied to become the PRI’s candidate for municipal president. A community leader from one of the 
region’s largest communities was also seeking this candidacy, and to this end was trying to 
become president of FA-1, which also had elections that year. J.J., however, tried to block the 
community leader from reaching the FA-1 presidency by using a loyal friend as opposing 
candidate and mobilizing the communities under his forestry services (mostly small-and-poor) to 
support him. Many of these communities voted in the FA election, despite their disqualification 
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 This rule was eliminated with the new bylaws designed by CONAFOR for all the ARS, which contemplated that 
associations could have non-members occupy positions in their governing boards. 
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based on a rule making voting rights contingent on being up-to-date in membership payments. 
As a result, J.J.’s friend won the FA presidency. Eventually, J.J. won the party’s candidacy, and 
the new FA president used his position to accompany him in his campaign throughout the region. 
After winning the municipal election, the forester rewarded  the FA-1 president by appointing 
him municipal treasurer, a position with a salary of approximately $50,000 USD a year.  
 The internal election also highlighted how the organization is part of the larger clientelist 
and corporatist politics in the region. As one of the original leaders stated: “the Union was 
always managed as priísta [part of the PRI].” (interview 03-10-2010) Thus, it had a duty to 
support the PRI’s candidates. While the change into ARS legally prohibits the association from 
engaging in partisan-political activities, historical practices have been maintained, another 
indication of path dependence.90  
Both the electoral process and the forced change into ARS have been a major source of 
conflict in the organization in the last few years; some resist these processes as a strategy to 
protect autonomy and others to maintain past privileges. The transition into ARS was 
consistently criticized by interviewees as a way for the PAN party to marginalize pre-existing 
ejido unions, increase support in rural areas and create new corporatist organizations which 
would serve their party rather than the PRI.91 The election, meanwhile, was criticized by some 
leaders for its lack of fairness and the ‘politicization’ of the organization.  
 
4.4.2. FA-2: Bottom-up forestry services  
Elite capture has also been problem in FA-2, though not to the same degree and frequency 
as FA-1, and not related to corruption but rather to political use of the organization and some 
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 As the FA-1 president stated, politics still ‘infiltrates’ the association and this “is inevitable because we are still 
social actors.” (interview, 03-05-2010) 
91
 Similar criticisms were made nationally by other FAs and academics (see Chapter 2). 
228 
 
internal inequalities in the distribution of benefits. FA-2 emerged from a struggle by 
communities against a top-down permisionario union created in 1986 and controlled by the 
region’s main forester, increasingly disliked for perceived mismanagement of the forest and of 
the organization’s resources. With the 1992 forest law, which privatized all forestry service 
concessions (see Chapter 2), the forester –knowing that he would probably be fired as union 
director– falsely claimed that the law implied they had to dissolve the permisionario union and 
pay severance benefits to all the employees.92 He offered to pay the severance in exchange for 
the Union’s infrastructure, which had been developed through collective investments by 
members. Through manipulations of membership (e.g. corruptly adding new members) and the 
voting process, and against the will of the vast majority of original member communities, the 
forester kept the union’s infrastructure. This allowed him to develop a large and profitable 
forestry services business.  
Seven of the nine original member communities left the union and formed FA-2 in 1994 to 
administer their own forestry services with autonomy from a forester. However, over the first 
eight years, taking advantage of a weak leadership, the FA’s forestry service director began to 
“control everything”, becoming the organization’s legal representative. During this period, the 
Union did not submit the required fiscal reports to the Treasury department. The FA’s leadership, 
described as “frustrated businessmen” trying to use the union to channel funds for personal 
projects, also attempted to solidify control over the organization.93 In 2002, right before the 
elections for a new leadership, they maneuvered a restructuring of the Union’s statutes in order 
to allow private landowners to become members of the organization. Apparently, this was an 
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 The forester very candidly explained to me that he did this because he knew that he could be fired at any point and 
that he “did not want to fall behind” (interview, 08-13-2012). 
93
 One of the members of that group has a small eco-tourism venture, a trout farm and a water-bottling company, 
which were built with funds channeled by the FA for his community, but now are his personal businesses. 
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attempt to incorporate allies into the union in order to obtain a permanent majority and 
perpetuate their leadership. 
However, the previous dramatic experience with elite capture had left most members very 
aware and prepared to respond. A new leadership was elected almost unanimously and they 
quickly re-organized the Union to prevent elite capture. They started to file their tax returns and 
submit required fiscal reports, replaced the forester and clarified authority roles by giving elected 
leaders the exclusive authority to represent the union and emphasizing that the forester was 
simply an employee of the association, not part of its leadership. They also hired an accountant 
to improve financial transparency. These mechanisms seem to have worked, as the Union –at 
least from the members’ perspective – does not show a problem of corruption or personal 
enrichment. Contrary to leaders in FA-3 and FA-4, the president of the union lives modestly in 
his community, where he works the land as any peasant would.   
While economic capture did not emerge as a problem in FA-2, 25% of its members still 
perceive that the association is used by its leaders to achieve personal political goals. The 
president has in recent years benefitted from his position to advance his political career and, 
recently, became the region’s representative to the CNC, a position widely understood as 
springboard to others. He also gained positions as representative in SEMARNAT’s Central 
Consultative Council and CONAFOR’s State Evaluation Committee, which enable him to 
become informed about programs and lobby in favor of certain projects, giving him power as a 
‘broker’ for others. A previous member of the FA’s governing board and strong ally of the 
president, who now serves as the FA’s main external advisor, is a longtime PRI operative from 
the region and is now a municipal councilmember in Durango city.  
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This example underscores another dimension of the political use of the organization: its 
direct connections to the CNC and PRI since its beginnings. This relationship, aside from helping 
the association obtain benefits, has also served the party to influence electoral results, although 
not in such a blunt way as FA-1. The PRI uses the Union’s leadership to mobilize peasants for 
their activities, and to publicly express support for the state and municipal governments and the 
party’s candidates. This generates permanent exclusions of those who are not part of these 
arrangements. A community leader from the opposition party (PAN) argued that he would like to 
be Union leader but knew that they ‘would not let him’. And the last opposition candidate for the 
presidency argued that he was marginalized because he was ‘a working man, not a politician’.  
The region’s main timber corporation has also been involved in attempts to influence and 
capture the organization and its resources. The corporation’s CEO is the region’s most powerful 
man and is described by some as a cacique. He has acquired most of the region’s private lands 
over the years (over 120,000 ha), and he has 50%+ shares in the region’s most important 
community (his son is the president of the comisariado). His second-hand man in the corporation 
was recently the president of the governing board of another community. These communities and 
others provide him with inexpensive timber. According to some interviewees, the CEO has 
prevented one of the communities from contracting the association’s services and another from 
even becoming a member. With the PROFAS program, he was able to create his own 
association, which he has used to capture most of the state and federal resources for eco-tourism 
and wildlife management ventures in his properties and the community he controls.94 Eventually 
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 FA-2 members had created their own parallel organization, but it was labeled as ‘local’ rather than regional by 
CONAFOR. The timber CEO’s association was given the ‘regional’ title, thanks to his connections to the 
government. In 2007, CONAFOR decided it would only fund ‘regional’ associations. Thus, FA-2 members were 
forced to join the other association, though contrary to FA-1 they decided to maintain their original organization 
functioning.  
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the FA-2 president also benefitted, as he was elected as president of the association, a position he 
still holds and which has given him additional access to decision-making bodies and resources.  
Finally, as in FA-1, FA-2 has suffered a similar but less vicious conflict between two 
groups, enhanced by the internal electoral process and the perception that the leader was serving 
mostly the interests of the sub-region where the largest and wealthiest forestry communities are 
and where the timber entrepreneur operates. The other sub-region is mostly agricultural and its 
members have felt somewhat abandoned by the FA. In the last election, this group, allied with 
the ‘failed businessmen’, tried to become elected into the governing board, but lost by one vote. 
 
4.4.3. FA-3: Top-down forestry services 
FA-3 was created as a forestry service union in 1989, after the 1986 forest law (which 
created a perceived requirement to form a new association) and mobilization by leaders from a 
few communities, private landowners, and an up-and-coming forester from the region’s largest 
community (Mr. S.), to change the existing government-appointed forester (see Chapter 2). Mr. 
S., who had been the right-hand man of the region’s previous forester when the services were 
administered by the government, had a strong hand in creating FA-3. He helped draft the bylaws, 
and was selected as the association’s vice-president. After a year, he was named the 
organization’s forestry service director, becoming both employee and employer at the same time, 
an obvious conflict of interest.95 In the following years, strong disagreements emerged between 
the Union’s president and Mr. S. over the handling of the Union, particularly its finances. 
Apparently, the Union’s president would not let the forester manipulate him and opposed the 
forester’s control over the organization, but party politics were also involved. Regardless, in 
1995 the forester mobilized key members to elect a new president. After more than fifteen years, 
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 There were no rules in the bylaws against this.  
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the second president, Mr. N., still holds his position. This may be in violation of the association’s 
bylaws, which require a leadership change every two years, but without specifying a maximum 
number of reelections. The governing board is completely controlled by both of them –the 
secretary and the oversight council are Mr. N. and Mr. S.’s uncles, respectively. Moreover, the 
president is perceived by many as a marionette of the forester. There were also issues with the 
excessive decision-making control exerted by Mr. S. 
The main problem with FA-3 has been with economic capture by the leadership and Mr. 
S., as perceived by 36% of members (see Table 4.1). For instance, members contribute $1/m3 of 
wood yearly for a ‘road improvement’ quota. This amounts to almost $200,000 Mexican pesos 
(about $20,000 USD) per year. However, some communities said their roads had never been 
fixed and the forestry services director could not explain exactly how the quota was being used 
except for fixing some potholes. Several communities also complained about having paid for a 
study of a proposed electrification project that has never been carried out. The forestry service 
fee –which is raised annually and is the highest in the state (and according to some in the 
country)– together with the 20-25% fee leveled on all programs channeled to communities, was a 
source of constant complaints (by more than 50% of members) and another mechanism through 
which the forester is allegedly enriching himself. There is little transparency or justification 
about what the money will be used for, and no monitoring. There were also some recent 
problems with the federal Treasury for apparent tax evasion. 
The forester’s control over the association has also allowed him to influence the 
organization’s forest management activities for his own benefit and that of his friends. Having 
the power to decide to which programs to apply for each community, Mr. S. has an incentive to 
focus on programs where he can charge the 25% fee. A top CONAFOR official in Durango 
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noted how FA-3  kept requesting funds for reforestation despite the fact they had few areas left 
for this activity, because ‘that is what pays’.96 One interviewee also claimed the forester 
designates as extraction areas the locations where his brother (who owns a crane) has contracts to 
extract timber and receives money to change extraction areas in other cases. 
Meanwhile, the association’s president took $10,000 Mexican pesos from a community 
leader promising to obtain a solar panel for his home, but the panel was never installed. He has 
also developed a timber extraction business in the region which has provided another venue to 
skim off funds; for instance, he has taken timber logs from community members in several 
communities with unfulfilled promises to pay later –he owes one community leader $30,000 
pesos. Similar stories of debts were recorded in another community. Another forester in the 
region (Mr. S.’s compadre) noted that these ‘tricks’ were the reason why the president did not 
visit communities.97  
The association’s president and the forester have also used their positions to escalate into 
political positions, though only 18% mentioned it as a current problem. The forester’s role in the 
association propelled him into fame and has given him access to other positions of power. He has 
won state and national awards, and has served as the president of the state’s association of 
foresters and on several federal and state advisory committees. In 2010, he was appointed as 
head of an important state government agency dealing with forestry issues. For his part, the 
president has held elected positions as municipal comptroller and currently as councilmember. 
Both are positions with a salary of about $20,000 USD a year. Community leaders complained 
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 Nevertheless, the focus on reforestation in this region has had significant positive impacts –it is credited with 
being one of the reasons why timber stocks have increased over time. Moreover, it is one of the main sources of 
employment (albeit temporary) in forest communities.  
97
 My own personal experience with Mr. N. confirmed this perception. Even the current forester, in reference to one 
of his debts, said: “we all know how he is.” 
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that Mr. N. only visited them when he was campaigning for these positions.98 I observed how he 
brought food bags to several communities supposedly on behalf of the Union, but the timing 
coincided with his campaign for councilmember. Mr. N was also elected as vice-president of the 
state-level forest association, and is almost guaranteed to become its next president. These 
positions have increased their different forms of capital, reinforcing their power.  
As in FA-2, a private timber corporation was an important elite actor. In this case, 
however, the corporation is a member of the association. It is run by one of the wealthiest and 
most powerful families in the state, and is a strong ally of the forester; it is credited with having 
being behind Mr. S.’s appointment to the state government. The corporation is the one which sets 
the timber prices in the region. The presence of the corporation also creates a disincentive against 
the development of vertically-integrated forestry enterprises in member communities, because 
corporations make most profits buying timber logs rather than sawn wood. An interviewee who 
also worked for his company explained that “they are the ones who manage the FA together with 
[the largest community].” (interview, 09-27-2011) 
Despite these processes of capture, FA-3 has remained relatively conflict-free throughout 
its history and has only lost one member during its 20-year existence. This is reflective of the 
leaders’ strong control over the organization, but it also implies that elite capture, though 
recurrent, is sufficiently small so as to be hidden from public view and be tolerated by 
communities.  
 
4.4.4. FA-4: Top-down forest management organization 
FA-4 was created by the region’s main forester, Mr. G.M., in compliance with the 2003 
Forest Law, which he perceived as a mandate to create new silviculturalist associations. Mr. 
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 This critique was also leveled against the leaders of the other FAs. 
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G.M. was a wealthy and well-connected individual in the region –he had been there for over 20 
years since being appointed by the government to direct the region’s forestry services. In the 
1980s, he created a forestry service association (much like FA-3 and the predecessor of FA-2), in 
which he controlled things despite formal community ownership.  
With the privatization of the forestry services under the 1992 law, G.M. became the owner 
of the services, although the association remained in place. Almost all of the communities he 
serviced remained with him. During this period, G.M. accumulated substantial wealth and 
cultivated connections –he is close friends with the forester in FA-3 and with the previous 
secretary of the state’s environment ministry. When the 2003 forest law came into effect, G.M. 
mobilized his communities to form the new silviculturalist association. Not surprisingly, the 
association’s first and second presidents were described as ‘front men’ for G.M. Communities 
complained that little information flowed in those periods, with hardly any meetings or visits 
from the leaders to the communities. During the three-year term of the second president, for 
instance, the association only met twice and there were no visits to member communities. The 
projects implemented were selected by G.M. The association’s office space was, and still is, a 
desk in G.M.’s office, and the association’s forestry technician is also an employee in the same 
office. The association’s meetings, which for the first two presidencies were directed by G.M., 
are still held in his private property in the mountains.  
From the results in Table 4.1, FA-4 appears to have the lowest levels of elite capture, 
mostly associated to the political use of the organization by the president. There were some 
indications that the forester has used the association and its resources for his private benefit. For 
instance, he has been using the association’s equipment (computer and plotter) for his own 
private forestry services. Recently there were some tensions when the forester apparently failed 
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to report that the association’s funds for a project had been deposited to him. However, contrary 
to FA-3, where the forester has been able to maintain almost total control of the organization, the 
forester was never directly in the governing board, and thus his ability to capture the organization 
was more limited. Moreover, the forester already had wealth, and, contrary to the foresters in 
FA-1 and FA-3, was not interested in politics. Thus, while he may have benefitted economically, 
this did not represent a substantial issue among members (no communities mentioned the 
forester in relation to financial mismanagement) and, paradoxically, his control over the 
organization reduced political capture by the leaders.  
Recently, the power within the association has begun shifting due to the current president’s 
interest in making the association more autonomous from the forester and reducing external elite 
capture. Yet the president’s move may also signal an attempt to use the association for his own 
private objectives. He became part of the leadership of a newly-created cattle rancher’s 
association in his municipality, and is also the president of the local chapter of the CNC. And in 
2010 he tried, unsuccessfully, to use his position as a springboard to becoming the PRI’s 
candidate for municipal president in his region. This political use of the organization was 
mentioned by 18% of members and several external observers. Two external observers added 
that the president has been insisting on positioning his sons in local political and administrative 
positions. In several programs in the FA, he hired family members to carry out key tasks.  
These issues have created a rift between him and the region’s PRI operatives and elected 
local officials, as well as unease among some community leaders. Nevertheless, contrary to 
expectations, the extent of elite capture is much smaller than in FA-1 and FA-3, and to date there 
have not been any strong conflicts or small-versus-large-communities dynamics.  
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4.5. Discussion: From benefits to capture 
4.5.1. Multiple actors, multiple captures 
The results of this study show that elite capture and conflicts are ubiquitous to cross-scale 
governance of forest commons in Durango, Mexico. They also point to the numerous actors, 
internal and external, that are involved in these processes, and to the strategies employed by 
these actors to capture resources, but also to avoid losing authority or to recentralize it. 
Foresters represent one of the main elite groups capturing these organizations. Their status 
as elites is longstanding and widely recognized. As a community leader stated, “I do not see any 
foresters doing badly.” (06-11-2010) Socially, they also command high prestige because of their 
education and ‘technical know-how’, which is necessary for communities’ forestry activities. 
Conversations with leaders of other associations and external observers highlight that the capture 
by foresters in FAs was a commonality in all the new ARS associations created in Durango. 
Foresters were the main promoters or direct creators of these associations, which they saw as a 
new source of funding. In the field, it was common to hear people refer to these FAs as ‘X 
forester’s association’. CONAFOR paid the associations to hire their own forester, but usually 
the person hired was already working for the established foresters. In several cases, the 
associations became inoperative and the foresters kept their equipment (e.g. computers, plotters).  
There may even be an inherent contradiction between foresters and FAs. As a government 
official explained: “…[the foresters] have participated so much in structuring them [the FAs], 
promoting them, drafting their bylaws, registering them, that there comes a moment where they 
say ‘it’s mine’.…And that’s where the disjunctive is, and conflict comes in.” (interview, 08-20- 
2010). This conflict, he went on to explain, lies in the fact that associations need income, and 
since the membership dues are not enough, the only other source of viable income is providing 
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technical services, like the ones private foresters currently provide. Thus, foresters have an 
incentive to maintain associations in a dependent state, so that they do not become the 
competition. These findings partly confirm Barsimantov’s (2010) conclusion that foresters seem 
more focused on capturing resources than on promoting community empowerment and good 
forest management. Foresters also are in some aspects similar to McDonald’s (2001) “techno-
caciques” –professionals who are able to deal with new market and administrative issues but still 
remain connected politically. Still, these propositions must be nuanced by highlighting foresters’ 
positive contributions to FAs (see Chapter 3, 5) and noting how their impacts depend on several 
contextual factors.  
 A second habitual group of actors in the stories of elite capture is FA (peasant) leaders. 
They are politically connected to the the PRI directly (e.g. as president of the local party council) 
or indirectly through the CNC or other related associations. During the 2010 state elections, all 
of the FAs’ leadership, together with foresters and timber entrepreneurs from all regions, 
attended public activities in support of the PRI. In a campaign meeting with the PRI candidate 
for governor, a well-known forester, speaking “on behalf of the forest sector”, talked about the 
PRI as “our party” and said it should “count with our vote” (participant observation, 31-May-
2012). The clientelist nature of the exchange was obvious. As an FA leader said: “we are 
working to support the candidates but in exchange for not being forgotten” (ibid). The patterns of 
clientelism and misuse of power have interesting parallels to the work on the “dark side” of 
leadership (Luthans et al., 1998; Theesfeld, 2009), and underscores that more attention needs to 
be paid to the negative characteristics and behaviors of leaders, especially in contexts with a 
history of authoritarian, clientelist and corporatist politics. The role of timber corporations, on 
the other hand, is not surprising in retrospect but was certainly unexpected, given that there has 
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been historically a conflictive relationship between peasants and corporations in the forestry 
sector and are often seen as two separate spheres of governance.  
Interestingly, these patterns mimic those at the community level, where histories of 
corruption and mismanagement of funds by community leaders and political bosses were 
reported in almost all communities I sampled. In this sense, these processes represent 
longstanding practices of elite persistence, as in Wilshusen’s (2009) study. Yet the results also 
highlight that these ‘capture’ processes engender conflict and resistance from different actors 
within each network, some of which seek a more just or equal distribution of benefits (like the 
smaller and marginalized communities in FA-1 and FA-2), and some of which want to be in a 
position to capture the benefits. In these resistances, members use a variety of strategies. The 
origins of FA-1 and FA-2 are examples of associations struggling against previous top-down 
linkages captured by external actors through grassroots mobilization. Some have chosen an ‘exit’ 
strategy of disaffiliation (as with some members in FA-1 and FA-2), and others use everyday 
practices of resistance or ‘weapons of the weak’ (Scott, 1985) such as verbal forms of de-
legitimizing and foot-dragging on paying membership dues and attending meetings.  
These resistances show that despite the prevalence of elite capture in community-based 
natural resource governance, it is not an inevitable outcome. In the contestations and turbulences 
that often take place in these settings, horizontal linkages and mobilization between 
communities, as well as connections to external allies, can advance the devolution of authority to 
local users and alter local power relations (e.g. Agrawal and Ostrom, 2001; Adger et al., 2005; 
Britt, 2002; Chapter 2; Cronkleton et al., 2008; Fox, 1996; Kashwan, 2011; Poteete and Ribot, 
2011; Saito-Jensen et al., 2010). Local and regional leaders may also help avoid interference by 
external actors (e.g. Balooni et al., 2010) –as seems to be happening with FA-4; or serve as 
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“political brokers” that organize and empower previously marginalized groups to pressure 
elected leaders, increasing elites’ accountability (e.g. Daftary, 2010; Fox, 1992), as with the 
subgroup within FA-2 led by the ‘failed businessmen’.  
 
4.5.2. Explaining elite capture and persistence: Power, institutions and context 
These findings also underscore important differences in the degree of capture in the four 
FAs and in the main actors involved (see Table 4.1 above). The question, then, is what accounts 
for these differences and why are certain actors –foresters and PRI-associated peasant leaders– 
the ones recurrently dominating this process? I argue that these differences are the product of a 
combination of institutions and power relations embedded in a particular political-economic 
context. Table 4.2 offers a summary of the explanatory processes observed.  
 
Table 4.2. Institutions in the four FAs  
FA
 
Potential explanatory factors Elite 
Capt 
 Origins Voting  Meetings Particip. Represent.  Transpar. Enforce  
FA
-
1 BU Equal 1/month Open Elected 
leaders 
Moderate Very low H&F 
**** 
FA
-
2 BU Equal 1/year* Open Elected 
leaders 
Moderate 
*** 
Moderate L&I 
**** 
FA
-
3 TD Unequal 1/year Limited Forester Moderate 
*** 
High H&F 
**** 
FA
-
4 TD Equal 1/year* Open Elected 
leaders** 
Moderate Low L&I 
**** 
* In violation of bylaws 
** Forester until recently 
*** Have accountants who provide reports to members 
**** H&F = High and frequent; L&I = Low and isolated 
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4.5.2.1. Local institutions 
Local institutions play a crucial role in the observe outcomes, but as we will see they 
cannot fully account for them. Voting and representation rules were found to be among the key 
institutions (Table 4.2). In FA-3, the share-based voting system clearly helps maintain the power 
relations and the elite capture in place. When the association was created, all of the founding 
members acquired equal shared. However, when new members were incorporated, this equality 
was lost. Today, this system ensures that only two members (the forester’s community and the 
timber company) control more than 50% of the votes. Thus, it creates a strong incentive against 
any opposition, because without convincing one of these two members (which are strong allies 
of the forester), it would be futile to present any proposals that contradict the leadership’s 
positions. Conversely, it is not so clear that voting rules on their own constrain elite capture in 
the other three associations, which have equal voting rights.  
The forester’s selection as the legal representative of FA-3 is also critical, as this position 
is a key aspect of his power. In contrast, in FA-2 the change of legal representation from forester 
to peasant leaders was done precisely to avoid elite capture, and it seems to have worked in the 
economic dimension. In FA-4, representation was in the hands of the forester until the new 
leadership began to exclude him. Paradoxically, the original arrangement may have prevented 
political capture by the leaders, while the new one facilitates it. 
Regular meetings and reporting may limit the power of elites to capture organizations by 
creating frequent monitoring opportunities, but it only seems to work in combination with other 
institutional variables. In FA-3, meetings are only once a year, and according to interviews the 
forester’s activities are rarely up for discussion. Rather, a prepared annual work plan is presented 
each year and people simply vote for or against it, giving little time for careful analysis or 
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modification. Moreover, there is no monitoring to see if the activities that the plans stipulate are 
actually carried out, since the oversight council (in charge of monitoring) is the forester’s uncle. 
FA-2 and FA-4 also have yearly meetings, but neither have had substantial problems with 
financial mismanagement. An unexpected finding is that FA-1, the association with the most 
frequent meetings (i.e. most opportunities for monitoring and accountability), is also the one with 
the most problems of capture. In this case, monitoring and accountability seem to be 
overwhelmed by lack of rule enforcement and sanctions, which were recurring problems. In FA-
2 the hiring of an accountant eight years ago was meant to straighten up the organization, both 
politically and economically, including preventing resource capture. He submits a very detailed 
income report every year, and this appears to have the expected effect of limiting elite capture in 
its economic form. The current president in FA-4 has also submitted very detailed financial 
reports.  
However, in all four associations the effect of financial reports and accounting is limited by 
the inability of members to carefully analyze these reports; members are not provided in writing 
in advance of the meetings, there are no ways to corroborate many of the expenses detailed, and 
community leaders often have limited formal education. Moreover, as with other peasant 
organizations (e.g. Lutz-Bachere, 2002), proposals are presented by the leadership and submitted 
to the membership for approval and there is a tendency to approve them because of a 
combination of trust, deference to those who have accepted the responsibilities of these 
positions, and lack of full information about all the elements of the proposals (e.g. no previous 
evaluation). Thus, leaders have a lot of leeway in making decisions. 
A third relevant institution is leadership terms. In FA-3, the lack of term limits and the lack 
of regular election processes have led to the perpetuation of a clique, which reduces performance 
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incentives and forces members to openly ask for a change in leadership rather than having a 
secret-ballot election.99  Yet while the term limits in FA-1, FA-2 and FA-4 can potentially 
constrain the ability of any one leader to dominate, there does not seem to be any correlation 
between this institution and the level or recurrence of elite capture in those three associations.   
Partly this may have to do with lack of enforcement of rules and sanctions. In FA-1, the 
leaders consistently overstayed their terms. The lack of punishment of leaders accused of 
corruption or mismanagement, and the violation of other internal rules (prohibition of external 
individuals to become members, requirement of payment of dues), were recurrent problems. This 
is reflective of the power of the rule-breakers, but non-enforcement also generates incentives for 
others to replicate their behavior. FA-2 and FA-4 had a similar problem of lack of rule 
enforcement regarding participation and accountability, though it was not as drastic as in FA-1. 
For example, the bylaws of FA-2 require three annual meetings, but during my year of fieldwork 
they only had one. FA-4 also had fewer assemblies than required (one in 2010) and had problems 
collecting member dues despite numerous public verbal commitments by non-paying members 
to comply. In all four associations there were also complaints by community leaders about the 
lack of information and of communication (particularly visits to communities) from association 
leaders, which hindered transparency and accountability. All four FAs also broke their rules 
against their participation in partisan political activities. 
Institutional origins are also related to the process of capture. The bottom-up organizations 
(FA-1 and FA-2), which originated with the strong support of the CNC-PRI, have maintained 
strong ties to these organizations. The top-down FAs (FA-3 and FA-4) have remained more 
politically autonomous as organizations –though never completely– and have been controlled 
                                                           
99
 Many preference expressions are not secret in FAs –it is common to express opinions during assemblies and to 
have open voting on matters such as whether to approve the leaders’ annual report, to invest in a certain project or to 
apply for a program. However, elections are almost always by secret ballot.  
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internally by the foresters since their creation. Origins can also influence these organizations by 
providing an ‘institutional repertoire’ for future collective action. The case of FA-2 is illustrative:  
previous struggles against elite capture by a forester provided the necessary knowledge to deal 
with a new forester who attempted to do the same.  
Another issue is that accountability from above (i.e. government monitoring of FAs) is 
reduced only to use of government funds for specific programs, and it hardly ever has involved 
an audit –only FA-3 was once audited by the Treasury and, while the organization was fined for 
some ‘irregularities’, the sanction does not seem to have had lasting effects. The government is 
complacent with getting a report and receipts detailing expenses, which are not hard to forge in 
Mexico. Moreover, while CONAFOR and the state’s natural resources agency are often invited 
to the FAs’ meetings, they do not interfere in internal decision-making issues. And when leaders 
have mismanaged funds from a government program or project, as the president of the state-level 
association, there have been no consequences. 
Finally, norms are an essential part of the puzzle. In particular, the analysis accentuates the 
importance of the magnitude of the capture and the benefit distribution –when elite capture is too 
large, or when benefits only reach a few acting in cliques, then the issue becomes more salient. 
For instance, in FA-1 millions of pesos were captured by the leadership from projects from 
which members never benefitted.  This created strong resentment, conflicts, and lack of trust. In 
stark contrast, in the other three associations the resource capture has been smaller and there 
have been recurrent benefits, so they have enjoyed much more stability. In the same vein, it is 
possible that since leaders do not receive any salary for their services (except for reimbursement 
of expenses), skimming off resources is a ‘culturally accepted’ phenomenon which partly serves 
to incentivize people to participate in leadership.  
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4.5.2.2. Power relations 
While institutions account for some of the observed variation, they cannot account for all 
of it. The cases analyzed underscore that unequal power relations among the actors involved are 
also at the root of elite capture and persistence. Power allows certain actors to employ strategies 
through which they can prevent loss of authority, recentralize it, or capture resources, which  
recall the “strategies of domination” discussed by Poteete and Ribot (2011). Moreover, 
institutions and power interact in multiple ways. First, while institutions can mitigate power 
imbalances, they can also maintain them –such as with the FA-3 share-based voting rule and 
unlimited leadership terms. Second, institutions can be skirted by powerful actors, especially 
when there is weak monitoring and enforcement.  
The case of FA-3 is illuminating. Why, despite their constant complaints about the rising 
costs of the forestry services in their organization and inconformity with their president, have 
member communities done nothing to change things? An informant replied: “Because no one 
wants to grab the bull by the horns” (interview, 10-03-2010).100 The image evokes fear (the 
forester as a bull) and a sense of impotency, very similar to the “feeling of powerlessness” 
described by Gaventa (1980; see also Luthans et al., 1998). It also suggests that there is no leader 
(no ‘bull rider’) to come forward and unite the opposition or at least to make the forester 
accountable. Several informants described the forester as having centralized control and not 
being accountable to anyone else. An ex-member of the governing board of the largest 
community stated: “everything is controlled by him, no one intervenes, only his governing 
board” (interview, 06-11-2010). He further explained that the forester has “a lot of influence” 
and “manages the comisariados in his way”. As an example, he mentioned that when 
                                                           
100
 Another interviewee similarly claimed that the problem was that “no one wants to put the bell on the cat” 
(interview, 09-26-2010). 
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communities tried to re-organize an ejido union in the 1990s to help them in timber 
commercialization and price bargaining, the forester actively and successfully opposed this. The 
image of fear and control was similarly evoked by another interviewee who described the 
forester as having his communities “mafiados” (in a mafia-style system). 
The forester and the president are both wealthy men who live in large houses in the capital 
city. The forester’s political connections (close friend with the current governor, cousin of the 
current municipal president of FA-3’s region, etc.), together with his prestige, serve as a strong 
dissuasive for anyone wishing to confront him. In addition, the control of information that he and 
the FA’s leadership hold allow them to misinform and use threats to maintain power 
asymmetries. The forester and FA leaders told communities that if they left they would lose 
government monetary supports because the government wanted communities to be organized. A 
community that exited FA-3 noted how the forester initially did not want to give them their 
forest extraction permit. Their positions and control over information also facilitated propaganda 
about the FA’s benefits. ‘We are the best’, was the message constantly conveyed. This self-
congratulatory discourse maintained the ‘hype’ about the association among the members and 
reinforced the prestige of the leadership’s ability to channel resources. The forester’s control 
over the organization, and the perception about him as the only person able to channel resources 
to the members, are so strong that when he resigned as forestry service director to take over the 
new position, the organization agreed that when he finished his 4 years in the government, he 
would be hired back.  
Internal power relations in FA-3 are also maintained through economic exchanges 
including small loans given to community leaders on a personal basis. This not only creates a 
binding financial dependence, but also a sort of political servitude in which community members 
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are afraid to speak up for fear of losing  future access to more funds, often needed for medical 
emergencies or family festivities (on the relation between loans and power, see Wilshusen, 
2009). According to some, this technique is especially used with the comisariados to maintain 
their support, and could explain why community leaders who oppose the costs of the forestry 
service and their annual raises change positions once they become comsisariados. The forester’s 
modifications to planned forest management interventions (increasing the marked-up timber 
volume) in exchange for political support or money are another example of these strategies. 
An additional aspect of power relations within FA-3 is the presence in it of a single 
community –the region’s wealthiest, best-organized and most-developed–101 whose prestige and 
power influence other members in their voting. As one of the community’s leaders said: “In the 
meetings when the community [representatives] raises its hand to speak everyone looks [pay 
attention to] and supports us.” Because the community’s leadership is allied to the forester, who 
is a member of that community and has a large family network there, these relationships serve to 
maintain the status quo. The family relations in the governing board further strengthen this 
dynamic. 
Similar observations emerge from the other associations. One common aspect is the 
positional power and the control over resources and information this power affords. As noted by 
Flores and Rello (2002: 37; emphasis added), the traditional leader in Mexico has relied on 
clientelism– “offering, promising, giving and managing in exchange of political 
fidelity…[serving as] an intermediary between the peasant world and the urban world, and in 
this he has cemented his power.” Foresters and peasant leaders can access resources directly 
                                                           
101
 This is the only FSC-certified community in the region and the only one with a sawmill. Another relevant factor 
is that the community has become the regional hub for a band of drug traffickers, with which some think that the 
leadership has become affiliated. This creates a fear effect which, although not discussed in interviews, is an obvious 
factor at play. 
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through the associations. Yet in forestry aspects, it is foresters who can apply to these funds on 
behalf of their communities and FAs, and this is often done without the most basic consultation. 
In FA-4, the first elected leader could not recall what programs the FA applied to during his 
tenure (from 2004-2007), because the forester had made those decisions. This is enhanced by the 
technical nature of the programs and their applications (and consequently by differences in 
education), and differences in financial resources that allow some actors to live near the 
government agencies (i.e. the city) or to at least be able to frequently travel to those locations. 
Foresters and peasant leaders also gain access to meetings where they can influence policies and 
obtain key information.  
However, in these meetings it is often the foresters who speak on behalf of FAs, further 
entrenching their interests. A clear example of both processes was foresters’ reactions to the 
original rules set out by CONAFOR for the PROFAS program funds, which stated that the 
associations’ foresters could not have any other jobs. Foresters strongly opposed this because all 
of them would have been disqualified (only one ARS forester does not have a private forestry 
service office). After ignoring this rule for several years with the complicity of CONAFOR, they 
lobbied hard to have it changed until they succeeded. In the first meeting I attended during my 
fieldwork, a gathering of the state-level association, the foresters complained about the lack of 
funding for reforestation in different areas of the state in that year’s CONAFOR programs. I 
found it curious that it was the foresters, and not the association leaders (who were also present), 
who spoke at the meeting. A few days later, a top-level government official noted that this was 
because the foresters, and not the associations, were the ones that directly benefitted from 
reforestation programs, because they could sell the plants they produced to CONAFOR for the 
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communities’ reforestation activities and charge communities a 20-25% fee over the project’s 
total funds.  
The prestige of leading an organization, and the political and economic advantages this 
provides, was also evident in the other cases. As in FA-3, the members in the other three FAs 
closely associated resource channeling with their leaders’ actions. Leading an organization also 
makes leaders more coveted by parties and other external actors, since it facilitates mobilization 
of member communities for political and economic purposes. This, in turn, gives these ‘leaders’ 
bargaining power to extract benefits from political parties interested in those votes. In all four 
FAs, foresters and leaders in several FAs used their positions to mobilize members to attend PRI 
events or to campaign for political positions themselves, often remunerated with programs, 
projects or political positions. The case of FA-1 was the clearest example.  
Control over information and the associated misinformation and threats about the loss of 
government funds if members left their associations was another common strategy employed by 
leaders and foresters to maintain their authority, as well as by CONAFOR and state government 
officials. Fear towards powerful caciques –sometimes enhanced by threats or by situations of 
dependency– were also evident in FA-2 and FA-1, but not in FA-4. In FA-1, fear of a previous 
president, one of the region’s most powerful men, was mentioned by some as a reason for why 
he was able to overstay his term and why he was not punished for his corruption. This is also an 
example of how power has allowed elites to skirt rules or change them. The description of the 
communities under the region’s main forester as ‘captive’ was starkly similar to the ‘mafia’ 
description in FA-3.  
In FA-2, in the recent internal elections, the municipal councilmember --closely allied to 
the exiting president-- threatened some community leaders saying he would not support the 
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association if the opposing group won. Meanwhile, the timber entrepreneur in this region uses 
multiple strategies such as purchase of membership rights and provision of high-interest loans to 
community members. According to one interviewee, he operates “like in the times of the 
haciendas when the comisariados would be bought and the weakest shot at.” (interview, 10-27- 
2010) 
The FA-1 elections also highlighted the role of clientelism –support for the forester in 
return for well-paid positions in the municipality. The final commonality observed is the 
circularity of social capital –as theorized by Bourdieu (1977, in Wilshusen, 2009). A repeated 
sequence is positions that facilitated connections, which in turn gave access to information and 
resources, which in turn opened spaces for new positions.  
Power relations, however, were not all alike in the four associations, and this difference 
can also be tied to different outcomes. An important contrast concerns the wealth of the 
presidents. In FA-1 and FA-2, the presidents were not as wealthy as those in FA-3 and FA-4. 
This seemed to limit their ability to connect upward with the highest echelons of power. A 
second contrast regards the stability or dominance of elites. In FA-1 they have shown high 
instability with strong competition between two groups, and this may be magnifying the process 
of capture. Meanwhile, in FA-3 the diametrically opposite situation occurs (one group 
dominating for over 15 years) and elite capture is also very high but more hidden from public 
view. 
Finally, given the observed current and past struggles to resist and overturn elite capture, 
we must conclude that in addition to power over, power to –the power to act collectively to 
change a given situation– is also very present, with perhaps the exception of FA-3 in which 
constraints on collective action to change the leadership are very strong. 
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4.5.2.3 Historical and political-economic conditions 
While power relations and institutions can help explain the differences in the forms and 
intensities of capture that take place, they are insufficient to explain its persistence in all four 
associations. I argue that this can be understood by looking at the historical and current political 
economy of Durango.  Both power relations and institutions operate in broader political-
economic structures and historical processes that affect them (Hayward, 2006; Shapiro, 2006; 
Swartz, 2007; Bourdieu, 1977, 1985, in Wilshusen, 2009). National political or legal changes, 
such as decentralization policies, as well as large-scale economic changes, can alter power 
relations in society by creating political openings for less powerful groups, or by reinforcing 
elites’ power (Tarrow, 1998; Wollenberg et al., 2006).  
Yet path dependencies hamper institutional change. The experience of ex-communist 
countries in Eastern Europe is very relevant because, as with Mexico, they endured a very long 
period of authoritarian and centralized government. Luthans et al. (1998) conclude that the 
prevalence of manipulative, corrupt and abusive (i.e. “dark”) leaders in ex-communist countries 
is a product of this history. The class-based social system controlled by one party restricted 
leadership to a selected party elite –the nomenklatura. These leaders, in turn, destroyed or co-
opted any opponents, creating a scarcity of good leaders. Meanwhile, communism –by imposing 
decisions from the top and giving people very little room to develop their own abilities– created 
a sense of “learned helplessness” in which people felt they did not have the ability to influence 
outcomes and had low levels of experience and confidence, and consequently became passive 
and unmotivated to act collectively. After the fall of communism, the high level of uncertainty 
and crisis in the transition period fostered “role ambiguity and uncertainty regarding 
responsibilities”, making leaders “vulnerable to changes and power struggles”, while also 
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creating a social desire for ‘strong’ (i.e. authoritarian) leaders who could solve the social and 
economic crisis and fill the power vacuum.   
In Durango, the best example of path dependence is the role of foresters; in three of the 
four FAs, the foresters that have been involved in the process of elite capture are the same 
individuals who were at the head of the government-run forest management units (UAFs) in the 
1980s. Thus, the power of foresters and their behavior is partly a result of the history from which 
they emerge. Until the 1980s, foresters in Durango were accountable upwardly, first to timber 
corporations (under the private concession system in the 1950s) and later to the government 
(under the government-run concession system and the forest administration units). They tended 
to strongly favor the timber interests rather than the interests of conservation or community 
benefits (Klooster, 2003; Merino, 2004). Moreover, they played a decisive role in facilitating the 
expansion and regularization of timber extraction in the state. In these positions, foresters 
became wealthy and strengthened their political connections (the mere appointment to these 
positions already reflected good political connections). They also developed strong links to 
communities. While in some cases foresters were crucial in organizing and supporting 
communities in their struggles for more autonomy (see Chapter 2), in many they simply 
implemented federal prerogatives on the ground. The privatization of forestry services in 1992 
generated new opportunities for personal enrichment. It also generated two perverse incentives 
regarding community forestry: to submit applications for projects that generate income for them, 
regardless of whether communities or associations need them or not (e.g. reforestation); and to 
subvert communities’ and FAs’ development. 
The use of FAs by peasant leaders to escalate into political positions and capture resources, 
and the symbiotic relationship between these associations and the PRI, need to be understood in 
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the context of Mexico’s history of clientelism, corporatism and caciquismo. Peasant 
organizations served as ‘intermediaries’ to peasants and peasant communities, and negotiations 
between them and the government were all-important. The PRI benefitted from the associations’ 
mobilization of political support and votes through leaders that “usually control large quantities 
of peasants” (interview with FA-4 leader, 01-31-2012). The FAs were envisioned as vehicles of 
political representation and as intermediaries to channel resources, and FA leaders as natural 
choices for elected or appointed positions within the party-state apparatus. This created a 
perverse incentive to use the organizations as political ladders as well as strong attachments 
between peasant leaders and the PRI-CNC.102 Resource capture was often allowed as part of the 
‘tools of the trade’. As explained by the FA-4 leader: “[the benefits are] always distorted because 
this or that leader is supported and obtains huge benefits, and while in some cases these benefits 
reach the majority of the population, in others the benefit is only for a few who act in cliques 
(camarillas).” (interview, 01-31-2012) This is especially a threat in contexts where members of 
an organization have developed a history of delegation and lack of political participation (an 
‘apathy’ of sorts), as is the case in many FAs in Mexico (Chapela, 1998; Lutz-Bachere, 2006).  
Mexico’s democratic openings have had some effects on this system –loss of political 
power by the CNC and FAs, and an increased awareness by peasants about their rights. As one 
government official explained, “people have understood that they can obtain funds because it is 
their right and not because they are from a party.” (interview, 01-28-2010) Yet, at least in 
Durango, historical relations have shown tremendous resilience. For instance, despite the 
attempts by the federal government to use PROFAS to build political support for the PAN party, 
most associations in Durango were captured by the same people that had been controlling 
                                                           
102
 The vast majority of community and FA leaders interviewed expressed a strong conviction that the PRI is the 
party best representing their interest. 
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associations before –foresters and PRI operatives– “taking the money and continuing to support 
the PRI”, as one interviewee put it. The case has similarities to the “nomenklatura effect” 
observed in Bulgaria’s water user associations by Theesfeld (2009). This shows the capacity of 
existing clientelist networks to adapt to changing contexts, as found in other countries 
transitioning away from heavily centralized and authoritarian governments. It also underscores 
the importance of pre-existing networks but also of historical patterns of governance, as 
explained by Bourdieu (1977, in Wilshusen, 2009). However, a key difference with those 
previous case studies is that the comparative analysis of four FAs has shown that these historical 
patterns can be overcome or at least modified through institutional design, grassroots 
mobilization, and more equitable power distributions. In FA-2 and FA-3, for instance, the 
existence of forestry services gave the association financial autonomy and consequently more 
leeway in implementing the PROFAS program.  
These historical patterns are intermixed with other current political-economic factors that 
reinforce or mitigate elite capture. In Durango, the continued strength of the PRI and the lack of 
a well-developed civil society and NGO sector further reinforce peasants’ and FAs’ dependence 
on foresters and the government. In other words, the linkages are ‘reduced’ rather than diverse. 
The bureaucratic complexity and technical nature of government programs also contribute to 
elite capture by making it nearly impossible for peasants to directly engage in the process of 
applying for programs and creating a dependency on external foresters and well-educated leaders 
for their support. Finally, the PROFAS policy has altered power dynamics. In FA-1, it enhanced 
the intra-group conflicts and created an opportunity for the small-and-poor communities to gain 
an increased majority (with new member influx). It also created opportunities for already-
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established or emerging elites to consolidate their power by capturing more resources, as 
happened with the foresters in all four associations and the timber entrepreneur in FA-2.  
 
4.6. Conclusions: Mitigating elite capture 
 This study has demonstrated that elite capture is pervasive in cross-scale linkages even in a 
successful community forestry experiment such as that of Mexico, underscoring the need for 
more scholarship on this subject. The findings about power and political economy have 
important implications for the theory of institutions, particularly for trying to explain why formal 
and informal rules do not coincide (see Clement, 2010; Theesfeld, 2009). They also contribute to 
furthering our understanding of the relations between institutions and equality in the commons, a 
seldom-studied subject (Andersson and Agrawal, 2011).  
 The question remaining is what are the most effective strategies to mitigate and resist elite 
capture. From the government’s standpoint, limiting foresters’ intermediary role through new 
rules that generate direct and true community involvement in community forestry programs 
seems necessary. Training of community leaders in forestry services is also very promising, as is 
increasing funding for programs aimed at strengthening community institutions, organizations, 
participatory processes, and economic enterprises. In fact, this research, as well as previous 
work, has suggested that one of the strategies elites –particularly foresters– have used to 
maintain their control over community forestry and the associated linkages is downplaying the 
social dimension in the resource-channeling process. Breaking this “vicious cycle”, as 
Barsimantov (2010) calls it, will also require the active intervention of other civil society actors, 
such as NGOs and progressive academics. Oaxaca provides several examples of the positive 
effects of these strategies. 
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 Yet these strategies are mostly externally-driven. Grassroots actions will also be required. 
One is improved design of community and inter-community institutions, such as the hiring of 
external accountants, active monitoring by members, and the clear delineation of authority roles. 
The second is internal mobilization for democracy, a process which, although evident from 
previous historical periods in the FAs studied, is currently lacking.  
 
  
257 
 
References 
Adger, W.N., Brown, K., and Tompkins, E.L. (2005). The political economy of cross-scale 
networks in resource co-management. Ecology and Society, 10(2), 9. [online] URL: 
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol10/iss2/art9/  
 
Agrawal, A., and Gupta, K. (2005). Decentralization and participation: The governance of 
common pool resources in Nepal’s Terai. World Development, 33(7), 1101-1114. 
 
Agrawal, A., and Ostrom, E. (2001). Collective Action, Property Rights, and Decentralization in 
Resource Use in Indian and Nepal. Politics and Society, 29(4), 485-514. 
 
Andersson, K. and Agrawal, A. (2011). Inequalities, institutions, and forest commons.  Global 
Environmental Change, 21(3), 866-875. 
 
Andersson, K. and Ostrom, E. (2008) Analyzing decentralized resource regimes from a 
polycentric perspective. Policy Sciences, 41(1), 70-93. 
 
Antinori, C.M., and Rausser, G. (2010). Summary report of the National Survey Project for 
Mexican Community Forests. CUDARE Working Paper 1105. Berkley, CA: Department of 
Agricultural and Resource Economics, University of California- Berkeley.  
 
Armitage, D. (2008) Governance and the commons in a multi-level world. International Journal 
of the Commons, 2(1), 7-32. 
258 
 
 
Balooni, K., Lund Friis, J., Kumar, C., and Inoue, M. (2010) Curse or Blessing? Local elites in 
Joint Forest Management in India’s Shiwaliks. International Journal of the Commons, 4(2), 707-
728. 
 
Bardhan, P. and Mookherjee (2011) Political clientelism and capture: Theory and evidence from 
West Bengal.  
 
Barsimantov, J. (2010) Vicious and Virtuous Cycles and the Role of External Non-government 
Actors in Community Forestry in Oaxaca and Michoacán, Mexico. Human Ecology, 38(1), 49-63 
 
Bartley, T., Anderson, K., Jagger, P., and Van Laerhoven, F. (2008) The Contribution of 
Institutional Theories to Explaining Decentralization of Natural Resource Governance. Society 
and Natural Resources, 21(2), 160-174. 
  
Bartra, A., and Otero, G. (2005). Contesting neoliberal globalism and NAFTA in rural Mexico: 
From state corporatism to the political-cultural formation of the peasantry? Journal of 
Latino/Latin American Studies, 1(4), 164-190. 
 
Benjamin, C.E., Brechin, S.R. and Thoms, C.A. (2011). Introduction to the Special Issue: 
Organizational Networks and Environmental Governance. Journal of Natural Resource Policy 
Research, 3(3), 211-222. 
  
259 
 
Berkes, F. (2008). Commons in a Multi-level World. International Journal of the Commons, 
2(1), 1-6. 
 
Bofill Poch, S. (2005) Bosque político: Los avatares de la construcción de una comunidad 
modelo. San Juan Nuevo, Michoacán, 1981-2001 [Political forest: The vicissitudes of the 
construction of a model community]. Zamora, Michoacan (Mexico): El Colegio de Michoacán.  
 
Bray, D. B., Merino, L., and Barry, D. (Eds.). (2005). The Community Forests of Mexico: 
Managing for Sustainable Landscapes: University of Texas Press. 
 
Bray, D. B., Merino, L., Negreros-Castillo, P., Segura-Warnholtz, G., Torres-Rojo, J. M., and 
Vester, H. F. M. (2003). Mexico's Community-Managed Forests as a Global Model for 
Sustainable Landscapes. Conservation Biology, 17(3), 672-677. 
 
Brondizio, E., Ostrom, E. and Young, O. (2009) Connectivity and Governance of Multi-Level 
Social-Ecological Systems: The Role of Social Capital. Annual Review of Environment and 
Resources, 34, 253-278. 
 
Chapela, G. (1998) La Organización Campesina Forestal en el Cambio Liberal Mexicano: 1980-
1992. Unpublished Dissertation. D.F., México: Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México. 
Clement, F. (2010) Analysing decentralised natural resource governance: proposition for a 
“politicised” institutional analysis and development framework. Policy Sciences, 43(2), 129-156. 
 
260 
 
Crona, B., and Bodin, Ö. (2010). Power asymmetries in small-scale fisheries: a barrier to 
governance transformability? Ecology and Society, 15(4), 32. [online] URL: 
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol15/iss4/art32/.  
 
Daftary, D. (2010) Elected Leaders, Community and Development: Evidence on Distribution and 
Agency from a Case in India. Journal of Development Studies, 46(10), 1692-1707. 
 
Dasgupta, A., and Beard, V.A. (2007). Community driven development, collective action and elite 
capture in Indonesia. Development and Change, 38(2), 229-249. 
 
D’Exelle, B. and Ridle, A. (2008). Elite Capture, Political Voice and Exclusion from Aid: An 
Experimental Study. CESifo Working Paper No. 2400. Center for Economic Studies– 
Information and Forschung (CESifo), Munich, Germany. 
 
Duffy, R. (2011). Global Networks in Conservation: The Politics of Engagement between States, 
Civil Society and the World Bank. Journal of Natural Resources Policy Research, 3(3).  
 
Fabricius, C., Folke, C., Cundill, G., and Schultz, L. (2007) Powerless spectators, coping actors, 
and adaptive co-managers: a synthesis of the role of communities in ecosystem management. 
Ecology and Society, 12(1), 29. [online] URL: 
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol12/iss1/art29/ 
 
261 
 
Flores, M. and Rello, F. (2002) Capital Rural Social. Experiencias de México y Centroamérica 
[Rural Social Capital. Experiences from Mexico and Central America]. DF, Mexico: CEPAL. 
 
Fox, J. (1996) How does civil society thicken? The political construction of social capital in rural 
Mexico. World Development, 24(6), 1089-1103. 
 
García-López, G.A. (2009) Bringing power back in: Inserting power into the Institutional 
Analysis and Development (IAD) framework. Paper presented at the 67th Midwest Political 
Science Association (MPSA) Conference, Chicago, IL.  
 
Gaventa, J. (1980) Power and Powerlessness: Quiescence and Rebellion in an Appalachian 
Valley. Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press. 
 
George, A. L., and Bennett, A. (2005). Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social 
Sciences. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.  
 
Gerring, J. (2007) Case Study Research: Principles and Practices. New York: Cambridge 
University Press. 
 
Hamilton, N. (2011) Mexico: Political, social and economic evolution. New York: Oxford 
University Press.  
 
Hayward, C. (2006) On Power and Responsibility. Political Studies Review, 4(2), 156-163. 
262 
 
Heikkila, T., Schlager, E. and Davis, M.W. (2011) The Role of Cross-Scale Institutional 
Linkages in Common Pool Resource Management: Assessing Interstate River Compacts The 
Policy Studies Journal, 39(1), 121-145. 
 
Iversen, V., Chhetry, B., Francis, P., Gurung, M., Kafle, G., Pain, A., and Seeley, J. (2006) High 
value forests, hidden economies and elite capture: Evidence from forest user groups in Nepal’s 
Terai. Ecological Economics, 58(1), 93-107. 
  
Johnson, C. (2004). Uncommon Ground: The ‘Poverty of History’ in Common Property 
Discourse. Development and Change, 35(3), 407-433. 
 
Kashwan, P. (2011) Democracy in the Woods. The Politics of Institutional Change in India’s 
Forest Areas. (Doctoral dissertation). Bloomington, IN: Indiana University.  
 
Klooster, D. (2003). Campesinos and Mexican Forest Policy during the Twentieth Century. Latin 
American Research Review, 38(2), 94-126. 
 
Knight, A. (1998). Populism and neo-populism in Latin America, especially Mexico. Journal of 
Latin American Studies, 30(2): 223-248. 
 
Knight, J. (1992). Institutions and Social Conflict. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
Knox, H., Savage, M., and Harvey, P. (2006). Social networks and the study of relations: 
networks as method, metaphor and form. Economy and Society, 35(1), 113-140. 
263 
 
 
Labonte, M. (2011). From patronage to peace-building? Elite capture and governance from 
below in Sierra Leone. African Affairs, 111(442), 90–115. 
 
Lebel, L., Garden, P., and Imamura, M. (2005). The politics of scale, position, and place in the 
governance of water resources in the Mekong region. Ecology and Society, 10(2): 18. [online] 
URL: http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol10/iss2/art18/ 
 
Lukes, S. (1974). Power: a radical view. London: Macmillan. 
 
Lutz-Bachere, B. (2006) Formas de dominación en las organizaciones rurales de México. In H.C. 
de Grammont (ed) La construcción de la democracia en el campo latinoamericano [‘Forms of 
domination in Mexican rural organizations’, in The construction of democracy in the latin 
american countryside]. Buenos Aires, Argentina: CLACSO.  
 
Lutz-Bachere, B. (2002) La apuesta democrática en una empresa social guerrerense, la Sanzekan 
Tinemi. Veredas, 4-5: 99-116. [The democratic bet in a Guerrero social enterprise, the Sanzekan 
Tinemi.] 
 
Mathews, A. (2006) Building the town in the country: official understandings of fire, logging 
and biodiversity in Oaxaca, Mexico, 1926–2004. Social Anthropology, 14(3), 335–359. 
 
264 
 
McDonald, J.H. (2003) An Exploration in the Veiling of Power: The Politics of Development in 
Rural West Mexico. Mexican Studies, 19(1), 161-185. 
 
McDonald, J.H. (2001) Reconfiguring the countryside: Power, control, and the (re) organization 
of farmers in west Mexico. Human Organization, 60(3), 247-258. 
 
Merino, L. (2004). Conservación o deterioro. El impacto de las políticas públicas en las 
instituciones comunitarias y en las prácticas de uso de los bosques en México. [Conservation or 
deterioration: The impact of public policies on community institutions and the practices of forest 
use in Mexico.] Mexico City: Instituto Nacional de Ecología (INE). 
 
Merino, L. and Martínez, A.E. (2011) A vuelo de pájaro. Las condiciones de las comunidades 
con bosques templados en México. México, D.F.: IIS-UNAM. 
 
Nayak, P. K., and Berkes, N. (2008). Politics of co-optation: Community forest management 
versus joint forest management in Orissa, India. Environmental Management 41(5), 707-718. 
 
Njaya, F., Donda, S., and Béné, C. (2011). Analysis of Power in Fisheries Co-Management: 
Experiences from Malawi. Society and Natural Resources, 25(7), 652-666.  
 
Nelson, F., and Agrawal, A. (2008). Patronage or Participation? Community-based Natural 
Resource Management Reform in Sub-Saharan Africa. Development and Change, 39(4), 557-
585.  
265 
 
Nuijten, M. (2004). Between Fear and Fantasy: Governmentality and the Working of Power in 
Mexico. Critique of Anthropology, 24(2), 209–230. 
 
Nuijten, M. (2003) Power, Community and the State: The Political Anthropology of 
Organisation in Mexico. London: Pluto Press. 
 
O’Dwyer, C. (2006). Runaway State-Building: Patronage, Politics and Democratic 
Development. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press. 
 
Olivera Rivera, A., Ed. (2010). La Democratización Frustrada: Limitaciones Institucionales y 
Colonización Política de las Instituciones Garantes de Derechos y de Participación en México. 
[The Frustrated Democracy: Institutional Limitations and Political Colonization of the 
Institutions that Grant Rights and Participation in Mexico.] Veracruz, Mexico: Center of 
Research and Higher Studies on Social Anthropology/Veracruzana University. 
 
Pérez-Cirera, V., and Lovett, J. C. (2006) Power distribution, the external environment and 
common property forest governance: A local user groups model. Ecological Economics, 59(3), 
341-352. 
 
Platteau, J.P. (2004) Monitoring Elite Capture in Community-Driven Development. 
Development and Change, 35(2), 223-246.  
 
266 
 
Platteau, J.P., and Gaspart, F. (2003) The Risk of Resource Misappropriation in Community-
driven Development. World Development, 31(10), 1687–1703. 
 
Poteete, A. and Ribot, J. (2011) Repertoires of Domination: Decentralization as Process in 
Botswana and Senegal. World Development, 39(3), 439-449. 
 
Ribot, J.C., A. Agrawal, and A.M. Larson (2006) Recentralizing while decentralizing: How 
national governments reappropriate forest resources. World Development, 34(11), 1864-1886. 
 
Ribot, J.C., and Peluso, N.L. (2003) A theory of access. Rural sociology, 68(2), 153-181.  
 
Saito-Jensen, M., Nathan, I., and Treue, T. (2010) Beyond elite capture? Community-based 
natural resource management and power in Mohammed Nagar village, Andhra Pradesh, India. 
Environmental Conservation, 37(3), 327-335. 
 
Schmidt, O. and Theesfeld, I. (2010) Experiences with devolution measures as a new form of 
governance in Albania’s fishery sector. Paper presented at the conference “Institutions in 
Transition – Challenges for New Modes of Governance”, Halle (Saale), Germany, June 16-18, 
2010. 
 
Scott, J. (1985). Weapons of the weak: Everyday forms of peasant resistance. New Haven, CT: 
Yale University Press. 
 
267 
 
Shapiro, I. (2006) On the Second Edition of Lukes' Third Face. Political Studies Review, 4(2), 
146-155. 
 
Sikor, T., Stahl, J., and Dorondel, S. (2009). Negotiating Post-Socialist Property and State: 
Struggles over Forests in Albania and Romania. Development and Change 40(1): 171–193. 
 
Swartz, D. L. (2007) Recasting power in its third dimension. Theory and Society, 36(1), 103-109. 
 
Taylor, P.L., and C. Zabin (2000) Neoliberal reform and sustainable forest management in 
Quintana Roo, Mexico: Rethinking the institutional framework of the Forestry Pilot Plan. 
Agriculture and Human Values, 17(2), 141-156. 
 
Taylor, P.L. (2001) ‘Community forestry as embedded process: Two cases from Durango and 
Quintana Roo, Mexico’, International Journal of Sociology of Agriculture and Food, 9(1), 59-
81. 
 
Theesfeld, I. (2011) Perceived power resources in situations of collective action. Water 
Alternatives, 4(1), 86-103. 
 
Theesfeld, I. (2009) The Downgrading Effects of Abuse of Power on Trust and Collective Action 
in Bulgaria's Irrigation Sector. In: Beckmann, V., Padmanabhan, M. (Eds.): Institutions and 
Sustainability: Political Economy of Agriculture and Environment - Essays in Honour of Konrad 
Hagedorn. Heidelberg, Berlin: Springer, pp. 223-242. 
268 
 
Wilshusen, P. (2009) Shades of social capital: elite persistence and the everyday politics of 
community forestry in southeastern Mexico. Environment and Planning A, 41(2), 389-406. 
 
Wilshusen, P., and Murguía, R.E. (2003). Scaling up from the grassroots: NGO networks and the 
challenges of organizational maintenance in Mexico's Yucatán peninsula. In S.R. Brechin, P. 
Wilshusen, C.L. Fortwangler and P.C. West (eds), Contested nature: Promoting international 
biodiversity with social justice in the twenty-first century, pp. 195-216. New York: SUNY Press. 
 
Wollenberg, E., Moeliono, M., Limberg, G., Iwan, R., Rhee, S., and Sudana, M. (2006). Between 
state and society: Local governance of forests in Malinau, Indonesia. Forest Policy and 
Economics, 8(4), 421-433. 
 
Wong, S. (2010) Elite capture or capture elites? Lessons from the “counter-elite” and “co-opt-
elite” approaches in Bangladesh and Ghana. UNU-WIDER Working Paper 2010/82. Helsinki, 
Finland: World institute for Development Economics Research, United Nations University. 
 
Zia, A., Hirsch, P., Songorwa, A., Mutekanga, D. R., O’Connor, S. McShane, T., Brosius, P., and 
Norton, B. (2011). Cross-scale value trade-offs in managing social-ecological systems: the 
politics of scale in Ruaha National Park, Tanzania. Ecology and Society, 16(4): 7. 
 
 
 
  
269 
 
CHAPTER 5  
APPLYING THE DIAGNOSTIC FRAMEWORK TO POLYCENTRIC GOVERNANCE: 
THE CASE OF INTER-COMMUNITY FOREST ASSOCIATIONS IN DURANGO, 
MEXICO 
 
ABSTRACT 
This chapter analyses how a combination of internal and external factors influence the operation 
of four second-level organizations (inter-community forest associations, FAs) in Durango, 
Mexico. Applying Elinor Ostrom’s diagnostic framework, I focus on how the history of collective 
action, leadership, autonomy, and political-economic context combine to influence associations’ 
effectiveness in providing services to their member communities. 
 
5.1. Introduction  
 Previous research (see Chapters 2 and 3) has demonstrated the positive impacts of 
connections across levels or scales (labeled cross-scale/multi-level/networked governance) for 
common-pool resource (CPR) management. However, we need to recognize that their existence 
is not automatically a positive thing, much less a panacea. The CPR scholarship has highlighted 
the multitude of variables influencing the initiation and sustainment of collective action and CPR 
management. So far, cross-scale has been analyzed as a factor for success itself. What 
characteristics of cross-scale systems make them more or less successful remains unanswered. 
Moreover, it remains unclear which of the factors identified as crucial (i.e. Ostrom’s design 
principles) in local-level CPR governance apply to higher levels of governance. 
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 In this chapter, I analyze the factors that influence effectiveness of four inter-community 
forestry associations (FAs) – a form of cross-scale governance– by looking at five key internal 
variables: origins and previous history of collective action, leadership, financial and political 
autonomy, social capital, and internal institutions (see Figure 1.2, Chapter 1). In addition, I 
discuss two confounding factors which influence FAs directly as well as the community-level 
outcomes that are affected by FAs: the political-economic context (i.e. the socio-political and 
governance system) in which FAs operate, and community-level characteristics. In the next 
section, I present the diagnostic framework which serves as the basis for the theoretical 
exploration. In Section 3, I describe the research design and context. Then I present the results 
(Section 4) and discussion (Section 5). 
 
5.2. Theoretical framework: Explaining the success of polycentric common-pool resource 
systems 
 The scholarship on common-pool resources has shown that there is a wide range of 
factors that can influence the success of CPR governance (e.g. Agrawal, 2001; Padgee et al., 
2006). Following this lead, Ostrom (2007, 2009) proposed a “diagnostic framework” which 
sought to navigate this complexity by organizing the large number of potentially relevant 
variables into five categories: (1) Resource System (RS), (2) Resource Units (RU), (3) 
Governance System (GS), (4) Users (U), and (5) Social, Economic and Political Setting (S). 
Figure 5.1 presents this framework and the variables considered most important in my analysis 
(marked with an asterisk).  
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Figure 5.1. Variables in the Diagnostic Approach 
 
Social, Economic and Political Setting (S) 
S1- Economic development. S2- Demographic trends. S3- Political stability. S4- Technology. 
S5*- Government resource policies. S6-Market incentives. S7- Media organization. 
Resource System (RS) Governance systems (GS) 
RS1- Sector (e.g. water, forests, pasture, fish) GS1- Number of users 
RS2- Clarity of system boundaries GS2- Nongovernment organizations 
RS3- Size of resource system GS3- Network structure 
RS4- Human-constructed facilities GS4- Property-rights systems 
RS5- Productivity of system GS5- Operational rules 
RS5a- Indicators of productivity of system GS6- Collective-choice rules 
RS6- Equilibrium properties GS6a*- Local collective-choice autonomy 
RS7- Predictability of system dynamics GS7- Constitutional rules 
RS8- Storage characteristics GS8*- Monitoring and sanctioning process 
RS9- Location  
Resource Units (RU) Users (U) 
RU1- Resource unit mobility U1- Number of users 
RU2- Growth or replacement rate U2- Socioeconomic attributes of users 
RU3- Interaction among resource units U3- History of use 
RU4- Economic value U4- Location 
RU5- Size U5*- Leadership/entrepreneurship 
RU6- Distinctive markings U6*- Norms/social capital 
RU7- Spatial and temporal distribution U7- Knowledge of SES/mental models 
 U8- Importante of resource 
 U9- Technology used 
Action Situation [Interactions (I) – Outcomes (O)] 
I1- Harvesting levels of diverse users O1- Social performance measures (e.g. 
effective rules, efficient, equitable, 
accountable, sustainable) 
 
O2- Ecological performance measures (e.g. 
overharvested, resilient, diverse, sustainable) 
 
O3- Externalities to other SESs  
I2- Information sharing among users 
I3- Deliberation process 
I4- Conflicts among users 
I5- Investment activities 
I6- Lobbying activities 
I7- Self-organizing activities 
I8- Networking activities  
Related Ecosystems (ECO) 
ECO1- Climate patterns- ECO2- Pollution patterns. ECO3- Flows into and out of focal SES. 
 
Source: Modified from Poteete et al. (2010) 
 *Variables considered most relevant in this study 
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This approach promises to navigate the immense complexity of CPR problems without 
falling into the ‘panacea’ trap or the ‘my case is unique’ trap (Basurto and Ostrom, 2009). 
According to this framework, the key for any analysis is to carefully specify a particular context 
and identify variables which are most likely to be relevant for that context, and then use theory to 
map the causal connections between them (Basurto and Ostrom, 2009; Ostrom 2007; 2009; 
Poteete et al., 2010). The diagnostic approach implies that to truly understand how and why FAs 
succeed in providing benefits to member communities, one needs to focus on a combination of 
factors, rather than a single one. 
Recent empirical applications of the framework have showcased the value of this approach 
to understand causal combinations of variables, rather than the magnitude of a correlation 
between one variable and the outcome (e.g. Basurto and Ostrom, 2009; Gutiérrez et al., 2011; 
Madrigal et al., 2011). Gutiérrez et al. (2011) analyzed a large database of community fisheries 
and found leadership as the most important factor influencing outcomes, followed by local 
institutions and social capital. However, they also found that the most successful cases combined 
eight different factors: size of the resource system, productivity of the system, resource unit 
mobility, group size (nonlinear), leadership, norms and social capital, knowledge of the social-
ecological system, salience/importance of resources to actors, and collective-choice rules –
especially monitoring and enforcement as well as autonomy as a precondition to craft those 
rules. 
Leadership, social capital, and local institutions have also been identified as key 
combinations of variables for success by scholars analyzing peasant organizations and NGOs 
(e.g. Flores and Rello, 2002; Seixas and Davy, 2008). This scholarship has also identified as 
important external supports, including financial, technical and/or political assistance from 
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governmental and non-governmental organizations as well as professional services (e.g., forestry 
services); and capacity-building of members and leaders, especially professional training.103 
Success factors combine in different ways in each organization and each type of activity they 
carry out (Flores and Rello, 2002). In what follows, I summarize the theoretical and empirical 
relevance for the variables in this study: origins and previous history of collective action, 
leadership, autonomy, social capital, and internal institutions.  
 
5.2.1. Origins and previous history of collective action 
The factor which guided case selection is the historical origins of the organization – 
whether it was formed in a process of bottom-up (grassroots) organization and cooperation 
between communities,104 or whether it was formed in a top-down process, either by the 
government or another external actor such as a political boss or a forester.105 In Mexico, the top-
down nature of FAs has often been cited as a source of organizations’ failure (e.g. Bray and 
Merino, 2004; Bofill-Poch, 2005). In Chapter 2, we saw that FAs’ origins influenced the types of 
services they provided, which coincides with recent research that shows that PROFAS 
organizations strongly focus their activities on promoting the new government programs and 
supporting communities in their applications to this program because of the high level of 
financial dependence (low financial autonomy) on CONAFOR (Merino et al., 2008). Meanwhile, 
Chapter 3 showed that the types of perceived benefits from FAs varied somewhat between the 
top-down and bottom-up organizations in the study. In this chapter, I am interested in exploring 
how FAs’ origins affect their effectiveness.   
                                                           
103
 This training becomes increasingly important as the organizations enter into economic activities (Flores and 
Rello, 2002). 
104
 The bottom-up motivation is similar to the “demand-driven approach” discussed by Madrigal et al. (2011). 
105
 Foresters are the second most-common external actor –after the government– leading to FA formation (see 
Chapter 2). 
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Previous experiences of collective action, whether top-down or bottom-up, should also be 
relevant. Previous organizational experience can facilitate collective action (Ostrom, 1990; 
Vedeld, 2000; Madrigal et al., 2011), but previous experiences with bad leadership or with 
external interventions may also decrease trust and create “vicious cycles” (e.g. Barsimantov, 
2010).  
 
5.2.2. Leadership  
Leadership has been long recognized as an important factor for collective action in CPR 
settings (Ostom, 1990; Vedeld, 2000). Together with prior organizational experience, leadership 
“reduces the users’ costs of coming to agreement and finding effective solutions for a particular 
environment.” (Ostrom et al., 1999: 281) In this sense, effective leadership can overcome 
problems of large group size and heterogeneity (Vedeld, 2000; see also Ostrom, 1990). Leaders’ 
connections to external knowledge, resources and people are crucial (Balooni et al., 2010; Bodin 
and Crona, 2008), though they can also be an obstacle (e.g. Vedeld, 2000). Empirical work has 
found leadership to be an important characteristic in numerous cases of CPR management (e.g. 
Basurto and Ostrom, 2009; Dinar et al., 2005; Gutiérrez et al., 2011; Hurrelmann et al., 2006; 
Olsson et al., 2006; Seixas and Davy, 2008; Sinha and Suar, 2005).  
Leaders can be crucial for mobilizing collective action, to ‘activate’ the existing social 
capital within a group (e.g. Hurrelmann et al., 2006). They can help counter challenges to local 
autonomy from external actors (e.g. Balooni et al., 2010; Basurto, 2007). Leaders are also part 
dispute mediators and part development agents who obtain and share information on government 
programs, interact with external agents visiting their communities, and build independent links to 
government and non-government actors (Daftary, 2010: 170). Agranoff (2006: 18) refers to 
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leaders of public sector networks as “champions” – a “highly visible and powerful” actor with a 
strong vision who “can command organizational resources, has the political and technical respect 
of others, serves to move the network along, and when needed…protects its interests politically 
when under hostile attack.”   
However, leadership should not be regarded as a panacea. As Rondinelli and Heffron 
(2009: 4) put it, “we must avoid falling into the trap of assuming that success requires successful 
leaders, and that therefore every success in development demonstrates the importance of 
leadership.” Leaders that are too strong can create dependency and crowd out effective 
participation from others (Madrigal et al., 2011), or they can abuse power and use their positions 
and the information they control for their own benefit (Crona and Bodin, 2010; Theesfeld, 2009). 
In short, they can have a ‘dark side’ (see Chapter 4). There are also trade-offs between different 
leadership roles, for instance, between internal representation/legitimacy and networking or 
connections to external actors (e.g. Vedeld, 2000). In some cases networking may be more 
important; in others, resource channelling; and legitimacy in others. Different leadership styles 
and traits, such as charisma, courage, creativity, inclusiveness, far-sightendness, 
authoritarianism, and manipulation, also influence the impact of leaders on collective action in 
different ways (Rondinelli and Heffron, 2009; Sinha and Suar, 2005;). Finally, organizations 
often have multiple internal leaders, as well as links to outside ones, recognized in concepts of 
“team”, “shared”, and “distributed” forms of leadership commonplace in the organizational 
management and psychology literatures (e.g. Bolden, 2011; Pearce et al., 2010). In FAs, 
leadership can be shared within each governance board; between the board and 
professional/expert advisors, such as foresters or other external allies; between the board and the 
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community leaders that constitute the FA’s assembly; and between community leaders and other 
members of their communities.  
Previous research on Mexican FAs has identified leadership as an essential variable for the 
success or failure of FAs, communities, and other peasant organizations (Bofill Poch, 2005; Bray 
and Merino, 2004; G. Chapela, 1998; F. Chapela, 2008; Fox, 1990, 1992; Hernández Navarro, 
1990, 1992). Several important findings emerge from this literature. First, the overall lack of 
(good) leadership –particularly those trained in administrative and economic issues– is a major 
limitation on community forestry (F. Chapela, 2008). Besides lack of formal education and 
administrative and economic knowledge, lack of continuity has emerged as an area of concern 
(F. Chapela, 2008; Lutz-Bachere, 1999). Also, leadership and politics (especially caciquismo, 
corporativism and clientelism) have been intricately intertwined in Mexico, and this has had 
lasting effects on leadership characteristics and behavior. On the positive side, there have been 
grassroots experiences across Mexico that have challenged these tendencies with a more 
democratic, representative, and professional leadership (see Hernández Navarro, 1992).  
The crucial importance of leadership in FAs was mentioned repeatedly in interviews with 
different stakeholders in Mexico City and Durango during my fieldwork. Because one of the 
main roles of FAs in Durango is resource channeling from government agencies (see Chapter 3), 
effectiveness is closely related to leaders’ ability to navigate the government bureaucrac –
knowing how it operates, who is in charge, what kinds of programs are available, etc.– as well as 
having good relations with key actors from within. In this regard, previous experience in 
leadership positions in their communities or other organizations is a key requirement, though not 
a guarantee of success.  
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5.2.3. Financial and political autonomy   
 The ability of users to design their own rules has been identified as another key factor of 
sustained collective action in CPR settings (Ostrom, 1990). By definition, this is a relational 
variable because a community or organization’s autonomy depends directly on the government’s 
level of intervention in their affairs. The balance between external connections to government 
and non-governmental actors and autonomy is a crucial yet hard to define issue, and is intricately 
connected to the topic of leadership. Vedeld, (2000), for instance, found that, consistent with 
Mancur Olson’s (1965) predictions, political elites and leaders’ higher levels of wealth and 
connections can help increase collective action. Yet he also found that this potential was 
undermined when leaders’ connections to external officials were too strong, underscoring the 
importance of autonomy. 
 In Mexico, the issue of autonomy has been one of the central aspects of research on 
peasant/rural organizations. In Chapter 2, I showed the negotiated and contested dynamic of FAs 
autonomy throughout the history of Mexican forest policy and politics, and the importance of 
grassroots collective action to initiate, expand or maintain autonomy. Here, I pay attention to these 
conditions in their current form –i.e. during my fieldwork– and how they affect the organizations’ 
observed performance.  
It is often assumed that autonomy has been low because rural organizations have traditionally 
depended on state aid and have been embedded in a long history of authoritarian governance and 
the practice of clientelism, corporatism and caciquismo (Chapela, 1998; Wilshusen and Murguía, 
2003). According to Bartra (1992), external relationships potentially compromise autonomy. 
Understanding autonomy to mean “political indefinition” (i.e. not adhering to a specific political 
party), he argued that when peasant organizations are dependent on national agencies, they become 
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more subordinate to gain access to development funds. Gordillo (1988) and others argued that the 
only way for peasant organizations to become autonomous from the state was to develop economic 
projects that would lead to financial independence. From this perspective, autonomy does not mean 
complete independence from the state, which would imply confrontation and/or isolation; it means 
self-governance in the financial, commercial and technical aspects (see Hernández Navarro, 1992). 
However, as Bartra and Otero (2005) note, this strategy was not successful on many instances 
because it substituted dependence on the state with dependence on a ‘free’ market in which peasants 
could not compete. One could argue that this is precisely the case in the forest sector. Taylor (2001, 
and Zabin, 2003) and Wilshusen (2010) have also shown how an economic focus can generate 
internal tensions within an organization, particularly regarding internal democracy. As I discuss 
below, this is also evident in one of the FAs in this study.  
In this context, what seems important is to have a clear delineation of the roles of internal and 
external actors, and a diverse, balanced set of funding sources, including internal sources of income 
from productive activities (see Wilshusen and Murguía, 2003).  
 
5.2.4. Operational-level institutions  
There is a long line of work highlighting the importance of institutions for CPR 
governance in general (Agrawal, 2001; 2007; Ostrom, 1990; 2007) and for forests in particular 
(Gibson et al., 2000; Padgee et al., 2006). Institutions facilitate collective action by reducing 
uncertainty among participants regarding their rights and responsibilities. Monitoring and 
enforcement have been found to be consistently important (Ostrom and Nagendra, 2006). 
Downward accountability has also been posited as a crucial factor (Agrawal and Ribot, 1999; 
Fox, 1992; Madrigal et al., 2011; Ribot et al., 2006).  
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In Mexico, clear rules about membership and decision-making which (1) give voting rights 
only to active members, (2) establish clear procedures for new members, (3) require full 
consensus for major decisions and simple majority for ordinary ones, and (4) regulate 
compliance, have been found to be important for success of some regional collective action 
endeavors (e.g. Wilshusen and Murguía, 2003). Other issues to consider are the availability of 
spaces for participation such as general assemblies, and the frequency and types of participation 
(Merino et al., 2008). 
 
5.2.5. Norms/social capital   
 Pre-existing social capital –including relations of trust and cooperation but also networks 
and organizations–can be crucial for the formation of new inter-community networks as well as 
for their sustainment (Berkes and Seixas 2004; Flores and Rello, 2002; Seixas and Davy, 2008). 
In networked contexts, this means social capital not only in each member community (i.e. local 
social capital) but also at the inter-community level (i.e. regional social capital).  
 
5.3. Methods and Data  
The question posed by this research was: what factors are most important for the success of 
cross-scale/multi-level collective action (in this case, inter-community associations, FAs)? My 
hypothesis is that success requires a combination of previous histories of bottom-up collective 
action, strong leadership, financial and political autonomy, strong internal institutions and social 
capital.  
The diagnostic framework served as a guide in the selection of variables and the overall 
methodological approach, which required paying close attention to the symptoms of the cases 
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and identifying the combinations of variables and causal processes generating them. While the 
main focus here is on the internal organizational characteristics of each FA, I also pay attention 
to the social, political and economic context as an overarching variable that influences the 
independent variables (i.e. origins and previous history of collective action, leadership, 
autonomy, social capital, internal institutions) as well as the outcomes of interest (i.e. emergence 
and sustainment of collective action, benefits to communities, elite capture). 
Durango was selected for several reasons: it has the largest share of forest and timber 
production in the country (importance), and it has several external conditions conducive to 
success, including some of the first community forestry experiments in Mexico, a long history of 
local collective action, large number of FAs, substantial state funding, and ‘supportive’ 
relationship between government agencies and FAs (Merino et al., 2008).  
Through a qualitative comparative case study of four FAs, I aimed to contribute to the in-
depth analysis of these key factors in order to better understand the causal pathways through 
which they operate rather than to identify a weight or correlation value (see Gerring, 2007; 
Madrigal et al., 2011). Case selection was based on the origins of the organizations –whether 
they were originated by communities (self-organized/bottom-up) or by external actors (top-
down). Two of each type –as similar as possible in terms of group size and geographic location-- 
were selected for analysis. All four FAs are in the same ecosystem (temperate dry pine-oak 
forests of Durango), though not all have the same extent of natural capital (see Table 3.1, 
Chapter 3).  
Open-ended questions about the main challenges and problems, services and benefits, and 
the different variables of interest in each association provided most of the information. Each 
variable’s operationalization is discussed below. 
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5.3.1. Effectiveness 
Organizational effectiveness, which I here use interchangeably with success, is one of the 
hardest concepts to define and operationalize (Rojas, 2000). One of the challenges it presents is 
its multidimensional nature (Madrigal et al., 2011), especially in socio-ecological settings. 
Success can be defined in terms of the achievements or advances made on the organization’s 
objectives and goals (Flores and Rello, 2002). Different proposals for measuring effectiveness in 
civil society organizations include “profitability” ratios, constituent satisfaction, outcome 
indicators, and reputational measures (e.g. Herman, 1990). Others measure it through the 
survival of the organization, and others as the ability to satisfy key strategic constituencies in 
their environment.  
There are strengths and weaknesses in each of these approaches. Profitability ratios are 
often not appropriate because the main objective is rarely profit-making, while constituent 
satisfaction is difficult to appraise consistently across organizations (Rojas, 2000). Reputational 
measures are problematic because those most informed to make these evaluations often have 
vested interests in the organizations being evaluated (Williams and Kindle, 1992; 386).  
In this study I use three measures of success which combine constituent satisfaction and 
reputational measures: member perceptions about their association’s resource channeling 
benefits (average percentage between three categories – see Chapter 3), percent of members of 
each FA saying benefits were high, and external observers’ opinion of the success of the 
association.106 I then add a fourth measure –reported trends in timber stocks– that is closer to an 
                                                           
106
 These evaluations exclude those of the FAs’ governing boards, which have a very strong incentive to overstate 
benefits. 
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outcome indicator and, given that FAs are focused on sustainable forest management, a measure 
of goal achievement. 
 
5.3.2. Independent variables 
I operationalize the independent variables based on multiple dimensions, and using as a 
basic source of data members’ evaluations. Leadership quality can be defined in multiple ways. 
One is the degree of influence and personal ability (Rojas, 2000). Another is previous training 
and knowledge of the issues at hand, in this case forestry (Basurto, 2007). I use perceptions of 
the quality of the leadership by the members (community leaders and other community 
members) as well as by external observers to compare the percentages of participants evaluating 
the leadership as good. I also compare the different qualities that emerged from respondents’ 
own explanations about leaders’ characteristics.  
 To measure financial autonomy, I use the percentage of communities rating the financial 
situation of their organizations as a weakness. I also use financial data from the organizations 
themselves to compare the levels and sufficiency of human, physical and economic capital (see 
Merino et al., 2008), including the percentage of funds coming from internal sources. For 
political autonomy, I looked at each association’s ability to craft their own rules, members’ sense 
of ownership, and percent of members perceiving political use of their organization as a 
weakness. Social capital, in turn, is defined with three inter-related components: participation in 
assemblies, members’ financial contributions to the organization, and members’ perception about 
the cohesion or unity of their organizations (% mentioning as strength or weakness). Finally, 
institutions are measured based on member perceptions as well as observed presence/absence 
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and specific characteristics of key institutions for participation (assemblies), decision-making 
(voting), monitoring (financial audits/reports), and enforcement (sanctions). 
    
5.4. Results: Diagnostics in four Mexican FAs 
5.4.1. Effectiveness  
Table 5.1 summarizes the results of effectiveness.107 Based on the measure of the average 
percent of communities in each association perceiving some benefits in the “resource 
channeling” category (Column 2 from left, see Chapter 3), there is little distinction between FA-
1, FA-2 and FA-3. These three associations appear to be enjoying some level of success, with 
more than half of their members perceiving some benefits in this category.108 FA-4 appears to be 
much less successful in this regard. 
 
Table 5.1. Indicators of effectiveness in four FAs 
FA** RC *** 
(Avg., %) 
Perceived level of overall  
benefits (%) 
External evaluations 
of success (%) 
Perceived change in 
timber stock 
  None Low Med High Low Med High - None + 
FA-1 52.4% 14%* 14% 57% 14% 33% 50% 17% 43% 29% 29% 
FA-2 55.6% 0%* 8% 42% 42% 25% 0% 75% 40% 40% 20% 
FA-3 56.7% 0% 0% 30% 70% 0% 25% 75% 0% 18% 78% 
FA-4 28.1% 15% 23% 31% 31% 0% 100% 0% 100% 0% 0% 
* Percent higher (35% in FA-1, 8% in FA-2) if we consider only the Comisariado responses 
** Sample size different for each category of success. See Appendix 2 
*** RC = Resource channeling 
                                                           
107
 Appendix 2 presents the detailed evaluations of benefits per community. 
108
 Some percentages were higher and others lower in the other categories (see Chapter 3). 
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According to other three success measures (columns 3-5), FA-1 and FA-4 were not very 
successful and the least successful amongst the four. Both associations had the lowest percentage 
of communities perceiving a high level of benefits (14% and 31% respectively) and the highest 
percentage perceiving none or low (28% and 38%). In four of five cases (80%) where the elected 
community leaders (comisariados) perceived no benefits in FA-1, the failure was partially 
attributed to an unequal distribution of benefits –a perception that these were mostly going to 
large-and-wealthy communities. FA-1 and FA-4 also had the lowest ratings from external 
evaluators: in the former, only 17% rated success as high, while in the latter 0% did so. Most 
rated their success as moderate (50% in FA-1 and 100% in FA-4), but FA-1 had an important 
proportion (33%) rating its success as low. Finally, both associations showed the highest 
percentages of communities reporting decreases in timber volume (forest stock). 
 FA-2 could be categorized as moderately successful. Substantial percentages of its member 
communities reported a high (5/12, 42%) or moderate (42%) level of benefits. Only one 
community leadership viewed the benefits as low (8%) and another as nonexistent (8%).109 Three 
out of four (75%) external observers rated success as high (although 25% rated it as low), and 
60% of respondents reported no negative trends in timber stocks. 
 Meanwhile, FA-3 showed very high levels of success and is clearly considered the most 
successful of the four associations in this study. Seventy percent (70%) of its members ranked 
the level of benefits as high, and seventy-five percent (75%) of external observers ranked success 
as high, while no community or external observers ranked benefits or success as low. FA-3 has 
also been very successful in one of its core objectives –managing the region’s forests. All seven 
responding communities (100%) reported a stable or increasing forest stock, with 78% reporting 
                                                           
109
 In this second community, other interviewees did perceive benefits In another community, the leaders thought the 
benefits were high but the general assembly thought they were very low to nonexistent. 
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increasing timber volumes. The organization’s forester has won national and state awards for his 
practices. Meanwhile, 82% of eleven member communities mentioned forestry services and/or 
forest management as one of the association’s strengths. The association’s  infrastructure is also 
clearly the most developed in the state: it has the largest number of forest watchtowers (5), the 
most extensive radio communications system, and the largest tree nurseries of any association in 
the state. As a comparison, FA-3 produces about 2 million pine seedlings a year in three (3) 
nurseries, while FA-2 produces about 120,000 in one. 
 The leaders also argued that the organization was the most successful in the state in terms 
of resource channeling, noting that member communities as a group consistently receive the 
highest amount of funds in Durango.110 A CONAFOR official expressed it this way:  
“They are the most advanced, definitively. They are self-sustaining [financially] and have a 
plan for where they want to go, where they want to grow. They are the ones with the most 
infrastructure, they are the ones who have a technician [forester], there the forester is part 
of the organization, they are not separate….maybe it is an example to replicate in other 
regions, maybe not in all, but in some it would be interesting to replicate that model.” 
(interview, 08-02-2010) 
 
 Another official from the state’s environmental ministry argued that FA-3 was “the most 
consolidated in the country” and characterized its level of organization as “optimal”. He noted 
the quality of its forestry services (particularly in reforestation, forest fires, diversification) and 
again proposed it as a model to be followed (interview, 08-20-2010).  
                                                           
110
 This was corroborated in some cases like the environmental compensation program. However, in terms of direct 
funds to FAs through PROFAS, FA-3 did not receive the highest amount.  
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 What accounts for FA-1 and FA-4’s low levels of success, the moderate level of success of 
FA-2 and the high level of FA-3? In what follows, I attempt to explain these differences by 
looking at five factors: origins and history of collective action, leadership, financial and political 
autonomy, internal institutions and governance, and social capital.  
 
5.4.2. Origins and previous history of collective action 
 There is no discernible relationship between the origins of the associations and their level 
of success. Each category (top-down and bottom-up) had a failure and a success. In terms of 
previous experience with collective action, all four FAs had it (see Chapter 2), and without 
further parsing out what type and amount, it is hard to determine how this variable has affected 
success. It is telling, however, that the organization with the most previous experience, FA-1, is 
also the least successful. Nevertheless, previous experience, as we shall see, is very important in 
conditioning trust and reciprocity. 
 
5.4.3. Leadership 
In all four case studies leadership was mentioned as a decisive factor in the creation and 
success of the organizations, as well as in their collapse or decay. A community leader expressed 
that having good leadership was the main recurrent challenge in their association, stating bluntly: 
“without leadership there is nothing.” (10-01-2012). Lack of continuity of leadership was 
consistently mentioned as a problem for community and FA leaders in general, as well as in the 
four FAs. Peasant leaders often have little formal training or education, so they have to learn 
through practical experience. However, the three years they are usually allowed to occupy their 
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positions is not enough time to acquire the necessary knowledge and skills.111 Corruption and 
mismanagement and the use of leadership positions for political gain were also identified as 
major leadership problems (see Chapter 4). 
Table 5.2 presents the evaluation of leadership in each of the four associations, and Table 
5.3 presents the main positive and negative attributes mentioned about each of the leaders at the 
time of my fieldwork. Appendix 3 presents the evaluations of leadership per community and 
external observer. According to the theoretical framework and the outcomes of the success 
measures presented above, we would expect leadership to be strongest in FA-3 followed by FA-
2, and weakest in FA-4 and FA-1. This hypothesis is partially supported by the data.  
 
Table 5.2. Evaluation of current leadership quality in four FAs in Durango 
Association Ratings, Communities Ratings, External 
 Good Average Poor Good Average Poor 
FA-1 (n= 14 c, 11 e.o.)112  43%113  14% 36%  0% 55% 45% 
FA-2 (n = 9 c, 5 e.o.) 78%114 0% 0% 100%  0% 0% 
FA-3 (n = 11 c, 9e.o.) 64%115   0% 27%  78%  11%   11%  
FA-4 (n = 9 c, 6 e.o.) 78%  11% 0% 67% 33% 0% 
 
 
                                                           
111
 As an external observer with much experience in the private timber business stated: “A governing board comes 
and works well for three or six years, and then the other party attacks them because they are enriching themselves. 
Politics is very engrained into communities…Then another governing board comes in and dismantles everything 
that the previous one and the one previous to that one did.” (interview, 01-31-2010) 
112
 c = communities, e.o. = external observers. Communities include elected community leaders as well as other 
community members. External observers include federal and state government officials and foresters. 
113
 One community (7%) had opposing views; some considered leadership is good while others thought it is poor. 
114
 22% had opposing views. 
115
 9% had opposing views. 
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Table 5.3.  Evaluation of current leadership attributes in four FAs in Durango 
Attributes FA-1 FA-2 FA-3  FA-4 
Positive 
Education X X  X  
Knowledge  X X X  
Honesty X X   
Effort/persistence X X  X 
Resource channeling  X X X  
Communication   X    
Connections/networks  X X  
Legitimacy/represent.  X   
Presence  X  X  
Internal agreements  X X  
Strictness   X  
Technical support  X X  
Shared  X X  
Negative 
Domineering   X  X  
Unequal benefits X  X   
Political use X  X  X  X  
Corruption   X   
 
FA-1 has the worst leadership ratings of all four organizations, with negative ratings by 
36% of communities and 45% of external observers. It also has the smallest proportion of 
‘positive’ leadership ratings (43% of communities and no external observers). Poor leadership 
was also mentioned by 29% of communities as one of the organization’s main weaknesses. 
Despite what some saw as his commitment and “effort” (mentioned by 29% of communities), the 
FA’s president had the least number of positive attributes of any of the four FA leaders. He was 
characterized by many as indecisive, timid, lacking communicative skills, and without the ability 
to mobilize the membership. Moreover, the process by which he reached his position was marred 
by the interventions from the region’s most powerful forester (see Chapter 4). This undermined 
the president’s legitimacy from the beginning. Another weak spot was his inability to channel 
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funds and develop projects (gestión), a characteristic mentioned by four communities (36%) and 
three external advisors (27%). This inability was due to a lack of resources, but also to a lack of 
skills and of persistence. The leadership was also fragmented within the governing board; two of 
them even considered leaving their positions. Towards the end of my fieldwork, the President 
left for a position in the municipal government.  
On the positive sitde, the president has had a long relationship with most of the region’s 
communities and possesses substantial administrative and political experience. He worked for 25 
years as the accountant of many of the region’s communities as well as the FA. He previously 
served as president of his community’s governing board and as the FA’s Treasurer. From there 
he moved onto politics, sequentially holding positions as president of the municipal branch of the 
PRI, and municipal comptroller (the second in command in local government). 
Another major problem relates to previous leadership experiences which reflect recurrent 
use of leadership positions for personal political and economic gain, ensuing internal conflicts, 
and stark inconsistencies and lack of continuity. Almost all interviewees, when talking about the 
history of the organization, mentioned at least one of these three factors as the catalysts for the 
organization’s weakening and its current state. These previous experiences substantially reduced 
trust in the organization, in turn reducing member participation and financial contributions. 
FA-2, FA-3, and FA-4, in contrast, appeared to have much stronger leaderships, with over 
60% of communities and external observers rating them as good. In the case of FA-4, the 
leadership does not have the expected ‘weak’ value; together with FA-2, it has the highest 
leadership ratings among communities (78% good). The external observer ratings offer a slightly 
different picture: the rating is still high (67% good) but it is below FA-2 and FA-3. The FA-4 
leader’s education and previous experience, knowledge of the region, and his effort and 
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persistence were mentioned as salient characteristics. The involvement of the region’s main 
forester, the organization’s founder, was mentioned by some as crucial for the successful 
development of the organization and several key projects (e.g. fire watchtowers, community-
level fire combat brigades, road repair equipment –see chapter 4). The lack of involvement from 
the other members of the governing board was noted as a limitation. An interviewee remarked: 
“The President has much knowledge about the forest and peasant issues, but he is alone, the 
people around him don’t know.” (interview, 12-08-2010; emphasis added) Some interviewees 
also expressed reservations about the fact that the president did not live in the region’s main city. 
A few others criticized his political involvement and his domineering attitude, which seemed to 
crowd out support from some actors. 
As with FA-1, FA-4 also faced the challenge of previous leadership experiences. The first 
two leaders were rather weak, and lacked both knowledge and experience. There was consensus 
that they responded mostly to the founding forester. Lack of presence (mentioned by 69% of 
communities) and lack of information (61.5%) were the two main weaknesses identified for the 
organization. The previous president (2007-2010) only held two meetings in his three-year 
tenure and many communities reported that he had never visited them. This created a problem 
because people began to be disillusioned and payment of membership dues started to drop. As a 
community leader stated: “[providing this information] is something that is very necessary 
because community members ask why they are in the association, who authorized it, and what is 
the benefit.” (14-December-2010) Information deficiencies also had to do with the failure of 
community leaders to inform their community assemblies properly, as mentioned in several 
interviews in FA-1 and FA-4.  
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FA-3 did not have the strongest leadership but its ratings were still very high (64% of 
communities and 78% of external observers). The president has been in his position since 1995 
and although he did not have any previous leadership experience when he started, he has 
obtained substantial amounts over time, holding elected municipal positions twice and having 
numerous other positions in government policy-making bodies, NGOs and a state-level FA. He 
was described by some as hard-working and attentive (27% of communities). Yet there were 
complaints in some communities about his lack of presence in the region (36% of communities). 
The true leadership in FA-3, however, is in the hands of the association’s forestry services 
director. This could be seen as a form of shared leadership, as stated by the forester: “all of this 
[success] is the job of the Union [membership and governing board] and also of the Unidad 
[forestry services], because we do it like that, in a very coordinated way.” (interview, 06-26-
2010) Four communities (36%) mentioned the role of the forester as an important component of 
leadership. Most considered the forester’s participation a blessing to the organization and a key 
component of its success, though some strongly disagreed abot this (see Chapter 4). The ability 
of the forester (and to lesser extent the FA president) to channel resources was identified as a 
positive characteristic by 45% of communities interviewed (5/11) and 44% of external observers 
(4/9). The accompanying technical staff and leaders’ connections to external actors were 
mentioned as additional positive aspects. One final aspect mentioned as an important 
characteristic of FA-3, which was unique to this organization, was the ‘continuity’ or ‘stability’ 
of the leadership. According to the second-forester in charge, this was one of two components of 
success for the association (the other was the willingness to make financial contributions). Yet 
the permanence of the president and the forester for so long was also a source of tension within 
the Union, even in the community which most supports these leaders. 
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The leadership of FA-2 was ranked the highest of all four organizations among both 
communities (78% good, 0% poor), and external observers (100% good). It also had the highest 
number of positive attributes mentioned. The most salient characteristics were the president’s 
professional education (he was a forester by training) and knowledge (mentioned by 44% of 
communities), his effort and engagement with the organization (67% of communities), his 
honesty and trustworthy character (33%) and his ability to channel funds and develop projects 
(33%). The ability to channel resources, as in FA-3, was tied to the strong connections between 
the leadership and external governmental and non-governmental actors. Shared leadership was 
mentioned by a majority of communities (67%) as another central component of the leadership 
and the success of FA-2. Within the governing board, the president had a group with previous 
leadership experience and professional education. Two external actors also supported the FA’s 
efforts in advancing key regional projects such as paving of the region’s main road and bringing 
electricity to the region: the CEO of the region’s main timber corporation, and a municipal 
councilmember/alderman who had been a member of the FA governing board. A community 
leader explained: “The Union…channels resources from different agencies, and as such we go 
through others such as [the councilmember] and [the timber CEO], who is heard everywhere, and 
they support us.” (participant observation, FA-2 assembly, 30-Sep-2011). Another community 
leader noted their natural complementarity: “[the timber entrepreneur] has the money and the 
Union the human capital.” (interview, 10-29-2010)  
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5.4.4. Autonomy 
 Table 5.4 presents the results concerning political and financial autonomy. Appendix 4 
presents the strengths and weaknesses by community. The findings again lend partial support to 
the expectations.  
 
Table 5.4. Autonomy in four FAs 
FA Political autonomy  Financial autonomy 
 Craft 
own rules 
Sense of 
ownership 
% stating as 
weakness 
% of funds 
from members 
% stating as 
weakness 
FA-1 0.5 Low 36% 30% 50% 
FA-2 1 High 25% 66%-74% 42% 
FA-3 1 Medium 18%  84% 0% 
FA-4 0.5 Medium 15% 33% 23% 
 
5.4.4.1. Political autonomy  
 All four associations had some degree of ability to craft their own institutions. However, 
this autonomy was lowest in FA-1 and FA-4, due to the forced change into the ARS model by 
CONAFOR. In the case of FA-1, the association had to integrate new members, including 
private landowners (which had historically been prohibited in the FA) and communities from 
areas that had never been considered part of the Union’s reach. Those new members did not have 
to contribute any entry fee, contrary to the initial membership. The association also had to adopt 
a set of bylaws based on a model provided by CONAFOR, and later had to modify them at the 
request of the agency. As a result, FA-1 is now prevented from directly engaging in any revenue-
raising activities (and distributing revenues to members), because of its non-profit status. 
Consequently, the association could not enter into a partnership with a timber corporation to 
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establish a much-needed wood chipper in the region and could not receive financing from the 
government’s rural bank (FIRA). As suggested by community representatives, this problem 
could be solved by creating a parallel for-profit organization for these purposes, but this would 
also imply added transaction costs (e.g. drafting bylaws, becoming notarized, making yearly 
reports).   
 Within these constraints, FA-1 still designs internal rules through  assembly decisions, 
called ‘agreements’, and they have also planned to draft more detailed written rules increasing 
regulation of member attendance to meetings and quota payments. Still, sense of ownership is 
low. There is a widespread perception that participation in the new ARS is mandatory in order to 
receive funds from CONAFOR, that “not participating can produce sanctions” (interview, 05-24-
2010), and that the Association is ‘part of the government, part of CONAFOR’.  “Since the 
ARS’s [new CONAFOR FAs] are part of the federal government, one cannot raise one’s voice 
too much” (ibid). These changes have created some lasting tensions within the association and 
have reduced its legitimacy, and consequently the communities’ commitment. The addition of 
new communities also created difficulties for the leadership, which now had to interact with 
local authorities from three different municipalities.116 
FA-4 and FA-3 also entered the PROFAS program, but neither had to change their bylaws. 
In FA-4, the forester, with the participation of a few communities and the advice of 
SEMARNAT and CONAFOR, had drafted the bylaws before the program started. Moreover, the 
association retains the same ability to make internal rules through the assembly. Still, as with 
FA-1, there was a widespread perception among FA-4 communities that being in the association 
was mandatory to obtain CONAFOR funds. The strong control the forester has exerted was also 
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 The same happened in FA-4; in contrast, FA-2 and FA-3 only had to deal with one municipality. 
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an issue, though it seems to be changing mostly due to the current association president, who has 
strong feelings about the need for the association to become autonomous from the forester.  
 FA-3 did not have to adopt any changes due to its pre-existing legal status as a civil society 
(non-profit) association and its inclusion of private landowners as members. However, avoiding 
CONAFOR’s impositions also had to do with strong leadership and financial autonomy (see 
below), which made the association less dependent on CONAFOR funds. Despite this autonomy, 
some complained about the forester’s excessive control and the lack of decision-making 
autonomy by the elected leadership and the assembly (see Chapter 5). An ex-leader argued that 
representation was weak because the governing board was not assigned sufficient resources 
(controlled by the forester) and that this made the forester the de facto representative. One 
community member claimed that “the truth is that the FA is [the forester] and nothing more”, 
and that decisions were made in a “very authoritarian” fashion. Despite being an employee of the 
organization, the forester was the Union’s legal representative and vice-president. As a 
consequence, there was a relatively weak sense of ownership (except in the leaders and a few 
communities). In contrast to FA-2, most FA-3 communities and leaders referred to it as the 
Unidad, which is the name that was used for the government-run forestry services in the 1970s. 
Moreover, with a few exceptions, no one made the distinction between the forestry services 
(Unidad) and the association per se (the Union), and most member communities perceived that 
the benefits came from the former.117 The FA-3 leader did not even have an office in the 
association’s building.  
In FA-2, the original bylaws and changes made to them in 2002 were drafted by 
communities with external advice, not in response to a government requirement. Since FA-2 did 
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 When calling the office, for instance, the secretary would always greet with the name “Unidad”, referring to the 
forestry services, despite the fact that the offices and staff are paid by the unión (i.e. FA-3).  
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not integrate into the PROFAS program, but rather created a parallel organization to channel 
those funds, it avoided the obligation to change its bylaws or membership. In contrast to the top-
down FA-3, sense of ownership was very strong. Communities have a clear sense of the 
distinction between their organization (the Union) and the forestry services. When talking about 
benefits, they always refer to the Union. In terms of internal organization, the FA president was 
always in the office and it was clear that the director of forestry services was under his authority. 
In fact, as several interviewees explained, that was precisely one of the reasons for forming the 
Union and was also a key point of struggle in the Union’s early history. 
 As Table 5.3 shows, in all four FAs the political activities of the presidents and other 
leaders raised concerns, and provoked discontent and distrust among some members. These 
activities included the support of party candidates through the association, and the use of the 
association as a “political trampoline” for the aspirations of certain individuals.118 In this regard, 
FA-1 was by far the worst, as political engagement has been at the center of internal elections 
historically (see Chapter 4), and received the highest percent of mentions as one of the 
association’s main weaknesses. The comisariado of a community complained that “they [the FA 
leaders] drag us from here to there, saying that this or that person will come, they are in 
campaigns; politics should be left hanging outside.” (interview 07-09-2010) The FA president 
very candidly explained that although the association has formal rules against leaders having a 
political position or supporting a political party, politics nevertheless “infiltrates” the 
organization. He said this was inevitable because members were still “social actors” and 
recognized that when the FA was an ejido union it was even more politicized.  
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 There is a fine balance between this ‘politicking’ and the external alliances that organizations have, which are a 
key to obtaining external support.  Defining this balance it is beyond the scope of this paper. 
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In FA-4, communities’ responses implied that political engagement was the lowest of all 
four FAs. However, the president’s failed attempt to become the PRI candidate for municipal 
president, and his subsequent opposition to the selected candidate (who won the race), led to his 
isolation from the new municipal government, closing off a potential ally and source of funds. In 
FA-2, problems with political use of the organization surprisingly received the second-highest 
percentage in the sample, though still relatively low (25%). The internal elections for a new 
leadership in 2010 highlighted some of the problems. Still, they were of much less magnitude 
and salience than in FA-1 and have not led to any strong divisions or departure of members. 
Moreover, political connections with the municipal councilmember were noted as an 
organizational strength which facilitated resource channeling.  
In FA-3 only 18% of communities (2/12) mentioned politics as a problem, and most 
perceived the leaders’ political connections to be an asset. An ex-leader boasted about the 
organization’s political strength noting how several of them had reached elected positions in the 
municipality, and that the state government consulted with them regarding who to appoint to 
different positions. Political use of the organization is still present (see Chapter 4). One of the FA 
leaders identified politics as the one weakness in the association because “many people act like 
sheep” (“se aborrega”) with [political] parties.” Yet this was a minor concern among 
communities and it did not seem to interfere with the union’s operation.  
  
5.4.4.2. Financial autonomy 
 Financial autonomy appears as key condition of success in the four cases and closely 
matches the expected relationships. In the two low-performing associations (FA-1 and FA-4), 
financial autonomy is low. In FA-1, insufficient financial resources was the second most-
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mentioned organizational weakness (50% of communities). The comisariado of one community 
said that all they saw at the meetings was “red numbers” (debts) and low levels of attendance 
(interview 04-06-2010). The organization had started the year with approximately $100 USD 
total funds. This problem was also duly noted by ex-Union presidents, foresters, and the current 
FA leadership. When asked about what was needed to be successful, they replied that they 
needed resources: “with that everything can be done because the association is pure gestoría.” 
(interview, 04-07-2010) The association only had two sources of funds –CONAFOR and 
membership dues– but was heavily dependent on the former. According to a March 2010 
financial report, in 2009 CONAFOR’s share of the total income represented more than two thirds 
(70%), with membership dues covering the remainder. According to various interviewees, the 
financial woes of the association are a direct result of two trends: the reduction of CONAFOR 
support, and the reduction in payment of membership dues (interview 03-09-2010). Direct funds 
from CONAFOR to the FA decreased from $500,000 to $250,000 Mexican pesos in three years. 
The main problem, however, is the lack of payment of membership dues and of reliable internal 
sources of income. Four communities bore almost half (49%) of the members’ burden, but only 
one of these was among the region’s wealthiest. The FA-1 president calculated that if everyone 
paid their 2010 dues and what they owe from 2008 and 2009, the association would raise 
$671,975 pesos. 
FA-4 faced a very similar situation, with only 32% of its funds coming from membership 
dues (in theory, without considering non-payment), and 23% of communities noting a problem 
of financial insufficiency as a result of unpaid membership quotas, the third-ranked problem in 
the FA. A government official complained that FA-4 communities thought that the only available 
sources of funds for the FA were the government programs (CONAFOR) and the membership 
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quotas, despite presentations by CONAFOR officials about numerous other sources of funds. 
Lack of funds has not prevented the organization from investing in important projects in recent 
years, but it has limited its possibilities.  
 In FA-2, lack of sufficient resources was also mentioned (by 42% of communities) as the 
second highest weaknesses. The main concern among communities was the inadequate number 
of personnel in the forestry services. Another issue is the small size of the forestry service fee 
(half of what FA-3 charges) when compared to the operating costs of the service, leading the 
association to operate with net losses in some years when special investments are made (e.g. 
replacement of vehicles). However, in stark contrast to the case of FA-1 and FA-4, the 
association’s forestry services has generated a sustained and substantial source of income that 
makes it almost completely independent (financially) from the government –in 2010 only 28% of 
its funds came from federal government programs, while 66% came from member contributions 
(membership quotas and forestry service fees). In 2011 the distribution was 7% and 74% 
respectively. Here and in FA-3, the forestry service fee has also helped avoid the problem of 
membership payments because quotas are charged bundled with the forestry services fees. 
Because the forestry services are required to obtain a timber extraction permit and to channel 
CONAFOR resources, communities have a much stronger incentive to pay their dues. This 
tendency was further reinforced by the fact that neither FA-2 nor FA-3 have any problems with 
member commitment; in fact, in FA-2, mindful of the problems of financial insufficiency, they 
recently approved an increase in the forestry services fee. This is not to say that the association is 
completely independent of government funds; government support was mentioned as key for the 
development and success of the FA –for instance, the support from the state and municipal 
governments in the paving of the region’s main road and in bringing electricity, two of the 
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association’s main achievements. Federal government support was also key for the construction 
of the tree nursery and the beginning of its operations to develop their forestry services, which in 
turn provided financial autonomy. And in 2011, the association received a $1,000,000 pesos 
federal grant to renovate and expand its tree nursery. 
FA-3 is by far the strongest organization financially. Its physical and human capitals are 
vast, and the organization is highly successful at obtaining funds. No community mentioned lack 
of sufficient resources as a weakness of the association. As with FA-2, the organization’s 
financial autonomy is based on its forestry services. Service fees represent approximately 84% of 
all of the FA’s income. As already discussed, several members and external observers argued 
that this self-sustainment from membership quotas was one of the main reasons for the 
association’s success. According to an ex-member of the governing board, this ‘economic 
strength’ was also tied to the ‘political strength’ of the organization:  
“The FA is strong economically, but also politically. That’s why we’ve been able to reach 
the positions we have. But if we were not strong in [our] organization and administration, 
we would not have political strength. The two go hand in hand. That’s why we are 
screwing the other FAs. We get the most [government] resources in the entire state.  This is 
something we know but we don’t say openly.” (interview, 10-05-2011) 
  
This financial health could itself be considered a measure of success (see Madrigal et al., 
2011). Paradoxically, the main problem mentioned in FA-3 was the costs of the forestry services 
(mentioned by 55% of communities), which were the highest in Durango (and some say the 
country) and are increased annually. There were also criticisms about the practice of taking 20% 
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of the money from the government programs as a transaction fee. Many, including the FA 
leaders, argue these costs are necessary and proportional to the services offered.  
 
5.4.5. Institutions and governance  
 Table 5.5 summarizes the results on this variable. Regarding meetings and participation, 
the findings appear to be opposite to the expected relations: the most participative association, 
FA-1, is the least successful, while the least democratic, FA-3, is the most successful. FA-1 has 
monthly meetings, which is the norm at the community-level as well.119 In contrast, the other 
three associations have one meeting per year. FA-4 is supposed to have 3 yearly meetings but it 
only has had one or less meetings per year for the past four years. The complaints about lack of 
information in the organization (its second-ranked weakness) –which, as discussed below, affects 
social capital– have much to do with this. In FA-2, one fourth of members complained about too 
few meetings and the limits this imposed on information-sharing. FA-3 also has one meeting per 
year, in compliance with the minimum required in their bylaws, but members did not complain 
about this, perhaps because it has been a longstanding norm or because they do not feel 
ownership of the organization. There were some complaints, however, about the limited space of 
participation in the meetings. The first president of the FA argued that “they only meet to raise 
the price [of the forestry services]” (interview, 06-11-2010). He explained that one of the 
founding principles of the Union was that all the members had to approve the forester’s 
activities, yet in practice these activities were never up for discussion. Rather, a prepared annual 
work plan was presented each year and people simply voted for it or against it, without 
opportunities for modification.  
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 According to the agrarian law, Mexican ejidos need to have monthly meetings. Most follow this rule, though 
others have adopted internal institutions to have less-frequent meetings. Still, the fact that the institution is widely 
adopted at the community level implies it enjoys much legitimacy. 
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Table 5.5. Institutions and governance in four FAs 
FA Meetings Participation Voting rights Transparency Enforcement 
FA-1 1/month Open  Equal  Moderate Very low 
FA-2 1/year* Open Equal Moderate Moderate 
FA-3 1/year Limited Unequal** Moderate High 
FA-4 1/year* Open Equal  Moderate Low 
* In violation of the bylaws 
** Based on the quota each member pays, in turn determined by timber volume 
  
 FA-3 also has two institutions concerning participation which separate them from the other 
three FAs. First, it includes a timber corporation among its members, a highly unusual 
arrangement. While this has some negative implications (see Chapter 4), it is also a way to share 
leadership with the timber entrepreneur, a very influential stakeholder in the state. Second, FA-3 
has a ‘proportional’ shareholder system, similar to those of private corporations. The region’s 
largest community and the timber corporation control over 50% of the votes. This system could 
be behind the association’s stability, but it also has very negative implications for democratic 
governance. 
 Transparency and accountability showed only partial consistency with the theoretical 
expectations. All four associations had regularized reports about finances and activities, yet FA-2 
and FA-3 had more professional and independent financial reports generated by certified 
accountants. In FA-2, members openly challenged leaders’ reports during meetings. The main 
limitation was that members did not receive copies of the accountant’s report, so there was no 
opportunity to closely analyze it. In FA-4, members complained that during the 4 years of the 
previous president there was no information provided on how the money from government 
programs was being spent. In FA-3, there were three separate and quite detailed reports: by the 
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forestry services director, the union’s president, and the accountant. Members received copies of 
the reports during the meeting. Yet the Oversight Council has failed to present an annual report 
analyzing the “veracity, sufficiency and reasonableness” of these reports, as required by the 
bylaws. Transparency is also limited by the fact that the secretary and the oversight council 
president are uncles of the FA president and forester, respectively. Furthermore, there was a 
constant unease with and lack of clarity about how the forestry service and road committee fees 
were being used, and how planned activities were being carried out.120  
 Enforcement of rules coincides strongly with expected outcomes. The problem was most 
severe in FA-1 and FA-4, particularly concerning non-payment of membership dues. As the FA-
1 forester stated when asked about what had transpired in a meeting: “as always, making 
agreements they can’t carry out”. (interview, 01-25-2011) This free riding and the lack of 
enforcement led some of the most active members to resent the others and in some cases to 
eventually stop paying their dues. In FA-4, the situation was strikingly similar. In a meeting in 
2010, some members complained that although all members had agreed to pay, in the past some 
had not fulfilled those agreements. Then, when a member asked what they would do if this time 
members did not pay, the president responded: “Well, what will we do, throw them out of the 
association? For what purpose? What will we do, go with a judicial order?” (participant 
observation, 9-Oct-2010) This response reflects the impotency felt by the forester, and the 
paradox these associations face in enforcing their rules –sometimes their only option is ejecting 
members, which would probably aggravate their financial woes. The implications for financial 
stability were clear: “we cannot get through with [the contributions of] only the ones which pay 
100%.” An additional problem in FA-1 has been the absence of sanctions for corruption and 
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 For instance, severla member communities complained about having made financial contributions for a project to 
connect them to the electricity grid which was never done.  
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mismanagement, which have fueled the recurrence of these practices as well as internal divisions 
and elite capture (see Chapter 4).  
 
5.4.6. Social capital 
Table 5.6 shows the results concerning social capital, which strongly match the 
theoretically-derived expectations. In fact, this variable surfaces as another key condition for 
success. 
 
Table 5.6. Social capital in the four associations 
Association Unity/Cohesion Financial commitment Participation 
 Strength Weakness Strength Weakness Strength Weakness 
FA-1 14% 60% 0% 40% 0% 27% 
FA-2 58% 33% 0% 0% 0% 25% 
FA-3 55% 0% 0%** 0% 0% 0% 
FA-4 20% 0%* 0% 46% 0% 8% 
* Forester, president and one community mentioned the exit of almost half of the members in 2007 as a result of the 
formation of a parallel FA by another forester. 
** This was mentioned by the FA leadership and external observers as a strength and key factor of success. 
 
FA-1 had very low levels of social capital and the lowest among the four FAs, having the 
worst ratings of all four FAs in unity and participation, and the second-worst in financial 
commitment. The organization has had strong and recurrent internal conflicts, with some 
members leaving the organization at two different times (they eventually re-joined). Lack of 
internal cohesion was identified as the organization’s main problem. A community leader, for 
instance, said that currently “each [community] scratches himself with his own nails” (interview, 
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07-09-2010) and another said that “each pulls to his own side” (interview, 04-27-2010). As 
discussed in Chapter 4, conflicts in FA-1 became stronger in the recent internal elections, which 
‘politicized’ internal governance. Some large-and-wealthy communities also perceived that they 
could obtain on their own many of the benefits provided by the association, pointing to the 
relation between social capital and group heterogeneity. The municipality where communities 
are located was also an issue. Most of the communities come from one municipality which 
historically was the center of the region’s struggles. However, a few come from two 
municipalities which have not historically been part of the network. These are all associated to 
the ‘small-and-poor’ group, and many of them became members after the PROFAS-induced 
changes.  
Partly as result of these conflicts, FA-1 has seen its membership dues and participation in 
assemblies dwindle. At a March 2010 assembly, FA leaders estimated that only about 1/3 of the 
membership was current with their dues (participant observation, 03-03-2010). This in turn has 
affected the organization’s ability to invest in regional projects, as well as the leaders’ resource 
channeling activities. A community leader expressed that the problem was lack of responsibility: 
“[the problem] isn’t that there is not [money], it is that we don’t want to [pay].” (participant 
observation, FA-1 monthly meeting, 3-March-2010) Another community leader said that “in the 
communities we don’t want to enter into anything [any project], we just want repartos 
[distribution of economic dividends].” (FA-1 monthly meeting, participant observation 7-April-
2010)121  
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 The problem, which seems to have grown over the years, is not completely new: a 2006 study of the region found 
a very similar situation (Hernández Díaz, 2006: 26). 
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Lack of member participation was also a recurrent issue. Only one of the six assemblies I 
attended had the required quorum of total members.122 All of those meetings were held 
regardless of quorum. On average, total member participation was 39% during the period 
observed. The association’s forester estimated that approximately twelve communities never or 
rarely came to meetings. In contrast, the participation of small private landowners was never 
higher than 39% and averaged 21% (7 out of 33 such landowners) in the same period. The 
communities and private landowners that rarely participated were those integrated forcefully into 
the association after the PROFAS program, highlighting the problems of social capital created by 
this program. 
FA-4, despite not having any strong internal conflicts or corruption issues, has also faced 
substantial and recurrent problems of member commitment (participation and financial 
contributions). Almost half its members (46%) mentioned the financial commitment problem, 
the highest proportion in the sample. In October of 2010, 72% of the total amount from 
membership dues remained unpaid; morose members commited publicy to paying but most did 
not. Several interviewees noted the disparities of this problem, with some communities 
consistently contributing while others did not. According to an ex-member of the FA governing 
board, this problem has existed from the beginning. However, others argued that it has worsened 
in the last few years, which they blame on the lack of information and lack of FA leadership 
presence. As a community leader stated: “This governing board does not motivate me to 
contribute… I’d rather steal the money myself than have them steal it.” (interview, 12-15-2010) 
This problem also affected investments in projects. For instance, a community was offered 
FA-4’s road improvement machinery but they did not want to invest the required $200 pesos 
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 In half of those meetings, there was a majority of the member communities. Average community participation in 
the six meetings was 53% (21 out of 40 communities). 
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(approx. $18 USD) per person to cover the costs of gasoline and operator. Instead, they decided 
to wait for the municipality to fix the road, despite their own heavy criticism of the 
municipality’s actions in this regard. The majority of members in that community agreed that the 
current FA president was doing a good job, but that the problem was the community’s 
unwillingness to directly cover costs. Similarly, a recent capacity-building course organized by 
the FA-4 president with CONAFOR funding had very low attendance levels and another had to 
be cancelled for lack of sufficient registration. The president was so disheartened that he stated 
he would not organize other activities for the association. 
Lack of member contributions is also strongly related to the problem of trust and 
reciprocity, which in turn is intimately tied to histories of governance peppered with cases of 
mismanagement or failure of projects at the community and inter-community levels, and of 
politicking by leaders and external actors. Yet the problem of member contributions also has to 
do heterogeneities between the small-and-poor communities and the large-and-wealthy ones 
(especially in FA-1); and communities’ lack of financial solvency, spurred by economic 
downturns and by internal divisions. When asked why they were not willing to invest in road 
improvements, the FA-4 community explained that they didn’t trust those initiatives because for 
a long time they had paid a road maintenance fee to a regional “road committee” which never 
fixed their road; and when they did, they used poor-quality material that did not last. However, 
they also said that internal divisions prevented the community from reaching an agreement –
some wanted a part of the road to be fixed, while others wanted another. Furthermore, their lack 
of savings from profits of forestry or other activities (mining in this case) implies that they have 
little ability to invest in regional projects.  
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In FA-1, the governing board similarly blamed the lack of trust on financial 
mismanagement from the previous administration, and a failure from the community leaders to 
properly inform their community members about the programs. The forester of one of the large-
and-wealthy communities in the region said that the community “remembers this well, and so 
when they ask the community to contribute there is a lot of mistrust.” (interview 06-22-2010) 
Communities’ unwillingness to contribute is also related to historical patterns of community 
governance. As a forester with many years of experience in the region explained, for a long time 
the comisariados accustomed their communities to very large utilities from their timber 
enterprises and no savings for investments;123 the comisariado giving the largest utilities was 
considered the best (interview 08-04-2010). 
As predicted by theory, social capital was highest in the two most successful associations, 
FA-2 and FA-3. Neither have had significant internal disputes or traumatic experiences with 
mismanagement of funds or project failures. Both had the highest percentages of communities 
identifying unity as a strength (55% in FA-3 and 58% in FA-2). There was a recognition that 
being organized creates social capital which facilitates collective action, resources, and projects. 
As a community leader in FA-2 expressed: “[being] organized it’s is a big advantage, because 
that way things get done. If we were not in the FA we wouldn’t, each community would be on its 
own, but with the FA we do it together and the president leads.” (interview, 08-10-2010) FA-2 
did face some challenges, but they never were as strong as in FA-1. There were some tensions 
related to political use of the organization. Heterogeneity was also an issue; here it was not of 
size and wealth, but of the main economic activity (forestry vs. agricultural). Member 
contributions were not mentioned as strength, but neither as an important weakness (except in 
                                                           
123
 In stark contrast, in successful communities like San Juan Nuevo in Michoacan the profits are all saved and 
reinvested back into the community enterprises, basic services, etc. See Bofill Poch (2005) 
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one interview with the FA forester). In 2010, only two members were delayed in payments; one 
of them owed money since 2006 but by 2011 the debt had been almost fully paid. Moreover, in 
contrast to FA-4, when a community leader asked if the debt would be repaid, the president 
responded with much more determination: “We have to recover it, we have no choice.” 
(participant observation, FA-2 meeting, 09-02-2010) The ability of FA-2 and FA-3 to avoid the 
problem of membership payments is not only due to strong commitment –as discussed above, it 
is also facilitated by charging membership quotas as part of the forestry services. In contrast, in 
FA-4 the ex-president complained that part of the problem was that the communities’ forester 
was in charge of collecting the association’s membership dues, butg he only cared about the 
service fees he charged to communities. 
In FA-3, almost everyone emphasized the members’ willingness to contribute financially 
as one of the organization’s strengths and a key element of its success. Lack of member 
contributions was never mentioned as a problem. Moreover, every year members agree to raise 
the quota for forestry services and membership by $1 peso per m3, in stark contrast to the other 
three associations.124 The association was also the only one which went beyond the minimum 
investment that was required for certain programs. The FA’s forestry services director explained: 
“…the owners of the Union, the members of the Union, from its formation to this date, they are 
willing to contribute… That is to say, the norm is to…propose. ‘Help me do this [project], don’t 
do it for me. Let’s do the road, let’s do the electrification, let’s plant trees, let’s produce them.” 
(interview, 06-26-2012; emphasis added) FA-3, he explained, is the only one where communities 
proposed to contribute 10% of the costs of all project applications, even those that don’t formally 
require any financial contributions by the applicant. In other words, the community asks for the 
                                                           
124
 This is not entirely a ‘voluntary’ act. It is also embedded in power relations and institutions that facilitate the 
imposition of this raise by the forester in alliance with the association’s leaders (see chapter 5), but it is nevertheless 
a fact that members are more willing to cooperate.  
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government’s contribution, but “they never ask for everything….” (ibid). This motivates the 
government to approve those projects. He gave as example that year’s environmental 
compensation projects, where FA-3 received the highest amount of funding of any region in 
Durango, and was the only FA to have all its project applications approved. This “solidarity in 
participation”, as an external observer called it, is also reflected in the coordination between 
members, especially regarding combat of forest fires. FA-3 has also been remarkably steady and 
cohesive, with no significant internal conflicts and with only one member community exiting the 
organization in its 20 years of existence.  
  
5.4.7. Confounding factors: Context  
As shown in Chap. 2, federal forest and agrarian policies have played an important role in 
the emergence and evolution of FAs. These policies have also influenced their success both 
directly and indirectly. Directly, in recent years both FA-1 and FA-4 had to face many challenges 
created by the PROFAS program; in the first it spurred strong internal conflicts, and in the 
second to the exit of half its members and a consequent reduction in the financial capacity of the 
organization.  
Indirectly, until a few years ago, government programs required little or no investment 
from communities, which created a culture of dependency. Coupled with the incentives faced by 
comisariados to spread as much wealth as possible, this created a ‘culture of reparto’ in which 
communities invested few or no resources. In public meetings I attended, CONAFOR officials 
constantly ‘reminded’ communities that things ‘were not like before’, since now government 
programs required communities to contribute part of the costs. Meanwhile, communities’ ability 
to contribute to the associations has been affected by the recent economic crisis which has 
311 
 
significantly affected the forestry sector and undermined community finances, which in turn has 
diminished communities’ ability to pay their membership dues and to invest in large projects. 
Timber prices have been reduced or have remained constant over time, while operational costs 
have increased substantially. The current timber market is, in lay terms, a ‘buyers market’. As a 
forester expressed in a community meeting: “we are past the glory days when we would meet in 
the Union every year to increase the timber prices based on the increase in the gasoline price.” 
(interview, 06-22-2012) Now there is a ‘race to the bottom’, where communities lower their 
timber prices in order to find a buyer quicker; things like price lists and joint commercialization, 
the raison d’être of associations like FA-1, have become somewhat impossible tasks.  
At the same time, participants’ oral histories converged on the idea that in recent decades 
FAs have increasingly lost political power, particularly their ability to influence decision-making 
and resource channeling. As analyzed by others (e.g. Hamilton, 2011), the peasant sector steadily 
lost power as the PRI turned more conservative and became increasingly closer to the business 
sector, a process only magnified by the victories of the conservative PAN in federal elections. At 
the same time, the ability of the PRI governments to channel funds to peasants –and 
consequently the ability of peasant organizations and FAs to channel resources– steadily 
diminished after the 1980s’ economic crisis. The result was clearly stated by a longtime CNC 
operative and now state official working on rural issues: 
“It’s not like before when the Unions said ‘we want x number of sawmills, x number of 
kiln driers, x number of trucks’, and they obtained the credit, they went to Mexico [City] 
and interviewed with the Secretary of whatever agency they wished. Now the Unions are 
managers [gestores], but they don’t go beyond that.” (interview, 11-30-2011) 
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 The federal government’s top-down policy scheme also limits FA’s ability to promote 
regional development. This scheme was described by the top CONAFOR official in the 
following way: “The government says ‘I have handcarts, do you want them?’. The community 
says, ‘But I need asadores’, and the government replies, ‘well I only have handcarts, do you 
want them or not?’” (interview, 01-22-2010) This process was also observed in the case of FAs. 
Each year, CONAFOR establishes the programs available to which FAs can apply, many of 
which do not match the priorities in each region. In contrast, at the state level the new secretary 
this year simply asked each FA what their most urgent need was; some asked for a pickup truck, 
others for a fire watchtower or for equipment for their fire combat brigades.  
Finally, as discussed in Chapter 4, the history of strong economic and political intervention 
in peasant organizations by the “state-party” apparatus in Mexico is strongly associated with the 
observed problems of elite capture, the problems of political and financial autonomy, and ‘dark 
leadership’ behavior, as evidenced by the problems of politicization in the associations. Yet these 
contextual challenges did not doom FAs to failure. While they influenced outcomes and 
processes, they did not determine them: although FAs with internal governance problems have 
been made weaker, the cases of FA-2 and FA-3 show that strong organizations can overcome 
these contextual challenges. 
 
5.5. Discussion and Conclusion  
 Table 5.7 summarizes the main findings, based on my own interpretation of the results 
from each table. These confirm most of the hypotheses about the causes of success in FAs. 
Leadership (except in FA-4), financial autonomy, and social capital had the expected values. 
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Political autonomy and institutions showed a less conclusive relationship, except for monitoring 
and enforcement. And origins and previous experience did not have the expected effect.  
 
Table 5.7. Summary of results 
FA Origin Previous 
exp. 
Leadership Political 
Autonom. 
Financial 
Autonom. 
Social 
capit. 
M&E 
Institutns 
Success 
FA
-
1 BU  Yes Weak Weak Weak  Weak  Weak Low 
FA
-
2 BU Yes Strong Moderate Moderate Strong Strong Moderate 
FA
-
3 TD  Yes Strong Moderate Strong Strong Strong High 
FA
-
4 TD  Yes Strong Moderate Weak  Weak Moderate Low 
 
 There were some surprising findings. Regarding the history of collective action, a 
counterintuitive finding is that the organization with the most collective action experience, FA-1, 
is currently the least successful. However, it is telling that all in four associations member 
communities had previous histories of working together before forming them; these previous 
histories were not always bottom-up –they also involved top-down efforts-- but the presence of 
this variable suggests it is a precondition for at least the sustainment of collective action.  
 Another surprising finding is that the reduced political autonomy in all four cases (by 
association to one political party) is not necessarily negative for success. It may even be an asset 
in Durango because of the political context (see Chapter 4). What is clear, however, is that 
political machinations generate strong internal conflicts when they interfere overtly and through 
subversion of exiting institutions, as happened in FA-1. Thus, the variable needs to be analyzed 
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in context –in some places it will be more relevant than others. Another related and puzzling 
finding is the apparent lack of relationship between the problems of elite capture and the 
associations’ success. FA-1 is the least successful and the one with the strongest problems of 
capture, but FA-3 also has substantial problems of capture and yet is the most successful, while 
FA-4 does not have many problems with elite capture yet its success is also low. 
 Confirming previous work, financial autonomy (including financial sufficiency), social 
capital and leadership emerge as crucial conditions for success. The two most successful 
organizations were the ones with the most financial stability, made possible by having their own 
forestry services. And the organization with the weakest leadership was also the least successful, 
while the two most successful had strong leaders. Effort, experience and knowledge, and good 
relations to external actors were identified as key positive leadership attributes. In FA-2, for 
instance, the strong leadership could help explain why despite not having the most financial and 
human resources (especially compared to FA-3), this association still comes out as successful. IIt 
is an example of how “resourcefulness” –the ability of leaders to do more with less– can help 
overcome scarcity (Ganz, 2000). FA-4 leader could be seen as an outlier; despite his positive 
evaluations, his domineering attitude, political machinations and lack of shared leadership 
seemed to overcome the positive attributes.  
 Multiple and shared leadership emerge as another decisive component of leadership in 
these multi-level/cross-scale governance arrangements. Four types of actors appear as leaders 
sharing authority and entrepreneurship with FA presidents: foresters, elected government 
officials (sometimes ex-members of the organization), timber entrepreneurs, and community 
leaders. These are the “champions” that help advance the cause of the FAs, and which mobilize 
collective action at the regional level. The two most successful FAs (FA-2 and FA-3) have 
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foresters integrated into their governance structure. Moreover, FA-3 has a very large and capable 
technical staff.125 In FA-4, the forester was crucial for the development of the organization and 
its most identifiable achievements (fire watchtowers, road improvement infrastructure). Both 
FA-3 and FA-2 also had timber entrepreneurs who supported them with their capital and their 
connections. Multiple and shared leadership also takes place between FAs and their member 
communities. As stated by a community leader in FA-4: “the will of the comisariado counts a 
lot, because if the comisariado doesn’t do it then the people in the assembly stay happy [they are 
indifferent].” The community leaders, however, cannot convince community members on their 
own, because as many explained, ‘no one is a prophet in his own land’; in other words, the 
presence of FA leaders in conjunction with community leaders’ activism are necessary to 
generate the collective action at the local level that sustains the FAs. 
One final finding of much relevance to our understanding of the success of cross-scale 
CPR governance concerns the interactions between variables. Leadership, autonomy and social 
capital are intricately connected. Political use by leaders diminishes the organizations’ 
autonomy, which in turn generates tensions within the organizations, reducing social capital and 
eventually leading to reduced member participation and financial contributions, which affect 
financial autonomy. These connections are nicely summed up by this statement from a 
community leader explaining the political meddling and the ensuing internal conflict within his 
association: “if there is no representation [legitimacy] there is no contribution [payment of dues, 
cooperation].” (interview, 10-12-2011)  
The history of collective action and social capital are also connected: community trust in 
leaders and between members was highly influenced by experiences with past leaders. Social 
capital, in turn, can affect political autonomy. In FA-1, internal divisions facilitated 
                                                           
125
 On the importance of staff for networks, see Agranoff (2006). 
316 
 
CONAFOR’s intromission, similar to the case discussed by Balooni et al. (2010). In FA-2 and 
FA-3, in contrast, the organizations’ strong initial position allowed them to better negotiate the 
terms of their engagement with the agency, leading to much more adaptive solutions: the 
creation of a parallel organization in FA-2, and, in the case of FA-3, the incorporation into 
PROFAS without changing their bylaws or adding new members. Consistent with previous work 
(e.g. Toor and Ogunlana, 2009), financial sufficiency and leadership performance are closely 
connected in the four cases.  
Finally, success itself (and perceptions about it) interacts with many of the independent 
variables. Most importantly, it motivates member communities to contribute, leading to more 
financial stability, which in turn facilitates the leaders’ work. In FA-1 and FA-4, several 
community leaders questioned why they should invest in the association if they saw no benefits. 
Success, in turn, is filtered by subjective interpretations that are highly dependent on information 
being shared, on considerations such as the equity of benefits, and on strategic calculations by 
some actors seeking to legitimize or delegitimize leaders. 
In conclusion, this chapter has shown the importance of a set of causal combinations of 
variables to understand success in polycentric CPR systems. It highlighted the importance of 
leadership, social capital, autonomy, and institutions, as well as the interactions between them 
and with the context in which they operate. Policy-makers should pay attention to these 
interactions when designing policies. Helping FAs to develop income-generating activities and 
diversify their funds so as to strengthen their financial autonomy should be a priority. Ultimately, 
however, members will have to be convinced through action (benefits) as well as words 
(information and negotiation) and, in those cases where it has been destroyed, trust and 
reciprocity will have to be rebuilt through good financial management and leadership. 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSIONS: TOWARDS SUSTAINABLE AND DEMOCRATIC CROSS-SCALE 
GOVERNANCE 
 
6.1. Introduction 
The main goal of this dissertation was to provide a better understanding of cross-
scale/multi-level/networked/polycentric governance by analyzing the constitution and evolution, 
internal governance, and impacts of FAs in Durango, Mexico. This goal was pursued with four 
key questions, and four related hypotheses: 
• Q1: What factors lead to the formation of FAs?  
o H1: FAs emerge as a combined result of grassroots initiatives in response to both macro 
and micro-level pressures: need to solve collective problems; previous collective 
experience, leadership, external support, and openings in political-economic conditions.  
• Q2: How do these networks contribute to community forestry?  
o H2: FAs provide three types of benefits to members– political empowerment, 
socioeconomic development, and improvements in forest conditions.  
• Q3: How do top-down FAs differ from bottom-up/grassroots ones in their services and 
benefits?  
o H3: Bottom-up and top-down FAs will have significant differences in their services and 
benefits, and in their capture by elites. 
 H3a: Bottom-up FAs will have more socio-economic and political benefits, and 
less elite capture 
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 H3b: Top-down FAs will have more benefits in forest conditions, and more elite 
capture 
•  Q4: How do these differences affect FAs’ effectiveness in positively influencing community 
forestry?  
o H4: The most effective FAs will be those with grassroots origins and previous collective 
action experience, and with stronger leadership, financial and political autonomy, 
institutions, and social capital.  
 
 Each of the chapters addressed one or more of these questions/hypotheses. Chapter 2 
explored the factors leading to FAs’ emergence and evolution. Chapter 3 focused on the impacts 
that bottom-up and top-down of FAs have on socio-economic, political and ecological aspects of 
community forestry. Finally, Chapters 4 and 5 analyzed the relationship between internal 
characteristics of these cross-scale/multi-level arrangements and different outcomes. Chapters 4 
focused on how internal institutions and power relations affected the process of “elite capture”, 
while Chapter 5 auscultated how origins and previous experience, institutions, leadership, social 
capital and autonomy influence FAs’ effectiveness. In the next section, I discuss the main 
findings in terms of the four hypotheses posited in the beginning then discuss (in Sect. 6.3.) the 
empirical themes that each of the questions ties into, and their theoretical relevance. 
 
6.2. Back to the findings and the hypotheses 
What were the main findings on each of the four questions posited, and how do they prove 
or disprove the related hypotheses? Overall, I argue that for all four hypotheses, we can provide a 
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qualified “yes” to their confirmation, but that there are important complexities in these answers 
which highlight partial rejections of our expectations as well as future areas of study.  
 
6.2.1. Q1/H1: Emergence and evolution of FAs 
 The results showed that FAs were recurrently formed or modified in response to a 
combination of macro-level and micro-level forces. On the one hand, new national laws and 
programs and changes in other macro-level conditions such as Mexico’s democratic opening and 
economic downturns created openings or constraints on the formation of linkages. For instance, 
the democratic opening in the 1980s, coupled with the support of progressive bureaucrats within 
the government and the economic downturn that weakened large timber corporations, facilitated 
the emergence of the first forestry-based social movements and eventually to the formation of 
production-oriented FAs. The centrality of the ‘state’ –the collection of government agencies, 
actors and institutions– was a somewhat unexpected finding, particularly when drawing on 
theories which emphasize the emergence of institutions and collective action as a result of a 
grassroots, autonomous efforts. In the case of Mexico, all cross-scale collective action efforts –
bottom-up and top-down– emerged within an authoritarian context that strongly constrained their 
possibilities for action.  
 At the same time, previous histories of collective action were important conditioning 
factors. For instance, communities’ collective experiences with the concession system and the 
ensuing social movements in the 1960s and 1970s paved the way for some of the first FAs. Other 
FAs emerged after previous failed government efforts aimed at creating regional initiatives. Yet 
other historical processes were important as well, highlighting the relevance of path dependence 
as an explanatory factor. Clientelism and corporatism in particular have shown strong resilience 
328 
 
to the democratic opening in Mexico, and these factors continue to influence cross-scale 
governance. Finally, from the micro-level, local and regional leaders were often key in forming 
the organizations, as well as in their demise. However, it is important to recognize that these 
leaders did not always operate for the benefit of the associations, but rather for their own 
political-economic gain and/or as corporatist agents of the central government. 
 
6.2.2. Q2/H2: Impacts of FAs 
 The historical analysis in Chapter 2 highlighted that FAs have been crucial in the historical 
development of community forestry in Mexico. More importantly, Chapter 3 demonstrated that 
inter-community associations provide services that help deal with ecological, economic and 
political issues across scales. The most important perceived benefits were related to resource 
channeling activities, in which associations help communities to apply to and obtain funds from 
different government programs. Resource channeling in forestry had the most mentions, 
followed by agriculture and basic infrastructure. Investments in collective goods, forestry 
services and political unity where also mentioned as important (perceived) benefits. Political 
representation and information were the least important, though still relevant.  
 While the ecological impacts do not appear to be as strong as expected, they are still 
present. On one hand, indirectly resource channeling is a crucial part of sustainable forest 
management, because government programs are by far the main (and often the only) source of 
financing for forest management activities; without these, most communities would not carry 
many activcities like reforestation and soil conservation. On the other hand, two of the FAs (FA-
2 and FA-3) did play a very important role in helping communities deal with forest fires, which 
is one of the main causes of forest degradation in Durango. Moreover, FA-2 and FA-3 helped 
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communities with producing good-quality and low-cost seedlings for their reforestation 
activities; while reforestation has been much criticized as ineffective in other parts of Mexico, it 
has been quite successful in Durango, with survival rates of approximately 70-75% (see Prieto 
Ruíz and Hernández Díaz, 2007). 
 Despit the evident benefits of FAs, there are several important caveats to these findings. 
First, the importance of the agricultural and basic infrastructure were not expected, especially if 
one departs from the cross-scale linkages literature, which has mostly emphasized ecological 
benefits. This shows that in contexts where forest communities are also agrarian communities, 
multi-purpose rather than exclusively forestry associations can predominate (see Taylor, 2010). 
Second, the test of the hypothesis partly depends on which outcome is used as a measure of 
benefits. If one looks at actual conditions of member communities, the evidence for benefits in 
socio-economic development and forest conditions was at best mixed. This was particularly the 
case for vertical integration, community organization, and deforestation. In short, while 
communities receive resources channeled by FAs, those resources do not translate directly into 
improved local-level outcomes.  Forest fire reduction is the only measure that is associated with 
FAs, and only with two of the four (FA-3 and FA-4, those which have invested in fire 
watchtowers). Comparing with non-member communities –while done here only in a somewhat 
haphazard way– also shows mixed results; in this case, there is evidence that communities 
outside of the FAs are doing as well or better than those in the linkages. One last caveat is that, 
contrary to the assumption in most collective action work, benefits were unequally distributed 
across communities and individuals, a topic discussed in depth in Chapter 4.  
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6.2.3. Q3/H3: Differences between top-down and bottom-up FAs 
 This was perhaps the least-supported hypothesis of all four. Overall, the bottom-up/top-
down categorization was not as relevant as one would expect from the literature. Nonetheless, it 
did have relevance in some aspects concerning benefits and the historical emergence and 
evolution. Chapter 2 showed that in a sample of 41 communities linked to 21 different FAs in 
Durango and Michoacan, there are statistically-significant differences (in correlations) in (1) the 
types of services provided by top-down and bottom-up FAs (bottom-up FAs are more focused on 
political and economic issues, while top-down FAs focus more on ecological aspects); and (2) in 
the historical period in which each type predominates (bottom-up FAs tend to be older).  
 The analysis in Chapter 3 for the four case study FAs partly confirmed Chapter 2’s finding. 
Perceived benefits of FAs varied between bottom-up and top-down services, but only in two 
categories: political representation (where bottom-up FAs had a significantly higher percentage 
of members perceiving benefits) and investments in collective and public goods (where the 
opposite occurred).126 In the other categories, there were no significant differences. Importantly, 
all four FAs had resource channeling in forestry as their main activity. In terms of community-
level conditions, forest fires was the only outcome that had significant differences between the 
top-down and bottom-up FAs, with the former showing a tendency towards decreasing forest 
fires. In the case of forest conditions (measured through reported changes in timber stock), there 
was no discernible pattern, and the most successful FA was a top-down one (FA-3). An 
important caveat in this analysis is that outcomes such as number of forest fires, deforestation 
patterns, and changes in timber stock are influenced by many more external (often macro-level) 
factors. For instance, deforestation is affected by crop prices/demand and changes in national 
                                                           
126
 There were observable differences also in the “resource channeling in agriculture” category but each individual 
FA had quite different values and thus the difference was mostly an effect of averaging across categories.  
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agricultural policies and programs, among others. Forest fires are affected by changes in climate 
(e.g. hotter and drier years), while changes in timber stocks are strongly influence by histories of 
forest (mis)management (especially during the concession period) that almost always pre-date 
the formation of the FAs.  
 Finally, the results from Chapter 4 and 5 regarding the factors affecting the distribution of 
benefits (i.e. elite capture) and success show that the origins of the FAs actually had the inverse 
relation to that expected: the most successful FA (FA-3) and one of the two with the least elite 
capture (FA-4) were both top-down associations. This implies that given certain internal 
characteristics (see below), top-down systems may end up being highly successful.  
 Yet the distinctions between bottom-up and top-down FAs are much more blurry and 
problematic than the categories suggest, and ultimately may not be such a useful 
conceptualization in the context of Mexico. The strong and centralized (though not unitary – see 
Rubin, 2003) state-party that ruled Mexico for seventy years based on a combination of violence 
and clientelist and corporatist cooptation made autonomous organization difficult to maintain. 
Many bottom-up associations thus received strong state support/intervention, and/or became 
coopted in over time. On the other hand, top-down associations often also had grassroots 
community involvement together with the top-down leadership, and sometimes had previous 
histories of autonomous collective action. Moreover, top-down FAs also need to respond to 
social demands in poor rural regions in order to remain relevant for the members as well as the 
party.  
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6.2.4. Q4/H4: Factors influencing FAs’ success 
 The dissertation (particularly Chaps. 4 and 5) also showed that FA benefits and their 
distribution are contingent on complex combinations of multiple factors. In other words, cross-
scale/networked/polycentric governance is not a factor or condition for success in and of itself 
(as it is often treated), but rather specific characteristics of those arrangements (origins, network 
leadership, social capital between members of the network, autonomy, etc.) make them more or 
less successful. Specifically, financial autonomy –obtained through the provision of forestry 
services–, leadership, social capital and enforcement of rules appeared as critical conditions for 
the success of these linkages. These characteristics fit nicely with Ostrom’s (1990) design 
principles, suggesting that the principles can be applied to higher-order systems. It also suggests 
that, as polycentricity scholars have emphasized, different production and provision activities 
have to be organized at different levels and forms depending on the characteristics. In this case, 
the technical nature of the forestry services may make top-down systems more effective, though 
this will certainly not always be the case. 
 Three variables contradicted the theoretical expectations represented by Hypothesis 4: the 
origins (bottom-up or top-down), already discussed above; previous experience; and political 
autonomy. Previous experience and political autonomy did not seem as relevant for success as 
expected. All four associations had their political autonomy somewhat compromised, which is 
explained by the macro-level political-economic context. Regarding previous experience, it is 
telling that the association with the most experience (FA-1) was the least successful. Still, the 
fact that it was present in all four associations implies that it is a necessary (though insufficient) 
condition. This is especially true for the sustainment of collective action over time, which was 
Ostrom’s (1990) measure of success.  
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6.3. Empirical themes and theoretical implications 
6.3.1. Institutional change and path dependence  
 The analysis of the emergence and evolution of cross-scale linkages has important 
implications for the study of institutional change. In recent years, there has been a resurgence of 
scholarship on this topic (Fréchette and Lewis, 2011; Kashwan, 2011; Mahoney and Thelen, 
2010; Ostrom and Basurto, 2011). 
 Analysis of institutional design and change from a rational choice perspective is based on 
actors’ internal cost-benefit calculation of alternative institutional choices (e.g. Ostrom and 
Basurto, 2011). The result is an explanation of the emergence of institutions as a functionalist 
response to a collective problem (e.g. Heikkila et al., 2011 for an application to CPRs). Yet what 
affects these cost-benefit calculations, and their subjective interpretations, is a key unanswered 
question. To understand this, one needs to pay attention to several other factors. Among those, 
two emerge as very important in this dissertation. One is political opportunities, which in turn are 
determined by power relations and institutions at micro, meso and macro levels.  As Fréchette 
and Lewis (2011) have argued, institutional change in forestry (and, we would add, in all aspects 
of society) occurs due to multiple micro and macro-level factors and thus requires combining 
multiple theoretical approaches. In this dissertation, I combined the functionalist interpretation 
with focus on macro-level political economic conditions –drawing on the extensive work in 
social movement studies– to better understand how and why cross-scale governance 
arrangements formed (Chapter 2).  
 The other factor –closely related to the political-economic context– is path dependence. 
This is an issue that pervades multiple aspects of the dissertation. The clearest examples are the 
persistence and adaptability of clientelist relations between the PRI and FAs in Durango; of 
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certain types of leaders (foresters, PRI-affiliated peasants) and certain individuals (i.e. the same 
individuals being involved in the organization since their origins); and of certain practices of 
internal governance (FAs as political ladders, use of deception, some degree of corruption and/or 
mismanagement). For instance, the same foresters who administered the government-run forestry 
services in the 1970s and 1980s (UAFs and UCODEFOs) are still the same ones leading many of 
the historical and new FAs. Simply put, there is substantial evidence that a more serious 
consideration of the ‘stickinness’ of institutions and behaviors is needed when analyzing 
institutional problems.  
 Path dependence, however, is not an insurmountable force of nature. After all, much has 
changed in the approximately 60 years of history of FAs in Mexico. In the four FAs analyzed 
here, there have been important moments of institutional change that substantially modified 
systems that had previously appeared to be unchangeable. For instance, in FA-1, communities 
overturned the concession system in the 1960s, while in FA-2, communities exited a top-down 
FA captured by a forester and created their own FA. In both cases, grassroots mobilization was 
crucial to achieve the desired changes. And in all four cases, as well as in others surveyed in 
Chapter 2, associations have shown an impressive ability to modify certain institutions to adapt 
to new government policies or other political-economic changes, as with the PROFAS program. 
This is what Wilshusen (2009) has called a “culture of accommodation”. Given the particular 
conditions of Durango’s political-economy, the results also need to be taken with caution before 
generalizing to other sites in Mexico.  
  
6.3.2. Impacts of cross-scale governance 
 While interest in multi-level/cross-scale/networked governance has been developing for 
over a decade, only recently have scholars begun to actually measure the activities and impacts 
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of these linkages. In doing so, scholars have taken a variety of approaches. Some have analyzed 
how the number and types of connections that a community has with external actors affects 
resource management activities and local development (e.g. Orozco-Quintero and Berkes, 2010). 
Others have analyzed the types of institutions that are developed in these cross-scale 
arrangements and whether they fit Ostrom’s (1990) design principles for sustainable resource 
governance (e.g. Heikkila et al., 2011). Still others have looked at how different forms of 
connections –e.g. whether they are top-down or bottom-up– vary in their robustness to 
disturbances (Schoon, 2008) or in their governance and resource management outcomes (e.g. 
Agrawal and Chhatre, 2006; Behera, 2009; Nayak and Berkes, 2008). Finally, recent papers 
point to the dysfunctionalities and conflicts or “turbulences” involved in these cross-scale 
initiatives (Benjamin et al., 2011; Bray et al., 2012). 
 This dissertation has provided an empirical case of the impacts of cross-
scale/networked/polycentric governance on local CPR systems, underscoring their importance 
currently and historically. Rather than looking at the community as the unit of analysis, as the 
vast majority of previous studies have done, I scaled up to look at the second-level FAs (see 
Figure 1.4, Chapter 1). In addition, this work helps better understand under what conditions the 
positive and negative outcomes can occur.  
 
6.3.3. Power, institutions and unequal benefits: capture and conflict in cross-scale 
arrangements 
The relationship between inequalities and institutions has been a relatively understudied 
topic in CPR research (Andersson and Agrawal, 2011), although it has been central to political 
ecology scholars and those in the so-called “entitlements” tradition looking at power and 
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conflicts in CPRs (Armitage, 2008; Crona and Bodin, 2010; Johnson, 2004; Kaswhan, 2011; 
Pérez-Cirera and Lovett, 2006; Raik et al., 2008; Sikor, 2006; Sikor and Lund, 2009), as well as 
development scholarship looking at elite capture (Platteau, 2004). Chapter 4 contributed to this 
discussion by showing that polycentric, cross-scale governance arrangements can be subject to 
constant capture and conflict in specific setting. In these processes, power plays a central role in 
determining who wins and who loses, or who has access or not to positions of authority and 
decision-making, connections, and resources. The chapter showed the diverse ways in which 
power operates, e.g. agenda-setting and control, institutional manipulation and avoidance, 
threats, information control. Furthermore, we saw a self-reinforcing process in which acquisition 
of these resources/positions/connections in turn facilitate access to more of them. This finding 
rejects simplistic understandings of social capital, and partly confirms Bourdieu’s (1977, in 
Wilshusen, 2009) conception of the term. From this perspective, individuals’ networks often 
serve to reinforce pre-existing power relations and lead to “elite persistence”, because those with 
more social capital also have more access to resources and decision-making.  
This study also went beyond the role of power by explaining why the outcomes of capture 
vary in their forms and degrees. Specifically, the study showed that differences in internal 
institutions were a key factor interacting with power to influence the outcomes. These findings 
contribute to the development of a richer institutional analysis that recognizes power as an 
explicit component of action situations, and ties into the advances made on this topic by other 
institutional scholars (e.g. Bardhan, 2005; Clement, 2010; García-López, 2009; Knight, 1992; 
Mahoney and Thelen, 2010; Moe, 2005; Theesfeld, 2009) on this topic. 
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6.3.4. Conditions for successful cross-scale governance 
 This work has also highlighted the complexity of causal processes generating success. This 
is reflected in several ways. First, I showed different combinations of variables that generate the 
same outcomes. FA-2 and FA-3 have quite different internal governance arrangements yet both 
have been able to be successful in providing benefits to members and promoting sustainable 
forestry. Their financial autonomy was a crucial link, but this did not operate in isolation –it was 
combined with leadership, institutions and social capital. FA-1 and FA-4 are also quite different 
in key ways (origins, internal governance, leadership) but their lack of social capital combined 
with lack of financial and political autonomy have led to failure. 
 There is also complexity in each individual variable, like leadership127 and autonomy. The 
dissertation has advanced our understanding of leadership by contextualizing this key variable, 
highlighting its positive and negative aspects. Leaders are not only elites capturing political and 
economic benefits from the FAs (Chap. 4), but neither are they always enhancers of collective 
action (Chap. 5). They are a bit of both, and to which side they lean depends on personal 
histories and preferences as well as the micro (institutional) and macro (political-economic) 
context in which they operate. Our understanding of this variable is also enriched by showing 
how polycentric governance such as that in FAs requires shared leadership within and across 
multiple levels or scales. The community-FA link is in a way activated by community leaders 
who represent their communities in the association’s monthly meetings. If the association’s 
governing board has good leaders but the individuals representing their communities do not 
possess such leadership (e.g. they play personal interest or politics and don’t report properly back 
to their communities), then the association will have a harder time garnering support (in terms of 
participation and financial contributions). Similarly, leaders within the FA (the secondary level) 
                                                           
127
 On this complexity, see also Kashwan (2011) 
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require the assistance of other leaders such as professionals or experts (e.g. foresters), and 
local/regional businessmen (e.g. timber CEOs) and politicians (e.g. local councilmen from the 
region). Yet the sharing of leadership between experts and elected leaders is not always a 
positive thing, and the outcomes partly depend on power relations as well as institutions and the 
origins of the networks. 
 Regarding autonomy, there is a complex duality between the necessity to build external 
connections and maintain internal legitimacy and representation. The proper balance between 
these two has not yet been studied, and this research has only begun to address this. For instance, 
the study suggests that leaders that are well connected politically can be successful if the 
connections are used to the benefit the organization rather than the individual, and if the external 
actors do not themselves have political or economic interests in the organization. When there is 
clientelism in between, i.e. when the support from external actors is given in exchange of 
something, this not only reduces autonomy but creates perverse incentives within the network to 
utilize the positions for personal gain or to foment partisan politics. This disregards the diversity 
of opinions among members and can generate strong internal conflicts.  
The study also suggests that autonomy needs to be understood as a result of a dialectical 
relationship between communities and central authorities (i.e. government or ‘the state’). The 
central government has a key role to play in autonomy, because as the ultimate guarantor of 
rights, it often retains some control over resources even while recognizing communities’ rights 
over them. The objectives of the government and that of communities can differ substantially 
(Agrawal and Chhatre, 2006), with governments promoting large-scale development projects, 
conservation areas, or exclusive concessions to large companies for resource extraction (e.g. 
mining or timber companies). Furthermore, the government might have as its central interest the 
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political control or extraction of rents from communities and might employ violent force to 
enforce its institutions (e.g. Peluso, 1992). Clientelist and corporatist systems may also be 
prevalent, as have been in Mexico. This generates back and forth tussles between communities, 
inter-community collective action endeavors (i.e., FAs), and government authorities over the 
boundaries of local rights (see Chapter 2), where grassroots mobilization becomes necessary.  
 Thirdly, the study highlighted complexity in the interactions between different variables. 
Institutional origins affect autonomy and trust, especially when top-down efforts are perceived to 
be unfair; trust and autonomy also affect each other. Lack of autonomy can also hinder effective 
leadership, especially when external actors undermine grassroots leaders as pat of their strategies 
of political control. Leadership can enhance autonomy, as in FA-2, but also undermine it, as in 
FA-1. And power interacts with institutions in complex patterns that can change or become 
reinforced over time (Chapter 4).  
 Lastly, complexity surfaces when considering how we define success, because it is a multi-
facedted concept. As others have noted (e.g. Ferguson, 1994; Escobar, 1995; Li, 2007), 
discourses of success and development are problematic because they always hide certain 
‘unpleasant’ elements from the public’s (and policy-maker’s) eyes. In the four FAs analzed, 
inconsistencies arise when trying to define the success of each collective endeavor. For instance, 
while FA-3 appears to be the most successful in terms of resource management and level of 
collective action, it is also the least democratic and has persistent problems of elite capture.  
 
6.3.5. The importance of context 
 The dissertation’s findings also demonstrate how the political-economic and historical 
contexts in which FAs are embedded influence not only the emergence, evolution and survival of 
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cross-scale/polycentric arrangements (Chapter 2), but also their effectiveness in the provision of 
benefits, and the distribution of these benefits (Chapters 4, 5). This makes a relevant contribution 
to CPR studies, which have seldom considered these external factors in their analyses (Agrawal, 
2007; Clement, 2010; Johnson, 2004; Sick, 2008; Taylor, 2001). At the same time, I have 
expanded on this work by highlighting the interactions between the context and the associations’ 
characteristics. This recalls Gidden’s (1984) idea of a dialectical relationship between structure 
and agency (see Wilshusen, 2003). For instance, we have seen that the context is a key variable 
influencing the possibilities for autonomous governance and non-partisan leadership in Durango: 
the PRI’s dominance there has implied that FA leaders are necessarily tied to that party, and this 
in turn generates processes of elite capture and persistence for political purposes within the 
associations. Yet these results are not in an iron casing; they can be molded by other factors such 
as grassroots mobilization, proper institutional design, and financial autonomy.  
 
6.3.6. Two-level collective action dilemmas 
 One final contribution from this study is to our understanding of collective action theory as 
it applies to polycentric systems. In FAs, each member is a group in itself (in this case, 
communities), as opposed to the typical organizations studied in CPR research, composed of 
individuals. In these situations there is a “double” or “two-level” collective action problem which 
recall the “networks of adjacent action situations” described by McGinnis (2011). Collective 
action first takes place at the community level, where the community members, in their general 
assembly, have to take decisions about being part of an FA, about paying their yearly 
membership dues, and about investing in association projects such as a regional sawmill, a fire 
tower or road repair equipment. Then there is a second collective action problem at the 
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association level, where the representatives of each community have to make decisions 
collectively about different matters. This link between the first and second collective action 
process is complicated by several factors, including the fact that representation is never perfect, 
and, as evidenced in the dissertation (especially Chapter 5), the local leaders that formally 
represent their communities in the FAs may not accurately potray their communities’ needs or 
desires, may not adequately inform their communities about the FA, or may not have the 
necessary leadership skills to convince (without misleading) the communities about supporting a 
certain FA project. This implies that sharing of information across levels is not only a potential 
benefit of cross-scale/networked governance, but a necessity for its proper functioning. The 
levels are connected in more complex ways. Processes at the community level can hamper cross-
scale linkages. For instance, a local corruption scandal reduces trust locally, which in turn 
complicates local collective action, but it also reduces trust towards higher-level organizations, 
further hindering the process. Economic hardships can similarly hamper communities’ 
contributions to the network. 
 
6.4. Limitations and Future Research  
 Despite these contributions, it is important to recognize the limitations of this study. The 
small sample size, combined with the complexity of the causal processes studied, means that 
some of the findings are contingent and should be taken as grounds for further exploration. This 
is particularly true when we recognize the importance of context. While I was able to use 
information from a larger-N survey database, that information was limited because it was from a 
different project whose main focus was not FAs. Still, it is important to keep in mind that in 
qualitative analysis, the number of observations is not the same as the number of cases (Brady 
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and Collier, 2004; George and Bennett, 2005; Gerring, 2007). In fact, for each FA I have 
multiple observations over time. More importantly, my interviews are from an even larger 
sample of communities (49). I also have observations from other associations in Durango as well 
as other parts of Mexico, allowing me to draw more generalizable conclusions.   
 Another potential limitation may be site selection. Durango may be considered an atypical 
case because one party (the PRI) has not relinquished power since the 1920s, even after the same 
party lost control of the federal level in 2000. The particularities of Durango imply that the 
findings need to be taken with caution when seeking to extrapolate to other areas, or to make 
generalizations for theory-building purposes. Although there are other Mexican states where the 
PRI has never lost elections (e.g. Veracruz, Coahuila, Mexico), there are still other states which 
show contrasting patterns to that of Durango. For instance, Oaxaca has a long history of 
autonomous grassroots organization.  
 However, the ‘atypical’ nature of Durango can also be considered a strength of this 
dissertation, and one of its main sources of contribution to theory and praxis. If one recognizes 
that Mexico is a very diverse country, then one must ask, what is a typical case? In reality, it is 
very hard to identify one. In fact, as stated in the introduction, most research on Mexican forest 
communities and FAs has been carried out in Oaxaca, and it is from those experiences (and a few 
cases in other states) that most of the theory and hypotheses about these topics have been drawn. 
Oaxaca can be considered as atypical as Durango, or even more so, because of the strong 
indigenous collective identity that is not found on many other states (particularly central and 
northern ones). Thus, several issues underscored in this research present contrasting findings 
with the research to date and analytical perspectives that have been absent from previous work, 
which helps provide a more grounded theory for future work: (1)  even bottom-up FAs can be 
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strongly influenced by macro-level contextual  factors, specially political ones; (2) the strong 
role that clientelist party politics still play in some Mexian rural areas; (3) the use of FAs for 
personal economic and political gains, rather than collective benefits; and (4) the role of foresters 
as more than simply ‘experts’ that support community forestry, but as leaders who can be central 
to regional networking and who can also have a ‘dark’ side.  
 Finally, the fact that my research design did not systematically compare non-FA and FA 
communities means that while I can say a lot about what FAs do, I cannot say how much of a 
statistical impact of FAs in the larger population of communities – i.e. the statistical difference 
between an FA community and a non-FA community. Ultimately, there was a tradeoff between 
gaining in-depth knowledge of FAs internal governance versus gaining comparative knowledge 
about FA and non-FA communities, and I chose the former because of my interest in 
understanding inter-community collective action.  
 Future research should take on the task of building large-N databases of cross-scale 
governance arrangements to look the characteristics that make them successful and to better 
understand the factors that drive their emergence and evolution over time. Comparison across 
states is a necessary next step to evaluate how different political-economic contexts affect the 
emergence and evolution of FAs and their success. This should include states with similar (PRI 
dominance) and dissimilar (other party dominance) contexts. A more systematic comparison 
between FA communities and non-FA communities is also needed to better understand the 
impacts of associations. Another issue that demands further exploration is the role of leadership 
in FAs, particularly: (1) the multiple, competing leaders that are inherent to multi-level/cross-
scale governance; (2) the effects of different leadership styles and roles in various contexts, and 
(3) the emergence of leadership in a given context.  Finally, the role of foresters is a crucial yet 
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understudied aspect that needs more attention in work on cross-scale linkages, as is the role of 
local timber entrepreneurs and larger timber corporations. 
 
6.5. Policy relevance 
 As a final conclusion, I point to several considerations for policy-makers. First, cross-scale 
linkages are necessary for sustainability but to be effective they need to go beyond the purely 
technical or managerial aspects of natural resource management. Sustainability requires cross-
scale linkages, but also requires a holistic perspective dealing not only with ecological but also 
with social (equity), economic (development) and political (empowerment) issues. Integrated 
conservation and development initiatives provide an example of policies aimed at balancing 
these multiple goals. Yet most of these initiatives have focused on the local level. Meanwhile, 
the focus so far in the vast majority of scholarship on cross-scale linkages has come from the 
resilience/social-ecological systems tradition, and consequently the focus has been on how these 
linkages can improve ecosystem management. Integrating both perspectives in policy-making to 
devise integrated conservation-development initiatives across scales seems like a fruitful 
strategy for the future.  
 Second, cross-scale linkages are important but they are not a panacea, and we need to look 
at their internal characteristics. Cross-scale linkages, even externally-created ones, can help local 
communities in multiple social, economic and ecological issues. The idea of some that large 
communities can go at it alone, as has been done by some Mexican forest communities, is at best 
not replicable beyond a few cases, and at worst simply wrong.  However, we cannot assume that 
cross-scale linkages will make things better, as CONAFOR seems to have done when it started 
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the PROFAS program. Creating connections between communities without properly supporting 
their internal governance is doomed to failure.  
 Policymakers would do well to understand the internal characteristics that make these 
arrangements successful before jumping to any conclusions. This dissertation has identified key 
factors that can help policy-makers determine the needs of a cross-scale/multi-level arrangement 
such as an FA. Multiple initiatives should emerge from here. One that could be very effective is 
supporting capacity-building for leaders and other members of FAs, including administration and 
networking and collaborative skills; promoting new institutions that facilitate leadership 
transitions without creating large instabilities in the organizations; developing diverse sources of 
funding; strengthening local institutions for monitoring and enforcement; and facilitating 
increased interactions between FAs at the state and national levels where they can influence 
policies more directly.  
 Programs that contribute to the financial self-sufficiency of FAs by helping spur revenue-
generating activities are also crucial. Currently, most of the CONAFOR programs for FAs have 
been to carry out studies (on topics decided by CONAFOR) or to develop very specific projects 
(again decided by CONAFOR). There is an urgent need to support other initiatives that help FAs 
generate their own funds. One promising alternative is the program known as Local 
Development Agencies (ADLs), through which associations could provide technical advisory 
services not only in forestry but also in agriculture, livestock and overall in regional 
development. Regional eco-tourism initiatives, such as those already being implemented in the 
Creel region of the state of Chihuahua, could also be an important source of revenue. This will 
not be without challenges. As several government officials stated, these kinds of initiatives, 
346 
 
while sorely needed for FAs, go against the economic interests of private foresters, because they 
would represent competition and loss of clients.  
 In relation to this, political and monetary support from the government and non-
governmental sector will be necessary. They will also need technical support to apply to multiple 
project grants in different agencies at state, federal and international levels. This ‘grant writing’ 
expertise is very difficult to find, but essential. Currently, only one association provides that kind 
of support in Durango, and it is extremely expensive. The government should help cover these 
costs. Moreover, in all these programs, it will also be necessary for the government and NGOs to 
go beyond providing money and requesting implementation reports; maintaining a sustained 
engagement with FAs, as has been done in the last few years, is necessary to provide both 
oversight and support. 
 To maximize cost-effectiveness (‘bang for the buck’), policymakers should begin by 
supporting linkages where there is previous collective action experience. All four FAs in this 
study had that previous experience, which suggests that their sustainment of collective action for 
so long is somewhat associated to this factor. The debacle of the PROFAS program in creating 
new organizations from scratch in regions with scant previous collective experience also 
underscores the importance of said experience. In other words, the objective of creating new, 
self-sustaining organizations is dangerously close to a contradiction in terms. This is not to say 
that regions where there is no previous experience should not be intervened. They should be, and 
some could argue that they should even be a priority. But this will require much more intensive 
and sustained initiatives.  
 It is also imperative that the different levels of government abandon the top-down and 
centralized model of policy-making that has predominated to date. The creation of spaces for 
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forest communities and FAs to participate in decision-making bodies like the sustainable rural 
development councils or the state forest committees is a positive step forward, but to date these 
bodies have had a mostly consultative role and their application is still quite limited. 
Furthermore, forest communities are still almost completely excluded from processes of design 
and implementation of federal and state programs. This needs to be modified in order for policies 
to be more relevant to the needs of these communities and their associations. 
 Regarding the role of particular actors in these networked forms of association, the crucial 
role of foresters as leaders, development agents and experts, but also as elites capturing 
resources, suggests that policy-makers need to pay more attention to these actors. In Mexico, 
there is a large institutional framework regulating the profession of foresters, but some of these 
institutions have obviously failed their stated goals. For instance, the effectiveness of the 
CONAFOR programs supporting community forestry is potentially undermined by foresters’ 
control over the decisions of which projects to apply to. The rule that requires community 
approval before foresters apply to any program should be more strongly upheld. Stronger 
oversight is needed. However, this also implies that CONAFOR must give longer time periods 
for the application process –in 2011 they only gave one month for submitting proposals. At the 
same time, some institutions should be modified to remove the perverse incentives that foresters 
have when applying to these programs. For instance, CONAFOR should continue the practice of 
priority areas for reforestation projects to limit foresters’ ability to continue soliciting these 
projects every year for their communities when they’re not needed. Nonetheless, these priority 
areas should be designed with communities’ participation to make sure key projects are not 
removed from priority areas by some bureaucrat in Mexico City. 
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  Meanwhile, the relative isolation of forest communities and FAs in Durango suggests that 
national and international NGOs need to pay more attention to this region. The positive examples 
of NGO interventions in Oaxaca and other states –especially when they act democratically in 
cooperation with (rather than imposition over) communities and FAs– show the potential of this 
sector strengthening cross-scale governance in Durango. For too long, Durango has been ignored 
by NGOs. It is time for them to step up to the challenge.  
 Finally, these reform initiatives from donors, NGOs and policy-makers will require 
complementary bottom-up efforts including grassroots mobilization from peasants, external 
support from social movements and civil society organizations truly committed to grassroots 
development and empowerment, as well as new peasant and government leaders who leave 
behind the old politics of political machinations and the ‘them versus us’ mentality that still 
pervade Mexican rural governance.  
 
  
349 
 
References  
Agrawal, A., and Chhatre, A. (2006). Explaining Success on the Commons: Community Forest 
Governance in the Indian Himalayas. World Development, 34(1), 149-1666. 
 
Andersson and Agrawal, (2011) Inequalities, institutions, and forest commons. Global 
Environmental Change, 21(3), 866-875. 
 
Armitage, D. (2008) Governance and the commons in a multi-level world. International Journal 
of the Commons, 2(1), 7-32. 
 
Bardhan, P. (2005) Institutions matter, but which ones? Economics of Transition, 13(3): 499-
532. 
 
Behera, B. (2009) Explaining the performance of state-community joint forest management in 
India. Ecological Economics, 69(1), 177-185. 
 
Crona, B., and Bodin, Ö. (2010) Power asymmetries in small-scale fisheries: a barrier to 
governance transformability? Ecology and Society, 15(4), 32. [online] URL: 
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol15/iss4/art32/ 
 
Escobar, A. (1995) Encountering Development. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 
 
350 
 
Ferguson, J. (1994) The Anti-politics Machine: Development, Depoliticization, and Bureaucratic 
Power in Lesotho. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.   
 
Fréchette, A., and Lewis, N. (2011) Pushing the boundaries of conventional forest policy 
research: Analysing institutional change at multiple levels. Forest Policy and Economics, 13(7), 
582-589.  
 
García-López, G.A. (2009) Bringing power back in: Inserting power into the Institutional 
Analysis and Development (IAD) framework. Paper presented at the 67th Midwest Political 
Science Association (MPSA) Conference, Chicago, IL.  
 
Heikkila, T., Schlager, E., and Davis, M.W. (2011) The Role of Cross-Scale Institutional 
Linkages in Common Pool Resource Management: Assessing Interstate River Compacts The 
Policy Studies Journal, 39(1), 121-145. 
 
Johnson, C. (2004). Uncommon Ground: The ‘Poverty of History’ in Common Property 
Discourse. Development and Change, 35(3), 407-433. 
 
Knight, J. (1992). Institutions and Social Conflict. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Li, T.M. (2007) The Will to Improve: Governmentality, Development and the Practice of 
Politics. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. 
 
351 
 
Mahoney, J., and Thelen, K.A. (2010). Explaining Institutional Change: Ambiguity, Agency, and 
Power. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press. 
 
Moe, T. M. (2005). Power and political institutions. Perspectives on Politics, 3(02), 215-233. 
 
Nayak, P. K., and Berkes, F. (2008) Politics of co-optation: Community forest management 
versus joint forest management in Orissa, India. Environmental Management, 41(5), 707-718. 
 
Orozco-Quintero, A., and Berkes, F. (2010). Role of linkages and diversity of partnerships in a 
Mexican community-based forest enterprise. Journal of Enterprising Communities, 4(2), 148-
161.  
 
Ostrom, E., and Basurto, X. (2011) Crafting analytical tools to study institutional change. 
Journal of Institutional Economics, 7(3), 317–343. 
 
Pérez-Cirera, V., and Lovett, J. C. (2006). Power distribution, the external environment and 
common property forest governance: A local user groups model. Ecological Economics, 59(3), 
341-352. 
 
Prieto-Ruíz, J.A., and Hernández-Díaz, J.C., Eds. (2007) Estudio Regional Forestal Caso 
UMAFOR 100X. [Regional Forest Study: Case of UMAFOR 100X] Durango, Mexico: 
SAGARPA and INIFAP. 
 
352 
 
Raik, D.B., Wilson, A.R. and Decker, D.J. (2008) Power in natural resources management: An 
application of theory. Society and Natural Resources, 21(8), 729–739. 
 
Schoon, M. (2008) Building Robustness to Disturbance: Governance in Southern African Peace 
Parks. Doctoral dissertation, Indiana University-Bloomington. 
 
Sikor, T. (2006) Analyzing community-based forestry: Local, political and agrarian perspectives. 
Forest Policy and Economics, 8, 339–349.  
 
Sikor, T. and Lund, C. (2009) Access and Property: A Question of Power and Authority. 
Development and Change, 40(1), 1–22. 
  
353 
 
APPENDIX 1. Interview Guides 
 
A1.1 Community Interview Guide (for individual members) 
1. Community  
1.a History  
• Tell me about the history of the community (open-ended) 
• What major events can you recall in this history?  
• How has the situation in this community changed since its founding?  
• Do you think the quality of life has improved? Economic? Social? Political? 
Environmental? 
 
1.b Current- General 
• How would you characterize your community’s conditions today? 
• What are the major challenges that your community faces today? 
• What are the things you think the community needs the most? 
• What are the most positive aspects about your community? 
 
1.c Current – Leadership 
• How would you define a good leader? What characteristics do you think he/she should 
have? 
• Who is/are the current leader(s) of the community? 
• How would you characterize this/these leader(s)? 
• Do you feel that the current leadership is effective? Is it representative? Transparent? 
• If not, why not? 
• Is the leadership rotated? If so, how often? 
• Is the leadership controlled by any specific group, such as a family or people from a 
given political party? 
• Does the community leader(s) have any special connection with the local, state or federal 
government? 
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• Does the organization or its leader(s) have a special connection to an entrepreneur such as 
a timber company owner or a private forester? 
• Does the organization or its leader(s) own any timber-related business? 
• Does the organization or its leader(s) own any private technical forestry services? 
 
1.d Current – Forest Institutions 
• Are there any rules about what can be done in the forest? If so, which? 
• Do you have any rules related to use of forest products? If so, what are the rules? 
If not, why not? If yes, which ones?  
• Are there people assigned to monitoring the compliance with these rules? Are the rules 
enforced?  
• Do you have a management plan for the forest? 
• Are there areas designated as protected areas in the forest?  
• Who designated these areas? The government, the community, the forester,…? 
• Why was it designed as a protected area? 
• Is the community paid to protect that area? 
• Do you have or have you had in the past problems with illegal logging? 
 
2. Inter-Community (ICO) 
2.a ICO History  
• Is your community a member of an ICO (union etc.)?  
• If no: Why not? 
• Has there been any discussion in the community about joining an ICO?  
• Was your community a member of an ICO before but not anymore? 
• If it was and is not anymore, why did the community leave the ICO? 
• If yes: Was your community one of the founding members? 
• If not: When did your community join the organization? 
• Do you recall what was/were the main motivations for joining the ICO? What did the 
people say in favor of joining? 
• Were there individuals from this community involved in the creating the ICO? 
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• What was happening in the region in those years? 
• Were there any conflicts in the region? Any problems with the forests? 
• What did the ICO X did for you in those initial years? 
• Did you notice any changes in the community after you joined the ICO X? 
• Are you aware of any changes in the organization since its origins? 
• If yes: What kind of changes? Large or small?  
• Would you characterize these changes as positive or negative? 
• Since its origins, have you been involved in the ICO directly in some way?  
• What was your experience in the organization? 
 
2.b  Current ICO Services 
• What things does the ICO do for you today? What services does it provide to your 
community? Examples: 
- Accessing resources from specific programs?  
- Lobbying or meeting a government agency on your behalf?  
- Establishing more connections with other communities in your region to learn more 
about the problems in other communities in the region and the strategies they are 
using to deal with those problems?  
- Providing technical or capacity-building courses? 
- Accessing markets? 
- Providing a price list? 
- Does the Association help in any way in the management of your forest or at the 
micro-regional or regional level? Has it established any rules or designed any plans 
about this issue? Has it implemented any projects related to this? 
• What have been the organization’s major achievements in the last 5 years? 
• How relevant do you think are the services that the ICO provides to your community’s 
needs?  
• Do you think the ICO is helping your community improve its condition? 
• If not, why do you think it has not? Are there any social, legal, political or economic 
issues preventing the association from helping you? 
• If yes, in what ways? 
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• How do you think the organization could better contribute to your community? 
• Do you feel that the organization benefits everyone equally in your community? 
• If not: Are there people in the community that are benefiting more than others? 
• Do you think the organization helps all its member communities equally? 
• Do you feel that you are benefiting less than other communities? If so, why do you think 
this is? 
• Why do you think the community still remains a member? 
 
2.c  Governance and Representation 
• How is your community involved in the ICO? 
• Do you have to pay for membership?  
• How is your community’s voice represented in the organization?  
• Who makes the main decisions in the organization? 
• How are these decisions made? Consensus, majority vote, the leader decides, etc.… 
• Are all members represented in the same way? If not, why not? 
• In your opinion, do you feel the ICO is representative and transparent? 
• Does the organization hold regular meetings or assemblies? If so, what issues are 
discussed there? 
• ¿Do you feel that your community’s voice is heard in those meetings?  
• ¿Do you feel that dialogue is promoted? ¿Do you feel that criticism and dissidence is 
permitted? 
• How are conflicts or differences of opinion managed within the organization?  
• Are there currently any important conflicts within the organization? 
• How much influence do other actors from outside the social sector, such government 
political appointees, foresters, or timber company executives have in ICO decisions? 
• In your opinion, how does the organization manage its finances?   
• Would you characterize the financial management of the organization as transparent?   
• Does the ICO provide the community with any reports about its finances and activities? If 
so, how often? 
• Have there been any problems with the management of the organization?  
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• How have these problems been handled? Were those responsible punished in any way? 
 
2.d ICO Leadership 
• Who is/are the current leader(s) of the ICO? 
• Is the leader a member of a community?  
• Or is he from outside the community (e.g. government appointee, forester, timber 
company executive, NGO representative)? 
• How was the leader selected? E.g. appointed by the previous leader, appointed by the 
government, appointed by the forester, appointed by a community committee, by 
consensus, by majority vote? 
• How would you characterize this/these leader(s)? 
• Do you feel that the organization’s leadership is effective? Is it representative? 
Transparent? 
• Is the leadership rotated? If so, how often? 
• Is the leadership controlled by any specific group, such as a family or people from a 
given political party? 
• Does the organization or its leader(s) have any special connection with the local, state or 
federal government? 
• Does the organization or its leader(s) have a special connection to an entrepreneur such as 
a timber company owner or a private forester? 
• Does the organization or its leader(s) own any timber-related business? 
• Does the organization or its leader(s) own any private technical forestry services? 
 
3. Community-government relations 
• Overall, how would you qualify your relationship with the government?  
• Are there any particular agencies with which you have a special relationship, like 
CONAFOR or SEMARNAT or the state environment agency? 
• Has your community (as a community, not as individuals) received any government 
support from forestry programs in the last 5 years? 
• If so, which? 
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• Are you satisfied with the type and the amount of government support for your forestry 
projects? 
• Does anyone in your community have special relations with any government actors at the 
local, state or national level that has helped you obtain these benefits?  
• How have those supports helped your community? 
• Has your community received any supports for other things related to health, education, 
agriculture, water,…? 
 
4. Other interactions/networks 
• Is the ICO part of a bigger regional or national coalition of organizations? 
• Does your community have any joint collaboration with other communities?  
• If so, what type of collaboration? E.g. Sharing information in meetings, sharing resources 
or labor (e.g. for road-building or fire combat?), joint projects, written collaborative 
agreement. 
• Is this done through the ICO? 
• Do you know if your community is a member of other organizations beside the ICO? 
• If so, which? 
• What does that organization do? 
• Do you have any informal relations (not formal membership) with other neighboring 
communities for collaboration or joint projects? 
• If so, what type of relations? 
• Do you have or have recently had conflicts with neighboring communities?  
• If so, why? Border disputes,…? 
 
5. NGO supports 
• Do you or the community receive help from other organizations, like an NGO?  
• In which ways does this organization help you? 
• Is it involved in local governance or forest management issues? 
• Do you feel this organization has been successful in helping you?  
• If not, why do you think is has not? 
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A1.2. Inter-community organization (ICO) interview guide (for community members who are 
representatives to the ICO and for other ICO employees) 
 
1. Origins and history (attention to history of grassroots mobilization) 
• When was the organization created? 
• Who promoted the creation of the organization? Possible examples: general assembly of 
the community, local leader (associated to a political party?), regional leader (associated 
to a political party?), government (what agency?), NGO or external  
• If possible, record name/s of the leader/s, or organization/s, that persuaded people to form 
the organization 
• Did the people that create the organization have any financial or other support from the 
government (what agency?)? From an NGO or an international agency? 
• What were the primary reason(s) to create the organization? Potential answers:  
- fighting against timber concessionaires 
- fighting against government policies 
- supporting a political party  
- obtaining government  funding  
- obtaining NGO funding 
- protecting the forest from illegal or indiscriminate logging             
- scarcity of timber or other necessary forest products  
- declining water availability 
- attraction of wages from forest protection  
- other: _______________________  
 
• What were the main objectives of the organization once created? Potential answers:  
- protecting forest resources 
- promoting reforestation 
- promoting sustainable timber harvesting 
- promoting sustainable community development 
- promoting vertical integration 
- providing market-related services (price info, contract monitoring, etc.) 
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- political opposition or representation 
- resource channeling  
• How many members did it have originally? 
• Who were founding members? (record names if possible) 
• How was the initial ICO committee selected? Possible answers 
- agreed to by all communities through consensus  
- agreed to by communities after some discussion on the names without  actual voting 
- executive committee was elected by voting 
- nominated by government officials (which agency?)       
- suggested by NGO/external donor 
- based on a pre-existing committee  
• When did the other communities join the organization? Why did they join? 
• What was going on in this region at the time the organization was created?  
• Were there any conflicts in the region? Any problems with the forests? 
• What have been the organization’s main changes since its origins? 
• Has the membership changed? Has its internal governing structure changed? Have its 
goals and activities changed? 
• What has motivated or influenced your organization to change? 
 
2. Main goals and activities   
• ¿What do you think should be the ideal model of a Forest Users’ Association? That is, 
what characteristics should it have to be successful?   
• ¿What are your organization’s current working models and proposals? ¿How do you 
visualize your role in community forestry? 
• What are the organizations’ main goals today for the short, medium and long term? 
• How were these goals decided upon? E.g. consensus, majority vote, committee decision, 
decided by the leadership, recommended by the forester, recommended by CONAFOR, 
obtained from the Regional Forest Study (ERF)… 
• Did other people from outside the communities participate in setting the goals? E.g. 
government, foresters NGOs or timber companies 
• Have these goals changed since the original founding of the organization? If so, how? 
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• Why do you think the organization’s goals changed?  
• Did other people from outside the communities participate in setting the new goals? E.g. 
government, foresters NGOs or timber companies 
• What are the organization’s main activities to achieve these goals? 
• How were these activities chosen? E.g. consensus, majority vote, committee decision, 
decided by the leadership, recommended by the forester, recommended by CONAFOR 
• How long have you been carrying out these activities? 
• Do you support your member communities in any way in managing their forests? 
• Do you have any strategic plans or projects for the region?  
• If so, which? How were they established? E.g. consensus, majority vote, committee 
decision, decided by the leadership, recommended by the forester, recommended by 
CONAFOR, obtained from the Regional Forest Study (ERF)… 
• In your opinion, what are the main benefits that member communities have obtained from 
these activities? 
• What have been your main achievements and experiences in the last 5 years? 
• Do you provide the same services to each member community, or are there services 
provided only to some communities? 
• Do you think all your member communities benefit in the same way from the 
organization? 
• How did your organization participate in the development of the ERF? 
• Are your goals, objectives, and strategic plans and projects reflected in the ERF? 
• Have you participated or do you currently participate in policy-making forums (such as 
the state forest council)? 
• Does your organization regularly participate in any discussion forums or decision-making 
bodies, such as regional or state forest councils? 
• If so, since when? 
• What is the nature of your involvement? 
• Do you feel your participation has influenced the forest policies that the government 
makes? 
• Have you had direct input into these policies? 
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• Are there any activities that your organization is legally prohibited to do? 
• Are there any other activities that you feel the organization should not or cannot do? 
Why? 
 
3. Membership 
• How many members does the organization have now? 
• Are the members communities or individuals or both? 
• Are there any non-community actors (government, foresters, timber companies, NGOs) 
who are part of the organization’s leadership? 
• Do you think all the members in your organization have more or less equal conditions, or 
are some communities much better developed than others? 
• If so, why do you think these inequalities exist? 
• Do you have member communities that do not harvest timber at all? 
• Why do you think that is? 
• Do you think this affects your organization in a negative way? 
• Do you have any communities that have subdivided into work groups to harvest timber? 
• When did this happen? Do you know how? 
• Do you think this is affecting your organization in a negative way? 
• What are the rules for new members?  
• What are the rules for maintaining membership?  
• Is there any payment that members have to contribute? 
 
4. Governance and Representation (Related to Decision-Making Autonomy) 
• How is each community represented in the organization? 
• How are these representatives selected? Possible answers 
- agreed to by all communities through consensus  
- agreed to by communities after some discussion on the names without  actual voting 
- executive committee was elected by voting 
- nominated by government officials (which agency?)       
- suggested by NGO/external donor 
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- based on a pre-existing committee 
• What type of decisions does the organization make? What is its mandate? 
• How does the organization make its decisions? What rules have to be followed? 
• Who makes the main decisions in the organization? 
• How are these decisions made? Consensus, simple majority,…? 
• To whom does the organization report its decisions?  
• How many times does the association meet per year?  
• What issues are covered in these meetings? 
• Who gets to participate in these meetings? 
• What is average the attendance rate in these meetings? 
• How do non-official representatives from communities get to participate? Potential 
answers:  
- Community members are members but they do not participate 
- Community members are informed of the decisions taken by the ICO 
- Community members are consulted on specific matters without guarantee of 
influencing decisions 
- Community members are asked to (or volunteered to) undertake specific tasks 
- Community members express their opinions freely whether or not solicited 
- Community members have a say in and influence over decisions regarding ICO 
activities – if so, how? 
 
• How are conflicts or differences of opinion managed within the organization?  
• Are there currently any important conflicts within the organization? 
• Are all member communities represented in the same way? If not, in what sense are 
they not? 
• What responsibilities or other requirements has the government established for your 
organization? 
• Do other non-community actors (government political appointees, foresters, timber 
company executives, NGOs) have any vote in ICO decisions? 
• If not, do you think they still have some influence on ICO decisions? If so, how? 
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• How often do you provide financial reports to the member communities? 
• Have there been any problems with the management of the organization in the past or 
recently? 
• How was the case handled? Were those responsible punished in any way? 
 
5. Leadership 
• ¿What perspective does your organization have about leadership? What do you consider 
to be a good leader or leadership team? 
• Can you provide the following details about the ICO presidents/leaders so far? 
• Who is/are the current leader(s) of the ICO? 
• Are the current leaders members of a community? If so, which? 
• How were these leaders selected?  Possible answers 
- agreed to by all communities through consensus  
- agreed to by communities after some discussion on the names without  actual voting 
- executive committee was elected by voting 
- nominated by government officials (which agency?)       
- suggested by NGO/external donor 
- suggested by the forester 
- based on a pre-existing committee 
 
• Is the leadership rotated? If so, how often? 
• What is the role of the leadership position(s) in the organization? 
• What are the main activities they carry out as leader(s) of the organization? 
• Have the leaders had to deal with any conflicts within the organization or with outside 
actors (e.g. government agencies, foresters, timber companies, NGOs, etc.?)  
• If so, what type of conflicts?  
• How were they managed or resolved?  
• What other challenges have the leadership faced in the organization? 
• How have they handled these challenges? 
• How would you characterize the leaders’ relation with government agencies?  
• …with the association’s forester? 
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• …with the board of the Confederación Estatal (AES)? 
• …with representatives from the timber industry (Asociación de Industriales Madereros)? 
• How often does the leadership interact with government agencies? 
• …with the association’s forester? 
• …with the board of the Confederación Estatal (AES)? 
• …with representatives from the timber industry (Asociación de Industriales Madereros)? 
• Is the leadership controlled by any specific group, such as a family or people from a 
given political party? 
• Does the organization or its leader(s) own any timber-related business? 
• Does the organization or its leader(s) own any private technical forestry services? 
• Are there individuals who are not in leadership positions right now but which have a lot 
of influence in the organization? 
• Do the leaders have to have a specific experience and/or training in order to be eligible 
for leadership positions? 
• Do the current leaders have any previous experience related to forestry? 
• Do the current leaders have previous experience dealing with the governmental 
bureaucracy? 
• Have they received any specific training for your position as a leader (workshops, 
courses, etc.)?   
• If so, what topics have they covered? 
___Forest management  ___Conflict resolution   ___Financial management/accounting   
___Proposal writing       ___Environmental education ___Roles and responsibilities/ laws 
and regulations    ___Health/sanitation    ___Other (describe) 
 
6. Human and physical capital (related to Financial Autonomy) 
• What assets does your organization have? (e.g. sawmill, road-building equipment, office 
space or land,…) 
• Do you have any staff? If so, how many? 
• Do they receive any special training for their work? 
• What was your operating budget last year? 
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• What is the main source of financial support for your organization?  
• Do you have other sources besides this main source? If so, which? 
• If so, what percentage of your budget last year came from that main source? 
• How many projects did you apply to last year? 
• How many projects were approved? 
• Do you think the resources you have are enough to meet your goals? 
• If not, what are your main financial needs? 
• How do you plan to cover those needs? 
 
7. Connections to other actors/ICOs 
• How would you characterize your relationship with the federal government? (conflictive, 
unstable, cordial, close, very close,…)  
• Are there any agencies within the government with whom you have a better relationship? 
• How would you characterize your relationship with the state government? With the local 
government? 
• Are there any agencies within the government at these levels with whom you have a 
better relationship? 
• How would you characterize your relationship with the forester from the association?  
• …with other civil society organizations?  
• …with the private timber companies that buy your wood? 
• …with other ICOs? 
• Does your organization informally or formally work together with other regional ICOs 
(ARS) in Durango? If so, which? 
• What type of relationship is this? E.g. meetings for information-sharing, joint projects, 
written agreements of cooperation 
• When did it begin? 
• Is your organization a member of the state AES (Confederación de Productores 
Forestales del Estado de Durango)  
• What does this organization provide to your organization?  
• When did you join? 
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• Is your organization a member of, or collaborates with, any ICOs at the national level? If 
so, which?  
• When did you join (or when did the collaboration begin)? 
• What does this organization provide to your organization?  
• Is your organization informally or formally affiliated with any political party? If, so, with 
which? 
• How did you become associated with that party? 
• Does any of the organization’s representatives have or has had a position in a political 
party? If so, in which? 
• How did you/they become a member of the party? 
• Do you think being in a political party helps your organization? 
 
8. Government Policies 
• Have you received support from any government program such as PROFAS or others 
before it?  
• How has this support helped your organization? 
• Can you identify any specific government policies that you think have positively affected 
your organization? 
• Have any government policies negatively affected your organization? If yes, how? 
 
9. Current challenges 
• What are the main challenges that your organization faces today? 
• Do you think the trade liberalization began in the 1990s with NAFTA has affected your 
organization in any way? Do you think it has affected your member communities? 
• If so, how? 
• What plans or strategies have you began to carry out or will carry out for dealing with 
these challenges? 
• Are there any other changes that you think have negatively or positively affected your 
organization?  
• … changes in government policies or programs? 
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• …changes in your community membership, for instance the formation of working groups 
in some of your communities, conflicts within a community, conflicts between 
communities, or conflicts with another ICO? 
• How are you trying to adapt to these changes? Have you taken any specific actions to 
deal with them or do you have any plans to do so? 
 
A1.3. Additional questions for ICO leaders only 
• In your opinion, what are the characteristics of an ideal leader?  
• How did you get involved in leading this organization? 
• Did you have previous leadership positions in this or other organizations? 
• When you entered the organization’s leadership, did you have any previous training in 
forest-related issues?  
• Did you have previous experience dealing with the governmental bureaucracy? 
• Have you received any specific training for your position as a leader (workshops, 
courses, etc.)?   
• If so, what topics have they covered? 
___Forest management  ___Conflict resolution   ___Financial management/accounting   
___Proposal writing       ___Environmental education ___Roles and responsibilities/ laws 
and regulations    ___Health/sanitation    ___Other (describe) 
 
• How would you define your role in your leadership position in the organization? 
• What are the main activities you carry out as leader of the organization? 
• Have you had to deal with any conflicts within the organization or with outside actors 
(e.g. government agencies, foresters, timber companies, NGOs, etc.?)  
• How did you handle those conflicts? 
• What other challenges have you faced as a leader in the organization? 
• How have you handled these challenges? 
• How would you characterize your relation with government agencies?  
• …with the association’s forester? 
• …with the board of the Confederación Estatal (AES)? 
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• …with representatives from the timber industry (Asociación de Industriales Madereros)? 
• How often do you interact with government agencies? 
• …with the association’s forester? 
• …with the board of the Confederación Estatal (AES)? 
• …with representatives from the timber industry (Asociación de Industriales Madereros)? 
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A1.4. Interview Guide Government Agents and Foresters 
 
1. Main challenges in forestry sector in Durango 
• What do you consider are the main challenges in the forestry sector in Durango? 
• How can these challenges be addressed? 
 
2. Main challenges in forestry sector in the region (UMAFOR) 
• What do you consider are the main challenges in the forestry sector in the region X? 
• How can these challenges be addressed? 
 
3. Role of Government in community forestry and its relationship to ICOs 
• What is the role of your agency in community forestry in Durango? 
• What kind of activities do you carry out related to this sector? 
• Do you have any relationship to any regional, state or national ICOs? 
• If so, what kind of relationship? E.g. informal meetings to share information, joint 
projects or activities, formal agreements of cooperation? 
• What role does your agency play in decision-making forums such as the State Forest 
Council and the Consultative Council for Sustainable Development (Consejo Consultivo 
para el Desarrollo Sustentable)? 
• What role did you play in the elaboration of the Regional Forest Study (ERF)? 
 
4. Role of ICOs in community forestry 
• What do you think is the role that ICOs have in community forestry in Durango? 
• From your experience, what kind of impacts have they had in community forestry? 
• What are the main challenges that you think ICOs in Durango face today? 
• Do you think they have the capabilities to deal with these challenges? 
• If not, what do they need? 
• What do you think is the model of an ideal ICO? What characteristics should an ICO 
have to be successful?  
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• What are your thoughts on the issues of autonomy and leadership in ICOs in Durango 
today? 
• What role did the Association play in the elaboration of the Regional Forest Study 
(ERF)? What role did communities play? 
• Do you have any specific knowledge of the following ICOs? (names of FA-1, FA-2, FA-
3, FA-4) 
 
• On a general level, how would you classify the leadership of each of these? 
• What are the most positive and most negative attributes of the leaders? 
• How would you classify the success of these organizations in promoting sustainable 
forestry in their regions? 
 
5. Impact of UMAFORs, PROARBOL and other government policies on ICOs 
• What balance can you make of the current government policies regarding the forestry 
sector? 
• What do you think has been the impact of UMAFORs, PROARBOL and other 
government policies on ICOs? 
• What policy changes do you think need to take place for the government to have a more 
positive impact? 
• How has trade liberalization affected the forestry sector? 
 
6. Role of other actors (NGOs, foresters, industry) in community forestry  
• How do you understand the current relationship between foresters and Durango’s ICOs? 
• …between the state government and Durango’s ICOs? 
• …between the municipal government and Durango’s ICOs? 
• …between NGOs and Durango’s ICOs? 
• …between the timber industry and Durango’s ICOs? 
• Which of these actors do you think has the most influence on ICOs? 
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APPENDIX 2. Types and Level of Benefits Perceived by Communities in the Four FAs 
 
 
A2.1. Types and Level of Benefits Perceived by Communities in FA-1 
 
Community 
(N=15) 
Benefits perceived by leadership Benefits perceived by community 
assembly and/or other community 
members128 
1 None/Very low 
- None, because of bad leadership 
and politicking (faulted F. 
Delgado) 
Moderate 
- Resource channeling in forestry. 
Pure “Gestoría” 
- Resource channeling in agriculture 
and livestock (general). Pure 
“Gestoría” 
- They don’t do commercialization 
anymore 
2 None/Very low 
- None, because of 
mismanagement (faulted R. 
Barraza); ARS should help with 
price setting, commercialization/ 
industrialization 
Low 
- None, because of bad leadership and 
because they are small and poor 
(faulted R. Barraza) 
- Resource channeling (little) in 
agriculture: oat seed subsidies, wire 
for fencing 
3 High 
- None until recently, because 
they are small and poor benefits, 
only to large and rich 
communities (faulted R. 
Barraza) 
- Now resource channeling in 
forestry: ProÁrbol  
- Resource channeling in basic 
infrastructure: the FA leadership 
wrote a letter to the Governor 
about the need to pave the 
community’s road 
Moderate 
- Resource channeling in agriculture: 
Wire for fencing, hose, fish farm, 
fruit (apple) trees, small things 
- “It all comes the Forestal (forestry 
services), the Union, and the 
government as well, between all of 
them.” 
 
4 Moderate 
- Information 
- Resource channeling in 
agriculture: oat seed subsidies 
- Resource channeling in forestry: 
Low 
- Resource channeling in agriculture: 
oat seed subsidies  
- Problem-solving and representation 
- Information  
                                                           
128
 All the information in this column, except for that associated communities 2, 3 and 4, comes from focus group 
discussion with the general assemblies of those communities. In the case of these three communities, the 
information came from individual interviews with several community members. 
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points in CONAFOR programs 
- But to them not so much because 
they can obtain these on their 
own; may meetings are to share 
information about projects that 
they’re not interested in or they 
already knew about 
-  No direct benefits (utilities), and 
ARS should help with 
commercialization 
5 None/Very Low 
- None, because they are small 
and poor - benefits only to large 
and rich communities (faulted R. 
Barraza and F. Delgado) 
- Only the points awarded for 
CONAFOR applications 
Moderate 
- Resource channeling in agriculture: 
Subsidized oat seed and fertilizer 
- Resource channeling in forestry: 
points in CONAFOR programs 
(mandatory), fire combat equipment 
- None according to some, very little 
according to others 
6 High 
- Resource channeling in 
agriculture: Subsidized oat seed, 
fruit trees 
- Resource channeling in basic 
infrastructure: SECOPI (road) 
NA 
7 Low 
- None until recently, because 
they are small and poor - 
benefits only to large and rich 
communities (faulted R. 
Barraza).  
- Now resource channeling in 
agriculture: subsidized oat seed 
NA 
8 High  
- Information (about forestry 
programs) 
- Resource-channeling in forestry: 
CONAFOR (mandatory), 
training in tree measurement, 
fire brigades, acordonamientos, 
fire lines, employment  
- Problem-solving: IMSS, 
Treasury 
NA 
9 Moderate 
- Unity 
- Problem-solving: 
CONAFOR/PROFEPA, IMSS, 
Treasury (for ‘large problems’) 
 
10 Moderate NA 
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- Resource channeling in forestry: 
CONAFOR (mandatory)  
- Problem-solving: IMSS, 
PROFEPA, SEMARNAT 
- Resource channeling in basic 
infrastructure: SCT 
11 Moderate 
- Resource channeling in 
agriculture: Subsidized oat seeds 
and fertilizer 
NA 
12 Moderate 
- Unity 
- Problem-solving: IMSS, CFE, 
Treasury 
Moderate 
- Resource channeling in forestry: 
payments for environmental 
services, other CONAFOR 
programs 
- Resource channeling in agriculture: 
fruit trees (during P. Hernández) 
- Capacity building: experience 
exchange course in Michoacán for 
community leaders  
- Timber commercialization project 
(during P. Hernández, unfinished) 
- Formation of communities (during 
initial years) 
- None according to some  
13 NA Moderate 
- Resource channeling in agriculture: 
Subsidized oat seeds and fertilizer, 
women’s tortilla shop 
- Problem solving: IMSS, Infonavit 
- Price list (not anymore - until 4 
years ago) 
- But to them not so much because 
they can obtain these on their own; 
sometimes the FA is the one asking 
them for help (same as La Victoria) 
14 None/Very Low 
- None, because it is used as 
“political trampoline” and 
because there is preference 
towards large and wealthy 
communities 
(ARS should channel resources and 
provide advisory services) 
NA 
375 
 
15 None/Very low 
- Resource channeling in forestry: 
gestión (agency) (During period 
with R. Barraza) 
- Resource channeling in 
agriculture: oat seeds, fertilizer, 
wire fencing and fruit trees 
(During period with R. Barraza) 
- Representation (general) 
- None currently (from ARS). 
There are studies being done but 
no supports. It’s not true that 
you need to be in the ARS for 
Proarbol (CONAFOR) supports. 
NA 
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A2.2. Types and Level of Benefits Perceived by Communities in FA-2 
 
Community  
(N = 12) 
Benefits perceived by leadership Benefits perceived by assembly/ other 
community members 
1 High  
- Resource channeling in forestry: 
resources for soil conservation, 
tree pruning, and other projects 
- Unity: government supports 
organizations more than 
individual communities 
- No support in agriculture 
Very low 
- Resource channeling in forestry: 
Some supports (programs) but very 
little, ex. cordons project only 
$10,000 
- “Nothing” according to one ex-
Comisariado.  
- They do not visit the community 
and do not ask about the 
community’s needs. The forester 
puts little effort and has no interest 
in helping them 
2* Moderate 
- Resource channeling in basic 
infrastructure: Paving of Navíos-
Regocijo road; Electricity  
- Resource channeling (general) 
- BUT the role of UNECOSID is 
combined with the gestión of 
Toño Mancinas (Forestal Líder) 
NA 
3 Moderate129 
- Resource channeling in forestry 
and general: All the government 
resources for the community 
(CONAFOR mainly) - 
employment, etc.  
- Resource channeling in basic 
infrastructure: Paving of Navíos-
Regocijo road 
- Unity: if a large social or 
political problem came up, then 
the Union could help 
- But need more supports for 
employment, and no projects for 
sustainable development 
- Mostly for political activities 
Moderate  
- Resource channeling and lobbying 
in general: When there are supports 
at regional level they channel them 
(according to an ex-Comisariado); if 
there is no one there lobbying the 
supports do not come down.  
- Resource channeling in basic 
infrastructure: Paving of road; 
Electrification  
- BUT Now mostly for political 
activities (used as political ‘ladder’) 
- No benefits (according to two 
community members) 
- BUT it also depends on the 
Comisariado’s actions and whether 
he approaches the Union’s 
leadership for help 
                                                           
129
 Note the drastically diverging perspectives from different members of the Comisariado. The president and CV 
said that the benefits were moderate to high, while the Treasurer said that they were minimal and that except for the 
government programs channeled, there had been no projects for sustainable development. 
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4 High  
- Resource channeling in basic 
infrastructure: Paving of Navío-
Regocijo road; Electricity 
- Addressing community needs  
- Resource channeling in forestry: 
Eco-tourism project 
- Unity 
 
Moderate 
- Resource channeling in forestry: 
general, eco-tourism project (4 log 
cabins) with funds from Municipal 
Rural Development Agency 
- BUT they are too slow to apply for 
project funds and in the tree 
markup, they need more employees  
- Consulting/advising (information) 
- BUT they pay for that (forestry 
services) and its only given to the 
Comisariado, many don’t know 
- Resource channeling in basic 
infrastructure: The ‘road’ 
(paving/improvements of Navío-
Regocijo road) 
5 High 
- Forestry services: control of the 
timber volume 
- Resource channeling in forestry: 
Ecotourism and hunting area 
(UMA), financial support for 
new management plan 
- Information about anything they 
need 
- Unity: If they weren’t in the 
Union many things wouldn’t get 
done  
High 
- Resource channeling in forestry: ex. 
support for eco-tourism (El Bayo 
project) 
- Forestry services (no problems) 
- Advise/information about support 
program 
- Help with solving problems 
- BUT the community needs to be 
more involved, “he who doesn’t 
speak, God does not hear” 
6 High 
- Cheap forestry services 
- Resource channeling general: 
They have supported them “a 
lot”. Efforts in different 
municipal, state and federal 
agencies in support of 
applications, including large 
projects that they could not have 
done on their own 
- Resource channeling in 
agriculture: Trout farm, though it 
is currently not operating 
- Resource channeling in forestry: 
Tree nursery 
- Resource channeling in basic 
infrastructure: Potable water 
Level NA 
- Resource channeling in agriculture:  
Trout farm, though currently not 
operating; subsidized oat seeds; 
pork farm for one community 
member; farm tractors 
- Resource channeling in basic 
infrastructure: school 
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(information provided by 
Graciano in UNECOSID 
assembly); Improvement of road 
to Navajas (information provided 
by Graciano in UNECOSID 
assembly)  
7 High 
- Resource channeling in basic 
infrastructure: Paving of Navíos-
Regocijo road; Electricity; 
Rehabilitation of the potable 
water network (in process); 
Cement for house flooring (in 
process) 
- Resource channeling in 
agriculture: Subsidized corn and 
oat seeds 
- Any community needs  
High 
- Unity: makes them stronger vis a vis 
government agencies (for doing 
resource channeling) 
- Resource channeling in general: of 
government supports (most 
important according to one) 
- Resource channeling in forestry: 
provides employment 
- Resource channeling in agriculture: 
Nutritional supplement for livestock 
in drought periods, application for 
oat seed subsidies 
- BUT, the problem is the supports 
take a long time to get to the 
community because they have to be 
approved in Guadalajara (centrally) 
- Resource channeling in basic 
infrastructure: Potable Water; Road 
and electricity, although in these and 
the water the community itself also 
intervened as well as the road 
committee; Housing improvements 
- Fomenting information, cultural, 
and economic exchange between 
member communities 
- Other two community members: No 
benefits 
8 Moderate 
- Advice (information) about to 
government programs 
- Resource channeling of 
government programs in general 
- Forestry services: good advice on 
how to manage the forest, if there 
is a problem like a plague (trees 
dying) they immediately help out 
- Unity = strength  
- But there is poor communication 
and consequently disinformation, 
High 
- Courses/capacity-building (how to 
manage the forest, the livestock 
range) 
- Resource channeling in forestry: 
clearings and pre-clearings 
(aclareos), mini-dams (presas 
filtrantes), contention walls, 
reforestation, wildlife management 
unit (UMA), equipment and 
dispensas for fire brigades 
- Advise (information) with 
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and they have not met their goals, 
they are somewhat stuck 
 
everything, e.g. what projects to 
solicit  
- Help with anything you need, e.g. if 
the pine trees are dying, they come 
and cut them (problem-solving) 
9 Low-Moderate 
- Forestry services: this is a “great” 
benefit and it is what has driven 
the Union’s successes 
- Resource channeling in forestry: 
reforestations, pruning, mini-
dams 
- But no benefits except for that, 
no agricultural benefits, those are 
directly channeled by the 
Comisariado with the municipal 
Rural Development agency 
- Lack of communication, 
politicking and lack of vision of 
what a Union is for the benefit of 
communities 
- The Union should provide legal 
services, veterinary services (for 
cows, etc.), accounting advice 
and capacity-building 
Moderate 
Ex-Pres Com:  
- Resource channeling for forestry: 
reforestation, pruning and presas  
- But only focused on forestry, no 
benefits in agriculture 
10* None 
- No services, no benefits 
- Only forestry services, but they 
don’t receive them from the FA 
because they are more expensive, 
and there are no projects. 
 
Moderate 
- Resource channeling in basic 
infrastructure: Road improvements 
- Unity: “union makes the strength, 
without it there is nothing”  
- Resource channeling in agriculture: 
ex. subsidized oat seeds, fencing 
wire 
- Forestry services, though they don’t 
receive them because they are more 
expensive 
- BUT in their community they are 
very problematic and once they did 
not do the job correctly and because 
they did not fix it or returned the 
money now they can’t get more 
supports  
- And if the Comisariado does not 
approach the Union, there will be 
nothing 
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11* Moderate 
- Resource channeling in basic 
infrastructure: Potable water; 
Electricity 
NA 
12 NA Low 
- Resource channeling in forestry: 
reforestation, pruning, clearings, etc.  
- Problem-solving 
- Resource channeling in basic 
infrastructure: Road repair and 
paving (long time ago, when they 
had a motorgrader) 
- Benefits used to be high, BUT now 
have decayed and are low 
- No benefits according to some 
* These communities do not receive forestry services from the Union, though they are members. 
Community #12 stopped receiving the services in 2011. 
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A2.3. Types and Level of Benefits Perceived by Communities in FA-3 
 
Community 
(N=10) 
Benefits perceived by leadership Benefits perceived by assembly/ 
other community members 
1 High 
- Forestry services: offices (rented), 
well-equipped, when there is a fire 
immediately they combat it. Volume 
increased by 5-10% in the new 
study, forest is better than 20-25 
years ago.  
- Resource channeling in forestry: 
supports from CONAFOR for 
reforestation, cordons 
(acordonamientos),… 
- Resource channeling in agriculture: 
Oat seeds, pesticides, even though 
the function of the UP-LVM is not 
agricultural 
- Resource channeling in 
infrastructure: Through 
PROARBOL they obtain supports 
for road improvements. Also 
lobbied for the paving of the San 
Miguel de Cruces road 
- Investment in public goods: road 
improvement quota ($1 MXN/m3 to 
fix holes in the region’s main road), 
tree nurseries, watchtowers, radio 
communication system (used for 
accidents, etc.) 
- Unity (reason for forming): More 
strength together - “For any support 
the Union is the one that asserts us” 
(“la que nos hace valer”) 
NA 
2 High 
- Resource channeling in 
infrastructure: Paving and 
maintenance of the region’s main 
road.  
- Investment in public goods: Quota 
for road maintenance and 
improvement. Radio 
communication, 5 fire watchtowers, 
and a fire truck. Fire brigades in 
each community and at the FA level 
High 
- Forestry services (ownership); 
other services only do tree mark-
up they offer much more 
- Resource channeling in forestry: 
courses about forest management 
and wildlife (capacity-building), 
reforestation. They have become 
aware of the benefits of clearing 
and reforestation. They receive 
points in the applications for 
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as well. As a result, fires are very 
well controlled in the region. Radio 
has served to ask for help in 
emergencies (e.g. accidents) or to 
report forest fires. Two tree 
nurseries (one in their community) 
- Resource channeling in agriculture: 
subsidized oat seeds 
- Capacity-building: Talks about how 
to do proper forest management 
(‘treatment’) practices 
- If not in the Union, access to 
resources would be reduced  
belonging to the Union; they are 
told that if they leave the Union 
they will not get supports because 
the government wants them to be 
united. Supports generate 
employment in the forest. In 
almost all the community’s 
projects the FA was always the 
one intervening, e.g. in the drier 
for the sawmill and the trout farm 
(the largest in the state).  
- Resource channeling in 
agriculture and livestock 
(general): promotes “regional 
development” 
- Resource channeling in 
infrastructure: Lobbying and 
“acts of presence” for road 
paving and electrification 
- Investment in public goods: 2 tree 
nurseries, one here and one in 
Durango, monetary contribution 
for road paving (achieved in 
combination with lobbying); 
radio communication (more than 
200 radios), which helps in 
emergencies (e.g. car accident 
two years ago)  
- Unity: If the agencies see that he 
communities are well-organized, 
they give supports 
- BUT…Union has not fought for 
fair timber prices (Price 
regulation) 
- Forestry services are too 
expensive 
3 Moderate 
- Resource channeling in forestry: 
supports to do the works in the 
forest – e.g. clearings, reforestation 
(a lot), fire combat. As a result there 
is an observable improvement in the 
forest. There have been no fires in 
the last few years. 
Moderate 
- Forestry services: The treatment 
given to the forest is very good, 
the forest is well-conserved  
- Resource channeling in forestry 
(sometimes): reforestation, 
clearings, cordons, pruning, mini-
dams,  UMA 
- Investment in public goods: Fire 
watchtowers, Radio 
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communication  
- BUT forestry services are too 
expensive (among the most 
expensive in the state) 
- They do not help with non-
forestry issues 
- The community made a financial 
contribution for an electrification 
project and the project was never 
done, but the FA kept the money 
4 Moderate-Low 
- Resource channeling in forestry:  
reforestation, cordons, pruning and 
clearings 
- Forestry services: ‘Good’, they 
strongly protect the forest, as 
opposed to other forestry offices. 
The forest has improved because of 
reforestation and the proper markup 
of trees (marking only defective 
trees)  
- Investment in public goods: Fire 
combat and radio communication 
- Price list, BUT the prices are always 
lower than at what they sell 
- Not many benefits because the 
leadership is weak 
Moderate 
- Resource channeling in forestry: 
Cordons, clearings, reforestations 
- Investment in public goods: 
Personnel and vehicles for fire 
combat,  fire watchtowers  
- Resource channeling in 
agriculture: subsidized oat seeds, 
fertilizer, though not for them 
because they don’t grow much 
- Resource channeling in 
infrastructure: they provide 
interest-free loans for housing 
improvements (through 
SEDESOL) 
- Resource channeling in other 
areas: Food bags 
- Supports are not much but not 
little.  
- Forestry services: Service is 
good. Forest management is done 
very well, they never leave them 
alone (advice/accompaniment)  
5 Moderate 
- Resources channeling in forestry: 
CONAFOR programs – 
reforestation, 
cordons,…environmental 
compensation project –all the FA’s 
communities got it because of the 
Union’s good standing with the 
government  
- Resource channeling in agriculture: 
subsidized oat seeds (for first time 
this year) 
- Resource channeling in 
NA 
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infrastructure: Lobbying the 
municipality for the electrification 
of the region, Paving of SMC road 
- Forestry services: The services are 
provided to all the member-owners 
and they are good, they help with 
anything that you need 
6 High 
- Resource channeling (general). 
“bridges” to get to the agencies. The 
Union has a lot of strength. They 
design the projects (applications) 
and move the paperwork, you only 
have to sign. They know the 
community well and do not involve 
it with projects that are not needed.   
- Forest improvement 
High 
- Forestry services: No illegal 
logging. Mark-up is well done, 
only the most crooked are cut, 
and timber volumen is increasing 
(están engordando y no se están 
acabando). They have become 
more involved in the more 
technical aspects of management. 
Before there were government 
forest guards revising the timber 
shipments and now each 
community has their own 
documenter (documentador). 
Change from Doyle to metric 
system. 
- Economic strength and political 
strength, which has allowed them 
to reach political positions, e.g. 
municipal asssembly (Regidor) 
and to obtain the most resources 
of any association in the whole 
state  
7 High 
- Resource channeling in agriculture: 
subsidized oat seed, tractors, 
fertilizer, etc.  
- Resource channeling in 
infrastructure: health clinic, roads 
- Resource channeling in forestry: this 
is “the (association’s) strength”  –
PROARBOL programs, e.g. 
payment for environmental 
compensation program (land use 
change) 
- But, sometimes leader asks for 
money for projects and then doesn’t 
bring them, e.g. solar panels for his 
house 
Moderate 
- Unity 
- Resource channeling in forestry: 
e.g. reforestation, though without 
the desired result (survival rate), 
fencing for reforested areas 
(though some steal it), and soil 
conservation (cordons, mini-
dams). BUT they keep 20%, it’s 
too much, and the services are too 
expensive 
- Resource channeling in 
infrastructure: Electrification of 
the region (Electrification 
Committee)  
- Radio communication system 
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- BUT no direct monetary gains 
(utilidades) 
8 High 
- Resource channeling in forestry: 
clearings,  pruning, mini-dams, 
cordons, reforestation 
High 
- Forestry services: Good service. 
Marks up the defective trees and 
leaves the good ones, and does 
not cut too much in the water 
sources (ojos de agua). As a 
result the forest has improved and 
timber volume has increased 
- Resource channeling in forestry, 
BUT they keep 20%, it’s too 
much, and the services are too 
expensive and keeps increasing 
- Investment in public goods: fire 
watchtowers, radio 
communication system, tree 
nurseries (if they bought the 
plants from another producer they 
would be more expensive).  
9 High  
- Forestry services: Protection and 
conservation of the forest, of the 
environment and the fauna (e.g. 
UMA) 
- Investment in public goods: Radio 
communication, and sometimes a 
pick-up truck when they need it to 
transport things or people 
High  
- Forestry services: Protect the 
forest a lot. Mark-ups are well 
done. Help in combating fires, 
reforestations, protection of 
fauna, cordons. As a result the 
forest is better than before, 
because there are no more fires 
- Investment in public goods: 
Radio communication system; 
support for fire combat brigades 
- Unity 
- BUT the forestry services are too 
expensive 
10 High 
- Resource channeling in forestry: 
reforestations; they provide advice 
and “are the ones in front so that the 
supports come”  
- Forestry services: good mark-up, the 
forest has improved, fire combat –
forest fires have been reduced a lot 
in the last 10 years 
- Investment in public goods: Radio 
communication system and fire 
watchtowers 
NA 
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 A2.4. Types and Level of Benefits Perceived by Communities in FA-4 
 
Community 
(N=13) 
Benefits perceived by leadership Benefits perceived by assembly/ 
other community members 
1 Low 
- Resource channeling in forestry: 
PROARBOL programs to promote 
better forest management. This is 
what he understood from the last FA 
meeting  
- Low before, now will be better 
because leader ‘obtains a lot’ 
Low 
- Resource channeling in forestry: 
Capacity-building courses, 
analysis of the community (done 
a long time ago), supports for 
cordons and mini-dams. They 
invited them to courses but did 
not go. 
- Investment in public goods: Road 
improvement machinery, BUT 
they did not want to make the 
required monetary contribution 
so they have not used it. 
- They have not been too close to 
the FA. The problem is not the 
FA but the lack of commitment 
from the community  
2 Low 
- Investment in public goods (with E. 
Palma): machinery for road 
improvement, fire brigades 
- Before E. Palma NO benefits 
 
 
Low 
- Investment in public goods: fire 
brigades (this year will be paid 
by the FA), BUT they have 
always paid for the brigades and 
they have never used the road 
imrpovement machinery 
- All the benefits have gone to one 
sub-region (side closer to the 
forester’s office) 
- The previous Comisariado gave 
no information about the FA 
- The problem begins when FAs 
become political because that’s 
when they do not do the job 
they’re supposed to, and that’s 
where they break down 
3 None 
- No benefits 
- He knows about the road 
improvement machinery but they 
have not seen it working in their 
road 
- Not very well informed about what 
NA 
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the FA does or its objectives. He 
didn’t go to the FA meetings in 
2010. 
4 None 
- No benefits; maybe they’re isolated 
because they are with a different 
forester 
- One of them thinks they are not in 
the FA (though they are officially a 
member) 
- The problem of becoming a member 
would be with the monetary 
contributions because the people in 
the community have no money 
NA 
5 NA Moderate 
- Resource channeling in forestry: 
Payment for Environmental 
Services (PSA) program, region-
wide permit for  extraction of 
cellulosic material (FA did the 
technical study), increased 
possibilities of funds being 
approved, capacity-building 
courses 
- Investment in public goods: Road 
improvement machinery which 
has helped them fix their road, 
fire watchtower and brigade – no 
fires in the last few years 
- BUT not a lot of benefits 
according to some 
6 NA High 
- Resource channeling in forestry: 
points in applications to 
CONAFOR for being a member 
of the FA, equipment for fire 
brigades 
- Investment in public goods: 
Machinery for road 
improvements, 3 fire 
watchtowers (partly built with 
resources channeled and part was 
contribution) and fire combat 
brigades ((1) Cerro Barajas, (2) 
Ciénaga de la Vaca, y (3) Arroyo 
de las Piedras) 
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- Resource channeling in basic 
infrastructure: large road 
improvement project in the first 
years (improvements in roads 
from Ciénaga Larga to El 
Coyote, Ojito to Ciénaga Prieta 
and Ciénaga de la Vaca to 
Guanaceví)  
- BUT “before they (the FA) 
worked, now they don’t”. Lately 
the communities don’t want to 
pay the quota. It’s because the 
previous FA president and the 
forester (Navar) did not inform 
the members about the projects 
they channeled.  
7 Moderate 
- Resource channeling in basic 
infrastructure: road improvements 
- BUT he just became Comisariado 
and is not well informed 
NA 
8 Low 
- Investment in public goods: Road 
improvement machinery, fire 
watchtowers which help in 
improving forest management 
(better detection of forests) 
- NO benefits related to resource 
channeling: The benefits that come 
out are not directly from the FA, 
they are channeled by the 
community’s forester, the FA does 
not get involved at all in the 
communities’ supports. 
Moderate 
- Forest management was 
controlled, forest is well 
conserved 
- Investment in public goods: Road 
improvement machinery 
- Resource channeling (general) 
9 High 
- Resource channeling in forestry:  
capacity-building courses about 
forest management, e.g. how to do 
the cordons. These are channeled 
between the FA and the forester. For 
some programs the government asks 
that communities be incorporated 
into an FA and they give points for 
it. Resources for fire watchtowers 
- Unity: Work is better united, they 
(the FA) bring ideas, they have 
High 
- Resource channeling in 
agriculture: agricultural tractors, 
fish farms (El Toro) 
- Resource channeling in basic 
infrastructure: roads 
- Resource channeling in forestry: 
clearings, cordons, 
environmental services, 
environmental compensation 
- Investment in public goods: road 
improvement machinery, 
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machinery and pay the brigades 
- Investment in public goods: Road 
improvement machinery and 
payment to fire brigades and the 
torristas (the people in the fire 
watchtower) , fire watchtowers 
- Resource channeling in basic 
infrastructure: Road improvement 
machinery 
equipment for fire combat 
(towers and brigades –one is in 
the community) 
- Information: through the 
UMAFOR they become informed 
about the different programs 
available 
- Regional Forest Study: first in 
the whole country 
- Political representation: for 
gestiones 
10 Moderate 
- Resource channeling in forestry: 
leads to more employment 
- Investment in public goods: Road 
improvement machinery  
Moderate  
- Resource channeling (general), 
BUT not many 
- Investment in public goods: Road 
improvements with the road 
improvement machinery, fire 
combat brigade and tower, which 
has led to reduced fires 
- Unity: The government says that 
it will provide more support to 
communities that are united. In 
their community supports have 
increased.  
11 NA Moderate 
- Investment in public goods: Fire 
watchtowers and fire combat 
brigades (tower built with 
investment from the FA, brigade 
paid for by the FA), road 
improvement machinery 
- Resource channeling in basic 
infrastructure: Support from 
CONAFOR to fix the road 3 
years ago 
- But not enough supports for the 
road and insufficient information 
about government programs 
12 NA High 
- Investment in public goods: Fire 
watchtower, fire combat brigade, 
road improvement machinery and 
investment for road improvement 
(2009),   
- Resource channeling in forestry: 
Resources to purchase equipment 
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for the brigade 
- Information: Good information in 
the FA assemblies; Promotion 
and diffusion of the CONAFOR 
programs (1 year), diffusion of 
the Regional Forest Study (2011) 
13 High 
- Resource channeling (general): 
“through the organization it’s easier 
to transact and make gestiones. It’s 
easier than if each person would do 
the request separately because here 
people sign and they have someone 
to represent them.” More supports 
come in (are approved) because 
requests are made through an 
organization, all together.  
- Investments in public goods: Fire 
watchtowers and fire brigades, 
which facilitates fire prevention and 
combat. Has helped with reducing 
fires. 
- Unity: “unity brings strength” 
(related to resource channeling)  
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APPENDIX 3. Evaluations of leadership by community and external observer in the four 
FAs 
 
A3.1. Current Leadership Evaluation by Communities in FA-1 
 
Community 
(N=14)  
Evaluation by Community Leadership Evaluation by Community 
Assembly/other community 
members 
1 NA Poor  
- Assembly consensus: they don’t 
feel well represented or informed 
(lack of rallying power, lack of 
information) 
- One ex-leader doesn’t know who 
the current FA president is 
- No support with 
commercialization and timber 
prices (lack of gestión) 
- President has visited but not to 
talk about the FA, rather to talk 
about the municipal elections 
(use for personal political 
benefit) 
- Ex-comi: FA has always been 
used with political purposes, to 
escalate (use for personal 
political benefit). 
- And then the losing factions put 
many impediments because of 
personal interests (lack of 
multiple/shared leadership: 
FA-community) 
- Community leaders don’t inform 
their assemblies properly about 
the FA and communities don’t 
contribute financially (lack of 
multiple/shared leadership: 
FA-community) 
2 Very poor 
- Lacking rallying power 
(mobilization power) (‘it hasn’t 
motivated communities to 
participate’)  
NA 
3 Very poor 
- “Very grey” 
Ex-president of Comisariado: 
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- “No leadership”, he takes it as a job 
and if he doesn’t get paid he doesn’t 
do anything 
- Politicized, used as political 
stepping-stone (use for personal 
political benefit) 
- Lacking organization and rallying 
power (mobilization)  
- Before the union was much stronger, 
it was a model; previous president 
was a true leader 
Good 
- “Serious, trustworthy, and 
committed”, but he’s just 
starting so he couldn’t say. 
4 Good 
- He is “doing things” to the extent 
that he can (effort) 
- But he came in “bad times”  
Good 
Ex-president of Comisariado:  
-  “Very honest”  
- Very easy to relate to (“muy 
tratable”), and he is  
- Well-prepared 
- But he hasn’t done much to help 
commercialize timber. 
5 Good  
- “Has worked well”, but with 
difficulties because of lack of 
resources 
NA 
6 Good 
- Has “put effort into it”, but he’s 
just starting 
Poor 
Has not visited the community 
 
7 Good 
- Has knowledge (accounting) and 
much experience 
NA 
8 Good 
- Everything he has done has been for 
the benefit of the communities 
(collective benefit) 
NA 
9 Regular 
- They manage through ‘inertia’. 
- They are not in the FA because they 
want to, but because it is a federal 
government requirement in order to 
obtain funds 
NA 
10 Poor 
- The election process has affected 
them because the large communities 
don’t pay (lack of resources, 
multiple/shared leadership: FA-
community). 
NA 
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- However, if they would be good 
leaders and if they really wanted to 
work they would do it for free and 
would look for projects to sustain 
themselves, but they don’t.  
11 Regular 
- Has “put effort into it”, he works 
and has good initiative (enterprise) 
- But “he has not been able” and has 
become increasingly “disheartened” 
because the large communities do 
not want to contribute and he has no 
$ (lack of resources, 
multiple/shared leadership: FA-
community) 
 NA 
12 Good 
- Has “put effort into it”  
- Has been transparent 
NA 
13 Poor 
- Perhaps he could be good if he 
applied himself (lack of 
discipline/persistence).  
- But he hasn’t come to the 
community and does not know the 
community’s problems, so he cannot 
help solve them (lack of presence, 
lack of knowledge) 
NA 
14 Poor 
- Lacking organization, strictness, 
and “projection”. 
- The ARS leadership should look 
more important than the 
communities’ leaders, because it is 
the representative of all the 
communities.  
Poor 
- Did not respond to a community 
petition to intercede on a border 
conflict. (lack of gestión) “[The 
president] has no direction (no 
tiene orilla)”. 
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A3.2 Current Leadership Evaluation by External Observers in FA-1  
 
External observer (N = 11) Evaluation 
Forester of one community in the 
region 
Regular 
- Good intention but lacking 
insistence/persistence 
Forester and longtime employee of 
region’s main forestry services office 
Very poor 
- “Very cold, timid, without much leadership or 
rallying power.” 
Forester of one community in the 
region  
Regular 
- Good intentions but lacking insistence, needs to 
be stronger to convince the members to participate 
Forester of one of the communities 
in the region 
Poor 
- They are political (politicized), they are very 
involved in the PRI’s campaign, although now less 
political than with the previous president (Mr. B.) 
who was “a politician.” 
FA-1 forester Very poor  
- Very poor functioning (compared with previous 
president) 
- They don’t pay him and he gets assigned tasks that 
the president and the secretary (president’s 
daughter) should be doing, like organizing the 
meetings and making copies. 
CONAFOR official Poor 
- Not enough experience to be a leader, he is lacking 
experience.  
- The division between small and large 
communities has really affected them 
(multiple/shared leadership: FA-community).  
- But he is honest and does not have personal 
political and economic interests, unlike the 
previous president. 
SRNyMA official Regular 
- Lower in comparison to previous president 
- Not as much presence in the government 
agencies. The reason is the internal divisions 
(multiple/shared leadership: FA-community) 
Ex-municipal president in FA-1 
region 
Poor 
- The Union has never had good leaders, only people 
seeking personal benefit, because “they are 
political positions and they are inherited.” 
CONAFOR oficial in charge of ARS 
associations 
Regular 
- Previous experience with internal organization 
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- Medium vision of what they expect  
- Leadership changes in the periods required by the 
bylaws  
- Capacity to reach internal agreements: poor 
- Capacity to develop projects: poor 
- Capacity to make external connections: regular 
- Participation of members is very limited because 
of a lack of good leadership as well as an updated 
internal regulation (multiple/shared leadership: 
FA-community) 
President of state foresters guild Poor 
- The members have a positive view because he 
represents alternation with another group which 
had been leading the organization  
- Ability to reach internal agreements: poor 
- Ability to develop projects: poor 
- Ability to build external connections/networks: 
poor 
- Low interest in gestión (lack of gestión),  
- Manipulation by others (external forester, 
political peasant leader within FA) 
Ex-Secretary of SRNyMA Regular 
- New president (AR): leadership does not have the 
sympathy of all the communities of the region  
- Highest forest production potential in the state, the 
best road infrastructure, ample experience in 
forestry, and closeness to Durango and the pacific 
- Ability to reach internal agreements: regular; 
because of the internal division 
- Ability to develop projects: regular; being the 
region with the highest productivity, the 
government brings projects with the certainty that 
they will be successful, but there is little 
willingness on behalf of communities to contribute 
(financially) to those projects (multiple/shared 
leadership: FA-community).   
- Ability to build external connections/networks: 
good; they already have some agreements with 
government agencies, though they have rejected 
some proposals for long-term proposals for 
collaborating in commercialization with private 
landowners 
- Poor vision of the future  
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A3.3. Current Leadership Evaluation by Communities in FA-2 
 
Community 
(N=9) 
Evaluation by Community 
Leadership 
Evaluation by Community 
Assembly/others 
1  Very Good 
- President is a professional (in the 
technical sense) and his vocation 
is forestry; others in the 
Comisariado are also 
professionals (education) 
- Has always been fighting for 
peasant causes (commitment to 
issues) 
- Serious person  
- “Outstanding job”  
- Combined with the leadership at 
community level and of timber 
entrepreneur (multiple/shared 
leadership) 
NA 
2 Very Good 
- President has channeled many 
benefits (gestión) 
- President is a professional, a 
forester (Treasurer also 
professional) (education, 
knowledge) 
- Honest and law-abiding 
- He is well-received in 
government agencies (networks) 
- It doesn’t depend on the FA’s 
leadership but on the 
communities’ Comisariados who 
sometimes distance themselves 
from the FA because they don’t 
like its governing board (shared 
leadership: FA-community) 
Good 
- Above all in the financial and 
administrative transparency  
- So good that he was reelected 
- But there is a need for more 
communication 
- In the past year the leadership only 
came for political campaign 
purposes (use for personal political 
benefit) 
- President – has charisma and 
knowledge 
- Has contacts (networks) with many 
people, with all the government 
agencies 
- Carries it well (se desarrolla bien)  
- Forestry service director: In the 
beginning a little slow, maybe it was 
his first job opportunity, but over 
time he has gotten a hold of it. He 
channels good supports, this year 
CONAFOR supported them 
substantially. 
3 Good 
- Many projects were done with 
him, more than on previous 
NA 
- Main communication is between the 
community’s Comisariado and the 
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occasions. (gestión) FA forester (multiple/shared 
leadership). President did 
communicate with the comisariado 
for the FA’s offices and helped them 
with obtaining resources for eco-
tourism project in municipal rural 
development office (gestión) 
4 Regular 
- They don’t get the government 
supports they apply to, only 1/3 
(lack of gestión) 
- There is no information from 
the leadership about what they’re 
doing and why they’re not 
receiving supports  
- If they would do their job 
properly, much more would be 
achieved.  
- Some communities go one way 
and others go another, precisely 
because there is insufficient 
information  (lack of shared 
leadership: FA-community) 
- They are engaged (effort) and 
have good relations with the 
government (networks),  
- But too passive/lacking 
activity/” “too slow”.  
- Honest and trustworthy 
Good 
- Forester responds promptly 
whenever they need anything 
(effort/quickness) 
- Good connections to government 
agencies  
- They are very “active” and put a lot 
of effort, they never make a face 
- Trustworthy 
 
5 Good 
- Community CV: He has helped 
them, even went to get pine 
seedlings and brought them to 
the community, he was good to 
them (se portó bien). (effort, 
good treatment) 
- The problem is the people don’t 
cooperate, don’t participate; not 
everything can be done by the 
leaders (multiple/shared 
leadership: FA-community) 
 
Poor 
- Community President: there is a 
need for a leader who can be 
sensible, who can lead and know 
Regular-Good 
- Comm. Member: He puts effort into 
it 
- Ex-Pres. Comisariado: Regular 
because they only focused on 
forestry and nothing more.  
- He is transparent, honest, and 
equitable 
- Ex-Secetary: Interest (effort) in 
obtaining the most benefit for the 
member communities 
- Forestry services have worked well 
through the are missing a bit of 
interaction with communities (lack 
of presence) because not everyone 
has the same vision of conservation 
and some people do want to cut 
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communities’ needs. (lack of 
sensibility, lack of knowledge)  
- The only use the FA’s name (use 
for personal political benefit).   
- There has NOT (emphatic) been 
good leadership. 
- Sometimes he thinks the ones 
who battle for the FA’s 
presidency only do it to say they 
are the presidents and use them 
(manejarlo) for their own 
benefit, without vision or 
projects, which is what he sees.  
- The FA has been sustained by 
the foresters. (multiple/shared 
leadership: Forester) 
 
** Note the different evaluations of 
leadership within the same 
Comisariado 
timber in their community.  
 
6 Good 
- President and CV: “Much 
capacity”, “Very active”, he 
puts much effort into 
everything. “Very efficient”. 
- Knowledgeable and well 
informed about government 
support programs  
 
Regular 
- Treasurer: 60% - he was good on 
some things but for the rest he 
was a politician, to get votes for 
the governor (personal political 
benefit). 
- He had education and good 
communication skills. 
NA 
7 Good 
- Has good character and is 
treatable because he knows how 
to manage his temper and 
tolerate things.  
- Very easy to control and docile 
(mandable)  
- He was dedicated (effort) to the 
Regular 
- “Regular” according to some, “not 
very good” according to others.  
- Ex-comi: “Good”, brought 500 kg of 
subsidized oat seeds last year 
(gestión), together with local 
councilmember (multiple/shared 
leadership: FA-local 
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Union’s work – he obtained 
supports for things like the new 
office building (in construction) 
so that communities would have 
to contribute the least possible 
- He is a professional and 
therefore had good 
communication skills. 
- He was in Durango everyday 
(easy to contact/find).130 
- He was the best asset the Union 
had.  
- But, he did not visit the 
community (lack of presence) 
councilmember). The problem is 
that the comisariados don’t tell the 
FA the supports they need (multiple 
leadership/shared leadership: FA-
community).  
- Another: Sometimes they offer 
supports and people don’t want to 
work, e.g. recent soil conservation 
project (too little money).  
- Ex-Comisariado #2: But it’s also the 
FA’s fault.  
- Another: The FA should go into the 
agencies and lobby for supports 
8 Good-Very good 
- He has training, education, 
knowledge 
- He supports them in everything, 
sometimes even with a phone 
call to pass on a message to 
someone. (effort, gestión) 
Good 
- Ex-Comi: When he was 
Comisariado he saw that they put 
effort into it (le echaron ganas) 
- Assembly: The ejido also needs to 
be more involved. “He who doesn’t 
speak, God doesn’t hear.” 
(multiple/shared leadership: FA-
community) 
- Lack of presence according to some 
9 Poor 
- There were no benefits (lack of 
gestión). The community begged 
them to help obtain supports for 
flooring and roofing materials 
but they never helped.  
- The President would get the food 
bags (dispensas) but he would 
not distribute them.  
- All the benefits went to timber 
entrepreneur 
- The President should be active in 
all of the government’s activities 
to obtain information about 
programs and then inform the 
communities about these 
Good 
Ex-Comisariado #1: 
- Good work (effort) 
- Good representation  
- Good management of resources, 
though they need more 
- Not enough information because the 
community doesn’t go to the 
meetings; the community is the one 
who is at fault for not remaining 
close to the Union (lack of 
multiple/shared leadership: FA-
community) 
Ex-Comisariado #2:  
- “A” grade 
- They do gestión, they president 
“moved well” (“se meneaba bien” 
effort)  
- Good rapport with people 
                                                           
130
 Contrast with the case of FA-4 where some people complained that because the president did not live in the city 
that most community leaders are close to, it was hard to communicate with him. 
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(legitimacy)  
- The only thing that’s missing is that 
the Comisariados approach him, it’s 
impossible that he can approach 
them. “If the Comisariado doesn’t 
approach [the president] there will 
not be anything.” The community is 
full of envy, they don’t work and 
don’t let others work, and your 
morale gets low like that  
- In the forestry services the foresters 
need to do their job faster, they are 
“too slow” 
10 NA NA 
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A3.4 Current Leadership Evaluation by External Observers in FA-2 
 
External observer (N = 5) Evaluation 
Forestry director UCODEFO-X 
from region 
NA 
Private Forester of one 
community in region  
NA 
SRNyMA official Good 
- President has a lot of presence with the government 
agencies (networks), all the benefits in the region 
have come from his leadership and that of the timber 
entrepreneur. (gestión) 
- Communities and private properties have joined 
forces 
- New president is “hardworking” but has less 
experience and less presence, is an emerging leader  
CONAFOR official Good 
- 75% 
CONAFOR official in charge of 
ARS associations 
Good 
- Vision of growth and development towards the future  
- Capacity to reach internal agreements: regular 
- Capacity to develop projects: regular 
- Capacity to make external connections: good 
- Need updating and elaboration of internal governance 
documents are needed (e.g. bylaws) 
President of state foresters guild Good 
- Participation in regional politics (CNC regional 
peasant committee), professional (forester) 
(education) 
- Has empathy (legitimacy) with all the members of 
the FA and the main regional and state leaders 
(networks) 
- Capacity to reach internal agreements: very good 
- Capacity to develop projects: regular 
- Capacity to make external connections: regular 
- Weakness: Need to dedicate time to self-employment 
(farmer and businessman) to sustain himself. 
Ex-Secretary SRNyMA Very Good 
- Together with the timber entrepreneur the president 
has channeled some important projects for the 
region’s producers, such as ecotourism, housing, 
electricity, and road paving (gestión, 
multiple/shared leadership: FA-timber 
entrepreneur) 
402 
 
- The productive potential of the forests is lower than 
in the other regions but there is good social 
organization and good coordination, they have 
experience in management of government resources 
(multiple/shared leadership: FA-community), 
good infrastructure and good location 
- Capacity to reach internal agreements: very good; 
the experience of the president and the timber 
entrepreneur have opened spaces of negotiation with 
different government agencies benefitting the 
region’s communities. 
- Capacity to develop projects: very good; in the last 
few years several projects have promoted self-
management (auto-gestión), with communities 
making the required (financial) contributions 
(multiple/shared leadership: FA-community) 
- Capacity to make external connections: very good; 
Has carried out various agreements with federal, state 
and municipal governments as well as with 
individuals.  
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A3.5 Current Leadership Evaluation by Communities in FA-3 
 
Community 
(N=11)  
Evaluation by Community 
Leadership 
Evaluation by Community 
Assembly/others 
1 Good 
- “More or less, good”.  
- They have been “gestores” 
(gestión/management) i.e. have 
obtained many supports for the 
FA and the communities. They are 
the ones who receive the most 
supports in the state. In Proarbol 
50% of supports go to this region. 
NA 
2 Very good 
- The leadership’s role is “to be 
knocking on doors 
(gestión/management) to look for 
resources, elaborate projects.” 
- The ability of the Union to 
remain united is due to the “good 
leaders” they’ve had, mainly the 
President and forester.  
- They’ve been “strict” and have 
known how to manage the 
organization.  
- However, the President responds 
to the vice-president. “The one 
who is the boss is [the forester]. 
[The president] is like the wife of 
the congressman in the soap opera 
–an ornament.” (multiple/shared 
leadership: forester) 
Regular 
- #1 (Ex-Comi): Fifteen years as 
president “but where are the 
advances?” There is no visible 
work. That is where the 
disinterest (gestión/lack of) is 
shown 
- #2 (community member): “good 
leaders” because they have been in 
the organization many years and it 
seems that it is becoming 
stronger. But it has not been the 
governing board (president, etc.), 
those have NOT been good 
leaders, they ‘don’t get involved’. 
All that has been achieved is 
because of the forester (Mr. S). 
The FA depends on the forester 
(multiple/shared leadership: 
forester) 
- #3 (ex-Secretary): He doesn’t 
know who the FA’s leader is. 
Before they put a leader but he 
thinks the only one that is leader 
now is the forester, who is the one 
handling all the supports 
(programs). A good leader should 
channel all the supports for 
everyone, but what has happened 
is that the forester manages all the 
supports and takes away a good 
percentage [20-25%], which 
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should be for the comisariados 
(use for personal economic 
profit)  
- #4 (ex-Treasurer): “Good”. The 
forester was the leader of the 
paving of the region’s main road 
and always sought for a way in 
which “all could contribute”. 
- #5: Honest and straight. Does 
things for the collective good 
rather than personal benefit 
3 NA Poor 
- The FA exists to be united and to 
help in the commercialization 
and to obtain better prices, but 
they don’t help in that  
4 Poor 
- They don’t receive many 
supports 
- “Somewhat lazy/slacker (flojón)” 
- The President has never been there 
in a community meeting, only in 
the FA meetings (no presence) 
- He thinks that now it’s a different 
president [shows lack of 
knowledge, probably due to the 
lack of presence of the president in 
the community and that the 
community has more relationship 
to the forestry service personnel.] 
- But they also haven’t approach the 
FA a lot (multiple/shared 
leadership: FA-community).  
Good  
- #1: Very attentive and servicial 
- #3: “Has worked well” 
- Several: But, no presence – has 
not gone in the last year, when 
they ask for someone to go they 
send the foresters  
 
 
5 Good 
- “Good”, because many 
communities participate 
(multiple/shared leadership: FA-
community), e.g. the road 
committee did much for the paving 
of the San Miguel de Cruces road, 
and because Nati and Ing. Soto are 
in that committee, this was 
achieved. 
- Honest person and strives for 
transparency to “look good” 
(quedar bien) 
NA 
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- Grade: “Regular” [here we see 
regular means good]. He could 
put more effort into it. 
Sometimes a person has two 
projects and he has to leave one of 
them unattended to attend the 
other [because he is Regidor]. But 
the intentions are there. 
6 NA Very good 
- Focus group: Forester is a very 
good gestor 
(gestión/management) with the 
government agencies, and they 
have the president 
(multiple/shared leadership: 
president-forester) 
- Ex-Secretary of FA: “[the 
governing board]…they are good 
because they know before 
everyone else the needs of the 
association and since they are in 
the governing board, they know 
the supports (programs) available.” 
(information and knowledge of 
needs and programs).  
- Good communication with the 
comisariados to do things, for 
reforestations, etc., and if they 
cannot do the reforestation in one 
area then they do it in another 
(negotiation/accommodation) 
7 Regular 
- “Good members (elementos)” 
like the president who at mid-day 
or mid-night are there to give a 
hand131 (effort/attention). 
Leadership is “strong” 
- (separate conversation, in private): 
President owes him 30,000 MXN 
pesos from two timber orders that 
he took without telling. President 
is “very nice but very shameless”  
- President is “a little of a liar”  
-  
Good 
Several (assembly): president “is 
almost an ejidatario” there, he is a 
“very good person”. 
 
                                                           
131
 This was said in front of the FA president. 
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8 NA Very poor 
- #1:  6/10 rating 
- #2-#4: President has not visited 
them (no presence). One 
respondent just learned then who 
the president is. 
- #4: Only came for his political 
campaign for regidor (use for 
personal political benefit). 
- #5: 0/10 rating 
- #6: 2/10 rating 
- #7: President should pay more 
attention in asking for prices (of 
basic goods) to be lowered. And he 
has used the FA (use for 
personal political benefit) 
because first he was síndico and 
now regidor and that was because 
of the support of the members, so 
he should have more presence 
(lack of reciprocity/no presence).  
- #7: The elected leadership only 
provides their signature, the 
forester decides (multiple/shared 
leadership: forester) 
- #8: President, Secretary, treasurer, 
they all do what the forester says,  
They should “grab the bull by the 
horns” and separate the two 
- #9: He had never seen the 
president until he came to bring 
dispensas for his political 
campaign (use for personal 
political benefit). 
9 Good 
- Has gotten involved more or less 
in what is his function, which is 
management (gestión), maybe 
with some deficiencies. He is more 
focused on the social (political) 
part - meetings, going to 
government agencies 
- Could improve in speaking only 
on behalf of the organization, not 
mixed with others, not “managed” 
by others, that “the ideas would be 
NA 
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his own” (external interference) 
[I think he refers to the PRI here]. 
10 Very good 
- This is the FA that has the best 
way to manage things, the best 
relations to everything, the most 
movement (gestión, effort) in 
terms of communication and 
work. 
 
NA 
11* Very poor 
- President did nothing for them, 
never talked to them to say he had 
gotten some benefit for them (lack 
of gestión). He doesn’t remember 
anything that he did as President. 
Yesterday he heard the President 
say that he knew about some 
programs because he was the 
Union president. Sometimes the 
forester supported them 
(multiple/shared leadership: 
forester). 
Very poor 
#1 (Ex-Comi): Natividad did nothing 
for them (lack of gestión), did not 
visit the community (no presence), 
but he didn’t go to Natividad either 
(multiple leadership: FA-
community). 
 
#2 (Ex-Comi): Natividad was in 
charge of the electrification issue 
(gestión/lack of) but he (respondent) 
didn’t see much movement. There 
were no other gestiones. Only now in 
his political campaign (for regidor) 
did he bring food bags (use for 
personal political benefit). 
* No longer a member of FA-3 
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A3.6. Current Leadership Evaluation by External Observers in FA-3 
 
External observer (N=9) Evaluation 
Forester for a community 
in the region 
Poor 
- Lack of presence 
- The president and forester have done some tricks (trampas) 
and that is why they don’t go to the communities.  
- The president has problems in several communities because he 
buys timber and then doesn’t pay up, and then he disappears, 
doesn’t go to those communities anymore (financial 
mismanagement, use for personal economic benefit). 
Forester in the region Good 
- Close to the communities (presence), which allows him to 
have knowledge of their problems and needs   
- Participation in decision-making bodies, which allows him 
to present proposals in favor of his region 
- Capacity to reach internal agreements: very good; the 
agreements taken in the assembly are clear and information 
about their implementation is provided 
Capacity to develop projects: very good; “there is a multi-
disciplinary technical team that supports the formulation, 
evaluation and execution of projects that benefit the 
organization” (gestión) 
- Capacity to make external connections: very good; he is part 
of the state councils and committees related to the forest 
sector, and has a voice and vote in them 
- Forester “gets along with everyone” and is very well 
connected to CONAFOR. Everyone respects him as a good 
forester 
- Forester controls the communities under threat (“mafiados”) 
(authoritarian/domineering).  
- But he is a politician, he’s in the CNC and PRI and has sought 
political positions 
- The same as the FA president, who is there in a “political 
position” 
Forester in the region Very good 
- Always looking out for people and the interests of the 
organization (effort) 
- Capacity to reach internal agreements: very good 
- Capacity to develop projects: very good; they always 
channel many resources (gestión) 
- Capacity to make external connections: very good; have 
very good relationship to government agencies and know 
about the programs 
- But has too much time in front of the organization; it’s healthy 
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to change the president (perpetuation)  
SRNyMA official Good 
- The forester has been able to lead the region very well 
(multiple/shared leadership: forester) 
- Forester has a good reputation in terms of his projects.   
- Very strict in the application of his projects  
- Stability/continuity of leaders (forester and president) 
- Strong participation from members (multiple/shared 
leadership: FA-community)  
SRNyMA official Good 
- The forester is from the region, the president of the FA has 
been there a long time (experience).  
- Some argue that they have not done a good job but they have 
sustained good organization and good forest management. 
(gestión, good outcomes) 
- They have very good things. The social and technical 
(forestry) aspects are very integrated, they are both leaders. 
(multiple/shared leadership: forester)  
CONAFOR official Very good 
- 95% 
CONAFOR official in 
charge of ARS 
associations 
Good 
- Solidarity in participation of the members (multiple/shared 
leadership: FA-community) through the direction of their 
president, and a vision of growth and development at the 
regional level.  
- Capacity to reach internal agreements: high 
- Capacity to develop projects: regular 
- Capacity to make external connections: high 
- Ned to update internal governance arrangements to give more 
transparency and management (weak) of the process of 
internal organization.  
- Lack of rotation of leadership  
President of state 
foresters guild 
Regular 
- Participation in regional politics (regidor, síndico municipal) 
- Hard-working  
- Respected/well-perceived by members (legitimacy) 
- Knowledge of the region and its members and problems 
- Capacity to reach internal agreements: good 
- Capacity to develop projects: regular 
- Capacity to make external connections: regular  
- Little personal initiative 
- Too much dependency on the foresters and little authority 
or power in decision-making (multiple/shared leadership: 
forester)  
- Inability to unite the whole region  
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-  
Ex-Secretary SRNyMA Good 
- Well-perceived (legitimacy) by members and has good 
relation to forester who is now state-level official, which has 
facilitated many benefits to the region  
- Good productive potential and a personalized management 
(gestión) in government agencies by the state’s Secretary of 
Natural Resources 
- Capacity to reach internal agreements: good; they have the 
support of the state’s Secretary of Natural Resources, who is 
also the cousin of the current municipal president. 
Communities recognize the advantage this provides to channel 
funds 
- Capacity to develop projects: regular; the complacency of 
some community leaderships has led to a tendency to not want 
to contribute financially for projects 
- Capacity to make external connections: good; They have 
external advice from government officials and timber 
entrepreneurs 
- Problems: decisions not made by actual elected leaders but by 
others (forester and timber entrepreneur lack of shared 
leadership)  
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A3.7 Current Leadership Evaluation by Communities in FA-4 
 
Community 
(N=9) 
Evaluation by Community 
Leadership (Comisariado) 
Evaluation by Community 
Assembly/Other members 
1 Very good 
- President now (contrast to 
previous) is “very active”, puts a 
lot of effort into it  
- Obtains a lot of resources 
(gestión/management). They will 
surely obtain good benefits from 
him. 
- Respect to him (respected) 
- BUT there is a lack of resources  
Good 
- #1: “Regular”,  
- #2: “Good” 
- Various: Consensus -  He has 
always been “at our service” 
- #3: “But only that”, says another 
- #4: The problem is not the FA but 
the lack of compliance from the 
community. The President offers 
his help and supports but if it 
involves costs (investments) to the 
community, they don’t want it– for 
instance the president offered the 
road-fixing equipment but they 
didn’t want to invest the $200 
pesos per community member that 
was required to operate it. 
(multiple/shared leadership: FA-
community). 
2 Good 
- Have done a good job, that is why 
it hasn’t dissolved like the 
previous ejido union did 
(maintain unity) 
- President is very well prepared, 
has a lot of experience, has been 
president of his community’s 
comisariado several times  
Regular 
- #1: President has not come here to 
give information (no presence). 
- #2: President has much 
knowledge about the forest and 
peasant issues, but he is alone, the 
people around him don’t know. 
(multiple/shared leadership 
within governing board). 
Leadership change was political, 
as stepping stone to municipal 
presidency (use for personal 
political benefit)  
3 NA Good 
- The president is someone who 
likes that things go the best they 
can and who “puts effort into it”, 
it’s a bit better than before.  
- But there is a longstanding 
problem with payment of 
membership dues and because of 
that the leadership cannot do much 
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because there is not enough money 
(multiple/shared leadership: FA-
community, lack of resources) 
4 NA Regular 
- He puts effort into it, is “very 
active”  
- But he doesn’t have much of a 
way of  operating properly because 
he doesn’t live in the city where all 
the communities are in 
- Lacks contact/communication 
(presence) with comisariados. He 
should be in the city at least every 
1-2 weeks with the community 
leaders. “Needs to make people 
see, inform about the supports”. 
- The first thing the president 
wanted to do was to “clear up 
finances”, but he should forget that 
past gossip and get to work 
- President does not get along with 
the forester, who was one of the 
founders of the FA, and now the 
forester is resentful 
(multiple/shared leadership: 
forester) 
5 Poor 
- They’re all the same, maybe they 
go in and say  they will put effort, 
but there are no resources (lack of 
resources)–the current has not 
gotten involved in the road issue 
(lack of gestión), maybe because 
he is from another city and is the 
large city not so much (unequal 
benefit).  
- Lack of resources, maybe lack of 
time because they have to work on 
other activities to earn money 
Good 
- “Good” 
- The leadership has tried to move 
the FA forward, they have 
maintained themselves 
- He has “abilities, capacities” 
- BUT they have struggled with  
membership dues (lack of 
resources, multiple/shared 
leadership)  
- Needs more presence (no 
presence) in the communities to 
give more information about the 
FA benefits. 
 
6 Good  
- Hasn’t been there long but “more 
or less” (good) so far 
- He explains things very well 
because they find out about many 
NA 
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projects on time, before they used 
to find out too late (information, 
transparency)  
- He is very involved in many 
issues (connections), e.g. the 
livestock/cattlement association 
- Personal characteristics: Very 
good character, patient, explains 
things without getting altered, 
that’s very important in a leader. 
And then he doesn’t tell lies 
(honest/truthful).  
- He is a “very good person” 
- Even before this he was visiting 
communities to help them 
improve, he would inform them 
about projects. 
- “Good” – have gotten projects 
(gestión) 
7 Good 
- They’re more organized, “more 
active” (“más movidos”).  
- Good people 
- Have been working well, they are 
transparent  
Good 
- Good person and puts effort into 
it, the previous president also put 
effort, but this one more because 
“he is more studied” 
(education/knowledge)  
- He succeeds (“sale adelante”) 
8 Good 
- Have been active (se han movido 
bien), instead of desisting they 
“put effort into it” (“le echan 
ganas”).  
- Has known the president for a long 
time and he is very hard-working 
and responsible, a “good rooster”. 
Also the previous ones. 
- Everything that is agreed upon in 
the meetings he complies with 
(fulfills agreements) and does it 
right. 
NA 
9 NA Good 
- Good leader, he is “active” 
10 NA 
- Neither the current nor the past 
presidents have been to the 
community. 
NA 
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11 NA 
- Knows the president from many 
years of seeing him and then he 
got closer when he was 
campaigning (for municipal 
president candidacy). He wouldn’t 
know if he is bad or good leader 
because he hasn’t asked him for 
anything. He didn’t know who the 
president was.  
NA 
12 NA NA 
13 NA NA 
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A3.8. Current Leadership Evaluation by External Observers in FA-4 
 
External observer (N=6) Evaluation 
Regional forester (ex-
UCODEFO director) 
Good 
- Has much capacity for gestión and he likes politics 
- He dedicates sufficient time to the position 
- Capacity to reach internal agreements: good 
- Capacity to develop projects: regular 
- Capacity to make external connections: very good 
- But sometimes he is too domineering/overbearing 
(impositivo), and while he has capacity to make connections 
with agencies, he always wants to impose his style and 
sometimes his relationships do not bear fruit,  
- He has a very defined political tendency towards a party and 
he mixes politics an work a lot (use for personal political 
benefit) this is not healthy for a producers  organization 
where there are multiple political currents. 
- They make their decisions without consulting. He has told 
the current governing board that the road repair equipment 
should be left with him and it should be him who lends it to 
communities, but they don’t listen. “If there are many 
making a decision, no one makes it”  
CONAFOR oficial Good 
- 75% 
CONAFOR official in 
charge of ARS 
associations 
Good 
- Good leadership from the president and a medium and long-
term vision of growth for the organization  
- Capacity to reach internal agreements: very good 
- Capacity to develop projects: good 
- Capacity to make external connections: good 
- There is apathy and lack of full commitment from the 
members in financial contributions and decision-making 
(multiple/shared leadership: FA-community) 
SRNyMA official Very good 
- A lot of effort 
- He is one of the leaders who has had the most presence in 
the region for a long time.  
- In the area of influence of the president they are working a 
lot with a lot of enthusiasm  
- The problem there is the division in several regions (2-3) 
which makes coordination difficult, and the fact that it is one 
of the most disorganized regions, the formation of work 
groups started there (multiple/shared leadership: FA-
community) 
President of state foresters Regular 
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guild - Insistent (persistence), constant gestión and program 
applications 
- Knows the region  
- Knows the agencies and programs (knowledge) 
- Capacity to reach internal agreement: Regular 
- Capacity to develop projects: Regular 
- Capacity to develop external connection: Regular 
- Problems: protagonist leader, privilege personal interests 
over the organization’s use of the position for personal and 
family benefit (use for personal political benefit) 
Ex-Secretary of SRNyMA  Regular 
- “[The President] does not have the support and sympathy of 
all the silvicultores in that region, has an interest in escalating 
political positions for himself and also insists on promoting 
his sons into the different local political and administrative 
structures.” (use for personal political benefit) 
- Capacity to reach internal agreements: Regular. Lack of 
trust in the current president; doubts that his activities will 
benefit the organization 
- Capacity to develop projects: Regular. Poor organization of 
the members, poor willingness and ability to contribute 
financially to participate in projects. (lack of resources, 
multiple/shared leadership: FA-community) 
- Capacity to make external connections/networks: regular. His 
leadership is not solid. Also, due to the fact that the region is 
one of the farthest away from the state capital, he does not 
have a strong influence on the state government.  
- This is one of the regions that is most affected by illegal 
logging and organized crime (drug cartels). 
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APPENDIX 4. Evaluations of Strengths and Weaknesses in the four FAs 
 
A4.1. Main strengths and weaknesses identified by community in FA-1 
Community 
(N=15) 
Strengths Weaknesses 
1 - Resource channeling 
- Good relations with 
government 
- Bad leadership and politicking 
2 -  - Insufficient financial resources 
- Poor attendance to meetings 
- Lack of organization; insufficient 
“strictness” regarding attendance and 
membership payments 
- Poor leadership (present and past); 
insufficient leadership projection 
- Prejudice against small and poor 
communities (unequal benefit distribution) 
- Financial mismanagement 
- Discontent with the change from union  
(UNECOF) to association (ARS) (internal 
divisions) 
3 -  - Poor leadership (current) 
- Poor attendance to meetings 
- Political meddling 
- Lack of unity 
4 -  - Internal divisions/ Lack of unity; some 
communities not supportive 
- Lack of market (price) regulation; 
communities compete between them 
- Financial mismanagement in previous 
administration 
5 -  - Periods for each executive committee are 
too short 
- Lack of continuity from one Comisariado 
to the next; some projects are not 
completed 
- Poor attendance to meetings 
- Lack of information and knowledge at the 
community level  
6 -  - Insufficient financial resources, debts 
- Membership fee is too small 
- Lack of unity; those who lose try to 
boycott the association 
- Lack of presence of the ARS president in 
the community 
418 
 
- Community members don’t trust their 
representatives (“no one is a prophet in his 
own land”) 
- Community members are distant from the 
ARS, they don’t take it into account (lack 
of interest/participation)  
7 - “Lot of strength in 
government agencies” 
(good relations with 
government) 
- Timber market (price too low) 
- Insufficient financial resources; lack of 
members’ contributions and diminished 
government resources  
- Economic crisis which affected 
membership contributions 
8 - Good financial 
management, transparent 
- Timber market (price too low) 
- Prejudice against small and poor 
communities (unequal benefit distribution) 
9 -  - Lack of unity/members support; 
- Non-payment of membership dues 
- Insufficient financial resources 
10 -  - Insufficient financial resources 
- Prejudice against small and poor 
communities (unequal benefit distribution) 
- Financial mismanagement in previous 
administration (Mr. B) 
11 - Good relations with 
government, although 
before they would take it 
into account more (less 
political power now) 
- Insufficient financial resources; some 
members do not want to contribute 
(membership dues) 
- Lack of unity/Internal divisions; losers 
distance themselves 
- Lack of information/knowledge at the 
community level 
12 -  - Lack of organization; inconsistency of 
members’ contributions, lack of a work 
plan  
- Lack of consistent contributions of 
membership dues  
- Lack of price regulation, envy and 
competition between communities  
- Political meddling 
- Lack of experience  
- Lack of information-sharing between 
communities 
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13 -  - Lack of unity; those who lost do not 
support the association 
- Insufficient financial resources; large debts 
from Social Security and Treasury  and 
diminished support from CONAFOR 
(harder to obtain them) 
14 -  - Weak leadership 
- Politicking -  lack of member contributions 
and internal divisions/lack of unity 
15 -  - Politicking: used as political springboard 
- Prejudice against small and poor 
communities (unequal benefit distribution) 
 
 
Other 
actors 
Strengths Weaknesses 
Current FA 
leadership 
-  - Lack of unity; personal and political 
interests, rather than working for the 
common good 
- Insufficient consolidation 
- Insufficient financial resources 
- Insufficient information/ knowledge about 
each community’s needs- they know 
regional needs but not the individual 
community ones 
- Lack of joint commercialization 
- Poor participation/attendance levels in 
meetings 
- Members ‘do not let themselves be helped’  
- Previous financial mismanagement, which 
leads to lack of trust and members’ 
unwillingness to invest 
- Insufficient transfer of information about 
the ARS by the communities’ comisariados 
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President 
FA-1 
-  - Lack of unity/internal divisions  
- Unwillingness from members to contribute 
for regional projects (reparto culture)  
- Lack of price regulation  
- Timber market  
Ex-
President 
FA-1 
-  - Insufficient resources 
- Poor/inconsistent leadership (past) 
- Lack of member 
commitment/interest/participation 
- Lack of market (price) regulation 
Small 
private 
landowner 
-  - Insufficient consolidation 
- Lack of self-financing and employment 
mechanisms 
- Poor/inconsistent leadership (past) 
Region’s 
foresters 
  
1 -  - Insufficient financial resources 
- Insufficient human resources, particularly 
technical advisory 
- Political meddling 
2 - Good relations of leaders 
with government agencies  
- Insufficient consolidation 
- Insufficient technical advisory - need full-
time multidisciplinary technical team 
- Insufficient relations with some actors such 
as timber corporations outside Durango and 
FIRA (govt.’s Rural Financing agency) 
3 -  - Poor leadership (present and past) 
4 -  - Insufficient consolidation 
- Insufficient financial resources  
- Previous mismanagement of funds, which 
leads to lack of trust and members’ 
unwillingness to invest 
- Discontent with the change from union  
(UNECOF) to association (ARS) 
- Political meddling 
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A4.2. Main strengths and weaknesses identified by community in FA-2 
Community 
(N=12) 
Strengths  Weaknesses 
1 - The leadership is the best part 
- Equipment (D8 bulldozer) for 
road repair 
- Infrstructure – office space with 
everything they need (computers, 
photocopying machine) 
- Forestry services 
- Very efficient, they do things 
quickly and kindly (even free 
photocopies) 
- There were some complaints by 
one community leader about lack 
of benefits to his community 
[unequal benefit distribution] 
- Lack of supports for agriculture 
and livestock  
 
Ex. Pres. Com.  
- UMA Project: Lack of interest or 
perhaps lack of personnel  
2* - Union of 12 communities, which 
gives it strength  (unity) 
- All are from the same 
municipality, and thus resource 
channeling is done with only one 
municipal government, as 
opposed to other FAs which have 
to deal with multiple local 
governments  
- They have several large, 
important communities in their 
membership, which represent a lot 
of people, and it means that 
elected government officials 
should take them into account 
- Politics, because the FA is very 
identified with one political party 
[PRI] and in the communities 
there are always people from both 
parties [PRI and PAN], and so in 
election periods this division 
surfaces, after that it doesn’t. [this 
coincides with what the leaders of 
FA-1 told me once] 
- Not enough supports on one of the 
sub-regions because the timber 
entrepreneur is more focused on 
the sub-region where he is 
3 - Good relations with government 
- Forestry services 
- Communication, they have a radio 
and it is easy to contact the FA 
reps. 
- Union = strength  
- Meetings: need to do them more 
often, 2-3 times a year, there was 
an agreement to do them twice a 
year but it has not been followed  
- On previous occasions they 
elected people who were not very 
good. They have to pay more 
attention. When there is a change 
in governing board, they should 
elect someone who responds, not 
anyone. (leadership transitions) 
- Not divide ourselves, be more 
united (internal divisions) 
- Lack of sufficient resources: More 
resources are needed, perhaps get 
more communities to join the 
Union  
422 
 
 
Ex-Pres. Coms. 
- Lack of processing capacity: The 
problems in communities and FAs 
is that they don’t have industries 
(timber processing, e.g. sawmills). 
The problems of poverty come 
from there, that’s why peasants are 
poor. 
- Much apathy (lack of 
participation) 
- The leader did not do enough to 
unite, to reach out to those who 
were more distant (leadership) 
- Political trampoline/politicking  
4 - “Unity”, things are done together, 
they get along well 
- Good communication allows them 
to resolve any issues that may 
come up 
- Initiative to do things 
Pres. Com.  
- Not enough government supports 
 
General Assembly 
- Very slow (forestry services – 
talking about the forest study for 
the new forest management plan), 
they should do more temporary 
hires to peed up work 
- Advice is only given to the 
community governing board, 
many are not informed about the 
FA (lack of information) 
- They let the FSC certification 
expire because they didn’t want to 
comply with the deadlines 
5 - Organizes all the communities 
(unity), and “once organized it’s a 
big advantage, because that way 
things get done. If they were not 
in the FA they wouldn’t, each 
community would be on its own,  
but with the FA they do it 
together and the president leads.”  
-  
Pres. Com. 
- None. “everything is well”, except 
when they are in the process of 
electing a new leadership, many 
times its hard because of lack of 
capacity and knowledge, 
sometimes they want to elect 
someone who doesn’t have 
knowledge and training.  
 
Ex-Pres. Com. 
- Lack of sufficient resources. They 
still haven’t finished the office 
building because of this 
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Community member 
- Capture of eco-tourism project by 
timber entrepreneur 
6 - Resource channeling 
- Forestry services 
- Forestry services (lack of 
initiative, motivation), need more 
personnel 
- Lack of sufficient resources, need 
more communities to join 
- Decreasing timber volumes, from 
70,000 m3 to 30,000, the thing 
that is sustaining the FA is 
CONAFOR programs like soil 
restoration  
- Lack of industrial timber 
processing equipment 
- Cacique politics by regional 
timber entrepreneur  
7  - Leadership, which is profesional 
- The majority of applications have 
been approved, this has marched 
very well (resource channeling) 
- Union = strength 
Pres. Com. 
- “The contra (opposition group for 
internal elections) that we have 
right now” 2-3 communities...  
(internal division) 
- There are also problems in the 
communities. For instance in his 
community the opposition group 
tried to prevent him from being 
elected as community 
representative in the Union but he 
won although they also elected 
two from the opposition group 
 
Ex-Pres. Com.: 
- Resource channeling: Sometimes 
the communities get angry 
because they don’t receive the 
services/supports they expected. 
They feel a bit behind in their 
community, like the Union’s ugly 
duck, all the supports go to a few 
other communities [to the 
community of the president; 
perception about unequal benefit 
distribution] 
- Meetings: they are too far apart 
from each other; they should be 
424 
 
every month or at least every 2-3 
months. There had not been a 
meeting for the last 2 years 
- Human capital: Not enough 
personnel and resources. The work 
gets delayed as a result, too slow 
on the new study for the new 
management plan.  
- The ideals of some community 
leaders who sometimes do not 
agree with a decision from the 
FA’s assembly (divisions) 
8 - Unity, strong, it gets attention 
[from government officials] 
- Good financial administration, 
they have had to contribute very 
little because the FA has other 
sources to sustain itself  
- Very active and there is a lot of 
trust 
- Lack of information and 
communication 
- Internal divisions, some 
communities pull to one side and 
others to another, because there is 
no information [from the union’s 
leadership] 
- They don’t have an office, they 
are in the process of building it 
9 - Forestry services 
- Organized and with good 
leadership. “Supports for the 
social [peasant/rural] sector only 
come to those organized”. 
- Lack of communication and 
information 
- Lack of capacity-building  
- Lack of leadership 
- Lack of political 
autonomy/politicking: too tied to 
one party (PRI) 
10* Pres. Com.  
- None, they only provide forestry 
services but it’s the same as any 
private forestry services [this 
community does not receive the 
services] 
 
Ex-Pres. Com. 
- Union = strength  
- Some participate and others do not 
(lack of participation). The 
majority do not go to the 
community meetings, that’s why 
they don’t know what is 
happening in the association  
- Needs more resources 
- Forestry services 
- All the benefits go to region’s 
main timber entrepreneur 
11* - Resource channeling - Lack of participation from 
communities: Communities need 
to support the FA more, 
sometimes we fail in this, the FA 
organizes a meeting and we don’t 
go (social capital/participation).  
12 NA - Used to operate well but now not 
so much, lacks effort 
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- Not enough meetings, used to 
have them 3 times a year and now 
only once a year  
- They don’t visit communities 
(lack of presence) 
- Resource channeling: they didn’t 
get the program they applied to 
(environmental services) and got 
disheartened and then stopped 
participating, and now they 
changed foresters because it’s less 
expensive 
* Do not receive the FA forestry services 
 
 
Other 
actors 
Strengths  Weaknesses 
FA 
president 
2002-2010 
- Registered with Treasury and 
Social Security 
- Radio communication  
- Land property with office space 
(under construction) 
- Computer equipment 
- Resources channeled 
 
 
- Political groups that emerge as 
competition 
- Competition from other FAs, before 
they were among a few,  now there 
are many 
FA-2 
forester 
- Communities, their members, 
and their leaders, when there is 
need they support you 
- All communities are pretty well 
united, there is no division of 
sub-groups within the union 
[contrast with observation during 
the election] 
- Good relations with government 
- Friendly ambience in the 
workplace 
 
- Too few people (lack of human 
capital) to service everyone, because 
of the issue of communities delaying 
the payment of their memnership 
dues and service fees –up to 6 years 
in one case. They need 2-3 additional 
staff 
- They have equipped themselves with 
some computers, programs, though 
they will need more training in these  
- They have always been renting an 
office, now they have the base of 
their own office building, but they 
will need more resources (lack of 
financial capital/resources) to have 
more equipment and expand their 
services, and they will need an annual 
expense plan 
  
426 
 
A4.3 Main strengths and weaknesses identified, by community in FA-3 
 
Community 
(N=11)  
Strengths  Weaknesses 
1 - Organization, which takes you 
by your hand to channel 
resources 
- Forestry services, forest stock 
has increased 
- Well capitalized (physical and 
financial capital) – pick-up 
trucks, tree nursery, 
watchtowers, office, and they 
combat the fires very quickly 
- Unity: People reach agreements 
easily; “For any supports 
(programs) the Union is the one 
that makes us worthy (la que 
nos hace valer)” 
- Everything has worked more or less 
well. Sometimes they lack personnel, 
which is an economic issue (lack 
resources).  
- They don’t have their own office 
(they rent) 
2 - Good connections to 
government  
- Good leadership 
- Well organized, every day they 
improve, very open in the 
administration (unity) 
 
- Representation is weak because it [the 
governing board]  is not assigned 
resources and so the forester ends up 
in charge of the representation 
because he controls the resources 
- Corruption – forester receives money 
to change the extraction areas for 
some members, for instance he 
benefits his brother by designating as 
extraction area the location where his 
brother has contracts to extract the 
timber (his brother owns a crane).  
- Marked timber volume is always 
higher than the extracted volume 
- Forester buys people who oppose him 
with money; he also uses markup 
process to obtain political support – 
more timber marked in exchange for 
support  
- Forester has not allowed people from 
the community to work in the forestry 
services – he has fired 3-4 of them 
- Costs of forestry services -Forestry 
services are too expensive…But 
forester refuses to discuss in the 
community assembly the issue of the 
forestry service fee  
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- The timber corporation is not charged 
the same as all the other members, 
and the corporation controls him 
- Not enough opportunities to be more 
autonomous, especially in managing 
their timber extraction documents. 
Right now the forestry services unit 
manages everything and communities 
do not know how to do it because 
they have not been taught, and when 
PROFEPA comes communities 
cannot provide their documents 
because the forestry services have it.  
- Forest management: clearcutting 
- They only do what the forester says; 
he is authoritarian 
 
Forester’s brother 
- Third parties who have tried to 
promote disorganization, they try to 
convince members to leave the FA, 
because they don’t want the FA to do 
well (politicking). 
- Economic: Lack of sufficient 
resources, many and very strong, but 
they have been able to overcome 
them.  
3 - Forest management 
- Supports/Resources 
- Forest fire controls – towers  
- Radiocommunication 
- Costs of forestry services: among the 
most expensive in the state 
- Forest management: clearcutting 
- Low survival rate of reforestation 
projects 
- Roads not repaired despite the fact 
they pay a road repair quota 
- Put money for electricity but they 
never got it back and electricity never 
came (financial mismanagement) 
- Leadership 
- No help in commercialization and 
improving prices 
- No help with non-forestry projects 
4 - They haven’t seen much 
because they don’t approach the 
FA much 
- Forestry services 
- Resources channeled 
- None 
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5 - Forestry services, always 
willing to help 
- Good relations with 
government, very well 
recognized (environmental 
compensation projects, good 
reputation) 
 
- Lack of attention to agriculture and 
livestock, which is the community’s 
main focus 
- Markup of trees 
6 Governing board 
- Leadership – forester and 
president (shared), and both are 
on their side 
- Organizational strength, they 
even put in the paperwork for 
you, you only have to sign 
 
Ex-Leader 
- The FA is strong economically, 
but also politically. That’s why 
they’ve been able to reach the 
positions we have. But if we 
were not strong in the 
organization and administration, 
we would not have political 
strength. The two go hand in 
hand. “That’s why we are 
screwing the other FAs” We get 
the most [government] 
resources in the entire state.  
This is something we know but 
we don’t say openly. He was 
first councilmember (regidor) in 
[municipality] seven years ago. 
[FA President] is 5th 
councilmember now and he was 
municipal comptroller.  The 
government asks the FA who to 
appoint in different positions 
(good relations with 
government). 
- Good communication/ 
coordination with the 
community leaders, 
reforestations are well planned, 
and if it cannot be done in one 
place it is done in another.  
- None 
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7 - Leadership 
- Supports/Resources 
- Forestry services “among the 
best” 
- “Has united a lot of people” 
(unity) 
- Costs of forestry services 
- Forester applies for projects that the 
community doesn’t need so he can 
charge 20% (financial 
mismanagement) 
- Financial mismanagement by leader 
(personal debt) 
8 - Forestry services 
- Supports/Resources 
- No conflicts, they walk together 
in agreement (unity) 
- Costs of forestry services 
- Political use of FA by president 
- Financial mismanagement: an 
ejidataro claims they stole his derecho 
money 
9 - More united (unity) 
- Fire combat brigades 
- Costs of forestry services 
10 - Forest management: 
reforestation, tree markup, 
forest is growing  
- Good relations with government 
- Good financial and physical 
capital  
- None  
11 - Forestry services - Costs of forestry services 
- Tree mark-up (hollow, damaged) 
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A4.4. Main strengths and weaknesses identified, by community in FA-4 
Community 
(N=13) 
Strengths Weaknesses 
1 - Resources channeled 
- Leadership 
- Lack of presence of FA (despite the 
fact that the current oversight council 
of the FA is a member of the 
community) 
- Lack of compliance from the 
community. The president offers his 
help and programs but the community 
does not want to contribute – example 
of road repairs and capacity-building 
courses  
- Lack of organization, not all the 
communities work/contribute equally 
2 - Resources channeled - Politicking: last election was political, 
and that’s where the problems start; if 
the FA-4 president had won the 
municipal presidency bid he 
would’ve left the FA without a 
leadership 
- Lack of shared leadership 
- Organizational problems – lack of 
technical advisory  
- Lack of information about the FA 
- Lack of presence/visits to community 
- Loss of members when another 
forester formed a parallel FA 
- All the benefits have gone to one sub-
region (unequal distribution of 
benefits) 
3 - Infrastructure (fire towers, road 
fixing equipment)  
- Resources channeled 
Pres. Com.  
- The problem is collecting 
membership dues (lack of financial 
contributions from members); 
consequently they are struggling 
because they have insufficient 
financial capital. 
- “They don’t see the benefits, it’s that 
they don’t want to see them.” 
[Politics of evaluation of FA benefits 
and success.] 
 
Ex-Pres. Com.  
- The main problem is the membership 
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dues (financial contributions), they 
never reach 50%, some contribute 
and others do not. With their 
governing board it was the same “it 
has always been the same problem”.  
- From that position the leadership 
cannot do much because it has no 
resources (lack of financial capital) 
- The little that has been achieved is 
because of government supports 
- There is a lot of indifference in the 
community towards the FA because 
there is a lack of information and they 
don’t see benefits (lack of supports) 
- Lack of shared leadership in previous 
governing board 
 
Assembly: 
- Not discussed directly but lack of 
information was evident 
4 - Well constituted with its bylaws 
and documentation (internal 
instiutions) 
- Regional Forest Study – 
CONAFOR will support what is 
stipulated there 
- Road repair infrastructure 
- Lack of diffusion/information 
- Lack of presence/visits to 
communities  
- Previous comisariado in the 
community did not explain the FA 
activities properly to the assembly 
- “They only know the FA because 
they charge a fee”  
- Lack of supports for economic 
projects at the community-level 
5 - Resources channeled 
- Good relations with government 
- Lack of financial resources; this 
affects the leadership and projects 
- Weak organization because there is a 
lot of need, everyone owes the FA 
because there is no money – they 
prefer to buy necessities rather than 
pay the FA (lack of financial 
contributions tied to economic woes) 
 
Ex-FA leader 
- One of the main issues during his 
time was delays in payment of 
membership quotas. Maybe it wasn’t 
because the community didn’t want to 
pay but because the governing board 
would use the money for something 
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else [mismanagement by 
comisariados]  
6 - Regional Forest Study, first in 
the country, very important for 
the communities and for the sale 
of timber 
- Resources channeled 
- Strong internal organization 
- Unity 
- Integrated into the Cattle 
ranchers Union (CNC) 
- Lack of information/diffusion – now 
less because FA president has other 
jobs and lives farther away (in state 
capital) 
- Lack of information from the 
comisariado to the assembly 
- Not enough meetings of the 
association 
- Lack of financial contributions or 
delays by some members 
- Last year the FA delayed the payment 
of the fire combat in their community 
but at the same time it paid the 
brigades in other communities despite 
the fact that their community was up 
to date with the quota and the others 
were not (preference to other 
communities – I think he referred to 
the community from where the FA 
president is) 
7 Pres. Com. 
- Transparency of financial 
management and activities in 
meetings 
 
General assembly 
- Resources channeled 
Pres. Com.  
- Lack of member compliance with 
their membership quotas/dues (lack 
of financial contributions). They have 
not paid because the company that 
bought their timber was supposed to 
pay directly to the forester but it 
didn’t 
 
General assembly 
- Not many supports 
- Lack of information 
- Lack of presence of the leadership, 
neither president has ever visited (one 
said that the current president had 
visited but only in his political 
campaign) 
8 - Unity = strength 
- Resources channeled 
- Collaboration with fire combat 
- Everything that is agreed upon 
is complied with, the presidents 
take care to do things correctly  
- Lack of supports for economic 
projects – community members don’t 
want to invest, they need the money 
to eat 
9 - Resources channeled - Lack of information about the FA, its 
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- Leadership objectives and support programs 
available 
- Lack of presence/visits of FA leaders 
in the community 
10 NA - Did not discuss directly but the 
interviewee stated lack of information 
about the FA and lack of presence of 
FA leaders 
 NA - Did not discuss directly but the 
interviewees stated lack of 
information about the FA and lack of 
presence of FA leaders 
11 - Fire management, including 
infrastructure 
- Resources channeled 
- Leadership 
- Lack of presence of previous 
leaderships 
- Failure of members to comply with 
paying the quota (Lack of financial 
contributions by members). The 
agreement they took in the FA 
assembly did not work. The problem 
started about 3 years ago. They didn’t 
pay the 2009 quota because the FA 
did not pay the fire combat brigade 
- Lack of office space and lack of 
financial capital to pay rent 
12 NA - Did not discuss directly but the 
interviewees stated lack of 
information about the FA and lack of 
presence of FA leaders 
 
Other actors Strengths Weaknesses 
UCODEFO 
forester and FA-
4 founder 
 - The main problem with the 
comisariados is that they never 
inform their assemblies about the FA 
- Loss of members when another 
forester formed a parallel FA 
Current ARS 
president 
 
- Lack of trust to participate in 
common projects. This comes “from 
below”, from mismanagement in 
communities –traditionally leaders 
have sought positions to capture 
money for themselves– and in peasant 
orgnizations. 
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PRESENTATIONS 
 
García-López, G.A. & Villamayor-Tomás, S. (2012, April). Expanding collective action 
theory in common-pool resources: Insights from social movement studies. 70th Midwest 
Political Science Association (MPSA) Conference, Chicago, IL. 
 
 García-López, G.A. (2012, March). Del co-manejo de los recursos naturales a la 
gobernanza en redes: Experiencias del manejo de bosques en Durango, México. [From 
co-management to networked governance of natural resources: Experiences of forest 
management in Durango, Mexico.] Presented at the colloquium of the Social Research 
Center and the Graduate School of Public Administration, University of Puerto Rico–Rio 
Piedras, San Juan, PR.  
 
García-López, G.A. (2009, December). The hegemonic development discourse in Puerto 
Rico. Counter-hegemonies and ‘greenwashing’ from the sustainability discourse. Paper 
presented at the Arqpoli Roundtable on Nature, City, Power: Practices and Discourses of 
Sustainability, Architecture School, Polytechnic University, San Juan, PR. 
 
García-López, G.A. (2009, April). Bringing power back in: Inserting power into the 
Institutional Analysis and Development (IAD) framework. Paper presented at the 67th 
MPSA Conference, Chicago, IL. 
 
García-López, G.A. (2009, March). Suburban sprawl and crony capitalism in Puerto 
Rico: Alternatives for sustainability. Paper presented at the International Public Affairs 
Association Faculty/Graduate Student Conference, School of Public and Environmental 
Affairs, Indiana University, Bloomington, IN.   
 
Antinori, C., & García-López, G.A. (2008, July). Cross-scale linkages in common-pool 
resource management: The evolution of forest associations in the Mexican forest 
commons.  Paper presented at the 12th Biennial Conference of the International 
Association for the Study of the Commons (IASC), University of Gloucester, 
Cheltenham, England.  
 
García-López, G.A. & Kashwan, P. (2008, April). Forest policy in Mexico and India: 
Decentralization, recentralization and back? Paper presented at the 66th MPSA 
Conference, Chicago, IL. 
 
García-López, G.A. (2007, September). Social-environmental movements and alter-
developments in Puerto Rico. Paper presented at the XXVII International Congress of the 
Latin American Studies Association (LASA), Montreal, Canada. 
 
García-López, G.A. (2007, June). The National Community Forests of Mexico Project: 
Challenges and Lessons. Presented at the Workshop in Property Rights and Collective 
Action in Natural Resources with Application to Mexico, University of California-
Berkeley and Casa de la Universidad de California en México, Mexico City.  
 
 
CONSULTING  
 
2012:  San Juan Bay Estuary Program (SJBEP), San Juan, Puerto Rico 
  
  Description: Revise and update the drafts of all the new actions 
proposed for the SJBEP Management Plan. Write additional new 
actions to address gaps in the proposed ones. Coordinate participatory 
process with stakeholders to discuss the new actions. Track 
implementation of the existing (approved) actions in the Management 
Plan and prepare implementation report for public outreach. 
 
 
2011:  SJBEP, San Juan, Puerto Rico 
 
Description: Wrote five new actions for the Management Plan (on 
climate change impacts on the watershed and adaptation measures; 
alternative transportation; access to SJBE-related information; 
establishment of a volunteer program for water quality monitoring; and 
development of studies about the socioeconomic value of the estuary) 
for the Conservation and Management Plan of the San Juan Bay 
Estuary.  
 
 
VOLUNTEER-BASED COMMUNITY WORK 
 
2011–Present:  Administrator and Coordinator, Environmental Education Projects, 
Proyecto Laguna Corp. – Mariposario Aula Verde (community-based 
NGO) 
  
 Description: Design practice-based environmental education projects 
for low-income students in Aula Verde, an urban forest and butterfly 
sanctuary in San Juan, PR that serves as ecological education center. 
Administer the project and its workforce. Write grants. Represent the 
organization in conferences and other meetings. 
 
2011–Present:  Member, National Environmental Law Association (Asociación 
Nacional de Derecho Ambiental, ANDA) 
 
 Description: Provide free advice and capacity-building to low-income 
communities and individuals on matters related to environmental law 
and policy. Currently working with a coastal community in the 
municipality of Arecibo on issues related to access to the beach, 
delimitation of the Coastal-Maritime Zone, and protection of coastal 
ecosystems. 
 
2009–Present: Alternate Member (appointed) from Civil Society Sector, Special 
 Commission of the San Juan Ecological Corridor 
  
 Description: Participate in the Commission’s monthly meetings. Review 
and comment on government documents and projects, such as the 
 Management Plan for the San Juan Ecological Corridor, the San Juan 
Land Use Plan, and the  San Juan Bay Estuary Program, among 
others. 
 
2003–Present: Member, Executive Committee, Cupey Arboretum (community-based 
NGO), San Juan, Puerto Rico   
  
 Description: Co-coordinate reforestation and cleanup projects, 
including the National Cleanup Day in the Rio Piedras as part of the 
National Coastal Cleanup Day. Offer educational talks to school 
students. Participate in public hearings on proposed construction 
projects within the Arboretum. Comment on and help write legal 
motions in appeal cases. 
 
2008–2009: Emissary for Graduate Student Diversity, Midwest Crossroads Alliance 
for Graduate Education and the Professorate, Indiana University-
Bloomington 
  
 Description: Help with diversity-related recruitment activities on 
campus, such as campus tours, presentations or Q&A sessions. Blog 
about different aspects of graduate student life in Bloomington.  
 
2008–2009: Member (appointed), Dean’s Student Advisory Council, SPEA, Indiana  
 University-Bloomington  
 
2007–2008: Representative at-large (elected), Association of SPEA Ph.D. Students, 
 Indiana University-Bloomington 
 
 
SKILLS 
 
• Language: Spanish (native speaker), English (fluent), French (basic skills) 
• Qualitative methods: Qualitative Comparative Analysis (QCA) software 
• Spatial Analysis: ArcGIS and ArcMap for GIS 
• Statistical Analysis: STATA, Limdep and SPSS 
• Modeling: STELLA and VENSIM for System Dynamics  
 
 
PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS 
 
• International Association for the Study of the Commons (IASC) 
• International Society for Ecological Economics (ISEE) 
• Midwest Political Science Association (MPSA) 
• Puerto Rico National Association of Environmental Law (ANDA) 
